¹ The locus classicus for an analysis of the psychogenetics and psychodynamics of “chaos” in Chinese political culture is Solomon, Richard, Mao's Revolution and The Chinese Political Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).Google Scholar See also the seminal contributions of Lucian Pye.

² See Chang, Parris, “From Mao to Hua to Hu to Chao,” Issues and Studies, January 1989, pp. 56–73Google Scholar; Eshcrick, Joseph W. and Perry, Elizabeth J., “Leadership Succession in the People's Republic of China: ‘Crisis’ or Opportunity?”, Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1983), pp. 171–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³ This punctilious observance is manifest in efforts to retouch old photos, or to stage manage ceremonies to alter appearances, For example, there were allegations that Jiang Qing conspired after her husband's passing to have the photo of the succession lineup arranged so that she was one step ahead of the line, with Hua Guofeng on the far right and herself in the centre of the picture. See Onate, Andres D., “Hua Kuo-feng and the Arrest of the Gang of Four,” The China Quarterly (CQ), No. 75 (1978), pp. 540–566.Google Scholar

⁴ Details of which need not detain us here. For a relatively definitive analysis, see Teiwes, Frederick C., Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms, 1950–1965 (White Plains, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1979).Google Scholar

⁵ As pointed out in L. Dittmer, “Bases of Power in Chinese Politics: A Theory and an Analysis of the Gang of Four,” World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 1 (1978), pp. 26–61.Google Scholar

⁶ Renmin ribao (People's Daily), 17 January 1987, p. 1. The meeting was convened and chaired by CMC and CAC chair Deng Xiaoping, while Bo Yibo, who was not a member of the Politburo, presented the summary of complaints. For an analysis and critique of this meeting, see Zhongmei, Yang, Hu Yaobang: A Chinese Biography trans. Wycoff, William A. (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1988), pp. 155–160.Google Scholar

⁷ The Politburo members involved were Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian (former members of the Politburo Standing Committee); Peng Zhen, Yu Qiuli, Yang Dezhi, Xi Zhongxun, Hu Qiaomu, Fang Yi, Ni Zhifu, and Chen Muhua (alternate).

⁸ Under the constitution adopted by the 12th Party Congress the Politburo, the Politburo Standing Committee, the general secretary and the Secretariat were all to be elected by the CC, making the Secretariat and the Politburo competing sources of power. The Secretariat was in position to supervise regional Party organs and the functional departments of the Party. At the 13th Congress the Secretariat was reduced in size from ten members to only four full members (including the general secretary) and one alternate and has been made the working office of the Politburo and its Standing Committee. Its membership is now nominated by the Politburo Standing Committee and approved by the Saich, CC.Tony, “The Chinese Communist Party at the Thirteenth National Congress: Policies and prospects for reform,” Issues and Studies, January 1989, pp. 11–40.Google Scholar

⁹ In estimated rank order of influence, these are Deng Xiaoping (born in 1904), former CMC chair; Chen Yun (born 1905), CAC chair; Yang Shangkun (born 1907), chief of state and first vice-chair of the CMC; Li Xiannian (born 1909), chair of the National Committee of the CPPCC; Wang Zhen (born 1908), vice-chief of state, also a CMC vice-chair; Bo Yibo (born 1908), executive vice-chair of the CAC; Song Renqiong (born 1909), vice-chair of the CAC; Peng Zhen (born 1902), retired chair of the NPC Standing Committee; and Deng Yingchao (born 1904), former Politburo member and former chair of the CPPCC National Committee.

¹⁰ Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong), 17 May 1989, p. 2.

¹¹ “After Zhao Ziyang's resignation request was passed on to outside people, rumours circulated and people doubted that these old people in their 70s and 80s could properly solve problems. Here I would like to say that this question can be answered very easily. The decision was made by the majority of the Standing Committee members. The many old comrades enjoy the highest prestige inside the Party, because they have the highest seniority in the Party and have made major contributions to the Party and the state. At such a critical juncture of the Party and the state, how could they remain silent?” Speech given by Yang Shangkun at an emergency meeting of the Central Military Commission (24 May 1989), in Ming Bao, 29 May 1989, pp. 1–2.

¹² Zhao Ziyang's pained embarrassment when Deng forced a decision to impose martial law over his objections is evident in his locutions, in which he at once pledged his obedience to Deng and expressed his deep-seated reservations: “Let comrade Deng Xiaoping make the final decision.” “My thinking is different from yours and does not measure up. My continued participation in work would be an obstacle to the standing committee's implementation of ideas put forward by the several elder comrades.” Ming Bao, 30 May 1989.

¹³ See The Case of Peng Teh-huai 1959–1968 (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1968); also Teiwes, Politics and Purges, pp. 384–411.

¹⁴ Yang Zhongmei, Hu Yaobang, p. 155.

¹⁵ See Ching Pao, 10 April 1989, pp. 22–23; and Zheng Ming, 1 April 1989, pp. 6–9, and 1 March 1989, pp. 6–9.

