1. Although most accounts of Kuomintang politics fail to give adequate emphasis to the radicalism that survived within the party after the purge or the change that came in late 1929 and early 1930, two exceptions are Cavendish, Patrick, “The ‘New China’ of the Kuomintang,” in Grey, Jack (ed.), Modern China's Search for a Political Form (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 153, 158–67Google Scholar and Eastman, Lloyd E., “New insights into the nature of the Nationalist regime,” Republican China Vol 9, No. 2 (02 1984), pp. 8–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2. North China Herald, 8 September, 1928, p. 402, cols. 1–4; North China Herald, 21 April 1928, p. 98.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.; North China Herald, 2 March 1929, p. 349, cols. 1–2.

5. Jiangsu jianshe ting gongbao (Gazette of the Jiangsu Commission of Reconstruction), No. 15 (1 10 1928), pp. 126–31Google Scholar.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. “Zhongguo Guomindang dierjie Zhongyang jiancha weiyuan hui baogao shu” (“Report of the second Supervisory Committee of the Nationalist Party”) (N.p., n.d.), p. 8. (Internal evidence suggests that this was published in late 1928 or early 1929.)

9. Many such reports are cited below, though these constitute only a tiny fraction of the incidents recounted in Shanghai and Nanking newspapers, governmental gazettes and other sources.

10. Nanjing minguo ribao (Nanking Republican Daily), 24 October 1927, p. 5.

11. Feng xian's Sun Jishi was one such local elite who was summarily executed. (Interviews, Taibei,1977; Shi bao, 16 February 1928; ibid. 20 February 1928, p. 7.

12. On the establishment of the Special Court system and the “Articles on the Punishment of Local Bullies and Evil Gentry” that Kuomintang central authorities promulgated, see Shen bao (The Shun Pad), 2 August 1927, p. 6, col. 1, and Shen bao, 7 August 1927, p. 8, col. 1. In early 1929 when accusations of “local bullies and evil gentry” had diminished in volume, the Special Courts' remaining cases and their jurisdiction was handed over to the regular court system. See Kuhn, Philip A., “Local self-government under the Republic,” in Wakeman, Frederick Jr, and Grant, Carolyn (eds.), Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p.294Google Scholar.

13. The “Articles on the Punishment of Local Bullies and Evil Gentry” which governed prosecutions in the Special Courts listed certain specific and readily identifiable crimes such as murdering or maiming which would earn their perpetrators the designation “local bully.” But they also prescribed that label (as well as harsh punishment) for those who “cut a swath across the countryside, cheating and oppressing common people.” Obviously the latter charge was elastic enough as to provide a hunting licence to anyone who wished to see his competitors behind bars. (Shen bao, 7 August 1927, p. 8, col. 1.) My statement that “hundreds” were charged as “local bullies and evil gentry” is based primarily upon my reading of Shi bao, Shen bao and Zhongyang ribao as well as Nationalist journals for early 1927 through 1930 which has turned up over a hundred such cases.

14. Zhongyang ribao (Central Daily News), 5 May 1928, sec. 2, p. 4; Funingxian xin zhi (New Funing Xian Gazetteer), Vol IV, pp.23b–24a.

15. For examples of a xian assemblyman and an officer of a Chamber of Commerce arrested as “local bullies,” see the cases of Rugao xian's Zhang Wei and Zhang Shisun. (Shi bao, 2 July 1927, p. 10; Shen bao, 25 September 1927, p. 10, col. 6.)

16. On Yao's case, see Shi bao, 25 November 1927, p. 6; Shi bao, 15 January 1928, p. 6; Shi bao, 3 February 1928, p. 6; Shi bao, 4 February 1928, p. 6; Shi bao, 1 March 1928, p. 6; Shi bao, 2 March 1928, pp. 6–7; Shi bao,15 April 1928, p.6; Zhongyang ribao, 12 April 1928; Tadao, Tanaka, Guomin geming yu nongcun wenti (The National Revolution and the Rural Question) (Beiping: Jingcheng yinshu ju, 1932), Vol. 1, p. 67Google Scholar.

