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Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1967: The Struggle to Seize Power

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Extract

In January 1967, Communist China's “great proletarian cultural revolution” entered a new stage—a stage of violent overthrow of all those in positions of authority in the Party and government who refused to accept Mao Tse-tung's new “revolutionary” order. Erupting in Shanghai under the name of the “January Revolution,” this frenzied drive to “seize power” initiated a period of nation-wide violence and disorder.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1968

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References

1 Quoted by Piao, Lin in “Speech at Peking Rally Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution,” New China News Agency (NCNA), 6 11 1967Google Scholar.

2 For a survey of developments in the Cultural Revolution through 1966, see Bridgham, Philip, “Mao's ‘Cultural Revolution’: Origin and Development,” The China Quarterly, No. 29 (0103 1967)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 See the editorial “On the Proletarian Revolutionaries' Struggle to Seize Power,” Hung Ch'i (Red Flag), No. 3, 3 03 1967Google Scholar, in Peking Review, 3 February 1967, p. 13.

4 ”Premier Chou En-lai Gives Important Instructions,” in Kung-nung-ping Chan-pao (Worker-Peasant-Soldier Combat News), Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate General), No. 4078, p. 4Google Scholar.

5 The term “opposition” is an unfortunate one, since it suggests conscious resistance to Mao's directives concerning the Cultural Revolution. Much of the “opposition,” however, has come from those who consider themselves loyal supporters of Mao but who either have misunderstood the vague and contradictory guidelines laid down to govern the Cultural Revolution or have acted in self-defence.

6 “A Summary of the Last Two Months of Progress in the Cultural Revolution,” in Tung-feng Chan-pao (East Wind Combat News), 11 12 1966, Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) (Washington, D.C.), No. 40, 488, p. 13Google Scholar.

7 See the editorial “Welcome the High Tide of the Cultural Revolution in Industrial and Mining Enterprises” in Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily), 26 December 1966.

8 Accounts of these speeches by Mme. Mao, taken from Red Guard wall posters, appeared in the Japanese press. See, for example, Yomiuri, 4 January 1967.

9 For an account by one of the organisers of this strike, see the article by Shih-yin, Li in Kuang-ming Daily, 25 01 1967Google Scholar.

10 For a good analysis of this phenomenon of “economism,” see Anderson, Evelyn, “Shanghai: The Masses Unleashed,” Problems of Communism, 0102 1968Google Scholar.

11 Sankei, 17 January 1967.

12 See, for example, the speech by Po-ta, Ch'en in Huo-Ch'e-T'ou (Locomotive), 02 1967, SCMP, No. 3898, pp. 5Google Scholar.

13 Asahi, 4 February 1967.

14 Asahi, 18 February 1967.

15 Jih-ch'ing, Chang, “Steadfastly Support the Proletarian Revolutionaries' Struggle to Seize Power,” Red Flag, No. 4, 1967Google Scholar, in Selections from China Mainland Magazines (SCMM), No. 567.

16 Asahi, 18 March 1967.

17 SCMM No. 566, p. 3.

19 Mainichi, 8 February 1967.

20 NCNA, 2 March 1967.

22 SCMM No. 568, pp. 1–4.

23 Mainichi, 17 March 1967.

24 Ceteka (Prague), 28 04 1967Google Scholar.

25 Yomiuri, 6 April, 9 April 1967.

26 Yomiuri, 15 April 1967.

27 See the speech by Vice Premier Fu-chih, Hsieh in SCMP No. 3925, pp. 89Google Scholar.

28 Tokyo Shimbun, 18 April 1967.

29 Editorial entitled Warmly Respond to the Call to Support the Army and Cherish the People,” Red Flag, No. 6, 8 05 1967Google Scholar, in Peking Review, 5 May 1967, p. 22.

30 NCNA, 15 June 1967.

31 SCMP No. 4061, pp. 11–12.

32 Peking Domestic Service, 8 June 1967.

33 Yomiuri, 9 April 1967.

34 Asahi, 30 May 1967.

35 Yomiuri, 8 June 1967.

36 SCMP No. 3969, p. 1, and SCMP No. 3974, p. 5.

37 NCNA, 27 June 1967.

38 Sankei, 3 July 1967.

39 For a good account of the Wuhan Incident by a Japanese corespondent, see Sankei, 29 and 30 September 1967.

40 For a summary of this speech, see SCMP No. 4023, pp. 20–21.

41 Canton, Kung-an Chan-pao (Public Security Combat News), 1 08 1967, p. 4Google Scholar.

42 SCMP No. 4036, pp. 1–6.

43 Sankei, 22 August 1967.

44 On Military Power” in Hung-se Pao-tung (Red Riot), 1 08 1967, SCMP No. 4071, pp. 1317Google Scholar.

45 Peking, Wai-shih Hung-ch'i (Foreign Affairs Red Flag), 12 09 1967, p. 1Google Scholar.

46 SCMP No. 4075, p. 27.

47 Important Speech Given by Comrade Chiang Ch'ing,” Peking leaflet, 18 09 1967, in SCMP No. 4069, pp. 19Google Scholar.

48 SCMP No. 4026, pp. 1–2.

49 NCNA, 7 September 1967.

50 Chairman Mao's Latest Instructions” in Wen-ke T'ung-hsun (Cultural Revolution Bulletin), 9 10 1967, SCMP No. 4060, p. 1Google Scholar.

51 NCNA, 25 September 1967.

52 NCNA, 17 October 1967.

53 NCNA, 16 September 1967.

54 NCNA, 10 October 1967.

55 Chairman Mao's Latest Instructions” in Hung-chan-pao (Red Combat News), 10 10 1967, SCMP No. 4072, p. 2Google Scholar.

56 Premier Chou's Important Speech” in Chu-ying Tung-fang-hung, 1 10 1967, SCMP No. 4066, p. 5Google Scholar.

57 Chairman Mao's Latest Supreme Instructions” in Cheng-fa Hung-ch'i (Politics and Law Red Flag), 17 10 1967, SCMP No. 4070, p. 3Google Scholar.

58 NCNA, 20 October 1967.

59 SCMP No. 4070, p. 3.

60 Speeches by Leaders of the Central Committee,” Canton pamphlet, 10 1967, in SCMM No. 611, p.8Google Scholar.

61 SCMP No. 4076, p. 2.

62 Premier Chou En-lai Gives Important Instructions” in Kung-nung-ping Chan-pao (Worker-Peasant-Soldier Combat News), 14 11 1967, SCMP No. 4078, pp. 45Google Scholar.

63 Vice Premier Hsieh Fu-chih's Important Speech’ in Wen-ke T'ung-hsun (Cultural Revolution Bulletin), 11 12 1967, SCMP No. 4097, pp. 14Google Scholar.

64 Although only a rough estimate, the “handful” (the term employed in the original 8 August 1966 Central Committee decision on the Cultural Revolution) had probably grown by the end of 1967 to encompass several thousand leadership cadres including nearly two-thirds of the Politburo, half of the full members of the Central Committee, and three-fourths of the provincial party fifst secretaries.