1. Chan, Joseph Man and Lee, Chin-Chuan, “Shifting journalistic paradigms: editorial stance and political transition in Hong Kong,” The China Quarterly, No. 117 (1989), pp. 98–118CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Note that throughout this article, romanization of names is inconsistent partly because of the differences between Mandarin and Cantonese. The family name may be placed before or after the given name, depending on the custom, but it is customary that the given name is hyphenated.

2. Lee, Chin-Chuan and Chan, Joseph Man, “Thunder of Tiananmen: The Hong Kong press in China's orbit,” in Lee, Chin-Chuan (ed.), Voices of China: The Interplay of Politics and Journalism (New York: Guilford, 1990)Google Scholar.

3. See, for example, Hallin, Daniel, The Uncensored War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986)Google Scholar; Gitlin, Todd, The Whole World is Watching (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980)Google Scholar; Tuchman, Gaye, Making News (New York: Free Press, 1978)Google Scholar.

4. TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949), p. 13Google Scholar. According to Hawley, the current literature on co-optation is predominantly definitional in nature. There is also a renewal of interest in co-optation in studies in organizational sociology and administration as evidenced by the increase in the frequency with which Selznick's TVA study has been cited between 1975 and 1979. Hawley, Karen E., “A theory of an outsider's and insider's decision to participate in a political issue and its implication for the process of co-optation,” Ph.D. dissertation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1980)Google Scholar.

5. Pennings, J. M., “Strategically interdependent organizations,” in Nystrom, P. and Starbuck, W. H. (eds.), Handbook of Organizational Design (London: Oxford University Press, 1981), Vol. 1Google Scholar.

6. Lasswell, Harold, “The structure and function of communication in society,” in Bryson, Lyman (ed), The Communication of Ideas (New York: Harper and Row, 1948)Google Scholar; Aldrich, Howard E., Organizations and Environments (Englewood: Prentice-Hall, 1979)Google Scholar.

7. Weber, Max, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), edited by Roth, Guenther and Wittich, Claus, pp. 33–38Google Scholar.

8. The colonial regime is similarly besieged by a legitimacy gap about its ability to govern effectively, a gap to be widened as time draws close to British exit. The British have also applied co-optative strategies to retain press loyalty, but this is beyond the scope of this article.

9. Zedong, Mao, “On contradiction,” in Selected Works (Beijing: Xinhua, 1969)Google Scholar.

10. Chiu, Hung-dah and Ren, Xiao-yu (eds.), Negotiation Strategy of Communist China (Taipei: Lien-jing, 1985)Google Scholar.

11. We owe this conceptual clarification to Yoon, Youngchul, “Political transition and press ideology in South Korea, 1980–1988,” Ph.D. dissertation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1989)Google Scholar.

12. TVA and the Grass Roots, p. 17.

13. For example, Pfeffer, Jeffrey and Salancik, Phillip, The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 161Google Scholar.

14. For an exposition, see Lee, Chin-Chuan and Chan, Joseph Man, “Journalistic paradigms in flux: the press and political transition in Hong Kong,” Bulletin of Ethnology Academia Sinica, No. 63 (Spring 1987), pp. 109–131Google Scholar.

15. See ibid. for a description of the press structure.

16. Cheng Ming Monthly, September 1983.

17. Yuan-lo, Xuan, Looking Closely at Xinhua (Hong Kong: Wide-angled Publications, 1987), pp. 83–99Google Scholar. Our informants revealed that Xinhua threw at least 200 dinner parties a year.

18. To avoid political sensitivity, Xinhua renamed the United Front Department as the Social Co-ordination Department, performing the same function of winning friendship and coalescing support. News production is grouped under the News and Correspondance Department, which distributes news releases with inputs from the Propaganda Department and others. See Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 January 1986.

19. Giddens, Anthony, Central Problems in Social Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

20. For example, Xinhua leaked to Sing tao that Xu Jiatun would assume Xinhua's directorship in Hong Kong.

21. China's interests in Hong Kong include a total of 265 branches of the 23 PRC-based banks, 50 corporations, 90 labour unions, plus motion picture and publication companies, schools and other investment ventures (see Sin, Long, Hong Kong's “Shadow Government,” Hong Kong: Hai-san, 1985Google Scholar). Xinhua also controls the budget, personnel and content of the communist press in Hong Kong.

