* I am grateful to Norman Fainstein, Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., Ellen Frost, Mark Kesselman, Donald W. Klein, Steven I. Levine, Sharon G. Nathan, Michel C. Oksenberg, Robert H. Silin, Tang Tsou and Ezra F. Vogel for valuable comments, and to participants in various seminars and colloquia at which the ideas were tried out. An earlier version was prepared during a research associateship at the Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, and was presented at the 1971 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

1. Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 55-7. Opinion groups twice solidified into “ factions “ (” organized opinion groups “), Schurmann notes, in the Kao-Jao and P'eng Teh-huai affairs. But these were quickly rooted out. Schurmann's conception seems to include the possibility that certain leaders will take consistent positions in these debates, ending up sometimes in the majority and sometimes in the minority. We may thus regard as variants of his model those interpretations which classify leaders as “ radicals “ or “ moderates,” “ dogmatists “ or “ pragmatists,” etc., and view the Chinese political process as a debate among them.

2. Michel C. Oksenberg, “Policy making under Mao, 1949-1968: an overview,” in John M. H. Lindbeck, ed., China: Management of a Revolutionary Society (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), pp. 79-115.

3. See Philip Bridgham's three articles on the course of the Cultural Revolution: “Mao's ‘Cultural Revolution': origin and development,” The China Quarterly (CQ) 29 (January-March 1971), pp. 1-35; “Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1967: the struggle to seize power,” CQ 34 (April-June 1968), pp. 6-37; and “Mao's Cultural Revolution: the struggle to consolidate power,” CQ 41 (January-March 1970), pp. 1-25. See also his “ Factionalism in the central committee,” in John Wilson Lewis, ed., Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 203-35. The term “ Mao-in-command “ is my own.

4. On Field Armies, see William Whitson, “ The Field Army in Chinese Communist military politics,” CQ 37 (January-March 1969), pp. 1-30. On commissars versus commanders, see William Whitson, “ The military: their role in the policy process,” in Frank N. Trager and William Henderson, eds., Communist China, 1949-1969: A Twenty Year Appraisal (N.Y.: The New York University Press, 1970), pp. 95-122; and Ellis JofEe, Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949-1964 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, East Asian Research Center, 1965), and “The Chinese Army under Lin Piao: prelude to political intervention,” in Lindbeck, ed., China, pp. 343-74. On the Party and the gun, see, among others, Ralph L. Powell, “The Party, the government and the gun,” Asian Survey (AS) X:6 (June 1970), pp. 441-71. On legal specialists versus new cadres, see Victor H. Li, “The evolution and development of the Chinese legal system,” in Lindbeck, ed., China, pp. 221-255. For further discussion of the “ interest group “ and “ Mao-in-command “ models, see my “ Models of conflict in Chinese politics,” Problems of Communism, Vol. XXI, No. 3 (May-June 1972), pp. 80-3. The “policy making under Mao” and “ interest group” models could nicely be combined, but so far as I am aware no one has yet done so in print.

5. That is, politics in the upper level of the CCP from 1921 to 1949, and at the “ central level” (see below) of the CPR since 1949.

6. See, for example, Richard M. Pfeffer, “ The pursuit of purity,” Problems of Communism, Vol. XVIII, No. 6 (November-December 1969), pp. 12-25; Frederick C. Teiwes, “A review article: The evolution of leadership purges in Communist China,” CQ 41 (January-March 1970), pp. 122-35.

7. See, for example, Franz Schurmann, “ The attack of the Cultural Revolution on ideology and organization,” in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., China in Crisis, Vol. 1, China's Heritage and the Communist Political System, Bk. Two (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 558-60.

8. See, for example, Leonard Schapiro and John Wilson Lewis, “The roles of the monolithic party under the totalitarian leader,” in John Wilson Lewis, ed., Party Leadership, pp. 114-45; Benjamin I. Schwartz, “The reign of virtue: some broad perspectives on leader and Party in the Cultural Revolution,” ibid. pp. 149- 69; and Stuart R. Schram, “The Party in Chinese Communist ideology,” ibid. pp. 170-202.

9. See, for example, Jack Gray, “ Mao's economic thoughts,” Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. LXVII, No. 3 (15 January 1970), p. 16.

