^1. This article is written at a time of great uncertainty over the future of the China-Taiwan relationship. The authors have reached their conclusions based on a rational actor approach to the problem of military training. The senior Chinese political leadership has drawn a line in the sand concerning Taiwan. There may be a point where rational analysis no longer counterbalances irrational reactions to sovereignty issues. If Beijing decides that Taiwan has crossed the line, they may find themselves committed to act in spite of rational considerations. In such a case, a first step may be a limited military action against Taiwan′s forces nearest to China. While such an action may seem irrational to outsiders, the Chinese have proven themselves capable of disregarding objective political, diplomatic, military and economic costs when they consider sovereignty is at stake. A Chinese military venture against Taiwan remains a possibility, albeit a very costly alternative in political and probably military terms.

^2. The authors assess that the overall PLA modernization programme includes several components all being conducted concurrently: rejuvenation (to use their term) of the officer corps; restructuring of forces; improvement of educational standards for officers and enlisted; doctrine development; training modernization; logistics modernization; command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (Cl) modernization; and equipment acquisition, upgrade and modernization.

^3. At the risk of being accused of mirror imaging, for the purpose of this paper the authors use the U.S. Army concept of “doctrine” as a guide to what “doctrine” is. As defined by FM 100–5, June 1993, doctrine is the “fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives” (Glossary-3). FM 100–5, p. v calls the Army′s doctrine “the authoritative guide to how Army forces fight wars and conduct operations other than war.” In other words, doctrine is “how to fight,” but it is more than simply tactics or techniques. Two terms in Chinese are sometimes translated as “doctrine” tiaoling and lilun. The former has the connotation of “regulations,” whereas the latter is better defined as “theory.” These terms used together approach the U.S. Army′s concept of doctrine. “People′s war” (renmin zhanzheng) is often called a doctrine, but in Chinese it is associated with the words sixiang for “Thought.” The idea of “local war” is simply called jubu zhanzheng. This implies that the concept of local war is still under development and has not yet reached the level of sophistication that would allow it to replace “people′s war.”

^4. Joint operations are the integrated military activities of two or more service components Experi footnote continued for example, ground and air forces. (FM 100–5, p. 4–1) Combined arms operations are the simultaneous application of several arms, such as infantry, armour, artillery and aviation. For definition purposes, combined operations, as differentiated from combined arms operations, are conducted by forces of two of more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission (FM 100–5, Glossary-2). This article deals with joint and combined arms operations training.

^5. Jiefangjun bao (JFJB) (Liberation Army Daily), which is the official newspaper of the PLA, 15 February 1990, local translation by SEROLD Associates Ltd, Hong Kong. SEROLD produces the monthly “PLA Activities Report (PLA-ACT) which contains many citations used in this report. The authors wish to thank the entire staff of SEROLD for their support in the writing of this article. We decided to use the term General Training Programme (GTP) to indicate the body of training guidance issued by the GSD, although the exact Chinese terminology used consistently has been junshi xunlian dagang which can also be translated as Military Training Programme (MTP). Whether translated as GTP or MTP, this guidance lays out the general content and direction PLA training is to take during the period.

^6. References to the GTP have been made in JFJB, 20 February 1995, cited in SEROLD translation, ”Report confirms existence of new military training general program,“ 3 March 1995 and 21 February 1995, cited in PLA-ACT, February 1995. References to the three-year training reforms have been made in Xinhua, 1 October 1995, ”Zhang Wannian stresses military training reform,“ Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Serial OW1210021895 and JFJB, 14 February 1995, cited in PLA-ACT, February 1995. The clearest and most recent articulation of the progress of the three-year training reform programme is found in JFJB, 24 October 1995, ”Military region study methods of operations,“ FBIS Serial HK0112070095. This article summarizes the results of the past three years for each military region and service.

^7. See JFJB, 12 December 1995 for the GSD announcement and guidance on the new generation of GTPs for all PLA services and arms without providing any detail.

