¹ Giuglaris, Marcel, “A Journey to North Vietnam,” Konkret (Hamburg), 12 1963, pp. 11–14Google Scholar, inJoint Publications Research Service (JPRS), No. 5234 (1964)Google Scholar; Kirk, Donald, in “The Cost of the War,” Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), 07 15, 1965, pp. 130–131Google Scholar, notes that “Hanoi has failed to publish any statistics supporting the image of industrial advance it has tried to create.” For general information on North Vietnam's economy up to 1958, seeHirszowski's, J. article in Chemik, Warsaw, 05 1958, pp. 146–148Google Scholar, in JPRS 608–D (1959). On China's contribution, seeChing-sheng, , “Economic Co-operation between China and the Asian People's Democracies,” People's China, 11 1, 1957, pp. 13–17Google Scholar.

² See, for example, Ban, Ly, “Increase Exports,” Quan Doi Nhan Dan (The People's Army), Hanoi, 05 14, 1964, p. 1Google Scholar, inJPRS 25268 (1964)Google Scholar.

³ “Principal Economic and Cultural Indices of North Vietnam's First Five-Year Plan,” Nghien Cuu Kinh Te (Economic Research), Hanoi, 06 1963, pp. 67–72Google Scholar, inJPRS 21707 (1964)Google Scholar. Average annual increase in the output of agriculture was to have been 6–5 per cent.

⁴ Diem, Hoang Van (Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade), “The Importance of Foreign Trade,” Doc Lap(Independence), Hanoi, 02 28, 1964, pp. 3 and 9Google Scholar, inJPRS 24551 (1964)Google Scholar.

⁵ Tran, Nguyen Van, “Industry to Support Agriculture More Effectively,” Hoc Tap (Study), Hanoi, 02 1964, pp. 37–46Google Scholar, inJPRS 24437 (1964)Google Scholar. By the end of 1964 over 2 million peasant families were in collectives, representing 87 per cent, of total peasant households. About 30 per cent, of the collectives were “advanced ” and 51 per cent. “second level” co-operatives: “Democratic Republic of Vietnam Develops an Independent Economy,”Shih-chieh Chih-shi (World Knowledge), Peking, No. 16, 1964, pp. 12–13Google Scholar(article submitted by the News Office of the North Vietnamese Embassy in Peking), inJPRS 26571 (1964)Google Scholar.

⁶ Jones, P. H. M., “As the North Sees It,” FEER, 03 18, 1966, pp. 487–489Google Scholar.

⁷ Decree No. 52TTG, Office of the Premier, May 10, 1962, quoted byToan, Nguyen Kien and Hau, Le Dinh in “Increase the Production of Export Goods,” Nghien Cuu Kinh Te, Hanoi, 06 1963, pp. 55–66Google Scholar, inJPRS 21707 (1964)Google Scholar. Cf. “To protect demands for important products, we should support exports, and give priority to exports for the long range”: Government Report to 6th Meeting of the 2nd National Assembly, ibid. “The principal goal of agriculture is to increase exports”: ibid.

⁸ Van, Han, “Self Reliance, Industriousness, and Thrift for Building Socialism,” Nhan Dan (The People), Hanoi, 02 6, 1964, p. 3Google Scholar, inJPRS 24114 (1964)Google Scholar.

⁹ Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR za 1961 god, Moscow 1962Google Scholar, Table VII

¹⁰ “Principal Economic and Cultural Indices.”

¹¹ “ Problems in Hanoi's Handicraft Export Companies,” Nhan Dan, Hanoi, 10 4, 1963, p. 3Google Scholar, inJPRS 2540 (1964)Google Scholar.

¹² Van, Han, “Favorable and Unfavorable Factors in the National Economy,” Nhan Dan, Hanoi, 02 5, 1964, p. 3Google Scholar, inJPRS 24114 (1964)Google Scholar.

¹³ Tien, Tran Dung, “Changes in the Lao Kay Apatite Mine,” Nhan Dan, Hanoi, 09 30, 1963, p. 3Google Scholar, inJPRS 2623 (1964)Google Scholar. The Lao Kay apatite mine was “built” with Soviet assistance, but apparently Soviet technical advice has lately been ignored in the rush for quantity. See alsoPhuong, Do, “Seven Months or Brave Struggle in the Coal Regions,” Nhan Dan, Hanoi, 08 8, 1963, p. 3Google Scholar, inJPRS 21893 (1964)Google Scholar. The author complains of mounting difficulties in the Hong Quang coal fields due to the growing scarcity of exploitable resources, lack of equipment and shortage of replacement parts.