10. See, for example, Robert Jay Lifton, Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tsetung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1968).

11. For example, those interpretations which stress Chiang Ch'ing's jealousy of Wang Kuang-mei (Mrs Liu Shao-ch'i or Mao's resentment of insults suffered at the hands of Liu Shao-ch'i.

12. The model was first developed to explain political factionalism in early Republican China in my Ph.D. dissertation, “ Factionalism in early republican China: the politics of the Peking government, 1918-1920,” Department of Government, Harvard University, 1970. It has gone through various revisions in response to the criticisms of colleagues and to my own reading on both Chinese and non-Chinese politics. The logical status I would claim for the model, as distinct from the conditions of its development, is that of an internally consistent description of what political conflict would be like under certain assumptions.

13. In recent years studies of the political and other functions of clientelist ties have proliferated. Terminology varies (” dyadic contract,” “ dyadic alliance,” “ patron-client tie,” etc.) but there is little question that various authors are referring to the same quite clearly defined phenomenon. Among the many discussions of the clientelist ties or their political uses are George M. Foster, “The dyadic contract: a model for the social structure of a Mexican peasant village,” in Jack M. Potter, May N. Diaz and George M. Foster, eds., Peasant Society: A Reader (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), pp. 213-30; James C. Scott, “Patronclient politics and political change in Southeast Asia,” American Political Science Review (APSR) LXVI: 1 (March 1972), pp. 91-113; and Carl H. Lande, “Networks and groups in Southeast Asia: some observations on the group theory of politics,” paper prepared for delivery at the 1971 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, forthcoming in APSR.

Clientelist ties have been highly developed, and have played important roles, in China, where they have been embedded in and reinforced by a cultural stress on the mutual rights and obligations involved in social roles. See especially Benjamin I. Schwartz, “ On attitudes toward law in China,” reprinted in Jerome Alan Cohen, The Criminal Process in the People's Republic of China, 1949-1963: An Introduction (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 62-70; and Lien-sheng Yang, “The concept of pao as a basis for social relations in China,” in John K. Fairbank, ed., Chinese Thought and Institutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 291-309. In this article I must beg a number of important questions: what are the specific forms and functions of clientelist ties in Chinese life and how have these ties changed in the revolutionary process in China? Some thoughts on these matters are contained in my paper, “ ‘ Connections’ in Chinese politics: political recruitment and kuan-hsi in late Ch'ing and early republican China,” prepared for delivery at the 1972 annual meeting of the American Historical Association.

14. Peter M. Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), p. 5 and passim.

15. Marshal D. Sahlins, “On the sociology of primitive exchange,” in Michael Banton, ed., The Relevance of Models for Social Anthropology (London: Tavistock, 1965), p. 144 and passim.

16. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, trans. (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 152-3.

17. Cf. Foster, “ The dyadic contract.“

18. For suggestive studies of clientelist ties in operation in non-political contexts, see, among others, James N. Anderson, “ Buy-and-sell and economic personalism: foundations for Philippine entrepreneurship,” AS IX: 9 (September 1969), pp. 641-68; Mary R. Hollnsteiner, “Social structure and power in a Philippine municipality,” in Potter, et al., eds., Peasant Society: A Reader, pp. 200-12; Sidney W. Mintz, “ Pratik: Haitian personal economic relationships,” ibid, pp 54- 63; and Robert H. Silin, “ Marketing and credit in a Hong Kong wholesale market,” in W. E. Willmott, ed., Economic Organization in Chinese Society ‘Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), pp. 327-52.

19. See, for example, Karl D. Jackson, “Communication and national integration in Sudanese villages: implications for communications strategy,” paper prepared for presentation at a meeting of the SEADAG Indonesia Seminar in New York City on 30 March-1 April 1972; Martin and Susan Tolchin, To the Victor … Political Patronage from the Clubhouse to the White House (New York: Vintage, 1972); William Foote Whyte, Street Corner Society: The Social Structure of an Italian Slum, Enl. ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1955), Pt. II.

