^1. Shi, Haimei and Jia, Zi (eds.), Jingyongfaxue cishu (Legal Science Dictionary for Police Use)(Beijing: Zhongguo renmin gongan daxue chubanshe, 1994), pp. 856–59Google Scholar; Dangdai Thongguode gongan gongzuo (Contemporary China′s Public Security Work) (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1992), pp. 363–385; and Tang Zhi and Wang Linxiao, “80 niandai wujing buduide zujian” (“The establishment of the PAP in the 1980s”), Junshi shilin (Military History), No. 64 (September 1995) pp. 24–26.Google Scholar

^2. Interviews, Beijing, September 1995, and also “Military control points to political posturing,” Jane′s Defense Weekly, 28 October 1995, p. 3.

^3. For a full list of the Party committee members, see “Wujing budui dangwei kuodahui zai jing jiekai” (“Enlarged PAP Party committee meeting opens in Beijing”), Renmin gongan bao (People′s Public Security News), 13 May 1993, p. 1.Google Scholar

^4. Unconfirmed Hong Kong media reports said that some general detachments in eastern and coastal provinces such as Guangdong, Fujian and Jiangsu have been upgraded from division-level to deputy group army-level commands. Wu Zhong, “Military to control police in eastern provinces,” Hong Kong Standard, 29 August 1995, p. 5.

^5. Renmin wujing bao (PAP News), 3 August 1995, p. 1

^7. Interviews, Beijing, March 1994.

^8. Wang Shaoguang, “Demystifying China′s defence expenditure,” unpublished paper, 1995, p. 38. Wang compared different sets of figures given by the Ministry of Finance and the State Statistical Bureau for “administrative expenses” and concluded that the resulting discrepancies represented expenditures earmarked for the PAP. According to Wang, PAP expenditures slowly rose from RMB 1.205 billion in 1984 to RMB 3.221 billion in 1991. He estimates PAP expenditures in 1993 to be around RMB 5 billion (US$862 million).Google Scholar

^9. Zhang Yongzheng and Hua Ye, “Shenhua houqin gaige, zhuanbian wuge guannian” (To deepen logistics reform and shift five ideas“), Renmin wujing bao, 1 December 1988, p.4.Google Scholar

^10. ”Zhongguo renmin wuzhuang jingcha budui houqin“ (”Logistics work in the Chinese People′s Armed Police“), in Junshi kexue yuan shejie junshi nianjian bianjibu (Academy of Military Sciences World Military Affairs Yearbook Editorial Board), 1993/94 shijie junshi nianjian (1993–94 World Military Affairs Yearbook) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1994), pp. 801–803.

^11. Ibid.

^12. ”Wujing budui jinnian jiangzhixing xinde gongyong jingfei biaozhi“ (”PAP promulgates its new public funds standard“), Renmin wujing bao, 2 February 1993, p. 1.

^13. ”Zhongguo renmin wuzhuang jingcha budui houqin.“

^14. Ibid.

^15. ”The People′s Armed Police,“ China News Analysis, Hong Kong, April 1993, p. 7.

^16. On the PAP figures and a more general assessment of Chinese military spending, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1995/96 (London: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 270–75.Google Scholar

^17. Foreign military observers who have toured PAP facilities in Beijing have not noticed any significant changes in the alert status of PAP units nor have they observed any noticeable differences between ordinary guard units and their mobile counterparts. Interview, Beijing, rfarch 1995.

^18. Zhuzhong chuzhi tufa shijian yanjiu” (“Place attention on research of outbreaks of sudden incidents”), Renmin wujing bao, 27 January 1994, p. 1.

^19. See “Wujing budui shouci zhuangbei gongzuo huiyi zai Wuhan jiekai” (“Inaugural armed police weapons work conference opens in Wuhan”), Renmin wujing bao, 23 November 1993, p. 1.Google Scholar

^20. Chen Shenggeng and Wang Zhankui, “Xiang zhuangbei xiandaihua yao zhandouli” (“Increase combat effectiveness through modernization of equipment”) (Jiefangjun bao ]Liberation Army Daily), 5 December 1993, p. 2.Google Scholar

^21. “Zhencha qingbao tan xinlu” (“Working out new methods of information scouting”), Renmin wujing bao, 17 December 1994, p. 2.

^22. Jiefangjun bao, 22 January 1995, p. 1.Google Scholar

^23. Sun Chunying, “A comprehensive view of public order in rural areas,” Fazhi ribao (Legal Daily), 3 May 1994, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China (FBIS-CHI), 6 May 1994, pp. 19–22, and also Liu Jinghuai “Radical action will be taken to improve rural public order,” Liaowang, 6 June 1994, in FBIS-CHI, 17 June 1994, pp. 17–20.Google Scholar

^24. Investigations Unit, Political Department, Xingyi Military Subdistrict, “Survey and thoughts about a public order corps in which the militia is the main element,” Guizhou Daily, 1 August 1994, in Joint Publications Research Service, China(JPRS), 30 September 1994, pp. 85–88.