^8. In Chinese usage, ”blue forces“ refer to the ”enemy,“ while ”red forces“ represent friendly forces. Opposing force exercises may also be called ”confrontational“ (duikang xing) exercises.

^9. JFJB, 18 July 1994, cited in PLA-ACT, July 1994.

^10. Allen, Kenneth W., Glenn, Krumel and Pollack, Jonathan D., China′s Air Force Enters the 21st Century(Santa Monica: RAND, 1995), p. 23. This study uses the RAND study, pp. 22–34, as its touchstone concerning the development of Chinese military strategy and doctrine.Google Scholar

^11. McNamara Robert S., Jeremiah David E., McCarthy James P., Richardson William R., Ross Jimmy D., Lampton David M., Shambaugh David L. and MeiJune, Sino-American Military Relations: Mutual Responsibilities in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: National Committee on United States-China Relations November 1994), p. 10.

^12. Efforts to improve the educational levels of officers is related to the ongoing process to increase the level of professionalism of the officer corps. In the past decade significant changes in the professional officer development and management system have been implemented which further the process of professionalization. For data see Directory ofPRC Military Personalities, October 1995, published by USDLO Hong Kong, as well as the Directories from 1994 and 1993.

^13. The development of mobile training teams in each service represents a shift towards providing technical expertise at the unit level to implement training reforms quickly. For example, the Naval Command Academy has sent out professors and lecturers to PLA fleets to give on-the-spot lectures in modern military theory and to guide naval units in the conduct of training. See JFJB, 3 July 1995, cited in PLA-ACT, July 1995. In Nanjing Military Region (MR), a Combined Arms Training Centre has formed a roving Tactical Training Guiding Group to help organize and conduct exercises for division and regimental leaders and organizations. See JFJB, 15 August 1995, cited in PLA-ACT, August 1995.

^14. See JFJB, 31 May 1995, 6 June 1995, 8 June 1995, 11 June 1995 and 14 June 1995, cited in the ′Technical Support” section of PLA-ACT, June 1995.

^15. JFJB, 11 January 1994, cited in PLA-ACT, January 1994.

^16. JFJB, 28 February 1994, cited in SEROLD translation, “Liberation Army Daily editorial on training program,” 10 March 1994.

^17. Ibid.

^18. JFJB, 8 February 1995, cited in PLA-ACT, February 1995.

^19. Xinhua, 28 February 1995, cited in PLA-ACT, February 1995.

^20. “Build PLA into a big school, Jiang says,” China Daily, 10 March 1995, p. 1.Google Scholar

^21. Editorial, “Advance together with the Great Motherland - celebrating the 46th anniversary of the founding of the PRC,” in JFJB, 1 October 1995, in FBIS Serial HK1210032595.Google Scholar

^22. JFJB, 8 February 1995, cited in SEROLD translation, “General Staff Department outlines 1995 military training task,” 27 February 1995.Google Scholar

^23. JFJB, 26 January 1995, cited in SEROLD translation, “The focus of PLA training reforms in 1995,” 27 February 1995.Google Scholar

^24. Xinhua, 11 October 1995, “Zhang Wannian stresses military training reform.”Google Scholar

^25. JFJB, 11 October 1993, cited in SEROLD translation, “Blue force defeats red in 47th Group Army exercise,” 15 October 1995.Google Scholar

^26. Zhang Haiping, “The ‘blue army’ in high tide and low ebb - survey and thoughts on Shenyang Military Region promoting tactical reforms in tactics through building the ‘blue army,’ JFJB, 10 August 1995, in FBIS Serial HK2809014295.Google Scholar

^27. Ibid.

^28. Ibid.

^29. Table 1 is not intended to be a definitive list of PLA exercises. It lists only those that the authors are aware of through the open press. It is possible that additional exercises were conducted and reported that did not come to the authors′ attention. Moreover, all exercises at the group army, joint and fleet levels were probably not reported in publications available to the authors. Further complicating the issue is that some exercises were reported more than once or in several different press reports. The authors have attempted to weed out double counting. This was sometimes an arbitrary judgment on inconclusive evidence.