20. Distinctions can probably fruitfully be made between “clientelist parties,” defined as integrating all levels of the political system through clientelist ties, and “ machines,” defined as operating strictly on the local level. Among the major theoretically-oriented studies of such organizations are James C. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), chs. 6-9; and John Duncan Powell, “ Peasant society and clientelist politics,” APSR L«XIV:2 (June 1970), pp. 411-25.

Scott has gone furthest in specifying the conditions under which clientelist parties or machines can develop (Corruption, esp. pp. 104-22, and 151-7). The problem of the conditions of machine development becomes especially important when, as here, one is dealing with a mass participation system that nonetheless has oligarchic factions. Obviously a key difference between contemporary China and those political systems in which clientelist parties or machines have developed is that in China there is no real electoral competition for power. Among the case studies of political systems organized by clientelist parties are Robert H. Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), esp. chs. 8 and 9; Keith R. Legg, Politics in Modern Greece (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), esp. chs. 6-8; Myron Weiner, Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967); and William Foote Whyte, Street Corner Society, esp. ch. VI. I am grateful to Michael Bucuvalas and Pedro Cabin for bringing Legg and Dix to my attention.

21. For ways of conceptualizing a network from the standpoint of an individual ego, see J. A. Barnes, “ Networks and political process,” in Marc J. Swartz, ed., Local-Level Politics: Social and Cultural Perspectives (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), pp. 107-30; and Adrian C. Mayer, “ The significance of quasi-groups in the study of complex societies,” in Michael Banton, ed., The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies, A.S.A. Monograph 4 (London: Tavistock, 1966), pp. 97-122.

22. It seems unnecessary to specify an exact size boundary between factions and machines since the difference between the two is so large. The difference, of course, is not just one of size; as a consequence of their different sizes and different degrees of selectivity in recruitment, as well as of the different natures of their respective arenas, machines and factions behave in thoroughly distinguishable ways.

23. This conception of a faction is similar to that offered by Ralph Nicholas, “ Factions: a comparative analysis,” in Michael Banton, ed., Political Systems and the Distribution of Power, A.S.A. Monograph 2 (London: Tavistock, 1965), pp. 27-9, and to Landers concept of the “ dyadic following “ in his “ Networks and groups.” Let me stress again that I have defined “ faction” in a technical sense. By faction I do not mean an “ organized opinion group” (cf. Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, p. 56) contending warlords, or Red Guards. Nor should the word faction as used here be regarded as a translation of the Chinese terms p'ai, hsi, tang, or hui. Whether any of these things can be called a faction by the present definition can only be determined upon close structural analysis. Although restrictive, the definition advanced here seems to fit a wide range of configurations found in political systems and sub-systems including governments, parties, bureaucracies, parliaments, courts and villages in a number of different geographical areas and historical periods. Some examples are cited in my dissertation, pp. 372-85.

24. Each structural characteristic discussed is not necessarily unique to factions (for example, guerrilla bands may be equally flexible, and for some of the same reasons), but none of them is universal and the combination of characteristics is distinctive.

25. If a faction becomes corporatized the clientelist relations are submerged in authority relations and the structure ceases to be a faction in this sense. What might encourage or discourage corporatization of a faction is a question that cannot be investigated here. For the concept of “ corporate “ used here, see Weber, Theory of Social and Economic Organization, pp. 145-8.

26. The follower may in turn recruit others as his own followers.

27. For a suggestive exploration of the advantages of this sort of communications pattern, see Alex Bavelas, “ Communications patterns in task-oriented groups,” in Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell, eds., The Policy Sciences (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951), pp. 193-202.

28. See Barry E. Collins and Bertram H. Raven, “Group structure: attraction, coalitions, communications, and power,” in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, eds., The Handbook of Social Psychology, 2nd ed. (Reading, Mass.: Addison- Wesley, 1969), Vol. IV, pp. 137-55.- .

29. It may be asked why communications patterns and other structural features to be discussed below limit the size of factions but not of “ clientelist parties.” For one thing, although a clientelist party is founded on patronage dispensed through clientelist ties, it also takes on elements of formal organization (party label, headquarters, officers, rules) to enable it to administer its mass electoral base. It is in this sense not a “pure type” of clientelist structure. Even more fundamentally, each type of political structure ideal-typically stands in an adaptive relationship to its political environment. The clientelist party is adapted to, and tends to maintain, a mass electoral political system. The faction is adapted to and tends to maintain an oligarchic or small-scale system. Although I argue that certain elements of factional structure limit factional size, I could just as well build the argument in reverse: a political setting which involves relatively few people makes it possible for men to organize themselves in ways that would not be suited to large organizations.

