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The Increasing Power of Lin Piao and the Party-Soldiers 1959–1966

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Ralph L. Powell
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Extract

The events of the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” have resulted in Lin Piao becoming the heir apparent of Mao Tse-tung while the armed forces have become the principal power factor in Communist China. However, much of the basis for the greatly expanded roles and power of Lin and the military establishment was actually laid in the period 1959–66. In considerable part, Lin Piao and his lieutenants gained power by establishing themselves as “the most loyal” supporters and potential heirs of the venerable, charismatic Mao Tsetung. In addition, for several years they have been carefully infiltrating into numerous key institutions of the state and Party and have played an important role in seeking to purge the opposition. Many of Marshal Lin's supporters and some of his opponents are professional party-soldiers, who have long been the Party's senior specialists in military affairs. Legally these men no longer have the title of marshal or general, for ranks were officially abolished in June 1965. However, since these powerful figures continue to dominate the massive armed forces, while extending their influence much further into the battered party and government structure, it will help to clarify a complex struggle if those who are primarily party-soldiers are still designated by their previous military ranks. For example, after the party reorganisation of August 1966 there were eight former marshals on the list of members of the new Politburo of the Party.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 34 , June 1968 , pp. 38 - 65
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1968

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References

1 This article is drawn and updated from a larger research project done for the Research Analysis Corporation. The analysis and conclusions should not be interpreted as representing those of the Research Analysis Corporation or the Department of the Army.

2 New China News Agency (NCNA) in English, 25 May 1965.

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80 New York Times, 10 July 1966, p. 11; Washington Post, 7 July 1966, p. A15.

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82 New York Times, 1 August 1966, p. 4; Who's Who in Communist China, pp. 223, 722. In February 1967 a Red Guard Bulletin charged that General Hsiao's claim that Lin Piao sent him to the Ministry was false and that he was closely connected with Liu Shao-ch'i and Lo Jui-ch'ing. See CNA, No. 661 (26 May 1967), pp. 5–6.

83 See Radio Nanning, in Cantonese, 18 June 1966; Radio Nanning, 27 June 1966; Radio Chengtu, 2 July 1966; Radio Hofei, 5 July 1966; Yang-ch'eng Wan-pao(Canton), 22 07 1966, in SCMP, No. 3757, p. 7Google Scholar; Radio Wuhan, 29 August 1966; Radio Kweiyang, 31 August 1966; Radio Chengchow, 2 November 1966.

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85 During the summer of 1966, there were numerous press stories but more radio reports of attacks on and dismissals of university officials and professors.

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90 Ibid. No. 35 (26 August 1966), pp. 6–7; No. 37 (9 September 1966), pp. 5, 8; No. 41 (7 October 1966), pp. 4, 7; NCNA-English, 18 and 31 August 1966.

91 Christian Science Monitor, 27 July 1966, p. 7; Washington Post, 16 July 1966, p. All. These important appointments were all confirmed later.

92 New York Times, 2 August 1966, p. 1; Washington Post, 2 August 1966, p. A10.

93 New York Times, 5 December (p. 8) and 6 December (p. 6) 1966; Peking Review, No. 50 (9 12 1966), p. 5Google ScholarPubMed.

94 This concept and some of the data are drawn from Gittings, John, “Military Control and Leadership, 1949–1964,” China Quarterly, No. 26 (04–06 1966), pp. 82–101, esp. p. 97CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The only place where the veterans of Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army appear to have been favoured was in appointments of new members to the third term (December 1964) of the honorific National Defence Council.

95 After Lin Piao reappeared in the spring, on a number of occasions he was wished ”good health” or ”eternal health.” For examples, see Radio Kunming, 5 April 1967; Radio Peking, 20 April 1967.

96 For examples, see NCNA-Peking, in Chinese, 2 December 1967.

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