1. Solomon, Richard H., “Mao's effort to reintegrate the Chinese polity: problems of authority and conflict in the Chinese social process,” in Barnett, Doak (ed.), Chinese Communist Politics in Action (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), pp. 271–365Google Scholar.

2. Shao-ch'i, Liu, “On the Party” (05 1945), Collected Works of Liu Shaoch'i (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1969), II, 65Google Scholar .

3. Quoted in Solomon, “Mao's effort.”

4. Schurmann, Franz, “Organization and response in Communist China,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 131 (1959), p. 57Google Scholar .

5. “The wicked history of big conspirator, big ambitionist, big warlord P'eng Teh-huai,” Current Background (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate General), 851Google ScholarPubMed .

6. “Shen-hsu Pu An-hsiu” (“Investigate Pu An-hsiu”), in Wang, Ting (ed), “Chung-kung wen-hua ta ko-ming tzu-liao hui-pien,” Ming-poo yüeh k'an (Hong Kong), 15 06 1969, pp. 17–18Google Scholar .

7. Ko-ming kung-jen pao (Revolutionary Workers' Paper) 5 (19 02 1967), p. 4Google ScholarPubMed , quoted in Tsou, Tang, “The Cultural Revolution and the Chinese political system,” CQ 38 (1969), pp. 3–91Google Scholar .

8. Bodde, Derk and Morris, Clarence, Law in Imperial China, Exemplified by 190 Ch'ing Dynasty Cases (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 42Google Scholar and 97–98; also Kennedy, George Alexander, Die Rolle des Gestaendnisses in chinesischen Gesetz (Berlin: n.p., 1939), pp. 5–12 and 37Google Scholar .

9. For instance, in June 1957, two deputy chairmen of the Democratic League were accused of leading a nation-wide clique to overthrow the Party; neither admitted this, and so “the campaign against them was pushed relentlessly forward until January 1958 when Shih Liang claimed that they had confessed their crimes and their clique had been destroyed.” MacFarquhar, Roderick, The Hundred Flowers (London: Stevens and Sons, 1960), p. 263Google Scholar . Similarly, Ch'en i sought to exempt Liu from criticism by alleging that ” Liu and Teng have been thoroughly defeated and have confessed their crimes.” In the first case confession resulted in punishment whereas in the second Ch'en meant it to result in the accused's atonement In general, once confession or self-criticism is accepted as adequate or satisfactory, the process of criticism and self-criticism of the particular individual concerned comes to an end and a decision is made on the individual case. But the process of criticism and self-criticism continues on policy issues raised by that individual's mistakes.

10. The Trotsky citation is from Carr, E. H., The Bolshevik Revolution, 1913–23 (New York: Macmillan, 1953), III, 16Google Scholar . See also Luck, David, “Soviet and Chinese political development,” Survey, 74–75 (1970), pp. 29–49Google Scholar ; and Zeuner, Bodo, “InnerParteilliche Demokratie,” Zur Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1968), nos. 33–34, pp. 26–28Google Scholar .

11. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), I, 105–114Google Scholar .

12. “Lun fa-yang min-chu” (“On the expansion of democracy”), in Liu Shaoch'i wen-t'i ts'ai-liao chuan-chi (A Special Collection of Materials on Liu Shaoch'i) (Taipei: Institute for the Study of Chinese Communist Problems, 1970), pp. 134–142Google Scholar .

13. Ibid. p. 138.

14. Shao-ch'i, Liu “On inner-party struggle” (07 1941), Collected Works, I, 330–367Google Scholar .

15. Ibid. p. 363.

16. According to Fu-sheng, Mu, The Wilting of the Hundred Flowers (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 166–68Google Scholar , Mao listed no criteria in his original speech to the Central Committee on 27 February 1957. In the amended version published in July 1957 by the People's Daily he listed the following criteria for distinguishing between actions which are right or wrong: “1. Help to unite the people of our various nationalities…; 2. Are beneficial to…socialist transformation…; 3. Help to consolidate…the people's democratic dictatorship; 4. Help to consolidate…democratic centralism; 5. Tend to strengthen…the leadership of the Communist Party; 6. Are beneficial…to unite Socialist solidarity and the solidarity of the peace-loving peoples of the world.” The most important of these criteria were said to be the last two. If contradictions did not conform to these criteria, Mao warned, they “can turn into an antagonistic contradiction as between ourselves and the enemy.”

