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Aircraft and Anti-Communists: CAT in Action, 1949–52

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

William M. Leary Jr.
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Extract

“The United States Government,” President Harry S. Truman announced on 5 January 1950, “will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China.” Historians generally agree that President Truman meant what he said. American policy after the summer of 1949, writes Tang Tsou, was “to avoid, as far as possible, any further involvement in the Chinese civil war and to allow events in China to unfold themselves.” The Truman administration ruled out the use of force to prevent the fall of Formosa; non-recognition of the Communist government was adopted as “a temporary measure,” due to Republican pressure and the hope of gaining concessions from Peking. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, observes Lyman P. Van Slyke, “brought to a sudden end the policy that the administration had followed for two years, and committed us once again to involvement in the Chinese civil war.” The United States assumed a protective role towards the remnants of the Nationalists on Formosa and became the implacable foe of Peking. This article, a study of a commercial airline's participation in a major diplomatic and legal controversy during the last phase of the Chinese civil war, will suggest that there is reason to doubt, or at least to modify, the traditional interpretation of American policy towards China between late 1949 and June 1950.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 52 , October 1972 , pp. 654 - 669
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1972

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References

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66. With respect to the legal problems, Chennault wrote: “The technicality that they [the aircraft] are unavoidably private American property on a Navy ship can be faced after they are gotten off. An overriding public interest in the preclusive denial of their physical possession to the Chinese Communists (which has been effected) has been succeeded by an overriding public interest in precluding our western loss of face (and of irreplaceable effective material) if we are not able to remove them before Communist sabotage destroys them. In the Far East the hesitant groups who are watching to jump to the strongest people who can protect their own will not distinguish between public and private property in war material.” Chennault to Sparkman, Russell, and Johnson, 1 08 1952, Chennault Papers.Google Scholar

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78. “To have revealed publicly in Formosa,” wrote one CAT official, “that CATI was simply a cloaking nominee for C.A.T., S.A. would certainly have been communicated to Hong Kong, which would have seriously, perhaps fatally, endangered the security and success of the Hong Kong operation.” “Background statement,” 15 07 1953, Willauer Papers.Google Scholar

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