1 Department of Organization, “Guanyu gaibian xiang zhongyang bei'an de ganbu cailiao baosong banfa de tongzhi” (“Circular on changes in the method of reporting to the Party Centre for the record on cadres”), in Ministry of Labour, and Personnel, (ed.), Renshi gongzuo wenjian xuanbian (Selections of Documents on Personnel Work), Vol. 6 (Beijing: Laodong renshi chubanshe, 1986 [1983]), p. 432.Google Scholar Burns estimates the central nomenklatura positions to number around 4,100 as of 1990. See Burns, John P., “Strengthening central CCP control of leadership selection: the 1990 nomenklatura,” The China Quarterly, No. 138 (June 1994), p. 459.Google Scholar

2 See, for example, Manion, Melanie, “The cadre management system, post-Mao: the appointment, promotion, transfer and removal of Party and state leaders,” The China Quarterly, No. 102 (June 1985), pp. 203–233Google Scholar; Burns, John P. (ed.), The Chinese Communist Party's Nomenklatura System (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1989)Google Scholar; and Lee, Hong Yung, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).Google Scholar

3 Many documents in this collection - in fact issued by the Department of Organization - cover various administrative topics, ranging from cadre management, document transmittal procedures and standards for cadre compensation to specifications of the chains of authority among government agencies.

4 If one of the following seven circumstances applies, then the appointment decision requires prior approval from the Department of Organization: the nominee failed to secure majority consent in the opinion polls; the nominee committed “errors” during the Cultural Revolution; the nominee is considered for a promotion one rank above his current rank; the nominee is considered for a position outside the quota; the nominee is considered beyond his term of office; the nominee is considered for a position created for a new unit; or the nominee is a direct relative of the head of the department and is considered for promotion within the same department and system. See Department of Organization, “Guanyu jiaqiang zhonggong guojia jiguan sijuji ganbu guanli gongzuo de tongzhi,” (“Circular on strengthening bureau-level cadre management at central Party and state institutions”), in Ministry of Labour, and Personnel, (ed.), Renshi gongzuo wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 9 (Beijing: Laodong renshi chubanshe, 1987 [1986]), pp. 119–120.Google Scholar

5 Department of Organization and Ministry of Personnel, “Guanyu xiuding ‘Zhonggong Zhongyang guanli de ganbu zhiwu mingcheng biao’ de tongzhi” (“Circular on revising the list of cadres on the nomenklatura of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee”), in Ministry of Personnel (ed.), Renshi gongzuo wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 13 (Beijing: Zhongguo renshi chubanshe, 1991 [1990]), pp. 35–53.

6 The dossier management system serves similar purposes but it is not included here because the system has been treated extensively elsewhere. See Manion, “The cadre management system,” pp. 203–233 and Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres, pp. 329–351.

7 Department of Organization, “Guanyu xiuding ‘Zhonggong Zhongyang guanli de ganbu zhiwu mingcheng biao de tongzhi” (“Circular on revising the list of cadres on the nomenklatura of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee”), in Ministry of Labour and Personnel (ed.), Renshi gongzuo wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 7 (Beijing: Laodong renshi chubanshe, 1986 [1984]), pp. 119–120.

8 Department of Organization, “You lingdao you jihua de gaige ganbu zhidu” (“Reform the cadre management system under the leadership and in a planned fashion”), in Department of Organization (ed.), Dangde zuzhi gongzuo wenxian xuanbian (Selection of Documents on Party Personnel Work) (Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1986), pp. 431–36.

9 Department of Organization, “Circular on strengthening bureau-level cadre management.”

10 Department of Organization, “Guanyu shixing ganbu kaohe zhidu de yijian de tongzhi” (“Circular on suggestions on implementing a system of cadre evaluation”), in Bureau of Personnel (ed.), Renshi gongzuo wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 1 (Beijing: Laodong renshi chubanshe, 1980 [1979]), pp. 12–15.

11 Department of Organization, “Guanyu shixing difang dangzheng lingdao ganbu niandu gongzuo kaohe zhidu de tongzhi” (“Circular on provisional implementation of the system of the annual performance evaluation of Party and government cadres”), in Ministry of Personnel (ed.), Renshi gongzuo wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 11 (N.p.: Xueyuan chubanshe, 1989 [1988]), pp. 119–120.

