1. For an excellent discussion on “neutralization” as an effective means of regulating and conciliating international conflicts, see Black, Cyril E.et al., Neutralization and World Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968)Google Scholar . On the concept of neutralization and its practical application to South-east Asia, see Knorr, Klauset al., Neutralization in South East Asia: Problems and Prospects (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966)Google Scholar ; and Wilson, Dick, The Neutralization of Southeast Asia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1975)Google Scholar .

2. On the functions of the Politburo, and the relationship between Mao and his colleagues at the Politburo level, see Schurmann, Franz, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 55–56Google Scholar , and 146–47; Wilson, John Lewis, Leadership in Communist China (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963), pp. 31–34Google Scholar ; Barnett, A. Doak, China After Mao (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 73, and 78CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Snow, Edgard, The Other Side of the River: Red China Today (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 148, and 154–55Google Scholar ; Whiting, Allen S., “Foreign policy of Communist China,” in Macridis, Roy C. (ed.), Foreign Policy in World Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962), pp. 282–86Google Scholar ; and Oksenberg, Michel C., “Policy making under Mao, 1949–1968: an overview,” in Lindbeck, John M.H. (ed.), China: Management of a Revolutionary Society (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), pp. 79–83Google Scholar , 91–92, and 102–104 .

3. Kuo-t'ao, Chang, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party 1928–1938, Vol. II (Lawrence: The University of Kansas, 1972), p. 497Google Scholar .

4. For further information, see Klein, Donald W., “Peking's evolving Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” The China Quarterly, No. 4 (10–12 1960), pp. 29–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Jan, George P., “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China since the Cultural Revolution,” Asian Survey, Vol. XVII, No. 6 (06 1977), pp. 514–16, 523, and 529Google Scholar ; and Klein, Donald W., “The management of foreign affairs in communist China,” in Lindbeck, China, pp. 311–14Google Scholar , 322–25, and 328–30. On the “diplomatic power” of the State Council, see Houn, Franklin W., “Communist China's new constitution,” The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. VIII (06 1955), pp. 209, 217–19, and 222Google Scholar .

5. Enlai, Zhou, “Zai Rineiwa huiyishang di fayan” (“Speech at the Geneva Conference, 28 April 1954”) Renmin ribao (People's Daily), 30 04 1954, p. 1Google Scholar ; and Enlai, Zhou, “Zai Rineiwa huiyishang kuanyu Yinduzhina wenti di fayan” (“Speech concerning the question of Indo-China, given at the Geneva Conference, 12 May 1954”), Renmin ribao, 14 05 1954, p. 1Google Scholar .

6. Enlai, Zhou, “Speech at the Geneva Conference, 28 April 1954,” p. 1Google Scholar ; and “Speech concerning Indo-China at the Geneva Conference, 12 May 1954,” p. 1.

7. Enlai, Zhou, “Speech at the Geneva Conference, 28 April 1954,” p. 1Google Scholar ; “Speech concerning Indo-China at the Geneva Conference, 12 May 1954,” p. 1; and Enlai, Zhou “Zai Rineiwa huiyishang di fayan” (“Speech at the Geneva Conference, 21 July 1954”), Renmin ribao, 22 07 1954, p. 1Google Scholar . On the French colonization in Indo-China, see Cady, John F., The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954)Google Scholar ; Betts, Ramond F., Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory: 1890–1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961)Google Scholar ; Ennis, Thomas E., French Policy and Developments in Indochina (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936)Google Scholar ; Lancaster, Donald, The Emancipation of French Indochina (London: Oxford University Press, 1961)Google Scholar ; Rebequan, Charles, The Economic Development of French Indo-China (London: Oxford University Press, 1944)Google Scholar ; and Thompson, Virginia, French Indo-China (London: Allen and Unwin, 1937)Google Scholar .

8. Enlai, Zhou, (“Zai zhengxie quanguo wei yuanhui shang di zhengzhi baogao” (“Political Report, given at the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, 21 December 1954”), Renmin ribao, 27 12 1954, p. 1Google Scholar; and “Muqian guoji xingshi he woguo waijiao zhengce, zai di yijie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di erci huiyishang di fayan” w Congress, 30 July 1955'), Renmin ribao, 31 July 1955, p. 1.

