* I wish to thank Dr Richard Thornton, Dr Parris Chang, Dr Lee Houchins and Donald Keyser for their valuable comments during the preparation of this paper, and the Institute of Sino-Soviet Studies of the George Washington University for its material support.Google Scholar

1. The best single source on the disposition of corps prior to 1966 is: PLA Unit History (Washington D.C.; Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, no date). This was the official Nationalist China governmental history and location list of the PLA corps, released in 1966. Its accuracy was further attested by the U.S. Army Office of Military History finding it worth the trouble and expense of translation and publication. Secondary Chinese sources, whether Nationalist or Communist, must be used with care since scholarship is often blended with propaganda, but in a study of the contemporary PLA, Taiwan materials are of considerable value. The Chinese Nationalist Government quickly releases many officially collected documents, and in addition frequently translates primary source documents not readily available elsewhere. This study cites such translations and other Chinese Nationalist materials which are based directly on such primary source documents.Google Scholar

2. Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily) (Peking) (JMJP), Editorial, 15 12 1967. The original quote is from “On coalition government,” a report to the 7th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, 1945. It has been frequently invoked in the present era to defend Mao's military principles.Google Scholar

3. Cheng, Mien-chih, “The organization and equipment of Chinese Communist infantry,” Issues and Studies (Taipei: Institute of International Relations), Vol. III, No. 10, 07 1967. The article, based on captured documents, is authoritative. Independent units equate to “type-C” in Mr Cheng's presentation.Google Scholar

4. A central directive of March 1967 referred to the commander of a provincial military district as commanding “the independent division and independent regiment” (Current Background) (Hong Kong: American Consulate General) (CB), No. 852, 6 05 1968, pp. 109–10)Google ScholarPubMed. The commanders of the Canton and Wuhan Military Regions were held accountable for the garrisons in their urban namesakes. One of the charges against a dismissed officer of the Wuhan Military Region Command was that: “He concocted the charge that the Wuhan Garrison District did not carry out the orders of the Military Region.” (Unidentified Red Guard newspaper, translated in Chinese Communist Affairs, Facts and Features (Taipei: Institute of International Relations)Google Scholar(Facts and Features), Vol. I, No. 24, 18 12 1968Google Scholar, p. 26. See also, Hung-ssu T'ung-hsün (Red Headquarters Bulletin) (Canton), No. 45, 07 1968Google Scholar, as translated in Selections from China Mainland Magazines (Hong Kong: American Consulate General) (SCMM) No. 622, 08 1968, p. 18. Part of the difficulty in determining command lines over regional forces is caused by an ambiguity in Chinese usage. Many documents refer only to “chün-ch'u” which might mean either military region (ta-chün-ch'u) or provincial military district, (sheng-chün-ch'u).Google Scholar

5. Griffith, Samuel B., The Chinese People's Liberation Army (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967), p. 218: “Generally regional commanders command all PLA ground, naval, air and public security units assigned to the regions.…”Google Scholar

6. Hung-t'i-chün Chan-pao (Lhasa), 8 12 1967Google Scholar, as translated in Communist China Digest (Washington D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Joint Publications Research Service) (JPRS), No. 196, 18 03 1968; and JPRS, No. 44,721, pp. 109–12.Google Scholar

7. Facts and Features, Vol. II, No. 25, 2 10 1968, p. 15. (Basic source of Red Guard document not identified.)Google Scholar

8. CB, No. 852, 6 05 1968, pp. 128–30.Google Scholar

9. Cheng, J. Chester (ed.), The Politics of the Chinese Red Army (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution on War Revolution and Peace, 1966)Google Scholar, pp. 535 and 544. The book consists of translations of the “Bulletin of Activities” published by the Military Affairs Committee in 1960–1 for internal PLA use.

10. Szu-erh-erh T'ung-hsün (22 04 Bulletin), Liuchow, Kwangsi, No. 6, 29 05 1968Google Scholar, as translated in Survey of the China Mainland Press (Hong Kong: American Consulate General) (SCMP), No. 4202, 20 07 1968, p. 3.Google Scholar

11. San-erh-ch'i T'ung-hsün (27 03 Bulletin), Wuhan (?), 07 1968Google Scholar, as translated in SCMP, No. 4274, 29 08 1968, p. 28.Google Scholar