17. For another township headman (xiangdong) under attack as a “local bully,” see the case of Wu xian's Pu Rongqian. (Shi bao, 26 August 1928, sec. 1, p. 4.) For a Kuomintang-era township headman facing similar charges (in this case his title was xiang xingzheng juzhang), see the case of Kunshan xian's Qian Jingzhi. (Wu Tianhan, et al., Zhongguo Guomindang Kunshan xian dangshi (History of the Kunshan County Nationalist Party Branch) (N.p., 1929, Kuomintang achives, No. 435/177, p. 73.) For a sub-township manager (tudong) under similar assault, see the case of Yu Yichen. (Shi bao, 9 January 1928, sec. 2, p. 7.)

18. For a useful analysis of party-government conflict in Jiangsu (although, by and large, it skirts the issue of party radicalism versus government conservatism), see Tsai, David, “Party–government relations in Kiangsu province, 1927–1932,” Select Papers From the Center for Far Eastern Studies, No. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1975–1976), pp.85–118Google Scholar.

19. Bi, Ni, “Duiyu Jiangsu ge xian zhengzhi de ganxiang he xiwang” (”Opinions and hopes with regard to the politics of various Jiangsu xian”), Jiangsu xunkan (Jiangsu Ten-day Journal), No. 2 (11 09 1928), pp. 11–13Google Scholar.

20. Ibid.

21. Shen bao, 14 December 1927, p.7, col. 5.

22. Comintern and the CCP Central Committee abandoned any hope of perpetuating the “united front” in September 1927.See Schwartz, Seenjamin I., Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 90Google Scholar. This did not, however, explicitly rule out the use of Kuomintang organizations as fronts for CCP activities.

23. “Jiangsu Jiangbei feigong raoluan shikuang zhi diaocha” (“Investigation of the circumstances of communist disorders in northern Jiangsu”), Chan gong banyuekan (Communist Extermination Fortnightly), Nos. 5;6, 10 01 1931), p. 82Google Scholar, cited in Barkan, Lenore, “Nationalists, communists, and rural leaders: political dynamics in a Chinese county, 1927–1937” (Ph.D.thesis, Seattle, University of Washington, 1983), pp. 470, 521Google Scholar. See also Sheng, Zhong, “Jiangsu ge xian Gongchandang baodong jingguo” (“Communist riots in various Jiangsu xian”), Jiangsu xunkan, No. 1 (1 09 1928), pp.48–49Google Scholar.

24. Barkan, Lenore, “Nationalists, communists and rural leaders,” pp. 94–95, 104, 108, 416Google Scholar. For an example of a non-communist who played a role in attacks on local elites in Rugao, see references to Cheng Changwu in Barkan, pp. 94, 104. (Barkan renders “He Sen” as “He Lin.”)

25. North China Herald, 23 February 1929, p.301.

26. Jiangsu pinglun (The Jiangsu Critic) (ed.), Zhongguo Guomindang zuopai ABC (The ABC's of the left wing of the Kuomintang) (Beiping, 1930)Google Scholar. On the government's suppression of Jiangsu pinglun as a part of its general crackdown against Reorganizationists and other leftists in 1929, see Shishi xinbao (The China Times), 5 August 1929, sec. 1, p. 3; Shishi xinbao, 27 August 1929, sec. 2, p. 2.

27. Jiangsu pinglun, The ABC's, pp. 129–96

28. Jiangsu sheng zhengfu gongbao (Jiangsu Provincial Government Gazette), No. 62 (3 12 1928), pp. 32–35Google Scholar; Zhongyang ribao, 5 February 1928, sec. 2, p. 3; Zhongyang ribao, 28 June 1928, sec. 2, p. 3; Zhongyang ribao, 10 June 1928, sec. 2, p. 3; Zhongwu, Zhang (ed.), Shuyang xiangtu zhi lue (Concise Gazetteer for Shuyang County) (Taibei, 1974), pp. 134, 181–85Google Scholar.

29. Zhongwu, Zhang, Concise Gazatteer pp. 181–85Google Scholar; Jiangsu sheng zhengfu gongbao, No. 62 (3 12 1928), pp.32–35Google Scholar.

30. For support for the idea that local elites could and sometimes did brand others with the label “local bullies and evil gentry,” see Alitto, Guy S., “Rural elites in transition: China's cultural crisis and the problem of legitimacy,” Select Papers from the Center for Far Eastern Studies, No. 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1978–1979), pp. 218–86Google Scholar. Alitto apparently believes that because the Republican era lacked any single standard of legitgimacy, the question of who was a “bully” or “evil gentry” depended entirely upon who was doing the labelling.