9. For basic documents of China's first Five-Year Plan, see Zhonghuarenmingongheguofazhan guominjingji diyiwunian jihua (First Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the People's Republic of China)(Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1955)Google Scholar ; also see Li, Choh-ming, Economic Development of Communist China: An Appraisal of the First Five Years of Industrialization(Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1959)Google Scholar ; and Eckstein, Alexander, “The strategy of economic development in Communist China,” American Economic Review, Paper and Proceedings (05 1961), pp. 508–519Google Scholar .

10. “Zai di yijie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di yici huiyishang di zhengfu gongzuo baogao” (“Report on the work of the government, made at the first session of the First National People's Congress, 23 September 1954”), Renmin ribao, 24 September 1954, p. 3.

11. Dulles declared on 2 September 1953 that there was the risk that as in Korea, the Chinese People's Republic might send her own army into Indo-China. According to Dulles, direct Chinese Communist intervention in Indo-China “could not occur without grave consequences which might not be confined to Indo-China.” (See New York Times, 3 September 1953, p. 1.) On 11 June 1954, Dulles made another speech in which he plainly stated that a clash between China and the United States was possible if there would be any “open military aggression by the Chinese Communist regime.” (See New York Times), 12 June 1954, p. 2. Full text of Dulles' speech can be found in Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 30, No. 783 (28 06 1954), pp. 971–73Google Scholar .

12. When the situation in Vietnam was approaching a military disaster for the French, President Dwight D. Eisenhower told his chief advisers on 3 June 1954 that he would approve American military action in Indo-China on certain conditions. These conditions included the following: (1) the United States should not undertake any unilateral action to counter Chinese Communist aggression; (2) if the nations of the South-east Asian area showed a complete indifference to the fate of Indo-China, the United States then should undertake a reappraisal of its basic security policy in the region; (3) South-east Asian nations could not disclaim responsibility for their own safety, expecting the United States alone to carry all the burdens of Free World Security; and (4) if the president found it necessary to ask the Congress for authority to intervene in Indo-China, he wanted'to assure the Congress that the United States had allies such as Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and above all, the bulk of the Vietnamese people, ready to join the United States in resisting overt Chinese Communist aggression. See Eisenhower, Dwight D., Mandate for Change, 1953–1956 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1963), p. 362Google Scholar .

13. Before the opening of the Geneva Conference on 26 April 1954, there were some preparatory meetings in Moscow designed to work out the position which the Soviet Union, China and Vietminh would take in Geneva. On one occasion, Zhou and Nikita Khrushchev held a private conversation, and later Khrushchev recalled that Zhou had become apprehensive about the implications of the Indo-Chinese War. Zhou seems to have suggested, according to Khrushchev's account, that he was told by Ho Chi Minh that the Vietminh leaders had decided that they could not win a military victory in Indo-China, and that he was asked for help in securing an armistice. In Zhou's view, the situation in Indo-China was extremely serious, and a negotiated settlement of the Indo-Chinese War was preferable to further military escalation. See Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970), p. 482Google Scholar . On China's growing awareness of the implications of nuclear warfare in 1954, see Hsieh, Alice L., Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962), pp. 15–17Google Scholar .

14. Bidault, Georges, “Speech at the First Plenary Session on Indo-China, 8 May 1954,” Documents Relating to the Discussion of Korea and Indo-China at the Geneva Conference, April 27–June 15, 1954 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), p. 110Google Scholar ; and “Speech at the Fifth Plenary Session on Indo-China, 8 June 1954,” ibid. p. 137.

15. Georges Bidault, “Speech at the Fourth Plenary Session on Indo-China, 14 May 1954,” ibid. p. 132.

16. Bidault, Georges, “Speech at the First Plenary Session on Indo-China, 8 May 1954,” p. IIIGoogle Scholar ; and “Speech at the Fourth Plenary Session on Indo-China, 14 May, 1954,” p. 136.