12. NCNA, Hsining, Tsinghai, 7 03 1969, printed in SCMP, No. 4375, 13 03 1969, p. 15.Google Scholar

13. Cheng, J. Chester, Politics of the Chinese Red Army, pp. 374–5.Google Scholar

14. As quoted in John, Gittings, “Army-Party relations in the light of the Cultural Revolution,” in John Wilson, Lewis (ed.), Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China (Cambridge, 1970), p. 388.Google Scholar

15. Cheng, J. Chester, Politics of the Chinese Red Army, pp. 374–5.Google Scholar

16. Ralph, Powell, “Continuity and change in the PLA,” Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. LII, No. 2, 02 1968, p. 24.Google Scholar

17. Lung, Wei-tung, “Wholeheartedly supporting the revolutionaries …”, JMJP, 10 04 1967, p. 1.Google Scholar

18. J. Chester, Cheng, Politics of the Chinese Red Army, p. 565. Liaison stations were being established in 1961 among military regions, subordinate units and civil organizations such as colleges, factories and railway bureaux.Google Scholar

19. Ching-kang-shan (Ching Kang Mountains) (Peking), Nos. 9–10, 11 01 1967Google Scholar, as translated in SCMP, No. 3913, 6 04 1967, p. 19.Google Scholar

20. JMJP, 2 01 1967, p. 1, reprinting a 1 January editorial of the Liberation Army Daily.Google Scholar

21. JMJP, 13 04 1967, p. 1: “On January 21st and 23rd, Chairman Mao, the Party Central, and the Central Military Commission issued the great call for the PLA to support the revolutionary left.” The 23 January date cited by most western studies of the PLA in the Cultural Revolution was when the order was publicized.Google Scholar

22. JMJP, 22 01 1967, p. 1.Google Scholar

23. Radio Kweiyang, 18 July 1967, as translated in FBIS, 20 July 1967, p. ddd 24. The “three-supports” are PLA assistance to industry, agriculture and the revolutionary left. The “two-militaries” are military control and military training in schools.Google Scholar

24. JMJP, 12 04 1967Google Scholar, p. 1, and Kuang-ming Jih-pao (Peking), 25 03 1967, p. 1, provide two examples of such activities by military district Party committees.Google Scholar

25. On 12 April 1967, Madam Mao addressed the Central Military Commission in her role as a leader of the PLA Cultural Revolution Group. She stressed one theme repeatedly in her talk: PLA intervention was a necessity without which the Cultural Revolution would fail. Clearly she was trying to convince her audience. The speech was first released in Chung-kung Yen-chiu (Studies in Chinese Communism) (Taiwan: Institute of International Relations, 07 1970), pp. 114–30.Google Scholar An English translation is in Translations On Communist China, No. 115, 8 12 1970, JPRS, No. 44,680, pp. 4–9.Google Scholar

26. The directive ordering the PLA into the Cultural Revolution stipulated: “Counter revolutionaries and counter revolutionary organizations which oppose the proletarian revolutionary leftists must be firmly suppressed.” (CB, 852, 6 05 1968, p. 49.)Google Scholar The literary newspaper of the PLA published a story about the Harbin Garrison which intervened to protect the left from the assault of a much larger group, the “Glorious Restoration Army.” The paper noted approvingly that the troop commander demanded the dissolution of the “rightist” organization “on the spot,” and arrested its leaders. Chieh-fang-chün Wen-i (PLA Literature and Art) (Peking), No. 2, 1967Google Scholar, as translated in Communist China Digest, No. 189, 7 12 1967, JPRS, No. 42,503, pp. 160–2.Google Scholar

27. Jürgen, Domes, “The role of the military in the formation of Revolutionary Committees, 1967–8,” The China Quarterly, No. 44, 03 1970. Professor Domes provides a province-by-province survey of military reactions to the January 21st order.Google Scholar

28. Ta-p'i T'ung-hsün (Mass Criticism and Repudiation Bulletin) (Peking), 5 10 1967Google Scholar, as translated in SCMP, No. 4125, 26 02 1968, p. 5.Google Scholar

29. Ching-kang-shan (Ching-kang Mountains), 11 01 1967Google Scholar, as translated in SCMP, No. 3913, 4 04 1967, p. 21.Google Scholar

30. JMJP, 4 04 1967.Google Scholar

31. Kuang-ming Jih-pao, 25 03 1967Google Scholar, as translated in SCMP, No. 3912, 5 04 1967, p. 19.Google Scholar

32. Harbin Radio, 6 October 1967, quoted at greater length in Gittings “Army-Party relations in the light of the Cultural Revolution.”Google Scholar