30. Cf. the “ size principle” as enunciated by William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 32-3.

31. Cf. Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice- Hall, Inc., 1964), passim.

32. As was the case with the structural characteristics of factions, the claim is not made that the modes of conflict characteristic of factions are each unique to factional systems, merely that none of them is universal to all political systems and that the combination of all of them is found only in factional systems.

33. A major reason for differences in the power of factions is the differing power of their support structures (regional and/or institutional power bases). But opposing power bases cannot be entirely eliminated, nor, given the tendency of large, victorious factions to split, can they be taken over.

34. Nathan Leites, On the Game of Politics in France (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 23 and 45.

35. Cf. F. G. Bailey, “Parapolitical systems,” in Swartz, ed., Local-Level Politics, p. 282; Bernard Gallin, “ Political factionalism and its impact on Chinese village school organization in Taiwan,” ibid. p. 390; and Melford E. Spiro, “Factionalism and politics in village Burma,” ibid. pp. 410-12.

36. Leites, On the Game, p. 117.

37. In the Chinese context, for example, factional alignments did not cross the ideological boundaries between the late Ch'ing conservatives on the one hand and the constitutionalists and revolutionaries on the other, or between the Kuomintang and the CCP. But within each major ideological current factional alignments were not (how could they be?) determined by pure, a priori ideological compatibilities. Ideological stands were developed and revised in the course of politics. For a case study of the process by which ideological standpoint becomes defined in the course of political conflict, as rivals force one another to delineate and clarify their positions, see Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952).

38. Cf. Leites, On the Game, pp. 48-9.

39. Ibid. ch. 4, esp. pp. 97-8.

40. Cf. ibid. pp. 82-3.

41. Cf. James L. Payne, Patterns of Conflict in Colombia (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 3-24. Payne attempts to explain factionalism in Colombian politics on the basis of the prevalence of “ status,” rather than “ programme,” incentives among Colombian politicians. However, if our model is correct, factionalism can occur in the presence of either type of incentive. Politicians in factional systems will tend to act as if they were motivated by status incentives because of the importance of personal prestige and personal connexions as political resources in factional systems. It is immaterial to the model how highminded the ultimate motives for conflict are.

42. Cf. Leites, On the Game, pp. 7-34.

43. Cf. Payne, Patterns of Conflict, pp. 249-50.

44. Myron Weiner, Party Politics in India: The Development of a Multi-Party System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 237-40. See also Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 33-S.

45. On the unifying effects of conflict, see further Coser, Functions, passim; and George Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations, Kurt H. Wolff and Reinhard Bendix, trans. (New York: The Free Press, 1955), pp. 13-123.

46. The same distinction holds if, as I shall argue was the case with the CCP until 1949, the group of factions is itself the counter-elite and its enemies are the ruling elite.

47. Of course, they do not always succeed in preserving the regime. If the social context of the regime has been changing so that, e.g., new problems demand solutions or new groups demand access to the system, immobilism (see below) may prevent the regime from responding successfully. The consequent loss of legitimacy may make it an easy target for a strong rival. An example is the crumbling of the Peking Government before the Kuomintang advance in 1928.

The Clemenceau and Poincare” ministries in France are well-known instances of resistance by a factional system to external threat. See Philip M. Williams, Crisis and Compromise: Politics in the Fourth Republic, paperback ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1966), p. 11.

48. Cf. Simmel, Conflict, p. 41.

49. Bernard J. Siegel and Alan R. Beals, “ Pervasive factionalism,” American Anthropologist, 62 (1960), pp. 394-417. For a critique, see Nicholas, “ Factions,” pp. 56-7.

50. Cf. in particular Stuart R. Schram, “The Party,” p. 171; Howard L. Boorman, “Teng Hsiao-p'ing: a political profile,” CQ 21 (January-March 1965), p. 119; Whitson, “The Field Army,” passim.