¹⁴ Han Van, “Self Reliance, Industriousness.”

¹⁵ “Water Conservancy Projects under Expansion and Construction,”Yueh-nan Chieh-shao (Introducing North Vietnam), Peking, 05 10, 1963, pp. 16–17Google Scholar, inJPRS 21655 (1964)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Chi-minh, Ho, Selected Works (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Press, 1960)Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Nguyen Van Tran, “Industry to Support Agriculture.”

¹⁸ Nghi, Le Thanh, “Our Country is on the Road to Socialist Industrialisation,” Hoc Tap, Hanoi, 02 1964, pp. 27–36Google Scholar, inJPRS 24438 (1964)Google Scholar. This article details the destruction of the war against the French; e.g. only 114 kilometres of railroads left in North Vietnam in 1954; the death of over 2 million people from famine at the end of the Second World War (end 1944, beginning 1945).

¹⁹ Viet, Hong Quoc, “Strengthen Vietnamese-Chinese Friendship,” Nhan Dan, Hanoi, 10 1, 1964, p. 2Google Scholar, inJPRS 27198 (1964)Google Scholar. “When the time comes that the revolution of the two countries [Vietnam and China] is all under one leadership of the working class, the policy of the two countries will be even more unified and more directly influential on each other.… On the road to Socialism, the form of democratic people's dictatorship proposed by Chairman Mao Tse-tung has become a unique form of the countries that have completed the people's democratic revolution without having to go through capitalism”: “On the 40th Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party,”Nhan Dan, Hanoi, 06 26, 1961Google Scholar, inJPRS 10250 (1961)Google Scholar.

²⁰ See, for instance, “Pravda's Reminder,” FEER, February 25, 1965, p. 318.

²¹ Nguyen Kien Toan and Le Dinh Hau: “Some people think‘our production is still low. If there is an increase in exports, the domestic market will be nervous.’… For certain products there may be, at certain times, imbalances between domestic demand and demand for export.” This, however, is always corrected by “the nature of our planned economy.”

²² “Produce More Export Goods,” Nhan Dan, Hanoi, 02 19, 1964, pp. 1Google Scholar and 4, in JPRS 24067 (1964)Google Scholar. The article advocates the formation of regions specialised in export production.

²³ Sharapov, V., “Labor in Name of Victory,” Pravda, Moscow, 10 13, 1965, p. 5Google Scholar.

²⁴ Khue, Ngoc, “Some Financial Problems in the First Five-Year Plan of the DRV,” Finansy SSSR, Moscow, 03 1964. pp. 73–81Google Scholar.

²⁵ The basis of this assumption is as follows: (1) The probable stagnation (or even diminution) of domestically generated budgetary revenues resulting from (a) agricultural difficulties in 1963–64; (b) the damage inflicted on industry and transport by U.S. bombing since February 1965. According to Kirk, Donald, “The Receiving End,” FEER, 07 8, 1965, p. 97Google Scholar, “North Vietnam's industry, enlarged by Chinese and Soviet aid, has not met the targets of the First Five-Year Plan ending this year.” (2) The indirect evidence of stepped-up Soviet, East European and Chinese economic aid as seen in the number of new commercial and technical agreements. Thus, in June-July 1965 North Vietnam negotiated trade and aid agreements with the Soviet Union, China, Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and North Korea. On December 5, 1965, a Sino-Vietnamese agreement on loans and a protocol on the supply of goods and payments for 1966 were signed in Peking following a similar agreement for 1965 signed in September 1964. A protocol on scientific and technical co-operation between the two countries was signed in Hanoi on December 3, 1965: see NCNA, Peking, December 5, 1965, andPeking Review, December 10, 1965, pp. 3–4. Trade talks were also held between the Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous Region of China and representatives of the DRV Cao Bang and Lang Son border regions in June 1965: see Hsinhua, Nanning, 06 30, 1965Google Scholar. The July 13, 1965, Peking agreement specified Chinese aid “without compensation” in equipment for national defence and economy, mechanical equipment in complete sets, goods and materials: Economic Bulletin, Hong Kong, 10 1965Google ScholarPubMed. The July 1965 DRV-Soviet agreement “on developing the nonal economy and strengthening the defence capability of the DRV” was said to have provided “aid beyond that already granted under previously concluded agreements”: “In Spirit of Fraternal Friendship,” Pravda, July 13, 1965, p. 1. Roumania has reportedly granted new credits to the DRV in December 1965 while postponing repayments on earlier credits. East Germany concluded an aid agreement with North Vietnam on December 30, 1965. Bulgaria has pledged an interest-free loan for machinery, equipment and technical aid in January 1966: FEER, January 13 and 20, 1966, pp. 40 and 76. The Tricontinental Havana Conference in January 1966 formed a committee to aid North Vietnam: FEER, January 15, 1966, p. 112.