33. Hung-ch'i (Red Flag), No. 6, 1967. Subquotations are the subheads of Li's article.Google Scholar

34. CB, No. 852, 6 05 1968, p. 115.Google ScholarPubMed

35. This point was made by Professor Richard Thornton in a discussion of the use of main forces in the Cultural Revolution. Some confirmation may be found in the career of Ch'eng Shih-ch'ing, the Political Commissar of the 27th Corps at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. He was transferred to Kiangsi from Shantung along with a division of his unit in the spring of 1967. His regional post in Kiangsi until August 1967 was “Deputy-Commander of the Ichun Military Sub-district, Kiangsi Military District.” (Sankei (Tokyo), 15 08 1967, as translated in FBIS, 15 August 1967, p. ccc 15). Compared to the importance of Ch'eng's unit position, the regional post assigned to him was inconsequential.Google ScholarPubMed

36. One possible exception is the 38th Corps which may have moved to Peking in early 1967 or, as some observers on Taiwan believe, as early as July 1966. (Issues and Studies, Vol. VI, No. 12, 12 1970, p. 25.) A few relocations occurred in August.Google Scholar

37. Of the units relocated, two are descended from the 2nd Field Army, three from the 3rd, six from the 4th, and one from the north China units of Nieh Jung-chen. Had some sort of balance of power among the field armies still have been operative in 1967, Nieh's units should have been much better represented. In fact such a balance of power did not exist. The 1st Field Army of Ho Lung and P'eng Teh-huai has been represented by only one corps for 17 years. Its performance during the Cultural Revolution was exemplary. Units from areas presumably controlled by one faction moved into provinces supposedly under the control of a rival faction. Several of the corps leaders who performed well for Mao and Lin were from different “factions.” For example, 12th Corps Commander Li Teh-sheng did so well in Anhui that he was later promoted to Director of the General Political Department. Yet he is a “professional” soldier of “the Liu Po-ch'eng faction” which was supposedly opposed to Maoist military doctrine. There are similar examples of excellent behaviour for units of the Ch'en I and Nieh Jung-chen “factions.” Conversely, probably the worst behaved corps during the Cultural Revolution was the 54th – a “Lin Piao unit.”Google Scholar

38. NCNA, Peking, 11 February 1969, in SCMP, No. 4361, 20 02 1969, p. 15.Google Scholar

39. Radio Honan, 1 January 1969, as reported in China News Analysis (Hong Kong), No. 751, 4 04 1969, p. 4.Google Scholar

40. For example, a central directive issued on 6 June 1967 ordered certain constraints on mass organizations, e.g., they were not allowed to arrest persons or to search private homes. Point Six of the directive provided for enforcement and its wording was revealing regarding shared responsibilities between regional and main forces: “All garrison forces and PLA forces dispatched from [sic] Peking shall take responsibility for the implementation of the above points. Garrison forces and dispatched PLA forces shall have the right to arrest, detain and punish the leaders … in an offence.” (Yomiuri (Tokyo), 8 07 1967, in FBIS, 8 07 1967, pp. ccc 2–3.) This was perhaps the first acknowledgment that main force units were being used for control purposes in the Cultural Revolution. No contradiction is implied between the shared responsibilities discussed here and the earlier point that main forces and their leaders were not given important provincial and regional political posts. Responsibility for military control and “support the left” work in a given geographic area was a long step from assuming major political positions in the provinces. That long step was soon to be taken.Google ScholarPubMed

41. For a detailed account of the Wuhan incident, see Thomas Robinson's article in The China Quarterly, No. 47, 07–09 1971.Google ScholarPubMed

42. Cheng-fa Hung-ch'i (Politics and Law Red Flag) (Canton), Nos. 3 and 4, 17 10 1967Google Scholar, as translated in SCMP, No. 4070, 30 11 1967, p. 6.Google Scholar

43. Hupeh, the fourth district, was in late July put under the joint leadership of the political commissar of an air force unit, Liu Feng, and the new commander of the Wuhan Military Region, Tseng Szu-yu. Thus Hupeh too had a “main force” presence in the Military District Command as of August 1967.Google Scholar