31. Shen bao, 6 September 1927, p 6, col. 6.

32. Interview, Taibei, 1977.

33. Gu Ziyang, a leader of the Jiangsu Kuomintang from the time of its reorganization in 1924, argues that he and other party leaders concentrated on bringing young students and school teachers into the party. Ziyang, Gu, Jiangsu sheng dangwu yange (The Evolution of the Party Affairs of Jiangsu Province) (N.p., 1936), p. 2Google Scholar. For the social backgrounds of party members in the late 1920s see Guomindang, Zhongguo dangshi shiliao biancuan weiyuan hui (Committee on the Compilation of Nationalist Party History), (ed.), Zhongguo Guomindang nianjian (Chinese Kuomintang Yearbook) (Nanjing, 1929), p. 747Google Scholar.

34. Conversion of temples and shrines for secular purposes was not a practice invented by Kuomintang radicals. Around 1911 several localities were rocked by disturbances caused by reformist elites' attempts to take temples for their own uses. For one example, see Ma, Amy, “Local self-government and the local populace in Ch'uansha, 1911,” Select Papers from the Center for Far Eastern Studies, No. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1975–1976), pp. 47–84Google Scholar.

35. On the Yancheng xian Kuomintang's anti-superstition campaign and its violent outcome, see “Yancheng xian dangbu gongzuo diaocha shixiang yilan” (“A list of work investigation items for the Yancheng xian party headquarters”) (04 1930), Kuomintang archives No. 435177;, pp. 8–9, 34–35Google Scholar; Shen bao, 10 October 1928, p. 8; Shen bao, 13 October 1928, p. 11, col. 1; “Ling chaban Yancheng xianzhang Li Yicheng” (“Order for investigation and handling of Yancheng magistrate Li Yicheng”), Jiangsu sheng zhengfu gongbao, No. 56 (10 1928), p. 14Google Scholar; Jiangsu sheng zhengfu gongbao, No. 58, p. 52Google Scholar; Zhongyang ribao, 13 October 1928, sec. 3, p. 1; Zhongyang ribao, 16 October 1928, sec. 2, p. 3, cols. 1–4; Zhongyang ribao, 17 October 1928, sec. 2, p. 3, cols. 1–3; Zhongyang ribao, 17 October 1928, sec. 2, p. 3, col 8; Zhongyang ribao, 18 October 1928, sec. 2, p. 3, cols 3–5, 6–7.

36. See note 34 for sources on the Yancheng incident.

37. On the Gaoyou case, see Shishi xinbao, 5 March 1931, sec. 1, p. 4, cols. 9–10; Shishi xinbao, 1 March 1931, sec. 1, p. 4, col.7; Shishi xinbao, 9 March 1931, sec. 2, p. 2, col. 9; Shishi xinbao, 22 March 1931, sec. 1, p. 4, col. 12. On the Suqian case, see Zhenzhi, Zhang, Geming yu zongjiao (Revolution and Religion) (Shanghai, 1929), pp. 191–96Google Scholar. Also see, Shishi xinbao, 1 March 1929, sec. 2, p. 2, col. 3; Shishi xinbao, 24 April 1929, sec. 2, p. 2, col. 5; Shishi xinbao, 27 April 1929, sec. 2, p. 3, col. 6; Shishi xinbao, 30 April 1929, sec. 2, p. 2, cols. 5–6; Shi bao, 25 February 1929, p. 3; Shi bao, 21 February 1929, sec. 1, p. 3; Shen bao, 24 February 1929, p. 11, col. 3; Hefa, Feng (ed.), Zhongguo nongcun jingji ziliao (Materials on the Chinese Rural Economy) (Shanghai, 1935), p. 357Google Scholar.

38. Interview, Taibei, 1977.

39. Xiandao, Sima, Beifa hou zhi gepai siqiao (The Tides of Thought of the Various Factions after the Northern Expedition) (Beiping, 1930), pp. 203–211Google Scholar; interview, Taipei, 1977. Li Shouyong is transliterated as “Li Shuyung” and the Practice Society is called the “Practical Society” in Wilbur, Martin C. and Lien-ying, Julie How (eds.) Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China, 1918–1927 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), pp.442, 444Google Scholar.

