Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2009
Although the People's Republic of China attaches little importance to elections in parliamentary democracies, elections are seen as important in societies going through the transition between capitalism and communism.1 Elections of local level leaders were carried out in the CCP-controlled base areas before 1949, and throughout the period after Liberation. The attention devoted to election propaganda and voter turn-out attest to the importance placed on mass electoral participation by the Chinese leadership.2* I wish to express my gratitude to Thomas Bernstein, Steven Butler, Victor Falkenheim, Andrew Nathan, Brian Shaw, and David Strand for reading earlier drafts of this paper and providing many useful suggestions for its revision. Needless to say, all errors are the responsibility of the author.
1. Townsend, James R., Political Participation in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 38.Google Scholar
2. Ibid. pp. 48–49, 58–59, 62, 111.
3. See Pfeffer, Richard, “Serving the people and continuing the revolution,” The China Quarterly (CQ) (October–December 1972), pp. 620–53, where such a topic might be discussed.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
4. Doak Barnett, A., Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 419.Google Scholar
5. Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China, p. 170.Google Scholar
6. Although brigade cadres are also elected, the pattern of participation outlined in Barnett and later in Stavis is confirmed by my data. Brigade Party branch secretaries and deputy secretaries are appointed by the commune and they together with other Party branch members in the brigade determine a list of nominees for brigade cadre positions, usually all or mostly Party branch members. A meeting of representatives of the production teams (called the brigade congress), usually team cadres, votes on the list, the results of which are sent to the commune for approval. I found no cases where Party branch nominees were rejected by the team representatives, and only one case where team members were able to participate directly in the nomination and election process (in 1969, an election nominally supervised by the PLA). Having one's own team member as brigade cadre is highly valued by team members, however, as I will show elsewhere.Google Scholar
7. See Stavis, Benedict, People's Communes and Rural Development in China (Ithaca: Cornell University, Rural Development Committee, 1974), pp. 98–101.Google Scholar
8. See King Whyte, Martin, Small Groups and Political Ritual in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 135–67. Other works on rural organization include John Pelzel, “Economic management of a production brigade in post leap China” in Willmott (ed.), Economic Organization in Chinese Society, pp. 389–417.Google Scholar
9. Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China, p. 118.Google Scholar
10. Myrdal, Jan, Report from a Chinese Village (London: William Heineman, Ltd, 1965), p. 166. See also my interview with CN4D.Google Scholar
11. Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China, p. 118.Google Scholar
12. Ibid.
13. Kraus, Richard, “The evolving concept of class in post-liberation China,” Columbia University, Ph.D. dissertation (1974), pp. 316–17.Google Scholar
14. Union Research Institute, Documents from the CCP Central Committee, 1956–1966, Vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute), pp. 695–725.Google Scholar
15. Ibid. p. 714.
16. Ibid. p. 720.
17. Ibid. pp. 714–15.
18. NM5A–3,4; NM3A–4,6; NM11I–10; NM9A–23; NM9B–12; NM4C–7. These notations indicate interviews I did in Hong Kong from May 1975 to October 1976. “NM” means peasant, “CN” means sent-down youth.Google Scholar
19. CN5G–10.Google Scholar
20. NM5A–3; NM6A–2,3; NM9A–12,17; CN5G–1; CN5H–6.Google Scholar
21. NM9A–15.Google Scholar
22. NM11I–10; see also NM3A–4.Google Scholar
23. CN5H–6.Google Scholar
24. NM4.Google Scholar
25. CN5G–1.Google Scholar
26. Ibid.
27. NM9A–12.Google Scholar
28. NM9A–12,14; NM5A–3; NM3A–5; NM11F–1; NM6A–3; NM4C–7.Google Scholar
29. NM4, CN4C.Google Scholar
30. CN4C–2.Google Scholar
31. NM4, and CN10.Google Scholar
32. NM4.Google Scholar
33. CN5G–19.Google Scholar
34. NM5A–3.Google Scholar
35. NM6A–3.Google Scholar
36. NM11I–10.Google Scholar
37. NM5A–3; NM11I–10.Google Scholar
38. NM11I–10.Google Scholar
39. CN4C–2.Google Scholar
40. NM9A–17.Google Scholar
41. NM4C–7; CN4C–2; CN11.Google Scholar
42. NM8D–14.Google Scholar
43. CN4C–2; NM4C–7. One informant reports that jobs were apportioned by his team management committee before the Cultural Revolution, but by the brigade after that. Other informants mention no change in this procedure.Google Scholar
44. NM11I–10; NM9A–13.Google Scholar
45. NM8D–14.Google Scholar
46. NM9A–14.Google Scholar
47. NM1F–1; NM3A–5.Google Scholar
48. See the example given on p. 28 below.Google Scholar
49. NM9A–13, 14.Google Scholar
50. NM1F–1.Google Scholar
51. CN4C–2; CN11B.Google Scholar
52. See Parish, William and King Whyte, Martin, Village and Family in Contemporary China (forthcoming), ch. 8.Google Scholar
53. See CN5A–18.Google Scholar
54. NM9B–18.Google Scholar
55. NM9A–17.Google Scholar
56. Chen, C. S. and Ridley, C. P., Rural People's Communes in Lien-chiang (Hoover Institution Press, 1969), p. 192. See also pp. 217, 235–36 and 288.Google Scholar