17. Fahrle, Robert and Schoettler, Peter, Chinas Weg: Marxismus oder Maoismus? (Frankfurt: Verlag der Marxistischen Blaetter, 1969), pp. 85–115Google Scholar .

18. “Report on an investigation of the peasant movement in Hunan” (March 1927), in Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tsetung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1971), pp. 23–40Google Scholar .

19. People's Daily, June 1957.

20. Richard Baum and Frederick Taiwes , Ssu-ch'ing: The Socialist Education Movement of 1962–66 ( Berkeley, Calif.: Centre for Chinese Studies, China Research Monographs , No. 2 ), Appendix F, pp. 118–126.

21. According to Chang Kuo-t'ao's account, this is the way the 1937 dispute between himself and Mao was resolved. When a stalemate developed with Mao in control of the Politburo and Chang in control of the 2nd Provisional Central Authority, Chang simply stopped attending Politburo meetings for three months. When Mao sent Tung Pi-wu to ask him to stop “sulking,” he replied: “I don't want to attend Politburo meetings, or to receive comrades to discuss Party affairs. Furthermore, I wish to withdraw from the Central leadership of the Party. I'm now teaching economics with you at the North Shensi Public School; isn't this just fine?” Chang's Introduction in Collected Works of Liu Shao-ch'i, p. vii. For a more detailed account of this episode, see Kuo-t'ao, Chang, “Wo-ti hui-i,” Mingpao yüeh-k'an VI: 2 (1971), pp. 85–90Google Scholar .

22. Newspaper circulation increased from 3·4 million in 1951 to 15 million in 1958; magazine circulation jumped from 900,000 to 17 million over the same period: Yu, Frederick T. C., Mass Persuasion in Communist China (New York and London: Praeger, 1964), p. 90Google Scholar . China claims that her radio transmitting power is now almost five times greater than the total transmitting power under the KMT in the 20 years 1928–47. The Great Leap Forward of 1958 produced more than a million radios; 10 years before, there were scarcely more than a million sets throughout the whole of China: Howse, Hugh, “The use of radio in China,” CQ 2 (1960), pp. 59–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

23. Kecskemeti, Paul, review of Nationalism and Social Communication, in Public Opinion Quarterly XVIII: 1 (1954), pp. 102–105CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

24. Mark Selden, “The Yenan legacy; the mass line,” in Barnett, (ed.), Chinese Politics in Action, pp. 99–105Google Scholar . Chou En-lai discusses the cheng-feng movement in “Premier Chou talks about why firepower must be concentrating on criticizing the top Party persons in authority taking the capitalist road,” Hung chan pao (Canton, Red Guard paper), 15 (9 11 1967), pp. 1Google Scholar and 4, in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) 44574 (4 March 1968).

25. Liu, Alan P. L., Communications and National Integration in Communist China (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1971), p. 115Google Scholar

26. I owe these points to a personal communication from Alan Liu. Two other scholars have also noted that efforts to increase the flow of information between elites and masses through multiplicative media have tended to be combined with an increase in political control, making the communicative process increasingly one-way. Houn, F. W., To Change a Nation (New York: Free Press, 1961), pp. 230–37Google Scholar , and Townsend, James R., Political Participation in Communist China (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1967Google Scholar ), last chapter .

27. For example, in 1954–55 the “propaganda outlines” (hsuan-chuan ta-kang) and “propaganda handbooks” (hsuan-chuan shou-ts'e) periodically diffused through organizational channels by the Central Propaganda Department during mass movements were superseded by Party newspapers such as Chung-kuo ch'ingnien (China Youth), Hsüeh-hsi (Study) and later Hung ch'i (Red Flag). , Yu, Mass Persuasion in Communist China, pp. 88–89Google Scholar .