40. Interview, Taibei, 1977. One source named Ye Xiufeng, Liu Jihong, Jin Hesheng, Qi Xiyong, and Li Shouyong as the five. Li and Qi soon became key figures in Jiangsu's CC Clique. At the time of these meetings, however, CC and FF had not yet split. The eventual split came as a result of the strong personalities and ambitions of Li and Yeh. Each clique, it seems, had room for only so many chiefs. Personal correspondence from Taiwan, 1983.

41. Ibid.; Shaoxiao, Chen, Hei wang lu (Record of the Black Net) (Hong Kong, 1965), pp. 337, 356–61Google Scholar; see also pp. 290–91 for more of Ye's activities.

42. Private correspondence with a source in Taiwan in 1983; on Teng, see Zhuanji wenxue (Biographical Literature), Vol 36, No. 4 (4 01 1980), p. 145Google Scholar; on Yinquan, Lu, see “Su sheng dangbu gaixuan zhi qianhou” (”Before and after the re-election of the Jiangsu provincial branch”), Shehui xinwen (The Society Mercury), Vo. 1, No. 28 (24 12 1932), p. 555Google Scholar.

43. Interviews, Taibei, 1977.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Zhongyang zhoubao (Central Weekly), Vol 9. No. 94 (24 03 1930), p. 11Google Scholar; Jilu, Huang et al. (eds), Geming renwu zhi (Revolutionary Personages), Vol. XI (Taibei, 1973), pp. 371–75Google Scholar.

47. Zhongua Minguo Shishi Jiyao Bianji Weiyuanhui (Committee for Compilation of the Sketch of the Historical Events of the Chinese Republic) for January through June 1925 (Taibei, 1975), p. 439.

48. Xinwen bao (The News), 7 February 1930, sec. 3, p. 9, cols. 1–3.

49. Interview. Taibei, 1977.

50. E.g. see Geisert, Bradley Kent, “Power and society: the Kuomintang and local elites in Kiangsu province, China, 1924–1937” (Ph.D. thesis, University of Virginia, 1979), pp.85–86Google Scholar. See also Ziyang, Gu, Evolution of Party Affairs p. 18Google Scholar; Shishi xinbao, 26 August 1929, sec. 1, p. 3, col. 4; Shishi xinbao, 27 August 1929, sec. 1, p. 3, col. 1.

51. Bi, Ni, “Duiyu Jiangsu gexian zhengzhi de ganxiang he xiwang” (“Opinions and hopes with regard to the politics of various Jiangsu xian”), Jiangsu xunkan, No. 2 (11 09 1928), pp. 11–13Google Scholar.

52. Interviews, Taibei, 1977; Ziyang, Gu, Evolution of Party Affairs, p. 19Google Scholar; Xinwen bao, 7 February 1930, sec. 3, p. 9, cols. 1–3. On the Li-yang uprising, see Shi bao, 23 November 1929, p. 2; Shi bao, 24 November 1929, p. 3; Shi bao, 27 November 1929, p. 3; Shi bao, 28 November 1929, p. 2; Shi bao, 29 November 1929, p. 2; Shi bao, 27 December 1929, pp. 2–3.

53. Interview, Taibei, 1977; Boorman, Howard L. (ed.), Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, Vol. III (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 36–37;Google Scholar; Xun, I, Jiang dang jenxiang (The Truth about the Chiang Clique) (Hong Kong, 1949), pp.26–28, 65Google Scholar.

54. Xinwen bao, 7 February 1930, sec. 3, p. 9, cols. 1–3; Ziyang, Gu, Evolution of Party Affairs, p. 19Google Scholar; interviews, Taibei, 1977; Jiangsu gaodeng fating gongbao (The Gazette of the Jiangsu Supreme Court), Nos. 3 and 4 (bound together); juanjian section (03, 04 1930), pp.6–11Google Scholar.