12 Department of Organization and Ministry of Personnel, “Guanyu shixing zhongyang, guojia jiguan sichuji lingdao ganbu niandu gongzuo kaohe zhidu de tongzhi” (“Circular on provisional implementation of the system of the annual performance evaluation of bureauand division-level cadres in central Party and government institutions”), in Ministry of Personnel (ed.), Renshi gongzuo wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 12 (Beijing: Zhongguo renshi chubanshe, 1990 [1989]), pp. 72–80.

13 Chen, Wenqing and Su, Kai (eds.), Dangnei changyong wenti zhishi shouce (Handbook on Common Document Styles in the Party) (Shenyang: Baishan chubanshe, 1991), pp. 112—14.Google Scholar

14 Ibid. pp. 114–16.

15 For a description of the tasks of provincial Party and government general offices, see Ministry Of Personnel, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo sheng, zizhiqu, zhixiashi dangzhengqun jiguan zuzhi jigou gaiyao (An Outline of Party, Government, and Mass Organizations of Provinces, Autonomous Regions and Municipalities in the People's Republic of China) (Beijing: Zhongguo renshi chubanshe, 1989), pp. 5 and 15.

16 Jiang Zemin, “Zai quanguo sheng, zizhiqu, zhixiashi dangwei mishuzhang zuotanghuishang de jianghua” (“Speech at the National Conference of secretary-generals of the provincial Party committees”), in Ministry of Personnel (ed.), Renshi bumen bangongshi gongzuo shiyong shouce (Handbook on Office Affairs of Personnel Departments) (Beijing: Beijing gongye daxue chubanshe, 1991 [1990]), pp. 3–8.

17 Ibid. p. 8.

18 Yao Yilin, “Zai quanguo sheng, zizhiqu, zhixiashi dangwei mishuzhang zuotanghuishang de jianghua” (“Speech at the National Conference of secretary-generals of provincial Party committees”), in ibid. pp. 18–19.

19 Wen Jiabao, “Zai quanguo sheng, zizhiqu, zhixiashi dangwei mishuzhang zuotanghuishang de jianghua” (“Speech at the National Conference of secretary-generals of the provincial Party committees”), in ibid. pp. 21–35.

20 Li Ruihuan, “Zai quanguo sheng, zizhiqu, zhixiashi dangwei mishuzhang zuotanghuishang de jianghua” (“Speech at the National Conference of secretary-generals of provincial Party committees”), in ibid. pp. 19–20.

21 Xu Ruixin, “Zai bufen buwei bangongting zhuren zuotanghuishang de jianghua” (“Speech at the conference of general offices of a number of ministries and commissions”), in ibid. pp. 67–73.

22 Jiang Zemin, “Speech at the National Conference.”

23 Qiao Shi, “Zai quanguo sheng, zizhiqu, zhixiashi dangwei mishuzhang zuotanghuishang de jianghua” (“Speech at the National Conference of secretary-generals of the provincial Party committees”), in Ministry of Personnel (ed.), Renshi bumen bangongshi gongzuo shiyong shouce, pp. 15–17.

24 Hough, Jerry F. and Fainsod, Merle, How the Soviet Union is Governed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).Google Scholar

25 Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, “Planning without markets: knowledge and state action in East German housing construction,” East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Fall 1990), pp. 557–579.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

26 Chen Wenqing and Su Kai, Handbook, p. 43.

27 Zheng Youmei, “Zai sheng, zizhiqu, zhixiashi xinfang bumen fuzeren huiyishang de fayan” (“Speech at the Conference of the heads of petition units of provinces, autonomous regions, and directly-administered municipalities”), in Ministry of Personnel (ed.), Renshi bumen bangongshi gongzuo shiyong shouce, pp. 76–80.

28 Chen Wenqing and Su Kai, Handbook.

29 Zheng Youmei, “Speech,” p. 78.

30 Chen Wenqing and Su Kai, Handbook.

31 Ibid, and General Office of the Central Committee and General Office of the State Council, “Guanyu jiaqiang xinfang gongzuo de tongzhi” (“Circular on improving petition work”), in Ministry of Labour and Personnel (ed.). Renshi gongzuo wenjian xuanbian. Vol. 9, pp. 136–39.

32 Chen Wenqing and Su Kai, Handbook, p. 42.

33 Zheng Youmei, “Speech,” pp. 78–79.

34 Chen Wenqing and Su Kai, Handbook, p. 283.

35 Shandong Department of Personnel, “Zai shenhua gaige zhong zuohao renshi xinfang gongzuo” (“Do a good job in personnel petition work during the deepening of reforms”), in Ministry of Personnel (ed.), Renshi bumen bangongshi gongzuo shiyong shouce,; pp. 316–325.