22. King-shuen, Chan, “An insider's view of the suppression of The Seventies and Cheng Ming” Pai hsing, 16 08 1981Google Scholar; Mang, Yu, “Bu Xaofu, Har Kung and freedom of speech in Hong Kong,” Cheng Ming Monthly, 10 1985Google Scholar.

23. For example, the Beijing-based China Friendship Publishing Company has published collected works by overseas Chinese writers with the royalty, though meagre, paid in foreign currencies. A writer once extremely critical of Beijing remarked, “That company promises to print 35,000 copies of my work. I've never had that many readers in my life.” (See Leung, Julia, “China gets a better press in Hong Kong,” Asian Wall Street Journal, 7 01 1986Google Scholar.)

24. Xu took the initiative to communicate with Lam San-muk, publisher of the critical Hong Kong Economic Journal, who came away from Xu's banquet feeling a respect for Xu as a person, if not endorsing China's policy. See Kit-fung, Cheung, “Is it possible to maintain the status quo after 1997?” Pai hsing, 1 01 1985Google Scholar.

25. Jiatun, Xu, “A re-evaluation of capitalism,” Qiu shi, 1 07 1988Google Scholar.

26. Contemporary Weekly, 13 January 1990.

27. King, Ambrose, “Hong Kong's political transition,” China Times Weekly, New York, 3 11 1985, pp. 16–17Google Scholar.

28. Galbraith, John K., The Anatomy of Power (Boston: Houghton Mufflin, 1983)Google Scholar.

29. Lukes, Steven, Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan, 1974)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

30. Interview.

31. Solomon, Richard, “Chinese political negotiating behavior,” (Rand Corporation, 1983)Google Scholar; Chiu and Ren, Negotiating Strategy.

32. Leung, Julia, “China woos Hong Kong's business elite,” Asian Wall Street Journal, 16 01 1988Google Scholar; Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 August 1985.

33. A local businessman explains, “They invite you to dinner. After a week, they invite you again – and then again. After many dinners, it's most difficult to say bad things about your host.” Ibid.

34. Cheng Ming Monthly, October 1985.

35. Pai hsing, 1 July 1986, p. 9.

36. Leung, “China woos Hong Kong's business elite.”

37. Pai hsing, 1 July 1986, p. 9. Wang himself later emigrated to Hawaii.

38. Contemporary Weekly, 13 January 1990, p. 12.

39. Selections from the Documents on the Question of Hong Kong (Beijing: People's, 1985), p. 3Google Scholar.

40. “Heart to heart in Peking pantheon,” editorial, South China Morning Post, 12 April 1985.

41. Ta Kung, 21 December 1985.

42. “Heart to heart in Peking pantheon.”

43. “United front in Hong Kong,” Asiaweek, 2 November 1984; Leung, “China woos Hong Kong's business elite.”

44. Interview.

45. Lee and Chan, “Thunder of Tiananmen.”

46. “Xinhua's management of the situation after June 4,” Contemporary Weekly, 25 November 1989, pp. 14–15.

47. Xu Jiatun had consulted Zhao Ziyang during the movement and was told to play it down and not to impair Deng's image in Hong Kong. After 4 June, Ji Pengfei berated Xu for failing to check anti-Beijing activities in Hong Kong. Xu asked Li Peng for “understanding,” as the practical circumstances in Hong Kong were such that taking any repressive actions then could have backfired. See Contemporary Weekly, 16 December 1989, p. 5; and Ming, Wai, “Xu Jiatun protects cadres in Hong Kong,” Contemporary Weekly, 20 01 1990, p. 4Google Scholar.

48. To cover events in China, reporters have to secure entry permits from Xinhua and are not allowed to engage in activities beyond the planned itineraries spelt out in the application. Upon arrival in China, they must apply for a “reporter card” from the Chinese Journalists Association. Not only are they barred from gathering information during personal travels, they are prohibited from interviewing institutions, units and individuals by telephone in China.

49. Yum-cho, Ngai, “Hong Kong file,” Nineties Monthly, 09 1989, pp. 50–51Google Scholar.

50. “To rise again from the ‘ruins of confidence’,” Contemporary Weekly, 25 November 1989.