55. Ibid.

56. The original seven members were Zhang Daofan (tied to the Organization group; prior to this he had been the head of the Investigation Section of the Organization Department of the party), Ye Xiufeng (FF Clique leader), Zhu Jianbai (CC Clique sidekick of Li Shouyong), Wu Baofeng (Organization group), Qi Xiyong (CC Clique), Zhang Yuanyang (tied to the Organization group, though sometimes denoted as head of a “Central Political Academy Clique”), and Wu Baojin (CC Clique). For the list of committee members, see Ruheng, Zhao, Jiangsu sheng jian (Jiangsu Provincial Handbook) (Shanghai, 1935), Vol. I, dangwu section, pp. 6–7Google Scholar. I have depended on my 1977 interviews in Taibei for information on the backgrounds and factional ties of these persons. Confirmation from written sources is possible in some cases. On Zhang Taofan's connections with Chen Guofu, see Boorman, Howard L. (ed.), Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, Vol. I (1967), p. 113Google Scholar. On Yeh and Wu Baojin see Gong, Chong, “Jiangsu sheng dangbu gepai de lishi ji qi huodong” (“The history and actions of the various factions of the Jiangsu provincial party branch”), Shehui xinwen Vol. 1, No. 7 (21 11 1932), pp. 367–68Google Scholar. On Qi Xiyong, Zhu Jianbai, Zhang Yuanyang and Wu Baojin, see Ke, Da, “Su sheng dangbu xuanzhu yi mu” (“The inside story of the Jiangsu party branch elections”), Shehui xinwen, Vol. 2, No. 5 (13 01 1933)Google Scholar; Ke, Da, “Jiangsu dangwu de lishi guan” (”A historical perspective on Jiangsu party affairs”) in Xiandai shiliao (Materials on Modern History) (Shanghai, 1933), Vol. I, pp. 98–105Google Scholar. Although these and other articles in Shehui xinwen indicate that the CC and Central Political Academy cliques were moving away from their fixed loyalty to the Chen brothers and the Organization Department, my interviewees were adamant that the CC, FF and Central Political Academy cliques, as well as a “Yang-Ma-Cao Faction” (which I have chosen to omit from this brief account) were all closely tied to the Chens and the Organization Department. All of these factions at one time or another played important roles in the provincial rectification committee.

57. Ziyang, Gu, Evolution of Party Affairs, p. 21Google Scholar; interviews, Taibei, 1977.

58. Interview. Taibei, 1977.

59. Teiwes, Frederick C., Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms, 1950–1965 (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1979)Google Scholar. The list of provincial and municipal party branches that underwent rectification in the early 1930s includes Anhui, Gansu, Jiangxi, Qinghai, Ningxia, Hankou, Qingdao, Tianjin and Beiping. (This list is not exhaustive, as it is based on sources which cover only about a year-and-a-half.) [“Zhongyang zuzhi weiyuan hui xiaji dangbu zuzhi gongzuo baogao shencha huiyao” (“Central Organization Committee inspection summaries of organization work reports by lower-level party branches”), February-April 1934, Kuomintang Archive No. 435/17; “Zhongguo Guomindang geshengshi dangwu tongji biao” (“Party affairs statistical forms for various provinces and municipalities of the Chinese Nationalist Party”), July 1933–December 1933, Kuomintang Archive No. 435/205.] The list also omits several party branches that were under the control of centrally-appointed committees named something other than “rectification committees” [in most cases these other irregular bodies were called “Directorates” (zhidao weiyuan hui) or “Special Deputations” (tepai yuan)].

60. This view is based on interviews in Taiwan and my reading of Jiangsu dangwu zhoukan, Shi bao, Shen pao, Zhongyang ribao, Xinwen bao, and many other journals and sources from the 1930s. No single article or set of articles would suffice to prove my contention that party social activism and conflict between the party and pre-existing local elites declined significantly after rectification. By definition one cannot prove that something did not exist. One is further hindered from irrefutably demonstrating this by the declining quality of Chinese media coverage in the 1930s of events of all sorts - especially political conflicts. The stricter censorship of newspapers and magazines of the 1930s as well as growing secretiveness of the party meant that a considerable degree of discord was most certainly hidden from public view. Still, based on my interviews in Taiwan with former leaders of the Kiangsu Kuomintang branch, as well as on many other sources, I am persuaded that the pattern I describe here is more than an illusion.