36 I omit discussing the CDIC here because it has been treated elsewhere. See Sullivan, Lawrence R., “The role of the control organs in the Chinese Communist Party,” Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No. 6 (June 1984), pp. 597–617.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

37 Qinxiang, Dai and Yulong, Cai, Jiandu gongzuo shouce (Handbook on Supervision Work) (Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1989), pp. 65–66.Google Scholar

38 Formally, the Chinese bureaucratic system distinguishes between so-called “leadership relations” (xingzheng lingdao guanxi) and “professional relations” (yewu lingdao guanxi). Leadership relations refer mainly to relations of an administrative nature, i.e., if Unit A is able to have a primary say over the appointment, removal and transfer of cadres of a lower-level unit, Unit B, and Unit A's administrative expenditures cover Unit B's personnel payroll, then Unit A is said to have leadership relations with Unit B. Professional relations exist between Units A and B if Unit A is able to issue relatively binding operational directives to Unit B and if Unit A enjoys some degree of prerogative over the personnel decisions affecting the top officials of Unit B. See Lieberthal, Kenneth and Oksenberg, Michel, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and Processes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 148–151.Google Scholar

39 The information in this section is drawn mainly from State Commission on Government Establishment “Guanyu zhongyang yiji guojia jiguan renyuan bianzhi guanli he xingzheng yusuan de jige wenti de tongzhi” (“Circular on management of nomenklature and administrative expenditures of central government agencies”), in Ministry of Personnel (ed.), Renshi gongzuo wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 11, pp. 638–640 and State Commission on Government Establishment (ed.), Zhongguo zhengfu jigou 1990 (Chinese Government Agencies 1990) (Beijing: Zhongguo jingji chubanshe, 1990), pp. 149–151.

40 Dai Qinxiang and Cai Yulong, Handbook, pp. 61–63.

41 One such case concerns Nie Xiance, the governor of Jiangxi province between 1985 and. 1987. Nie was removed from his position and stripped of his Party membership for, apparently, having protected smugglers) in exchange for sexual favours. The CDIC handled the case. See Chen Wenqing and Su Kai, Handbook, p. 241.

42 Tian Jiyun, “Zai shenjishu chengli dahuishang de jianghua” (“Speech to the opening ceremony for the general auditing administration”), in Cui, Jianmin (ed.), Dangzheng lingdao tan shenji (Party and Government Leaders on Auditing) (Beijing: Zhongguo shenji chubanshe, 1990 [1983]), pp. 23–28.Google Scholar

43 Wang Bingqian, “Zai sheng, zizhiqu, zhixiashi shenji juzhang zuotanhuishang de Jianghua” (“Speech at the conference of chiefs of auditing bureaus of provinces, autonomous regions, and directly-administered municipalities”), in ibid. pp. 30–39 and Li Peng, “Zai tingqu quanguo shenji gongzuo huiyi huibao shi de jianghua” (“Speech at the briefing on the National Conference of auditing work”) in ibid. pp. 8–15.

44 General Auditing Administration, “Guanyu gaijin dui difang shenji gongzuo he sheli paichu jigou wenti de baogao (“Report on improving leadership over local auditing work and establishing direct branches”), in Ministry of Labour and Personnel (ed.), Renshi gongzuo wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 8 (Beijing: Laodong renshi chubanshe, 1986 [1985]), pp. 50–52.

45 Ibid.

46 State Commission on Government Establishment, “Circular.”

47 State Council, “Guanyu Gansusheng weifan guojia guiding luanfa jiangjin de tongbao” (“Notice on Gansu province's disorderly bonus practices in violation of state regulations”), in Ministry of Labour and Personnel (ed.), Renshi gongzuo wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 8, pp. 692–93.