28. For studies of these earlier campaigns, see I-fan, Yang, The Case of Hu Feng (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, Communist China Research Series, Vol. 18, 12 1956)Google Scholar ; Chalmers Johnson, Freedom of Thought and Expression in China: Communist Policies Toward the Intellectual Class (ibid. Vol. 21, May 1959); Theodore Ch'en, H. E., Thought Reform of the Chinese Intellectuals (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960)Google Scholar ; Alitto, Guy, “Thought reform in Communist China: the case of Chou Ku-ch'eng” (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, 05 1966)Google Scholar , and Edmunds, Clifford, “Historicism, ideology and political authority in Communist China: the case of Chien Po-tsan” (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, 12 1968)Google Scholar .

29. Oksenberg, Michel C., “Policy making under Mao, 1949–68: an overview,” in Lindbeck, John M. H. (ed.), China: Management of a Revolutionary Society (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), pp. 108–109Google Scholar ; Hsia, Adrian, Die Chinesische Kulturrevolution: Zur Entwicklung der Widersprueche in der chinesischen Gesellschaft (Neuwied: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1971), p. 139Google Scholar .

30. See above, n. 28.

31. “Chiang Ch'ing's speech at the enlarged meeting of the Military Affairs Committee of the CCP Central Committee on 12 April 1967,” Issues and Studies VI: 10 (1970), pp. 82–91Google Scholar.

32. For a perceptive analysis of the theory and practice of “opinion groups,” see Schumann, , Ideology and Organization in Communist China (2nd ed., Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 48 ffGoogle Scholar .

33. See MacFarquhar, Roderick, “Communist China's Intra-Party Dispute,” Pacific Affairs XXXI:4 (1958), pp. 323–336CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Chang, Parris H., “Struggle between the two roads in China's countryside,” Current Scene VI: 3 (1968), p. 1 ffGoogle Scholar .

34. That Mao reserved his opinions is revealed by a passage in Liu's first self-criticism: “As Mao was not in Peking then [1962], I went to him and delivered a report. Afterwards I learned that Chairman Mao was not at all in agreement with my appraisal of the situation.” Collected Works of Liu Shao-ch'i, III, 361 (emphasis added). Mao also permitted Chiang Ch'ing to prepare the original attack on Wu Han in secret, as she revealed in a speech in 1967: “I asked the Chairman if I could reserve my opinion. He said I could…Because he promised me to reserve my opinion on it it gave me courage to proceed with writing that article and to keep it secret. The secret was kept for seven to eight months during which the article was revised countless times.” See above, n. 31. Nor did Mao reveal the existence of this article to Feng Cheng when he asked the latter, on 10 October 1965, to carry out a rectification campaign against Wu Han.

35. Chang, , “Research notes on the changing loci of decision in the CCP,” CQ 44 (1970), pp. 169–195CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

36. There were 19 central work conferences in 1960–66: one in 1960, three in 1961, four in 1962, three in 1963, four in 1964–65, and four in 1966, according to Chang (ibid.). In addition to work conferences there were a number of other meetings, some with institutional labels, such as “enlarged Politburo meetings,” others known only by the place and time they were held.

37. Tsou, Tang, “The People's Liberation Army and the Cultural Revolution: a study of civil-military relationships in China” (unpublished paper, University of Chicago, 1971)Google Scholar .

38. As has also been noted in a 1 July 1971 People's Daily editorial which observed that some people have asked, “Since Liu Shao-ch'i…usurped part of the power…it needs only an order from Chairman Mao to dismiss them from office, why should the present method [of the Cultural Revolution] be adopted?” Quoted in Parris Chang, , Radicals and radical ideology in China's Cultural Revolution (Columbia University) (Research Institute on Communist Affairs, 1973)Google Scholar .

39. Beatty, Joseph, “Forgiveness,” American Philosophical Quarterly VII:3 (1970), pp. 246–255Google Scholar .

40. “Address before leaders of the CC” (1966), translated in JPRS 41884 (18 July 1967) and quoted in Starr, John Bryan, “Mao Tse-tung's theory of continuing the Revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat: its origins, development and practical implications,” (unpublished ph.d. thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1971), p. 417Google Scholar .

