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The Limits of Cataclysmic Change: Reflections on the Place of the ‘Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution‘ in the Political Development of the People's Republic of China
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2009
Extract
Few episodes in history have been the object of such widely divergent interpretations as the events of Mao Zedong's last decade. For the sake of convenience, I shall refer to the movement launched in 1966 by the name Mao gave it, but disputes have raged since the beginning as to whether it was in fact either cultural or revolutionary, let alone proletarian.
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- 20 Years On: Four Views on the Cultural Revolution
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- Copyright © The China Quarterly 1986
References
1. See, in particular, his conversation with an Albanian delegation, 1 May 1967, Wan-sui (1969), pp. 673–79; translated inMiscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought (Arlington, Va.: Joint Publications Research Service, 1974), pp. 456–61Google Scholar;
2. In this short piece, I shall on the whole not include references to the writings of other foreign scholars, either while the Cultural Revolution was going on, or in recent years. I have, of course, benefited greatly both from interpretations which I found convincing, and from the challenge of views I rejected. Such debts will no doubt be obvious to the reader.
3. Schram, Stuart R., “To Utopia and back: a cycle in the history of the Chinese Communist Party,” The China Quarterly, No. 87 (09 1981), pp. 407–439CrossRefGoogle Scholar;
4. On the ”mass line” in general, see my discussion inSchram, Stuart R., “Mao's Thought to 1949,” The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 13 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 821–22, 862–70Google Scholar;
5. This view was expressed by Gong Yuzhi in a conversation of 24 April 1986. On the circumstances in which the editorial, published in Renmin ribao (People's Daily) on 20 June 1956, was written and revised, seeMacFarquhar, Roderick, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution. 1. Contradictions Among the People, 1956–1957 (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 86–91Google Scholar; MacFarquhar correctly concludes that the main responsibility for the article lay not with Liu Shaoqi, as alleged during the Cultural Revolution, but with Zhou Enlai. This fact is taken for granted in China today.
6. See “To Utopia and back,” p. 420.
7. Gailong, Liao, “Guanyu dangshi he dangshi ziliao de mantan” (”Chat on Party history and materials on Party history”), in Gailong, Liao, Dangshi tansuo (Explorations in Party History) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1983), pp. 366–411Google Scholar; The section on the Cultural Revolution appears on pp. 402–409.
8. Ibid. pp. 406–408.
9. For a more detailed discussion of this mechanism, including references to recent Chinese articles putting similar arguments, see my essay“Party leader or true ruler? Foundations and limits of Mao Zedong's personal power,” in Schram, Stuart (ed.), Foundations and Limits of State Power in China (London: School of Oriental and African Studies; Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, forthcoming, spring 1987)Google Scholar;
10. The most comprehensive and judicious account is that of MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, Vol. 2. The Great Leap Forward 1958–1960 (London: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 187–251Google Scholar.
11. For a somewhat more extended discussion of these events, see“Party leader or true ruler?”. Wentian's, Zhang speech at Lushan is now available in his Collected Works: Zhang Wentian xuanji (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1985), pp. 480–506Google Scholar; A vivid account of the changing atmosphere is contained inRui, Li, “Chong du Zhang Wentian tongzhi de ‘Lushan fayan’” (“Re-reading Comrade Zhang Wentian's 'Speech at Lushan'”), in Huiyi Zhang Wentian (Remembering Zhang Wentian) (Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1985), pp. 289–302Google Scholarpassim. Also, conversation of 18 April 1986 with Li Rui, who was one of the six members of the drafting committee of the ”Summary decisions” which, in the end, were not adopted. The composition of this group makes plain how wide was the apparent consensus in July; the others were Hu Qiaomu, Zhou Xiaozhou, Mao's secretary Tian Jiaying, Tan Zhenlin, and Zeng Xisheng of Anhui.
12. For the texts of Liu's written and oral reports on this occasion, seeLiu Shaoqi xuanji (Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi), Vol. 2 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1985), pp. 349–443Google Scholar; For Wang Guangmei's account of the circumstances, see her article in Renmin ribao, 13 December 1985.
13. For a somewhat more detailed statement of my position on this question, which is not really central in the present context, seeSchram, Stuart R., Mao Zedong: A Preliminary Reassessment (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1983), p. 73Google Scholar;
14. Responsibility for this Renmin ribao editorial is now attributed toMao, Mao. himself said, in his speech “On the 10 great relationships,” that “we” wrote it. Selected Works, Vol. V, p. 304Google Scholar;
15. See, e.g. his philosophical conversation of August 1964, in Schram, Stuart (ed.), Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), pp. 220–21Google Scholar, 227–29, etc.
16. Schram, S., Mao Unrehearsed, pp. 277–78Google Scholar; See also the rather different text of these conversations in Wan-sui (1969), pp. 667–72, translated (badly) in Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought, pp. 451–55. For my own comments on the role of organization in Mao's thinking during the Cultural Revolution, see my article“Decentralization in a unitary state: theory and practice 1940–1984” in Schram, S. R. (ed.), The Scope of State Power in China (London: School of Oriental and African Studies; Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1985), pp. 107–115Google Scholar;
17. See Meisner, M., Mao's China and After. A History of the People's Republic (New York: The Free Press, 1986), pp. 442–43Google Scholar; though the conclusion here is partly contradicted by the analysis on pp. 376–79.
18. “On the 10 great relationships,” text as circulated in 1965, in a, Mao Unrehearsed, p. 70Google Scholar;Chinese, in Wan-sui (1969), p. 48Google Scholar;
19. Tsetung, Mao, A Critique of Soviet Economics (transl. by Roberts, Moss) (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), pp. 51, 66–67Google Scholar; translation modified on the basis of the Chinese text, Wan-sui (1969), pp. 334, 347.
20. Schram, S., The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, rev, . edit. (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 354–55Google Scholar;Mao Zedong ji, 2nd edit., Vol. 6 (Tokyo: Sōsōsha, 1983), p. 331Google Scholar;
21. Renmin ribao, 24 April and 1 July 1986.
22. Renmin ribao, 25 April 1986.
23. Guangyuan, Yu, “Shuangbai fangzhen tichu sanshi nian” (“The 30th anniversary of the putting forward of the two hundreds policy”), Renmin ribao, 16 05 1986Google Scholar;
24. Shaozhi, Su, “‘Shuangbai’ fangzhen sanshi nian” (“Thirty years of the ‘two hundreds’ policy”), Renmin ribao, 15 05 1986Google Scholar;
25. Shaozhi, Su, “Zhengzhi tizhi gaige yu fandui fengjianzhuyi yinxiang” (“Reform of the political structure and opposition to feudal influences”), Renmin ribao, 15 08 1986Google Scholar;
26. I offered an interpretation of developments from 1978 to 1984 in my article“Economics in command?”, The China Quarterly, No. 99 (09 1984), pp. 417–461Google Scholar; For an account of the ensuing two years, see my article “Tō Shōhei wa, Mō Takutō o norikoeru ka” (“Has Deng Xiaoping gone beyond Mao Zedong?”), Chuō Kōron, No. 10 (10 1986), pp. 222–37Google Scholar;
27. Wright, Mary C., “Introduction,” in Wright, M.C. (ed.), China in Revolution: The First Phase 1900–1913 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 60Google Scholar;
28. Schram, S., Mao Unrehearsed, p. 231Google Scholar (italics added).
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