48 See Li Peng “Speech” and Yao Yilin, ‘Tingqu quanguo tongji gongzuo huiyi huibao shi de jianghua” (“Speech at the briefing of the National Statistical Conference”), in State Statistical Bureau (ed.), Tongji gongzuo zhongyao wenjian xuanbian 1988–1990 (Selections of Important Documents on Statistical Work 1988–1990 (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1992 [1988]), pp. 63–64. The SSB officials, encouraged by the central leaders, repeatedly called for augmenting the statistical auditing function of the SSB. See Zhang Sai, “Qianghua tongji jiandu zhineng, chongfen fahui tongji gongzuo zai gaige he jianshe zhong de zhongyao zuoyong” (“Strengthen the statistical auditing function, fully develop the use of statistical work in reforms and construction”), in ibid. pp. 291–309 and Zheng Jiaheng, “Jiaqiang tongji gongzuo, jinyibu fahui tongji jiandu zuoyong” (“Strengthen statistical work and further develop the statistical auditing function”), in ibid. pp. 270–290.

49 Zhang Sai, “Strengthen the statistical auditing function,” p. 294.

50 The SSB was abolished in 1967; its personnel was subsumed under the State Planning Commission. It was re-established in 1970, but was subsumed under the SPC. See Wang Yifu, Xin Zhongguo tongji shigao (History of New China's Statistical Work) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1986).

51 Statistical researchers have argued that administrative subordination to the local governments, while enabling the SSB to provide statistical services, makes it difficult to audit government departments. Sun Yefang, a deputy director of the SSB in the 1950s and a respected economist, proposed in 1982 that the SSB be made an independent agency from the executive branch. Specifically, Sun argued that the SSB should be placed under the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and, to infuse it with a degree of disciplinary authority, the SSB should operate in conjunction with the CDIC. See Gao Zhongsheng, Yang Meilian, Fei Jianjun and Zhang Hua, “Jiaqiang tongji fazhi, tigao shuzi zhiliang” (“Strengthen the statistical law and improve the quality of data”), in China Statistical Association (ed.), Zhongguo tongji fazhan zhanlue wenti yanjiu (Research on China's Statistical Development Strategy) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1988), pp. 168–177.

52 Wang Yifu, History. 54. See Yue Wei, “Zai quanguo tongji gongzuo huiyi kaimushi de jianghua” (“Speech at the opening of the National Statistical Conference”), in State Statistical Bureau (ed.), Tongji gongzuo zhongyao wenjian xuanbian 1986–1987 (Selections of Important Documents on Statistical Work 1986–1987) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1988 [1986]), pp. 15–32.

53 Zhang Sai, ‘Tongji fazhan zhanlue wenti yanjiu” (“Research on the issue of statistical development strategy”) Tongji yanjiu (Statistical Research), No. 4 (1987).

54 Another example in China of informal behaviour as a product of formal institutions is corruption. The two-tier price system, put in place in the mid-1980s, gives strong incentives to use official positions to arbitrage between official and market prices.

55 There is a large body of social science literature on information as a motivation for bargaining. The classic work is Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980).Google Scholar For an application to planned economies, see Powell, Raymond P., “Plan execution and the workability of Soviet planning,” Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1977), pp. 51–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

56 Another way of stating the same theme is that informal and formal operations are linked. For an analysis along this line in a Chinese context, Walder, Andrew G., Communist Neo-traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).Google Scholar

57 Department of Organization, “Guanyu baosong zhongyang guanli ganbu zhiwu renmian cailiao jige wenti de tongzhi” (“Circular on transmitting information on appointment and removal of cadres managed by the Party Centre”), in Ministry of Personnel (ed.), Renshi gongzuo wenjian xuanbian. Vol. 14 (Beijing: Zhongguo renshi chubanshe, 1992 [1991]), pp. 59–62.

58 Bums, “Strengthening central CCP control,” pp. 458–491.

59 Li Peng, “Speech,” pp. 13–14.

60 Gao Zhongsheng et al., “Strengthen.”

61 This is similar to the argument that internalized bureaucratic norms in part obviate the need for elaborate monitoring and external control. For a good summary and application of this argument, see Manion, Melanie, Retirement of Revolutionaries in China: Public Policies, Social Norms, Private Interests (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

62 Because of the putative grip by the Party over the appointment process, the erosion of Communist ideology constitutes de facto decentralization in the appointment decisions. Also, local people's congresses have become more assertive; in 1993, they defeated two centrally-nominated candidates. See Burns, “Strengthening central CCP control.”

63 See “The price of economic reforms: central-local tensions,” China News Analysis, No. 1508 (15 April 1994), pp. 1–9.

64 “Zhonggong Zhongyang guanyu jianli shehuizhuyi shichang jingji tizhi ruogan wenti de jueding” (“The decision by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to establish a socialist market economic system”), Renmin ribao (People's Daily), 17 November 1993, pp. 1–2.