51. “In fact, CC membership has been in recent years a badge of recognition or a reward for things done.” Donald W. Klein and Lois B. Hager, “ The ninth Central Committee,” CQ 45 (January-March 1971), p. 37.

52. Parris H. Chang, “ Research notes on the changing loci of decision in the Chinese Communist party,” CQ 44 (October-December 1970), pp. 170-3.

53. Ezra F. Vogel, Canton under Communism: Programs and Politics in a Provincial Capital, 1949-1968 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 325; Michel Oksenberg, “ Occupational groups in Chinese society and the Cultural Revolution,” in The Cultural Revolution: 1967 in Review, Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies, No. 2 (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1968), p. 26.

54. “Lin Piao: a historical profile,” Current Scene, Vol. VII, No. 5 (10 March 1969), p. 3; Bridgham, “Mao's Cultural Revolution: the struggle to consolidate power,” p. 16; Ralph L. Powell, “The increasing power of Lin Piao and the Party-soldiers, 1959-1966,” CQ 34 (April-June 1968), pp. 62-3.

55. Schapiro and Lewis, “The roles of the monolithic Party,” p. 131.

56. Parris H. Chang, “ Mao's Great Purge: a political balance sheet,” Problems of Communism, Vol. XVIII, No. 2 (March-April 1969), p. 8; Whitson, “The Field Army,” pp. 13-21.

57. Cited from Hung-ch'i (Red Flag), No. 12, 1967, in “Quarterly chronicle and documentation,” CQ 32 (October-December 1967), p. 198.

58. E.g., see Charles Neuhauser, “The Chinese Communist Party in the 1960s: prelude to the Cultural Revolution,” CQ 32 (October-December 1967), p. 3.

59. Among these the most prominent so far are Chao Tzu-yang and Ch'en Tsai-tao, but many less prominent cadres are also said to have been reinstated.

60. Cf. Ezra F. Vogel, “The structure of conflict: China in 1967,” in The Cultural Revolution: 1967 in Review, pp. 106-7.

61. See Richard Baum, “China: year of the mangoes,” AS IX:1 (January 1969), pp. 3-4; Gordon A. Bennet, “China's continuing revolution: will it be permanent?” AS X:l (January 1970), p. 3.

62. Cf. Merle Goldman, “The fall of Chou Yang,” CQ 27 (July-September 1966), pp. 132-48.

63. For example, see Bridgman's three articles cited above, note 3. Also cf. Baum, “ China: year of the mangoes,” pp. 4-5.

64. See “ Quarterly chronicle and documentation,” CQ 32 (October-December 1967), pp. 184-221.

65. Of course at any given moment there seemed to be a definite policy line, but the question is whether the line was consistently sustained or whether it gave way to a contradictory line.

66. On Ulanfu, see Paul Hyer and William Heaton, “ The Cultural Revolution in Inner Mongolia,” CQ 36 (October-December 1968), pp. 114-28; on Li Chingch'uan, see “ Stalemate in Szechuan,” Current Scene, Vol. VI, No. 11 (1 July 1968), pp. 1-13. Frederick Teiwes, in his Provincial Party Personnel in Mainland China, 1955-1966 (New York: East Asian Institute, Columbia University, 1967), has shown that provincial leadership was mainly stable during the 1956-66 period (p. 62), which seems consistent with the “ independent kingdoms “ view advanced here, although Teiwes himself concludes that the data do not support the idea of provincial-level factions (pp. 27-8).

67. Whitson, “ The Field Army.“

68. Cf. Jiirgen Domes, “ The role of the military in the formation of revolutionary committees 1967-68,” CQ 44 (October-December 1970), pp. 112-45.

69. “ Quarterly chronicle and documentation,” CQ 32 (October-December, 1967) p. 196.

70. Melvin Gurtov, “The foreign ministry and foreign affairs during the Cultural Revolution,” CQ 40 (October-December 1969), pp. 65-102.

71. This analysis is based on Vogel, Canton, pp. 323-35; Gordon A. Bennett and Ronald N. Montaperto, Red Guard: The Political Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1971); and John Israel, “The Red Guards in historical perspective: continuity and change in the Chinese youth movement,” CQ 30 (April-June 1967), pp. 1-32.