44. The Sinkiang case was exceptional in that the 9th Air Army Commander, Li Chüan-ch'un, did not assume a formal military administrative post in Urumchi, but he did receive his orders direct from Peking and was made a vice-chairman of the Sinkiang Revolutionary Committee when it was finally formed in September 1968. There seems little doubt that Li's Unit 7335 was politically in command of the area. For example, the Civil Aviation General Administration Bureau instructed its subordinates in Sinkiang: “As far as supporting the left is concerned, you should follow Unit 7335.” Commander Li received orders directly from the Air Force Chief of Staff and at one time was ordered to “handle well the relations with the Sinkiang Military Region Command … paying attention to the methods of handling.” CB, No. 855, 17 07 1968Google ScholarPubMed, pp. 14 and 16. See also SCMP, No. 4127, 28 02 1968, pp. 13–14.Google Scholar

45. Tokyo Shimbun, 22 08 1967, as translated in FBIS, 22 August 1967, pp. ccc 2–3. See also FBIS, 23 August, p. ccc 2.Google Scholar

46. “The Central Committee and its Cultural Revolution Group, the State Council, and the Central Military Commission have decided to form a Wuhan Garrison Headquarters out of the 7250 Unit of the Wuhan Air District.” Ko-t'i T'ung-hsün (Correspondence From All Parts of the Country) (Dairen), No. 4, 13 12 1967Google Scholar as translated in SCMP, No. 4081, 15 12 1967, p. 9.Google Scholar

47. Kwangchow Hung-szu and Wuhan Hsien-hua Kung (Canton Edition), combined issue, 21 08 1967Google Scholar, as translated in Communist China Digest, No. 191, 31 10 1967, JPRS, No. 43,204, p. 75.Google Scholar

48. The Kwangsi troubles also pitted the 141st Division, 47th Army, against the District command. See “Speeches of Central Leaders on Kwangsi, 25 July 1968,” a pamphlet produced by “Kung-ko-hui” of Canton, 3 August 1968, translated in Chien, Yu-shen, China's Fading Revolution (Hong Kong: Centre of Contemporary Chinese Studies, 1969)Google Scholar, Documentation appendix, pp. 330–2. See also SCMP, No. 4241, 19 08 1968Google Scholar, p. 4. On the problems between the Peking Military Region and the 38th Corps, see SCMP, No. 4227, 29 07 1968Google Scholar, p. 6. The Shansi documents are in Communist China, 1968 (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1969)Google Scholar, p. 208. On the Tibet issues, see San-ssu Chan-ch'i, No. 2, 07 1968Google Scholar, as translated in Chien Yu-shen, pp. 332–4. The Hainan information is in SCMP, No. 4233, 7 08 1968, p. 10 and 4388, 2 April 1969, p. 5.Google Scholar

49. Unidentified Red Guard tabloid as translated in SCMP, No. 4181, 20 05 1968, p. 8.Google Scholar

50. Chu-ying Tung-fang-hung (Canton), 13 12 1967Google Scholar, as translated in Communist China Digest, No. 192, 29 11 1967, JPRS, No. 43,449, pp. 49–50.Google Scholar

51. See for example, Translations on Communist China, No. 5, 1 04 1968, JPRS, No. 44,878, p. 64.Google Scholar

52. Chu-ying Tung-fang-hung, 13 12 1967, n. 50.Google Scholar

53. Ch'ing-li Chieh-chi Tui-wu (Purification of Class Ranks), compiled by the Paoshan, Yunnan Revolutionary Committee Political Work Group, 01 1969Google Scholar, in Translations on Communist China, No. 140, JPRS, No. 52,658, 18 May 1971, pp. 15–16.Google Scholar

54. Extensive materials on the August 1967 machinations against the Canton Military Region are in SCMP, Nos. 4264, 24 12 1968; 4265, 25 September 1968; 4272, 4 October 1968 and 4273, 8 October 1968.Google Scholar

55. “Mao's latest instructions – September 1967.” Varying versions are translated in Facts and Features, Vol. I, No. 1, 1 11 1967Google Scholar, p. 19; Communist China Digest, No. 193, 8 01 1968Google Scholar, JPRS, No. 43,903, pp. 44–5, and Chien, Yu-shen, China's Fading Revolution, documentation appendix, p. 276.Google Scholar

56. Cheng-fa Hung-ch'i (Politics and Law Red Flag) (Canton), No. 23, 5 04 1968Google Scholar, as translated in SCMP, No. 4169, 8 05 1968, p. 1.Google Scholar

57. SCMP, No. 4165, 26 04 1968, p. 4.Google Scholar

58. Hung-ch'i P'ing-lun and Kang-pa-i, Canton(?), Joint Issue, 02 1968Google Scholar, as translated in SCMP, No. 4133, 7 03 1968, p. 4.Google Scholar

