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From Institutional Interaction to Institutional Integration: The National Supervisory Commission and China's New Anti-corruption Model

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 May 2019

Li Li  and
Peng Wang Open the ORCID record for Peng Wang [Opens in a new window]
Li Li
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, China University of Political Science and Law, China. Email: [email protected].
Peng Wang*
Affiliation:
Department of Sociology, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
*
Email: [email protected] (corresponding author)
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Abstract

How does the establishment of the National Supervisory Commission affect China's capacity to curb corruption? Using published materials and fieldwork data, this article addresses this question by comparing the newly established anti-corruption agency with the previous dual-track system. It first examines the previous system by focusing on four dimensions of the interaction between the Commission for Discipline Inspection (CDI) and the People's Procuratorate: complementarity, convergence, competition and conflict. Although the CDI and the procuratorate compensated for each other's deficiencies, competition and conflicts between the two institutions were rife, reducing the efficiency of China's anti-corruption work. The article then investigates what impact the establishment of the National Supervisory Commission has had on China's capacity to combat corruption. This new model strengthens the Party's capacity to curb corruption, and the focus of the anti-corruption work has shifted from punishment to prevention, but the Party still needs to resolve three types of unbalanced power relations: between supervision, prosecution and trial; between central and local authorities; and between the state and citizens.

摘要

国家监察委员会的成立如何影响中国政府腐败治理的能力？基于公开资料和实地调研数据, 本文通过探讨纪委与检察院这两个最为重要的反腐败机构之间的关系来回答这个问题。文章首先回顾了国家监察委员会成立之前, 以纪委和检察院作为反腐败主要机构之间的复杂的互动关系。文章将其概括为四个维度, 即互补, 融合, 竞争和冲突。基于上述四种关系, 文章发现虽然纪委和检察院在一定程度上存在互补关系, 可以弥补彼此的不足, 但两个机构在反腐败工作中仍然存在竞争和冲突, 因而在一定程度上降低了中国反腐败工作的效率, 这也成为理解国家监察委员会成立的逻辑起点。之后, 文章进一步讨论了新组建的国家监察委员会对中国反腐工作的影响。在审慎观察的基础上, 本研究认为新成立的国家监察委员会加强了执政党治理腐败的能力, 反腐工作的重点也逐渐从惩罚腐败转向预防腐败, 但执政党仍需要谨慎处理三种不平衡的权力关系：监察机关与审判机关、检察机关的关系; 中央和地方的关系; 以及国家权力与公民权利的关系, 这也是对正在行进中的国家监察体制改革进行持续观察的重要方向。

Keywords

anti-corruptionChinaCommission for Discipline InspectionNational Supervisory CommissionPeople's Procuratorate反腐败中国纪律检查委员会国家监督委员会人民检察院
Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 240 , December 2019 , pp. 967 - 989
Copyright
Copyright © SOAS University of London 2019 

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