¹⁶ Zhao insisted over Deng's objections that Hu be honoured as a “great Marxist-Leninist,” and that the memorial meeting be held in the Great Hall of the People. Zheng Ming, No. 142, 1 August 1989, pp. 9–10.

¹⁷ These include the shift of the Beijing Garrison commander, shift of the Beijing Military Region commander, transfer of officers or troops associated with the target out of the capital, replacement of the public security minister and vice-ministers, and the transfer of loyal troops into the capital arena. See Pillsbury, Michael, “Patterns of Chinese power struggles: Three models,” unpublished paper prepared for university seminar on modern China, Columbia University, New York, 27 March 1974.Google Scholar

¹⁸ In which case there may have been real risk that the target might mobilize military counterforce: Mao Yuanxin allegedly attempted to mobilize 10,000 troops in the Shenyang Military Region based on his position as political commissar, and there were apparently unsuccessful intrigues to arm Shanghai's urban militia. See Onate, Andres D., “Hua Kuo-feng and the arrest of the ‘gang of four',” CQ, No. 75 (1978), pp. 540–566.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Yang Zhongmei, Hu Yaobang, pp. 156–58.

²⁰ See for example Jencks, Harlan, “China's military after the Beijing massacre,” Air Force Magazine, November 1989.Google Scholar

²¹ Zheng Ming, No. 142, 1 August 1989, pp. 8–9.

²² Asiaweek, 9 June 1989, p. 26.

²³ Ming Pao, 21 May 1989, as cited in British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Part III: The Far East, 25 May 1989.

²⁴ Lin's Fourth Field Army loyalty group dominated five provinces, held a strong position in two, a weaker position in six others, whereas 14 provinces were under the control of his opponents and two under the domain of the Cultural Revolution left. Juergen Domes, China After the Cultural Revolution, pp. 130–31, as cited in Schattschneider, p. 124.

²⁵ “Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks to responsible local comrades during his tour of inspection” (mid August to 12 September 1971), in Kau, Michael, The Lin Piao Affair: Power Politics and Military Coup (White Plains, NY: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1975), p. 62.Google Scholar

²⁶ Domes, Domes, Government and Politics of the PRC: A Time of Transition (Boulder: Westview, 1985), p. 163Google Scholar, as cited in Schattschneider, p. 124.

²⁷ See Dittmer, L., Liu Shao-ch'i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).Google Scholar

²⁸ See Sandschneider, Eberhard, “Political succession in the People's Republic of China: rule by purge,” in Peter, Calvert, (ed.), The Process of Political Succession (London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 110–135.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁹ For one thing, it was the closest call since the contest between Lin Biao and Mao Zedong, with an unprecedented defection rate among high political and military elites prior to the bloodbath.

³⁰ My tentative periodization of intellectual fang and shou phases is as follows: from the death of Mao to December 1979, fang (i.e., the “wound” literature, “emancipation of the mind”); from January 1980 through December 1983, shou (including the criticism of Bai Hua, “bourgeois liberalism,” and “spiritual pollution”); from January 1984 to December 1986, fang (the “cultural fever,” critique of feudal tradition, discussion of alienation, existentialism, psychoanalysis, etc.); from December 1986 to March 1987, shou (critique of “bourgeois liberalization”); from the spring of 1987 to June of 1989, fang; from June 1989 to this writing, shou.

³¹ In 1987, these included Hu, Propaganda Department director Zhu Houze, his deputy Teng Teng, and Lu Jiaxi, president of the Academy of Science. In 1989, these included Zhao, Su Shaozhi (president of the Society for the Study of the Theory and Practice of Mao Zedong Thought), Wang Meng (Minister of Culture), Hu Qili (member of the Politburo Standing Committee and the Secretariat), Secretariat members Rui Xingwen and Yan Mingfu, and the leadership of Renmin ribao.

³² The first wave, retired in February 1980, included Chen Xilian, Chen Yonggui, Wang Dongxing, Ji Dengkui, and Wu De. The second wave, retired at the special Party conference in September 1985, included Deng Yingchao, Li Desheng, Nie Rongzhen, Song Renqiong, Ulanhu, Wang Zhen, Wei Guoqing, Xu Xiangqian, Ye Jianying, and Zhang Tingfa. The third wave, retired at the 13th Party Congress, has been partially listed in footnote 7.

³³ See Rush's, Myron classic analysis in Political Succession in the USSR (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965)Google Scholar, and How Communist States Change Their Rulers (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974).

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ See Bunce, Valerie, Do New Leaders Make a Difference? Succession and Public Policy Under Capitalism and Socialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981)Google Scholar, and Roeder, Philip G., “Do new Soviet leaders really make a difference? Rethinking the ‘succession connection,’” American Political Science Review, 79 (1985), pp. 958–976.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Roeder argues in contradistinction to Bunce that the innovative capacity of a new leader tends to be low, with the result that early years tend to be focused around consolidation, and reform is postponed till afterwards.