^30. The number of division and regimental exercises was estimated by SEROLD based on open source reporting.

^31. Just to name a few, use of airborne troops is mentioned in exercises reported in JFJB on 28 March 1994, 16 February 1994 and 30 November 1993, cited in SEROLD translation, “Preemptive attacks and limited power projection in PLA operational doctrine,” 2 October 1995 and New China News Agency, 3 November 1994, “Maneuver shows army′s enhanced combat capability,” in FBIS-CHI 94–215, 7 November 1994.

^32. Zhong Zhaotang and Shen Zhilu, “Liu Huaqing stresses need to have thinking of building army in a comprehensive way,” JFJB, 14 September 1995, FBIS Serial HK1110060695.Google Scholar

^33. As far as we can tell, Chinese airborne forces are even more lightly equipped than their Western counterparts. We have not seen evidence of a heavy equipment drop capability, but rather that their equipment is air landed in support of an operation. From examination of open source Chinese photographs, only limited supplies appear to be air dropped. As with any airborne force, because of their limited abilities to sustain themselves during ground combat operations, Chinese airborne forces require rapid link-up with other friendly forces or extraction.

^34. See JFJB, 4 and 25 November 1994, in PLA-ACT November 1994, for readings on building a special operation force and psychological operations capability. These concepts seem to still be in the nascent stage of development.

^35. Use of helicopters can be found in reports in JFJB, 16 April 1995, 30 August 1994, 13 May 1994 and 27 September 1993, and Guizhou Daily, 7 May 1995, cited in SEROLD translation, “Preemptive attacks and limited power projection in PLA operational doctrine.” Pictures of a few helicopters on the ground or flying over manoeuvring troops are also quite common.

^36. See JFJB, 27 October 1994, 26 August 1993 and 20 June 1993, cited in SEROLD translation, “Preemptive attacks and limited power projection in PLA operational doctrine” for examples of ground forces being transported by air.

^37. The PLA Navy has also taken part in exercises transporting ground forces. Some of these exercises include the use of roll-on/roll-off ships. See Table 1 for examples, in particular, Jinan MR reported in JFJB, 7 December 1994 and Shenyang MR reported by Xinhua Daily Telegraph, 4 February 1995.

^38. Jane′s All the World Aircraft 1992–93 (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane′s Information Group, 1992), pp. 201–202, lists the 11–76 as capable of carrying 140 passengers or 125 paratroopers 6,700 km or 4,163 miles. Combat radius, i.e., unrefuelled round trip for the aircraft, is half that distance, 3,350 km. For the sake of comparison, according to the Defense 94 Almanac (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1994), pp. 41, the U.S. Air Force has approximately 200 C-141 Starlifter aircraft. The 11–76 is the rough equivalent to the C-141.Google Scholar

^39. Allen, Krumel and Pollack, China′s Air Force, p. 118.Google Scholar

^40. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “War game ‘warning’ to Taiwan,” in the South China Morning Post, 19 October 1995, p. 1; Beijing Central Television News, 18 October 1995, 1900 hours.Google Scholar

^41. The tasks of assembling units from various parts of the country, training and rehearsing for the main event, and smoothly conducting the demonstration are worthy feats in themselves. A well-trained navy makes these basics look simple.

^42. Some would argue that a half-truth equates to a lie. The authors defer the examination of the nature of truth to another time and place.

^43. McNamara et ai, Sino-American Military Relations, p. 3. 44. This scenario was proposed by Huang Wenfang in “Exercises mimic real tactics for invasion,” Eastern Express, 18 March 1996, p. 15.

^45. “Officers comment on military exercise,” Beijing Xinhua in English 1014 GMT 20 March 1996, FBIS Serial OW2003102496.

^46. Ibid.