51. Xinhua arranged a special trip for journalists to visit Beijing in December 1989. At first, Xinhua planned to invite the Journalist Executives Association to send a delegation; but the very thought of possibly having to pay tribute to the martial law soldiers and to shake hands with Li Peng led them to turn down the invitation. Xinhua then invited individual journalists from various media to visit Beijing as a group. Still resentful about the bloody crackdown, they joined the tour with the understanding that they would not meet Li Peng. This information was based on interviews with journalists.

52. See, for example, Cheng, Joseph, Hong Kong: In Search of a Future (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1984)Google Scholar.

53. Chan, and Lee, , “Shifting journalistic paradigms,” p. 103Google Scholar. For definitions of press ideology see p. 102.

54. Interview.

55. Interview.

56. Interview.

57. Interview.

58. This title has been dropped from the mastheads of Sing tao wan pao, which is not sold in Taiwan, and from the Northern American edition of Sing tao jih pao.

59. Xaofu, Bu, “My pillow testifies to my serene sleep every night,” Ming pao, 27 01 1986Google Scholar. Poon has since emigrated to Australia.

60. Interview with Shum.

61. Leung, “China woos Hong Kong's business elite.”

62. For example, on 27 March 1986 Wah kiu carried a lead editorial headlined: “The dictatorial government ought to be held accountable to the people.” This would have been unimaginable just a few years before.

63. Cha, Louis, “In defence of freedom of speech,” editorial, Ming pao, 27 01 1986Google Scholar.

64. Interview.

65. Interview.

66. Frank about his editorial policy, Cha said, “I keep interference with my staff's work to the minimum so that they can develop their potential. But when they deviate from our policies, I tell them. As a matter of course, they will understand our positions after working together for some time. The new recruits usually do not occupy important positions; after working for a period of time, they naturally will keep in step with us.” (See Lai-kit, Ho, “Louis Cha: a learned boss” in Ho, , Ten Interviews (Hong Kong: Culture Book House, 1977)Google Scholar.)

67. Interview with one of Cha's aids.

68. Ming pao, editorial, 29 January 1986.

69. Cha, Louis, “On press freedom,” Ming pao, 21–23 03 1986Google Scholar.

70. Interview with a senior editor.

71. Interview.

72. For details see Lee and Chan, “Thunder of Tiananmen.”

73. Interview.

74. But the question remains of why Sing pao was among those papers most adamantly supportive of the students right from the outset of the 1989 democracy movement, in fact much earlier than most of its peers. See Lee and Chan, “Thunder of Tiananmen.”

75. “United front in Hong Kong,” Asiaweek, 2 December 1984.

76. Lee and Chan, “Thunder of Tiananmen.”

77. For example, “Hong Kong people definitely do not believe the Communist Party's promises,” editorial, Hong Kong Times, 16 April 1984; “Communists' words cannot be trusted,” editorial, Hong Kong Times, 3 August 1984; “The two cutting edges of the united front tactics by local communists,” editorial, Kung sheung, 16 September 1984; “Don't eat the sugar-coated poison,” editorial, Times, 12 January 1984; “‘Hong Kong administering Hong Kong’ is a sugar-coated poison,” editorial, Kung sheung, 9 December 1982.

78. Robert Ho, the publisher, explained that he feared a swift shift would have lost old readers but gained few new ones. (For an interview with Ho, see Hong Kong Economic Journal, 9 May 1988.)

79. For example, Dr Chang Ching-yu, Taiwan's former Director of the Government Information Bureau, could not obtain a visa to officiate at the inauguration of a KMT propaganda office in Hong Kong.

80. KMT forces in Hong Kong included the Chinese Cultural Association, the Central News Agency, the Hong Kong Times, China Travel Agency (which is a quasiconsular office), Overseas Chinese Travel Agency (which grants Taiwan visas to overseas Chinese), Kowloon Chamber of Commerce, and a dozen private colleges whose credentials are recognized by Taiwan. See Kang-sheng, Huang, The Problem of Hong Kong's Existence (Hong Kong: Buoyee, 1987), p. 31Google Scholar.

81. Selections from the Document on the Question of Hong Kong (Beijing: People's, 1985), p. 8Google Scholar. Xu Jiatun repeated the same message in an exclusive interview with Keng, Lu (Pai hsing, 1 02 1985)Google Scholar.

82. The Journalist, 22 January 1990, p. 81.

83. Xaofu, Bu, “Thank you, Mr Xu Jiatun's goodwill,” Newsdom, 17 08 1985Google Scholar; Chung-han, Tong, “Recent activities of pro-Taiwan forces in Hong Kong,” Pai hsing, 16 11 1985Google Scholar.

84. Hong Kong is Taiwan's third largest export market, after the United States and Japan. Additionally, about 40% of Taiwan's exports passes through Hong Kong to South-east Asia, the Middle East and Western Europe. This is not to mention Hong Kong's political role. See “The choices Taiwan has to make in face of the Hong Kong problem,” The Mirror Monthly, August 1983. Taiwan formed a special inter-ministerial committee to oversee its Hong Kong policy, which aimed to absorb part of Hong Kong's investments. Taiwan has also decided to invest aggressively in Hong Kong to establish a stronghold.

85. Martin Lee, a member of China's Basic Law Drafting Committee and of Hong Kong's Legislative Council, often spoke in favour of democratic formation in Hong Kong and against the PRC's interference. The Times (for example, editorial, 10 April 1986) praised Lee for having the courage to speak the truth while chiding his colleagues for acting like Beijing's “rubber stamp.” (see Kang-sheng, Huang, The Problem of Hong Kong's Existence, pp. 26–28Google Scholar). Lee was openly attacked by Beijing for his role in supporting the 1989 student democracy movement in China.

86. He said: “Beijing has said Hong Kong can exist under a ‘one-country, two-systems’ policy. We will stay to test this [policy] to see if they can accept our system. But we won't change to suit their palate,and we won't close down voluntarily.” (See Lau, Emily, “A media melting pot of all political stripes,” Far Eastern Economic Review, p. 29, 13 02 1986Google Scholar.)

87. Yufei, Shi, “The Hong Kong Times' quarrel in Taipei,” The Nineties, 02 1985Google Scholar.

88. For example, “Stay calm amidst changes, unite and self-help,” editorial, Hong Kong Times, 27 September 1984.

89. Interview.

90. 20 December 1985.

91. Lee and Chan, “Thunder of Tiananmen.”

92. A group of taxi drivers went on strike because of a dispute over price increases. When they petitioned their grievances to Xinhua, Xinhua told them to go to the Hong Kong government instead.

93. Interview.

94. Lau, “A media melting pot.”

95. Ibid.

96. When asked by a leftist reporter whether he was being unfair, Xu, retorted, “Fair, or unfair – so what?” Contemporary Weekly, 13 01 1990, p. 12Google Scholar.

97. Interview with a Wen wei po executive.

98. Interview.

99. Chan, Joseph Man and Lee, Chin-Chuan, “Press ideology and organizational control in Hong Kong,” Communication Research, 15,2 (1988), pp. 185–197CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

100. Many recent recruits, however, reportedly have left Wen wei after a short while because, despite the paper's efforts at liberalization, they still felt dissatisfied with its ideological rigidity. Wen wei has increasingly depended on Hong Kong residents educated in China, who are ideologically trustworthy and familiar with local Hong Kong needs.

101. Interview.

102. Interview.

103. Lee and Chan, “Thunder of Tiananmen.”

104. Lung-chi, Sun, The Deep Structure of the Chinese Culture (Hong Kong: Longmen, 1983)Google Scholar.

105. Jones, David A. Jr, “A leg to stand on? Post-1997 Hong Kong court as a constraint on PRC abridgement of individual rights and local autonomy,” Yale Journal of International Law, 12,2 (1987), pp. 250–293Google Scholar.

106. Galbraith, The Anatomy of Power, Lukes, Power: A Radical View.

107. “Xinhua in the aftermath of June 4,” Contemporary Weekly, No. 1, 25 11 1989, pp. 14–17Google Scholar. This magazine is published by the deposed publisher of Wen wei po, Li Zisong, and his associates.

108. Lee and Chan, “Thunder of Tiananmen.”

109. See Gitlin, , The World is Watching, pp. 303–305Google Scholar for an exposition of qualitative methodology.

110. The breakdown is as follows: Ultra-leftist: Ta kung pao and Wen wei po 6; Centrist: Ming pao, Sing pao, The Oriental Daily, Hong Kong Economic Journal 13; Rightist: Sing tao jih pao, Wah kiu yat pao 9; Ultra-rightist: The Hong Kong Times 3; Broadcast journalists (TV and radio) 6; Magazine journalists 3; Columnists, media critics or analysts 6; Government officials 2; Xinhua officials 6.

111. Available on request.