17. For further information on the meeting of Enlai, Zhou and Mendez-France, Pierre in Berne, Switzerland, on 23 June 1954, see New York Times, 24 06 1954, pp. 1 and 5Google Scholar ; see also, Devillers, Philippe and Lacouture, Jean, End of a War, Indo-China, 1954. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 252–55Google Scholar ; and Eisenhower, , Mandate for Change, p. 369Google Scholar . On Zhou Enlai's second meeting with Mende's-France in Berne, Switzerland on 20 July 1954, see Devillers, and Lacouture, , End of a War, p. 291Google Scholar .

18. Eden, Anthony, “Speech at the Fifth Plenary Session on Indo-China, 8 June 1954,” Documents Relating to the Discussion of Korea and Indo-China at the Geneva Conference, p. 152Google Scholar .

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Anthony Eden, “Speech at the Seventh Plenary Session on Indo-China, 10 June 1954,” ibid. pp. 166 and 167.

22. Ibid. p. 167.

23. Eden, Anthony, Full Circle: the Memoirs of Anthony Eden (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960), pp. 117, 137, and 138Google Scholar.

24. Eden, Anthony, “Speech at the Second Plenary Session on Indo-China, 10 May 1954,” Documents Relating to the Discussion of Korea and Indo-China at the Geneva Conference, pp. 122 and 123Google Scholar; and “Speech at the Third Session on Indo-China, 12 May 1954” ibid. pp. 126 and 127.

25. Bedell Smith, “Speech at the First Plenary Session on Indo-China, 8 May 1954,” ibid. p. 114.

26. Ibid.

27. Bedell Smith, “Speech at the Seventh Plenary Session on Indo-China, 10 June 1954,”ibid. p. 168.

28. Ibid.

29. Eisenhower, , Mandate for Change, p. 369Google Scholar.

30. For an excerpt of speech, V. M. Molotov's at the Fourth Plenary Session on Indo-China, 14 May 1954, see Documents Relating to the Discussion of Korea and Indo-China, pp. 127–31Google Scholar; for the full text of speech, Molotov's, see Rineiwei huiyi wenjianhuibian (Collected Documents on the Geneva Conference), Vol. 1 (Beijing: Shijiezhishi chubanshe, 1954), pp. 177–90Google Scholar.

31. Collected Documents on the Geneva Conference, p. 178.

32. Ibid. p. 187.

33. Ibid. pp. 187, 189–90.

34. Molotov, V.M., “Speech at the Fifth Plenary Session on Indo-China, 8 June 1954,” Documents Relating to the Discussion of Korea and Indo-China, p. 145Google Scholar.

35. Ibid. p. 150.

36. Ibid. p. 151.

37. Pham van Dong, “Speech at the First Plenary Session on Indo-China, 8 May 1954,”ibid. p. 112.

38. Ibid. pp. 112–13.

39. Pham van Dong, “Speech at the Second Plenary Session on Indo-China, 10 May 1954,”ibid. p. 118; for the full text of Pham's speech, see Collected Documents on the Geneva Conference, pp. 138–60.

40. See “Proposal by the Delegation of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam Regarding Viet Nam, 10 May 1954,” Documents Relating to the Discussion of Korea and Indo-China, p. 117.

41. Ibid.

42. Enlai, Zhou, “Speech at the Geneva Conference, 28 04 1954,” p. 1Google Scholar.

43. Ibid.

44. Enlai, Zhou, “Speech Concerning Indo-China at the Geneva Conference, 12 May 1954,” p. 1Google Scholar.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Full text of Zhou Enlai's Six-Point Proposal, issued on 27 May 1954, may be found in Renmin ribao, 29 May 1954, p. 1.

48. Ibid.

49. Eniai, Zhou, “Statement given at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Geneva Conference, 9 June 1954,” New China News Agency (NCNA), 11 06 1954, p. 98Google Scholar.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid. pp. 98, 99, and 101; also see Pham van Dong, “Speech at the Geneva Conference, 8 June 1954,” Collected Documents on the Geneva Conference, Vol. 2, p. 196Google Scholar; and Molotov, V.M., “Speech at the Fifth Plenary Session on Indo-China, 8 June 1954,” p. 143Google Scholar.