61. However, not all persons associated with Chen Lifu and Chen Guofu's network of personal relationships disavowed thoroughgoing social or economic reform (though I suspect that most of the powerful ones did). Xiao Zheng was both an intimate of the Chens and an advocate of fundamental reform of China's land tenure system. See Zheng, Xiao, Tudi gaige wushinian: Xiao Zheng huiyi lu (Fifty Years of Land Reform: Memoirs of Xiao Zheng) (Taibei, 1980)Google Scholar. Also the single most significant movement for reform in post-rectification Kiangsu –it is the exception that proves the rule - was a land reform programme for Qidong xian that was advocated (though never executed) by Organization Clique associate Zhou Ruqian. A letter I received from a former Kuomintang leader in Kiangsu - now residing in Taibei – establishes Zhou Ruqian as a close friend of Kiangsu CC Clique leader Zhou Shaocheng; for a blow-by-blow account of the political battle surrounding the issue of the Qidong proposal, see Xiuqing, Liu, “Qidong zudian wenti yu fuzhi geng nung yundong” (“The Qidong tenancy question and the movement to support the peasants' ownership of the land they till”), Dizheng yuekan, Vol. 5, No 2 (03 1937), pp. 321–46Google Scholar. It would be helpful to know the postrectification fates of those hundreds of young radicals that had been active in local Kuomintang branches since 1927, but I have been able to locate little information on them. I can only speculate that most of them (1) were expelled from or left the party; (2) laid low in order to protect themselves; or (3) adopted conservative ways and developed Organization Clique ties in order to further their party careers in a changed environment. However, enough Anti-CC and Reorganization Clique personnel remained in the party at the local level to elect a substantial number of delegates to the Provincial Congresses of the Kuomintang held in 1931 and 1932. [Interviews, Taibei, 1977; Gong, Chong, “Jiangsu sheng dangbu gepai de lishi ji qi huodong”; “Su quan hui huaxu lu” (“Small episodes of human interest from the Jiangsu Provincial Congress”), Shehui xinwen, Vol. 2, No. 4 (10 01 1933), pp. 35–36.]Google Scholar

62. Miner, Noel Ray, “Chekiang; The Nationalist's effort in agrarian reform and construction, 1927–1937” (Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University, 1973), pp. 74–77, 92–93Google Scholar. Although Miner does not explicitly blame the party centre for the shift, the juxtaposition of Dai Jitao's “negotiations” and the subsequent changes strongly implies that the centre was responsible.

63. The explanation of the party's role is based on countless newspaper and journal articles. But for one article on each subject, see: Shishi xinbao, 7 February 1931, sec. 2, p. 2, col. 3 (on training militia); Xinwen bao, 24 March 1933, sec. 1, p. 4. col. 8 (on the party and co-operatives); Zhongyang ribao, 9 May 1930, sec. 2, p. 4, col. 1 (on the propaganda role); 1 Zonghuang, Li, “Difang zizhi zhi quoqu yu jianglai” (“The past and future of local self-government”), Difang zizhi (Local Self-government), No. 3 (30 09 1935), pp. 443–46Google Scholar (on local self-government); Ruheng, Zhao, Jiangsu Provincial Handbook, zhang 2, p. 20 (on mass education)Google Scholar.

64. E.g., the term is rarely found in the official organ of the Provincial Rectification Committee, Jiangsu dangwu zhoukan (Jiangsu Party Affairs Weekly). However, there are exceptional instances, such as in the following article which speaks deprecatingly of “local bullies and evil gentry”: Yun, Xin, “Zhengli gongzuo zhong zhi zhengli lilun de jiantao” (“A discussion of rectification theory in rectification work”), Jiangsu dangwu zhoukan, No. 6 (16 02 1930), pp. 11–25Google Scholar.

65. For a typical meeting see Zhongyang ribao, 16 January 1930, sec. 2, p. 4. For an exceptional meeting which passed measures conflicting with the interests of certain local elites, see Zhongyang ribao, 3 May 1930, sec. 3, p. 2, col. 4; the party acted against the darling of a Suining xian non-party elite faction (Li Zifeng). The Anhui Rectification Committee was not as cautious in its treatment of local elites; see Zhongyang ribao, 26 February 1931, sec. 2, p. 1, cols. 1–2.

66. Xinzhai, Gong and Zhiyuan, Lo, “Jiangsu gexian xian zheng canguan jiyao” (“A record of an inspection of administration in various Jiangsu xian”), Jiangsu yuebao (Jiangsu Monthly), Vol. 4, Nos. 5 and 6 (1 12 1935), pp. 46–50Google Scholar.