^25. Renmin gongan bao, 25 January 1992, p. 2.

^26. Renmin wujing bao, 29 June 1995.

^27. Jiefangjun bao, 16 July 1995.

^28. Liu Zhongen, “Yong ganbu jianchi wuhu sihai” (“To choose PAP officers from the five lakes and four seas”), Renmin wujing bao, 14 July 1994, p. 3.Google Scholar

^29. This information was contained in a China New Agency interview with the commander of Yunnan′s general detachment, Senior Colonel Si Jiuyi, in FBIS-CHI, 4 April 1994, p. 31.

^30. Sun Chunying, Li Bingtian and Sun Baoye, Ten years of combat readiness: a look at the China-Burma border defence work,“ Renmin gongan bao, 3 February 1994, in JPRS, 27 April 1994, pp. 27–29.

^31. See Renmin ribao (People′s Daily), 27 July 1989, p. 2.

^32. Interviews with informed observers in Beijing in 1990 suggest that as many as 100,000 PLA soldiers may have been transferred to the PAP shortly after the Tiananmen crackdown. For statistics on the expansion of the PAP′s ranks in early 1990s, see Zhongguo falii nianjian bianjibu (China Law Yearbook Editorial Board) Zhongguofalii nianjian (China Law Yearbook) (Beijing: Zhongguo falu chubanshe, 1989 to 1993 editions).Google Scholar

^33. Zhihua, Yang, ”How to cope with political contingencies,“ Jiefangjun bao,21 July 1989, in FBIS-CHI, 1 August 1989, p. 35.Google Scholar

^34. ”Zhang Zhen inspects Shanxi armed police,“ Jiefangjun bao, 27 October 1995, p. 1. in FBIS-CHI, 22 November 1995, p. 25.

^35. Renmin wujing bao, 3 August 1995, p. 1.

^36. Interviews, Beijing, September 1995.

^37. Public security minister Tao Siju candidly admitted to these problems in an interview. See ”Public security chief on People′s Police,“ Liaowang, (6 November 1995), pp. 10–11, in FBIS-CHI, 19 December 1995, pp. 44–45.Google Scholar

^38. ”80% kanya budui qiaoqian xinju“ (”80% of PAP guard units in Guangdong moved into new accommodation“), Renmin wujing bao, 22 August 1993, p. 1.

^39. ”PAP commander cites poor conditions, treatment,“ South China Morning Post, 10 March 1995, p. 10.

^40. Anquan wending shi zuohao gongzuode baozhen” (“Pledge to do well in security and stability work”), Renmin wujing bao, 24 April 1993, p. 1.

^41. Renmin gongan bao, 17 December 1991, p. 1.

^42. “Hideous attempts to ′lure′ Guangdong armed police with ′money and women′,” Renmin ribao, 22 September 1992, p. 3, in BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts: Far East, 15 October 1992, p. B2/1.

^43. “Armed police to try to resist influence of debauchery,” Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, 1 June 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 9 June 1995, p. 42.

^44. Fazhi ribao, 14 April 1995, p. 1.

^45. “Jiang Zemin zongshuji guanxin wujing budui jianshe jishe” (“Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin′s on-the-spot meetings show concern for the armed police′s construction”), Renmin wujing bao, 4 January 1994, p. 1.

^46. “Tao Siju greets new armed police major generals,” Xinhua Domestic Service, 23 December 1993, in FBIS-CHI, 27 December 1993, pp. 32–33, and “Fifteen armed police officers given general rank,” Xinhua English Service, 8 October 1994, in FBIS-CHI, 13 October 1994, pp. 56–57. According to regulations governing PAP personnel appointments, all promotions to the rank of colonel or higher need the approval of the CMC chairman and premier. See “Specific regulations concerning the rank and title system of the Chinese People′s Armed Police,” Renmin ribao, 26 December 1988, p. 4.

^47. Military chiefs have traditionally been reticent to give their support to political leaders whom they think lack the military or political credentials to protect their interestsGoogle Scholar. Jiang′s lack of military experience before becoming CMC chairman has been an obstacle in his cultivation of the military top brass.

^48. “Jiang calls on Party to boost law and order,” China Daily, 25 December 1993, p. 1.Google Scholar

^49. “Yaoyou juan xiweide youhuan yizhi” (“It is important to be concerned and prepared for danger in times of peace”), Renmin wujing bao, 27 January 1994, p. 1.Google Scholar

^50. If a confrontation were to take place in Beijing, for example, the PLA could mobilize six divisions of more than 70,000 troops equipped with heavy armour within a few hours. PAP forces in the capital total only around 40,000 lightly-armed troops.

^51. See Wong, Kam C., “Public security reform in China in the 1990s,” in Maurice Brosseau and Lo Chi Kin (eds.), China Review 1994 (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1994), pp. 5.15–5.18.Google Scholar