72. See, e.g., “ Mass factionalism in Communist China,” Current Scene, Vol. VI, no. 8 (15 May 1968), pp. 1-13.

73. Bennett and Montaperto, Red Guard, pp. 72-7.

74. Ibid. p. 142.

75. Ibid. p. 186; Vogel, Canton, pp. 329-30.

76. See Ralph H. Turner, “Collective behavior,” in Robert E. L. Faris, ed., Handbook of Modern Sociology (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), pp. 382-425; and Lewis M. Killian, “ Social movements,” ibid. pp. 426-55.

77. Cf. Israel, “ The Red Guards,” p. 19.

78. Schram, “ The Party “; Whitson, “ The Field Army.“

79. See, for example, Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao; John E. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 1927-1935 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966).

80. Cf. Whitson, “ The Field Army,” pp. 3-8 and 21-6.

81. This generalization applies best to the history of the Party after about 1938. Before that there were several incidents of intra-Party military conflict and of permanent splits.

82. On the Kao purge, see Bridgham, “ Factionalism in the central committee,” pp. 205-211; Teiwes, “A review article,” pp. 122-6. On the P'eng Teh-huai purge, see both of these articles and David A. Charles, “ The dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai,” in Roderick MacFarquhar, ed., China Under Mao: Politics Takes Command, A Selection of Articles from The China Quarterly (Cambridge, Mass.; The M.I.T. Press, 1966), pp. 20-33. What is known about these episodes is consistent with the view that they represent instances of factional conflict.

83. The phenomenon of policy oscillation in the CPR has been noted by many analysts, and various efforts have been made to explain it. What is striking about many - not all - of these analyses is that they are non-political, avoiding any hint that elite conflicts might underlie the oscillations. For some noteworthy attempts to deal with this problem, see Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, pp. 73-104; Shinkichi Eto, “ Communist China: moderation and radicalism in the Chinese revolution,” in James B. Crowley, ed., Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation (N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1970), pp. 337-73; G. William Skinner and Edwin A. Winckler, “ Compliance succession in rural Communist Cihna: a cyclical theory,” in Amitai Etzioni, ed., A Sociological Reader in Complex Organizations, 2nd ed. (N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), pp. 410-38; and Alexander Eckstein, “ Economic fluctuations in Communist China's domestic development,” in Ho and Tsou, eds., China in Crisis, Vol. I, Bk. 2, pp. 691-729.

84. Cf. Vogel, Canton, chs. 2 and 3.

85. Whitson, “The Field Army,” pp. 15, 23-4.

86. The developments of this period are reviewed in Bridgham, “ Mao's ‘ Cultural Revolution': origin and development,” pp. 2-7. Also see Powell, “ The Increasing power,” pp. 45-6 and 62-; Joffe, “ The Chinese Army under Lin Piao,” in Lindbeck, ed., China; and Merle Goldman, “ Party policies toward the intellectuals: the unique blooming and contending of 1961-2” in Lewis, ed., Party Leadership, pp. 268-303.

87. Bridgham, “ Mao's ‘ Cultural Revolution': origin and development,” pp. 8-12.

88. Neuhauser, “The Chinese Communist Party,” pp. 19-25.

89. As Robert Jay Lifton has argued, in Revolutionary Immortality.

90. John W. Lewis, “Leader, commissar, and bureaucrat: the Chinese political system in the last days of the revolution,” in Ho and Tsou, eds., China in Crisis, Vol. 1, Bk. Two, p. 474. Note that if one views the Cultural Revolution not as a factional attack on Mao, but as a Maoist attack on factions, one disposes of most of the objections to a factional interpretation raised by Teiwes, “ A review article,” pp. 126-35.

91. Chang, “Research notes,” p. 177.

92. Cf. Klein and Hager, “The ninth Central Committee,” pp. 55-6. This is a “ new generation “ in the sense that these men had not previously been operating at the central level. Most or all of them had previously been high oflBcials of the Party or the Army or both. They had been followers in factions, we assume, but now they emerged as leaders in their own right, in the aftermath of the deterioration of many of the pre-Cultural Revolution factions.