²⁶ Tran, Nguyen Van, “Our Gratitude for China's Generous and Unselfish Aid,” Nhan Dan, Hanoi, 09 28, 1959, p. 3Google Scholar, in JPRS 3057 (1960)Google Scholar. The total amount of these “gifts” is given as 900 million yuan, or roughly 450 million old roubles.

²⁷ Le Thanh Nghi, “Our Country is on the Road.”

²⁸ Karamyshev, V. P., “Agriculture in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,” Zemledeliye, Moscow, 10 1957, pp. 78–86, in JPRS 313-DL (1958)Google Scholar. The Chinese also helped establish a number of specialised state farms: “New Economic Successes in Vietnam,” Markt lnformationen fuer den Aussenhandel, Berlin, 12 1, 1962, pp. 1–3Google Scholar.

²⁹ The figures for 1961–65 have probably to be raised, especially for grants: see note 29. The 20 milHon rouble “grant” for 1961–65 was a Soviet contribution to North Vietnam's anti-malaria campaign, whether a grant or a loan is not clear. For the record, Tran, Nguyen Van, in “Our Gratitude for China's Generous and Unselfish Aid,” Nhan Dan, 09 28, 1959, p. 3Google Scholar, mentions a figure of 900 million yuan as China's grants contribution in 1955–59. A New York Times report of February 1, 1965, p. 5, gives the figure of 141,750,000 new roubles (1,418 million old roubles) as China's pledged long-term credit aid agreed on at the end of January 1961. This seems unlikely. Ton Due Thang, Chairman of the Vietnam-Soviet Friendship Association, says that in 1955 the Soviet Union gave North Vietnam 400 million old roubles “which need not be redeemed” (presumably for 1955–58), and that on July 3, 1959, an agreement was signed for a further credit aid of 100 million old roubles (presumably for 1958–60):Nhan Dan, Hanoi, 03 14, 1959, p. 3Google Scholar, in JPRS 1593–D (1959), Shchedrov, I., in his Pravda, 01 30, 1963Google Scholar, article, says that total aid by “socialist countries” (gifts and loans) from 1955 to 1960 amounted to 250 million old roubles and that “fraternal aid” for the 1961–65 Vietnamese Five-Year Plan was 200 million roubles of which the U.S.S.R. contributed 40 per cent.

³⁰ New York Times, August 28, 1963, p. 3.

³¹ Topping, Seymour, New York Times, 02 16, 1966, p. 5Google Scholar. Indonesia, before October 1965, had used less than one-third of its $100 million Chinese loan allocation. The United Arab Republic did not use any of the promised S80 million credit line, and Algeria drew $3 million out of the $50 million offered. The basic reason for the disparity is China's inability to deliver the quantities of goods promised, nor meet the qualitative specifications of the loan agreements. Other factors include lengthy Peking haggling over precise terms, faulty delivery schedules, and difficulty experienced by some developing countries (e.g., Burma) in exploiting the Chinese loans for industrial development quickly, and in obtaining spare parts. In 1965 China pledged only $50 million, compared to $330 million in the previous year.

³² “Principal Economic and Cultural Indices.”

³³ Nhan Dan, Hanoi, 09 27, 1957Google Scholar, inJPRS 582–NY (1958)Google Scholar.

³⁴ The value of Soviet exports of “automobile transportation and garage equipment” was 5–4 million roubles in 1963 and 3–5 million roubles in 1964:Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR za 1964 god, Moscow, 1965Google Scholar. The U.S.S.R. also supplied North Vietnam with about 4 million roubles’ worth of petroleum products per year.

³⁵ “Principal Economic and Cultural Indices.” The output of the Lao Kay mine was reportedly 457,000 tons in 1961.

³⁶ Ibid. The output of the Hon Gay mine was 2–8 million tons in 1961.

³⁷ Hiang Ngay, Hanoi, 07 13, 1957Google Scholar, in JPRS 271–NY (1958).

³⁸ Nhan Dan, Hanoi, 09 27, 1957Google Scholar, in JPRS 582–NY (1958).

³⁸ North Vietnam had 2,180 “doctors and physicians” in 1960 and was aiming at 12,900 by 1965. Presumably this includes medical personnel serving in the armed forces. Communist definitions of “doctors and physicians” are rather elastic. If the Chinese practice is followed, the figure probably includes “doctors” practising traditional (folk) medicine. President Johnson claims, by comparison, that South Vietnam had 200 civilian doctors in 1965: seeJohnson, Lyndon B., The Third Face of War (Address to the Association of American Editorial Cartoonists, 05 13, 1965), Washington, D.C., Agency for International Development, 1965, p. 4Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ See, for example, Nhan Dan, Hanoi, 09 27, 1957Google Scholar, in JPRS 368–NY (1958).

⁴¹ “Chinese Assistance to Electrification of North Vietnam,” Yueh-nan Chieh-shao, Peking, 05 10, 1963Google Scholar, inJPRS 4935 (1964)Google Scholar; Thoi Moi, Hanoi, 08 10, 1957Google Scholar, in JPRS 368–NY (1958).

⁴² “Chinese Assistance in the Construction of the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Combine,” Yeh-nan Chieh-shao, Peking, 05 10, 1963, pp. 5–6Google Scholar, inJPRS 4935 (1964)Google Scholar.

⁴³ Ibid. In view of this and many other expressions of gratitude for Chinese technical aid one must discount a captured North Vietnamese officer's story that “the only Chinese Communists he had seen in Vietnam were army engineers who were repairing bridges damaged by United States bombing: New York Times, January 6, 1966, p. 2.

⁴⁴ “The Crystallization of Vietnam-Chinese Amity,” Yueh-nan Chieh-shao, Peking, 05 10, 1963, pp. 7–8Google Scholar, inJPRS 21655 (1964)Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ Anh, Tran Tuan, “The New Ham Rong Bridge,” To Quoc, Hanoi, 04 1964, pp. 22–24Google Scholar, inJPRS 24855 (1964)Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ Lao Dong, Hanoi, 12 21, 1957, p. 6Google Scholar, in JPRS 709–NY (1958).

⁴⁷ “Le Minh Factory—Symbol of Light and Warmth,” Yueh-nan Chieh-shao, Peking, 05 10, 1963, p. 2Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Nhan Dan, Hanoi, 09 28, 1959Google Scholar, inJPRS 3057 (1960)Google Scholar; Bao Tan Viet Hoa, Hanoi, 09 28, 1959, p. 3Google Scholar, inJPRS 3057 (1960)Google Scholar; Markt Informalionen; Nhan Dan, Hanoi, 09 3, 1963, p. 3Google Scholar, inJPRS 22041 (1964)Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ New York Times, February 14, 1961, p. 5.

⁵⁰ Thot Moi, August 4, 1957, in JPRS 368-NY (1958); The Statesman's Yearbook 1962–1963 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962), p. 1588Google Scholar. According to Han Van, Czechoslovakia's contribution during 1958–60 was four plywood plants and sawmills.

⁵¹ Nhan Dan, Hanoi, 05 12, 1961, p. 2Google Scholar, inJPRS 9986 (1961)Google Scholar.

⁵² Cuu Quoc, Hanoi, 01 8, 1959, p. 1Google Scholar, in JPRS 1593–N (1959).

⁵³ Associated Press, Berlin, 12 5, 1965Google ScholarPubMed. North Vietnam's production of bicycles (the principal form of transportation in the cities) was 27,000 units in 1960 with 100,000 scheduled for 1965.

⁵⁴ FEER, March 25, 1966, p. 536.

⁵⁵ Ibid., February 3, 1966, pp. 195–196.

⁵⁶ “How Low Can They Sink!” by Commentator, Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily), Peking, 12 25, 1965Google Scholar, in Peking Review, January 1, 1966, pp. 16–17. Earlier, the Chinese had charged that “in fact, the new leaders of the CPSU have disclosed the details of their so-called ‘aid’to Vietnam to the Americans through various channels”: “Refutation of the New Leaders of the CPSU on ‘United Action’, “by Editorial Departments of the People's Daily and Hung Ch'i (Red Flag), in Peking Review, November 12, 1965, pp. 10–21.

⁵⁷ The text was apparently leaked to the West through East Berlin. Excerpts appeared in the Hamburg newspaper Die Welt on March 22, 1966, the Washington Post of the same day and the New York Times of the following day.

⁵⁸ Za Rubezhom, December 10–16, 1965.

⁵⁹ FEER, July 29, 1965, p. 204.

⁶⁰ Taylor, Charles, “Bullets and Bargirls,” FEER, 01 6, 1966Google Scholar.