41. E.g., such questions as whether Wang Ch'ien stole a golden shoehorn and belt-buckle from Liu when he divorced her or whether he gave it to her and then falsely accused her.

42. Weber, Max, Economy and Society (ed. Roth, Guenther and Wittich, Claus, New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), I, 271–282Google Scholar .

43. For a discussion of “labelling” in the Cultural Revolution, see Bennett, Gordon A., “Political labels and popular tension,” Current Scene VII: 4 (1969), p. 1 ffGoogle Scholar .

44. London, Ivan and Lee, Ta-ling, “The making of a Red Guard,” New York Times Magazine, 4 01 1970, pp. 8–68Google Scholar .

45. Yomiuri, 4 April 1967, quoted in Rice, Edward, Mao's Way (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1972), p. 345Google Scholar .

46. See Vogel, Ezra, “From friendship to comradeship: the change in personal relations in Communist China,” CQ 21 (1965), pp. 46–61Google Scholar .

47. Chiang Ch'ing named her first daughter, Hsiao Li, as “person in charge” (chief editor) of the Chieh-fang-chün pao (PLA Daily) after the reorganization of the editorial board on 23 August 1967, and placed her second daughter, Li Ming, in one of the subordinate units of the science and technology commission for national defence, a department in charge of the nuclear weapons testing programme. Lin Piao appointed his wife Yeh Ch'ün as one of the nine members of the reorganized PLA Cultural Revolution Group in 1967, placing her sixth in order of precedence, and his daughter, Lin Tou-tou to the editorial staff of K'ungchün pao, the Air Force paper. Yu-shen, Chien, Chinds Fading Revolution: Army Dissent and Military Divisions, 1967–68 (Hong Kong: Centre for Contemporary Chinese Studies, 08 1969), p. 125Google Scholar .

48. Snow, Edgar, The Long Revolution (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 67Google Scholar .

49. “Biting the bullet,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 August 1971, pp. 21–23.

50. Oksenberg, , “Occupational groups in the Chinese society and the Cultural Revolution,” The Cultural Revolution: 1967 in Review (Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies, 1968), No. 2, pp. 1–45Google Scholar . See also Jancar, Barbara (whose study makes the same prediction), “The case for a loyal opposition under communism: Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia,” Orbis XII: 2 (1968), pp. 415–441Google Scholar .

51. Gittings, John, “Inside China: in the wake of the Cultural Revolution,” Ramparts X: 2 (1971), pp. 10–20Google Scholar .

52. Tsou, Tang, “The Values of the Chinese Revolution,” in Oksenberg, Michel (ed.), China's Developmental Experience (New York: Praeger, 1973, pp. 27–41Google Scholar .

53. In the autumn of 1970, after peasants had been urged to increase their investment funds by expanding side-line occupations and industries (Hung-ch'i, No. 3, 1970), radicals began attacking the commune system, agitating for the commune as unit of accounting, relating wages to need rather than work, etc. (Shensi Radio Service, 9 September 1970). During the winter, criticism continued in Shantung and Shansi until the 18 February People's Daily article.

54. “ Mao's speech to the 1st plenary session of the OCP's 9th OC” (28 April 1969), in Issues and Studies, March, 1970.

55. In Liu's formulation of the pre-Cultural Revolution pattern, “Leaders in the Party and higher-level organizations should pay more attention to democracy, and subordinates in the Party and lower-level organizations … to obedience.” Collected Works, I, 397. The post-Cultural Revolution pattern follows Mao's prescription, “Concentrate the great authority, diffuse the small authority.” Quoted in Schurmann, , “Organizational contrasts between Communist China and the Soviet Union,” (unpublished paper, Hong Kong, 03 1961), pp. 29–30Google Scholar .

56. Hung ch'i 11 (30 10 1972), pp. 19–22Google ScholarPubMed .

57. Henein, Georges, “Autocritique,” Petite Encyclopedie Politique (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1969), pp. 16–19Google Scholar .

58. Tatu, Michel, “Possibilities of evolution in the Soviet Union,” in The Atlantic Community and Eastern Europe: Perspective and Policy (Boulognes: The Atlantic Institute, 1967), pp. 19–25Google Scholar .