67. For the earlier attitude see Tianhan, Wu et al. , History oftheKunshan County, p. 46Google Scholar.

68. For more information on the terms of the alliance see Geisert, “Power and society.” A brief presentation of part of my argument on the alliance is to be found in Geisert, Bradley K., “Toward a pluralist model of KMT rule,” Chinese Republican Studies Newsletter, Vol. 7, No. 2 (02 1982), pp. 1–10CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Geisert, Bradley K., “Probing KMT rule: reflections on Eastman's ‘new insights,’” Republican China, Vol. 9, No. 2 (02 1984), pp. 31–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

69. For information on the government's support of landlord claims against tenants in southern Jiangsu and, especially, government help for landlord bursaries, see Jiangsu sheng zhengfu gongbao, No. 83 (14 03 1929), pp. 9–10Google Scholar; Menglei, He, “Suzhou Wuxi Changshu sanxian dianzu zhidu diaocha” (“An investigation of the tenancy system of Wu, Wuxi, and Changshu counties”) (M.A. thesis, Graduate School of Land Economics of Central Political Academy, 1932)Google Scholar, published in Zheng, Xiao (ed.), Minguo ershi nian dai Zhongguo talu tudi wenti (Data on Chinese Land Problems in the 1930s) (Taibei, 1977), Vol. LX, pp. 33197–211Google Scholar; Youyi, Zhang, Zhongguo jindai nongye shi ziliao (Historical Materials on Modern Chinese Agriculture) (Beijing, 1957). Vol. III, pp. 64–65, 307–308Google Scholar.

70. For information on the Kuomintang army's tendency during the War of Resistance to subsume under its banner guerrilla and militia forces raised and led by local elites, see Yung-fa, Chen, “The making of a revolution: the communist movement in eastern and central China, 1937–1945” (Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University, 1980), pp. 40–41, 67Google Scholar. Also see the following detailed compilation on Kuomintang-affiliated guerrilla activities in northern Jiangsu: Xuzhou baxian kangzhan jiaofei jiyao bianji weiyuan hui (Editorial Committee for the Summary of Bandit Suppression in the Eight Counties of the Xuzhou Area) (ed.), Xuzhou baxian kangzhan jiaofei jiyao (A Summary of Bandit Suppression in the Eight Counties of the Xuzhou Area) (Taibei, 1973)Google Scholar.

71. Cited in Wilson, Dick, When Tigers Fight: The Story of the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945 New York:Penguin Books, 1983), p. 89Google Scholar.

72. Jiangsu Sheng Zhengfu Mishu Chu (Secretariat of the Jiangsu Provincial Government) (ed.), San nian lai Jiangsu sheng zheng shuyao (A Sketch of Administration in Jiangsu Province in the Past Three Years), Vol. II (Zhenjiang, 1936), baoan section, intro., p. 1Google Scholar.

73. Interviews, Taibei, 1977; Geisert, , “Probing KMT rule,” pp. 28–30Google Scholar. On the uprising centring in Liyang xian, see Shi bao, 23 November 1929, p. 2; Shi bao, 24 November 1929, p. 3; Shi bao, 27 November 1929, p. 3; Shi bao, 28 November 1929, p. 2; Shi bao, 29 November 1929, p. 2; Shi bao, 27 December 1929, pp. 2–3.

74. Although the Haizhou party in the late 1920s found confiscated urban properties easy and profitable to administer, large rural holdings presented unexpected difficulties. Donghai xian was a sharecropping area in which landlords traditionally had the responsibility of providing seeds, fertilizer, tools and draught animals to their tenants. The prices of these items, together with the trouble and expense of collecting the harvested grain from scores of tenants who cultivated many small parcels of land and who were scattered over a wide area, presented a problem for the party. Lacking the finances for such outlays, the new Kuomintang managers attempted to collect the landlord's share without furnishing the requisite capital. Understandably, the peasants resisted Kuomintang efforts to collect the landlord's share of the crop on the grounds that the new Kuomintang landlords had violated the terms of the tenants' unwritten contract. The reporter noted that one large estate which “ordinarily yielded about $5,000 a year to its owner… yielded nothing at all… “ under Kuomintang management. Rather than aiding the tenants and gaining their allegiance, Kuomintang administration required that they “find ready money for taxes, seeds, animals, fertilizers, etc., to which they gave no concern before – and they have not the ready cash.” (North China Herald, 2 March 1929, p. 349, cols. 1–2.)

75. Eastman, Lloyd, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927–1937 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 1–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar.