1. Lardy, Nicholas R., Agriculture in China's Modern Economic Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 210CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2. See Oi, Jean C., “State and peasant in contemporary China: the politics of grain procurement” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1983)Google Scholar, Ch. 6.

3. See. e.g., “Guanyu gaige nongchanpin tongpaigou zhidu wenda” (”Answers to questions about reform of the unified quota procurement system for agricultural products”), Banyue tan (Bimonthly Commentary), No. 3 (1985), pp. 5–8Google Scholar.

4. Walker, Kenneth. “Chinese agriculture during the period of the Readjustment. 1978–83,” The China Quarterly (CQ), No. 100 (12 1984), pp. 789–91Google Scholar.

5. The Chinese press emphasizes that the record grain production of 800 billion jis is not too much grain and warns that grain production efforts cannot be relaxed. See, e.g., “We must certainly not relax grain production-third comment on readjusting the rural production mix,” [trans, from Zhongguo nongmin bao (China Peasants Daily), 30 01 1985, p. 1]Google Scholar, trans, in China Report: Agriculture, 6 03 1985, pp. 4–5; and “Adopt an open-door policy towards grain and there will be vigour and vitality across the board” [trans, from Liaowang (Outlook), No. 4 (21 01 1985), pp. 18–19]Google Scholar, translated in China Report: Agriculture, 6 March, pp. 8–12. Moreover, as Walker, “Chinese agriculture,” points out, there is also significant regional variation in grain production.

6. Zhongguo jingji jibao (China Economic Quarterly), No. 4 (1984), pp. 26–27Google Scholar.

7. Nongmin ribao (Peasant Daily), 9 January 1985, p. 2. Statistics on this problem are presented in Zhongguo jingji jibao, No. 4 (1984), pp. 26–28Google Scholar and in Ruhai, Zhang, Nongchan jiage wenti yanjiu (Research on the Problem of Agricultural Prices) (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1984)Google Scholar. The best work in English on the costs of subsidies is by Nicholas Lardy. The following paragraphs draw heavily on his efforts. See his Agriculture, particularly Ch. 5, and his “Consumption and living standards in China, 1978–83,” CQ, No. 100 (12 1984), pp. 849–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8. Lardy, , Agriculture, p. 193Google Scholar.

9. See Ruhai, Zhang, Research, p. 13Google Scholar.

10. Lardy, , Agriculture, p. 193Google Scholar.

11. Ruhai, Zhang, Research, p. 6Google Scholar.

12. Ibid. pp. 14–15.

13. Zhongguo jingji jibao. No. 4 (1984), p. 26Google Scholar.

14. Lardy, , Agriculture, p. 196Google Scholar.

15. Lardy, , “Consumption.” p. 854Google Scholar.

16. Lardy, , Agriculture, p. 196Google Scholar. The costs of this subsidy may have stabilized. An article written in 1984 by Chen Chichen states that for every jin of rationed grain sold, the state subsidy is approximately 1 jiao (or 0.1 yuan). Chen also writes that the state has adopted a plan to try to recoup some of its losses. As of April 1984 grain procured under the state plan can be sold outside the rationing system at a negotiated price called the “pingzhuanyi price.” This would be equal to the basic procurement price plus management costs plus a reasonable profit for the state (this amount is not stated). For each jin of grain sold at this price, 1 to 2 fen would be turned over to state revenues over quota procurements. Zhongguo jingji jibao. No. 4 (1984), p. 28Google Scholar.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid. p. 26.

19. “Rich peasants still have worries” (from China Daily, 4 December 1983, p. 4) in China Report: Agriculture, 12 January 1984, p. 36.

20. “Investigation of difficulties in selling grain reported” [from Nongye jingji wenti No. 8 (08 1983), pp. 52–54]Google Scholar, trans, in China Report: Agriculture, 12 January 1984, pp. 43–48.

21. E.g., Shanxi provincial store-houses have since 1979 been accumulating larger and larger stocks of grain. Because of poor conditions in the makeshift granaries, which the province was forced to use, 20 million jin of corn were lost to insects. Nongye xiandai hua yanjiu (Research on Agricultural Modernization). No. 2 (1985), pp. 24–26Google Scholar.

22. See Oi, “State and peasant,” Ch. 2, for a discussion the grain storage problems in the 1950s and the methods adopted to store surplus grain.

23. See, e.g., Zhongguo nongmin bao (Chinese Peasant Gazette), 6 September 1984, p. 1.

24. Jilin's total harvest that year was 29.5 billion jin. Without the mindai chu system, peasants would had a surplus of over 10 billion jin of grain on their hands. Renmin ribao (People's Daily), 24 July 1984, p. 2.

25. Zhongguo jingji jibao. No. 4 (1984), p. 28Google Scholar; Zhongguo nongmin bao, 26 August 1984, p. 1; and Shanxi nongmin (Shanxi Peasants). 14 December 1984, p. 1. In addition to the examples listed in text, also see Guangdong nongmin bao (Guangdong Peasant Gazette), 24 November 1983, p. 1; Zhongguo nongmin bao, 15 November 1983, p. 2; and Renmin ribao, 22 July 1984, p. 2.

26. Shanxi nongmin, 14 December 1984, p. 1.

27. This figure is based on examples from Hubei, and Shandong, . “Dangyangxian caiqu santiao cuojue baohu zhongliang jijixing” (“Dangyang county adopts three measures to maintain enthusiasm for grain cultivation”), Nongcun gongzuo tongxun (Rural Work Bulletin), No. 11 (1984), pp. 14–15Google Scholar; and Zhongguo nongmin bao, 16 October 1984, p. 1.

28. Jingji cankao (Economic Information), 22 May 1985, p. 2.

29. Ibid.

30. For press accounts, see Guangdong nongmin bao, 29 September 1983, p. 3. Interview No. 23/1/8 and No. 18/23/7. In the summer of 1984 I interviewed 20 former rural residents, from various provinces of China, on the economic reforms in their villages. Their experiences ranged from provincial level cadres to team leaders and ordinary peasants. The interviews were conducted in' Hong Kong at the Universities Service Centre and totalled 120 hours. I will cite these interviews by the interviewee number and the date in 1984 when the interview was conducted (day/month). The citation Interview No. 23/1/8 refers to an interview done with interviewee number 23 on 1 August (1984).

31. For press accounts see, for example, Renmin ribao, 16 March 1985, p. 5.

32. Interview No. 13/7/8.

33. See Oi, Jean C., “Peasant households between plan and market: cadre control over agricultural inputs,” Modern China (04 1986)Google Scholar for a discussion of the costs and difficulties of hiring transport in the post-reform period.

34. See, e.g., Zhongguo nongmin bao, 12 January 1984, p. 2; and Guangdong nongmin bao, 18 August 1984, p. 3.

35. Waiting is not always a problem. Peasants who can afford to wait out the market can make much bigger profits. An experienced and rather well-off peasant whose family grew water chestnuts said that if he sells his crop right after the harvest, when the supply is plentiful, he would only get 3–8 yuan/100 jin, whereas if he could keep his crop until about New Year, the price would go up to as high as 27 yuan/100 jin (Interview No. 15/8/8). Many grain farmers, however, do not find themselves able to afford this strategy.

36. Interview No. 13/7/8.

37. See Zelin, Madeleine, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in Eighteenth-Century Ch'ing China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984)Google Scholar, and T'ung-tsu, Ch'u, Local Government in China Under the Ch'ing (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962)Google Scholar, on the corrupt practices of Qing granary officials.

38. This practice is not limited to grain. A particularly interesting case of extortion by cadres from purchasing stations involves peasants waiting in line to sell cotton. The cadres approached the peasants and offered to buy their cotton and save them the trouble of waiting. The catch was that the price they were offering was significantly lower than the official state purchase price. When the peasants hesitated, the cadres retorted that if they refused to sell their cotton to them then, they were still going to lose when they got inside the purchasing station. The cadres said that they were the ones who weighed and graded the cotton. Renmin ribao, 16 March 1985, p. 5.

39. See, for example, Zhongguo nongmin bao, 14 July 1983, p. 3; and Zhongguo nongmin bao, 12 January 1984, p. 2.

40. Zhongguo nongmin bao, 2 September 1984, p. 2; and Zhongguo nongmin bao, 9 October 1984, p. 1, presents another clear case of granary cadre corruption and how connections and not quality determine what grain is accepted for purchase.

41. Interview No. 23/1/8. The market price sometimes also affected the state price. For example, when the market price of peanuts was lower than the state purchase price, the state also lowered it price. Guangdong nongmin bao, 13 November 1983, p. 3.

42. Zhongguo nongmin bao, 19 June 1984, p. 1.

43. Directives were issued at various times and places. See, e.g., Guangdong nongmin bao, 3 November 1983, p. 1: Zhongguo nongmin bao, 6 February 1983, p. 1; Zhongguo nongmin bao, 25 August 1983, p. 2; and Renmin ribao, 18 June 1980, p. 1.

44. See, e.g., Zhongguo nongmin bao. 2 September 1984, p. 2; Zhongguo nongmin bao, 12 January 1984, p. 2; and Renmin ribao, 31 January 1985, p. 1.

45. In this areas the state allowed peasants to fulfil their basic grain sales quota in money, at a rate of 10 yuan per 100 of unhusked rice.

46. Nongmin ribao, 30 January 1985, p. 1.

47. Zhongguo jingji jibao, No. 4 (1984). p. 28Google Scholar.

48. See, e.g., Nongmin ribao, 30 January 1985, p. 12, which was published almost the same time as Zhao Ziyang's speech urging the diversification of the economy and the need to limit grain production.

49. After the “difficulty of sale” experienced by peasants, in one area there was a 41 per cent decrease in grain sold to the state. Pinghan, Li, “Yiliang diqu tiaozheng chanye jiegou buying zai jianshao liangshi mianji shang zuo wenzhang” (“In areas suited to grain production, don't wilfully misinterpret the policy to reduce grain acreage”), Nongcun caiwu kuaiji (Rural Finance and Accounting), No. 6 (1985)Google Scholar.

50. This document is printed in a number of sources, see, e.g., Jingji ribao (Economic Daily), 25 March 1985, p. 1.

51. See Lady, Agriculture, Ch. 2, for a discussion of the state's various experiments with price planning.

52. Jingji cankao, 12 March 1985, p. 1.

53. The 10 million yuan difference in the costs of the procurement for these crops will be made up by the province. Nongmin ribao, 19 March 1985, p. 1.

54. Jingji cankao, 13 April 1985, p. 1.

55. Renmin ribao, 31 January 1985, p. 1.

56. In 1983, 197.6 billion jin was purchased out of a total production of 774.5 billion jin of grain. Zhongguo jingji jibao, No. 4 (1984), p. 26Google Scholar and “Liangshi fangkai quan pan jiehuo” (“Liberalizing grain policy enlivens everything”), Liaowang zhoukan (Observer Weekly), No. 4 (1985), p. 19Google Scholar.

57. Peasants now have the option of selling their surplus grain on the market, but as indicated above, this is not as viable an option as it may appear.

58. See, e.g., articles in Nongmin ribao, 22 February 1985. p. 2. On the limitation on cotton production see Jingji cankao, 11 April 1985, p. 2.

59. Nongmin ribao, 15 March 1985, p. 1.

60. See. e.g.. Jingji cankao, 2 April 1985. p. 2. For a case involving cotton, see Jingji ribao, 25 April 1985. p. 1.

61. See Jingji cankao, 11 April 1985, p. 2; and Jingji cankao, 25 April 1985, p. 1.

62. See. e.g.. Jingji ribao, 18 March 1985, p. 1; Renmin ribao, 14 March 1985, p. 1; and Shanxi nongmin. 12 April 1985, p. 1.

63. See. e.g., Nongmin ribao, 30 January 1985, p. 2.

64. Nongmin ribao, 30 January 1985, p. 2.

65. Nongmin ribao. 30 March 1985, p. 2. A similar contracting system exists for oil groups, including cotton, rapeseed, humazi, peanuts, sesame, and yellow mustard seed. See Shanxi nongmin, 12 February 1985. p. 1.

66. See, e.g., Nongmin ribao, 30 March 1985, p. 2.

67. Zhejiang ribao (Zhejiang Daily), 31 March 1985, p. 2.

68. See Dejun, Xu and Gaoyu, Men, “Shixing liangshi hetong dinggou xuyao jiejue de jige wenti” (“Some unsolved problems in the implementation of contract grain procurements”), Nongcun gongzuo tongxun. No. 4 (1985), pp. 33–34Google Scholar.

69. The contract the peasant receives is referred to as a qingdan (clear list). During the Qing dynasty, qingdan were enumerated lists, specifying in detail items that were only generally discussed in the main text. Such lists were often appended to memorials. The use of this term in the present context of contracts fits with the traditional usage. It is a detailed enumeration of a larger more general document, in this case, the collective contract.

70. Zhejiang ribao, 31 March 1985, p. 2.

71. “Shixing, ,” Nongcun gongzuo tongxun, No. 4 (1985)Google Scholar.

72. Nongmin ribao, 6 May 1985, p. 2. Also see “Liangmian hetong dinggou banfa zhongzhong” (“Various methods for contract grain and cotton procurement”), Nongcun gongzuo tongxun, No. 5 (1985), pp. 38–39Google Scholar.

73. Jingji ribao, 4 April 1985, p. 1.

74. “Liangmian, ,” Nongcun gongzuo tongxun, No. 5 (1985), pp. 38–39Google Scholar.

75. See Oi, “State and peasant,” Ch. 4.

76. Zhejiang ribao, 17 March 1985, p. 1.

77. “Liangmian, ,” Nongcun gongzuo tongxun. No. 5 (1985), pp. 38–39Google Scholar.

78. The township economic management station (jingguanzhan) is directly responsible for the contracts, while the township government supervises and notarizes the transaction. The township grain station (liangguan suo) and economic management station also have a contract. The grain bureau pays the station 0.15 yuan in handling fees for each household contract.Ibid.

79. “Liangmian, ,” Nongcun gongzuo tongxun. No. 5 (1985), pp. 38–39Google Scholar.

80. The (production) group(zu) is the division below the village.

81. In Zhejiang, a similar type of meeting was called of the household heads to help them decide on the amount they would contract to sell. Again the village cadres were organized, including the dui accountant, to review each household's production situation, before the contracts were signed.Ibid.

82. See. e.g..Nongmin ribao, 12 February 1985, p. 1; and “Yao ba tong nongmin qianding dinggou hetong dangdai yijian dashi laizhua” (“Treat the signing of procurement contract with peasants as an important matter”), Nongcun qongzuo tongxun, No. 4 (1985), p. 37Google Scholar.

83. See, e.g., Shanxi nongmin, 12 April 1985, p. 1.

84. Interviews in Guangdong, China, summer 1985.

85. Interview with provincial cadres in Liaoning, China, summer 1985.

86. “liangshi, Shixing,” Nongcun gongzuo tongxun, No. 4 (1985), pp. 33–34Google Scholar.

87. Zhejiang ribao. 31 March 1985, p. 2.

88. Nongmin ribao. 18 April 1985, p. 1.

89. See Oi. “Peasant households.”

90. Zhejiang ribao, 31 March 1985, p. 2; also Nongmin ribao, 22 March 1985, p. 2.

91. Nongmin ribao, 30 March 1985, p. 2. Guangdong has retained its earlier policy of letting peasants meet their grain responsibilities to the state in cash or grain. See above and supra, fn. 24.

92. “Liangmian, ,” Nongcun gongzuo longxun. No. 5 (1985)Google Scholar.

93. “liangshi, Shixing,” Nongcun gongzuo longxun, No. 4 (1985), pp. 33–34Google Scholar.

94. See articles in Nongmin ribao, 24 May 1985, p. 1.

95. The rate at which the tax is figured is based on the amount of grain that the peasant household owed under the original system. The conversion rate is the same dao sanqi system used for figuring grain sales. Of the amount of grain owed as tax, 70 per cent would be calculated at the over quota price, while the remaining 30 per cent is figured at the basic procurement price. The total worth of this grain is the peasant's current agricultural tax in money. To take account of price variation for different crops, the conversion rate is pegged to the price of the major cereal crop of an area. For a very detailed account of some recent proposals calling for the total revamping of the agricultural tax system, including using new base figures, see Zhaiju, Zheng and Shaoqun, Ye. “Dui gaige nongyeshui de shexiang,” (“Preliminary thoughts on reforming the agricultural tax”) in Nongye jingji wenti, No. 4 (1985), pp. 36–38Google Scholar and 59. None of these changes seems to have been adopted except the change of payment from tax-in-kind to money. Sun Yefang earlier had also called for reform in the tax system, proposing that the state increase the direct agricultural tax. This proposal, however, was dismissed by the government. See Lardy, Agriculture, pp. 218–19Google Scholar.