59. Chu-ying Tung-fang-hung (Canton), 1 10 1967Google Scholar, as translated in Communist China Digest, No. 194, 5 02 1968, JPRS, No. 44,241, p. 122.Google Scholar

60. San-ssu T'ung-hsün (Canton), 20 07 1968Google Scholar, quoting a Central Military Commission directive of 13 May 1968, as translated in Chien, Yu-shen, China's Fading Revolution, p. 200.Google Scholar

61. Kang-pa-i (Steel August First) (Wuhan), No. 1, 07 1968Google Scholar, as translated in SCMP, No. 4218, 16 07 1968, p. 8.Google Scholar

62. Facts and Features, Vol. I, No. 21, 7 08 1968, p. 3.Google Scholar

63. Pei-hang Hung-ch'i (Peking Aviation Institute Red Flag), No. 47Google Scholar, n.d., translated in Facts and Features, Vol. I, No. 26, 10 1968, pp. 19–23Google Scholar, see also San-erh-shih-ch'i T'ung-hsün, 07 1968Google Scholar, as translated in SCMM, No. 641, 20 01 1969, pp. 25–30.Google ScholarPubMed

64. Shou-tu Hung-wei-ping (Capital Red Guards) (Peking), 12 12 1968Google Scholar, as cited in Chien, Yu-shen, China's Fading RevolutionGoogle Scholar, p. 203. See also SCMP, Nos. 4213, 9 07 1968, pp. 1–3 and 4247, 29 August 1968, pp. 3–7.Google Scholar

65. Hsi-chiang Nu-t'ao (Angry Waves of the West River) (Wuchou), No. 2, 08 1968Google Scholar, translated in SCMP, No. 4241, 19 08 1968, p. 4.Google Scholar

66. Lin, Piao's “9 April 1968 Directive,” in Pei-hang Hung-ch'i, No. 47Google Scholar, English translations are in Facts and Features, Vol. I, No. 26, 16 10 1968Google Scholar, and SCMP, No. 4236, 10 08 1968, pp. 8–11.Google Scholar

67. Unidentified Red Guard pamphlet, translated in SCMP, No. 4181, 20 05 1968, pp. 5–6.Google Scholar

68. See SCMM, No. 622, 6 08 1968, p. 14.Google ScholarPubMed

69. NCNA, Peking, 7 January1968, as reported in SCMP, No. 4101, 17 01 1968Google Scholar, p. 14. See also Wen-hui Pao (Shanghai), 30 07 1968Google Scholar, as translated in SCMP, No. 4231, 2 08 1968Google Scholar, p. 13, and SCMP, Nos. 4211, 5 07 1968, p. 2 and 4091, 3 January 1968, p. 5.Google Scholar

70. JMJP, 19 10 1967, p. 1, quoting Mao Tse-tung.Google Scholar

71. Kang-pa-i T'ung-hsün (Steel August First Bulletin), No. 1Google Scholar, as translated in SCMP, No. 4218, 16 07 1968, p. 8.Google Scholar

72. Unidentified Red Guard document, translated in Facts and Features, Vol. I, No. 26, p. 21.Google Scholar

73. Tokyo Shimbun, 6 02 1970, as translated in FBIS, 9 February, p. B 2.Google Scholar

74. Issues and Studies, Vol. VI, No. 11, 08 1970, p. 12.Google Scholar

75. Ibid. p. 11.

76. Sing-tao Jih-pao (Hong Kong), 30 07 1969, p. 4.Google Scholar

77. The first major PLA political victim of the Cultural Revolution was Liang Pi-yeh, deputy-director of the General Political Department who fell in February 1966. Lin Piao later recalled what had happened in these words: “When I raised the point of giving prominence to politics, Liang Pi-yeh had a few things to say. He indicated that an emphasis on politics meant a falling behind in military preparations. This is in error. Military preparations and politics are not to be brought up together like that.” (Ch'ing-li Chieh-chi Tui-wu, in Translations on Communist China, No. 140, 18 03 1971, pp. 15–16).Google Scholar

78. Tung-fang-hung Tien-hsün (East is Red Telegram) (Canton), No. 3, 07 1968Google Scholar, as translated in Communist China 1968, the yearbook of the Union Research Institute, Hong Kong, p. 215. Emphasis added.Google Scholar