53. Eden, , Full Circle, p. 145Google Scholar.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Renmin ribao, 18 June 1954, p. 1.

57. New York Times, 24 June 1954, p. 5; and Devillers, and Lacouture, , End of a War, p. 254Google Scholar.

58. New York Times, 24 June 1954, p. 1.

59. Devillers, and Lacouture, , End of a War, pp. 252–55Google Scholar.

60. As early as 24 April 1954, in an address before the Indian Parliament, Nehru formally announced his six-point proposal for an Indo-Chinese settlement. In his proposal, Nehru called for an immediate cease-fire in Indo-China, and direct negotiations between France, the Associated States and the Vietminh. What is more significant is the fact that Nehru asked for a cessation of military aid, direct or indirect, to the belligerents and non-intervention by third states. The text of Nehru's six-point proposal is in Jawaharlal Nehru , India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946–April 1961 (New Delhi: Government of India, 1961), pp. 399–400Google Scholar. For a careful appraisal of Nehru's six-point proposal, see SarDesai, D. R., Indian Foreign Policy in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, 1947–1964 (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 40–43Google Scholar.

61. “ZhongYin liangguo zongli lianhuo shengming” (“Premiers Zhou Enlai-Nehru Joint Statement, 28 June 1954”), Renmin ribao, 29 June 1954, p. 1.

62. “Zhong Mian liangguo zongli lianhuo shengming” (“Premiers Zhou Enlai-U Nu Joint Statement, 29 June 1954”), ibid. 30 June 1954, p. 1.

63. “Kuanyu Zhong Yue huitan di gongbao” (“Comunique concerning the Chinese-Vietnamese Talk, 5 July 1954”), ibid. 8 July 1954, p. 1.

64. The text of Ho Chi Minh's report to the Sixth Plenum of the Vietminh Party Central Committee, 15 July 1954, appears in Gareth Porter (ed.), Vietnam: the Definitive Documentation of Human Decision, Vol. 1 (Stanfordville, N.Y.: Earl M. Coleman Enterprises, 1979), pp. 632–37Google Scholar.

65. Ibid. p. 636.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. See Ch'en, King, Vietnam and China, 1938–1954 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 313–14Google Scholar; and Randle, Robert F., Geneva 1954: The Settlement of the Indochinese War (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 153–54Google Scholar.

69. Hammer, Ellen J., The Struggle for Indochina 1940–1955: Viet Nam and the French Experience (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1966), p. 331Google Scholar.

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71. Devillers, and Lacouture, , End of a War, p. 291Google Scholar.

72. For the full text of the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference, signed on 21 July 1954, see Further Documents Relating to the Discussion of Indo-China at the Geneva Conference, June 16–July 21, 1954 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), pp. 9–11Google Scholar. The full text of the Final Declaration was also published in Renmin ribao, 22 July 1954, p. 1.

73. See Articles 4 and 5 of the Final Declaration. For a detailed discussion of the settlements for Laos and Cambodia, see Randle, , Geneva 1954, pp. 482–583Google Scholar.

74. Enlai, Zhou, “Speech at the Geneva Conference, 21 07 1954,” p. 1Google Scholar.

75. Enlai, Zhou, “Waijiao baogao, zai zhongyang renmin zhengfu weiyuanhui di sanshisanci huiyishang” (“Report on foreign relations, delivered at the 33rd session of the Central People's Government Council, 11 August 1954”), Renmin ribao, 14 08 1954, p. 1Google Scholar.

76. Ibid.

77. Enlai, Zhou, “Report on the work of the government, 23 09 1954,” p. 3Google Scholar.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.

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81. Enlai, Zhou, “Speech delivered to the final plenary meeting of the Asian-African Countries at Bandung, 23 April 1955,” New York Times, 25 04 1955. p. 7Google Scholar.

82. Zhou Enlai, “Statement presented to the Political Committee of the Asian-African countries at Bandung, 23 April 1955,” ibid.

83. Enlai, Zhou, “On the present international situation and China's foreign policy, 30 July 1955”, Renmin ribao, 31 07 1955, p. 1Google Scholar.

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85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

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