57. See Parish, and Whyte, , Village and Family in Contemporary China, ch. 8.Google Scholar
58. Ibid. Tables 8.5 and 8.7.
59. See NM3B–9 for a report on this.Google Scholar
60. Thomas Bernstein has pointed out to me that this is only partially true for sent-down youth. Most important for them is that peasants believe they will remain in the community. Press reports and interview data are contradictory on the ability of sent-down youth to secure cadre positions.Google Scholar
61. NM4E–10.Google Scholar
62. See CN2 for the period of “non-government” in the countryside.Google Scholar
63. CN3. See his comparison of peasant willingness in a wealthy brigade in Szechwan with a poor area near Shanghai.Google Scholar
64. Baum, Richard, Prelude to Revolution: Mao and the Peasant Question, 1962–1966 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), pp. 39–40Google Scholar, 185n.; Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China, p. 123Google Scholar; Documents from the CCP Central Committee, 1956–1966, p. 714.Google Scholar
65. “Five-good” commune members are (1) good in observing the laws and decrees of the government; (2) good in protecting the collective; (3) good in labour attendance; (4) good in protecting public property; (5) good in uniting with and helping other people. “Five-good” basic level cadres are (1) good in holding fast to the socialist road; (2) good in executing Party policies; (3) good in labour participation and production leadership; (4) good in observing the PLA's “three-eight” work style in diligence, thrift, honesty, and concern for the masses; and (5) good in political and ideological study. From Baum, p. 185n.Google Scholar
66. The five conditions for revolutionary successors, as given in Jen-min jih-pao, 3 August 1964 are:Google Scholar
(1)They must be genuine Marxist-Leninists;Google Scholar
(2)They must be revolutionaries who whole-heartedly serve the overwhelming majority of the people of China and the whole world;Google Scholar
(3)They must be proletarian political leaders capable of rallying and working with the overwhelming majority;Google Scholar
(4)They must set an example in applying the Party's democratic centralism, must master the method of leadership based on the principle of “from the masses to the masses,” and must cultivate a democratic style of work and be good at listening to the masses.Google Scholar
(5)They must be modest and prudent and guard against arrogance and impetuosity; they must be imbued with the spirit of self-criticism and have the courage to correct mistakes and shortcomings in their work.Google Scholar
67. I collected these cadre lists for each of my informants.Google Scholar
68. CN5G–21.Google Scholar
69. CN5H–18.Google Scholar
70. NM4.Google Scholar
71. CN5G–9.Google Scholar
72. NM6C–5.Google Scholar
73. See Parish, and Whyte, , Village and Family in Contemporary China, where it is observed that physical strength is necessary for team chiefs, thus placing a de facto age limit on this position.Google Scholar
74. CN5G–21.Google Scholar
75. CN5G–20.Google Scholar
76. CN5G–20.Google Scholar
77. CN5H–16.Google Scholar
78. Ibid.
79. NM9A–12.Google Scholar
80. Pelzel, p. 406.Google Scholar
81. CN2.Google Scholar
82. NM5A–4.Google Scholar
83. CN5G–23.Google Scholar
84. CN5G–20.Google Scholar
85. CN5C–2.Google Scholar
86. NM9A–13.Google Scholar
87. NM9A–13.Google Scholar
88. NM11F–4.Google Scholar
89. CN5G–3.Google Scholar
90. CN4D.Google Scholar
91. CN11A, B, C.Google Scholar
92. See Chen, and Ridley, , Rural People's Communes in Lien-chiang, p. 145Google Scholar; and Jen-min jih-pao, 9 August 1972.Google Scholar
93. As for example it did during the Four Clean-ups campaign.Google Scholar
94. See my “Election of production team cadres in rural China: 1958–1974,” prepared for the Workshop on the Pursuit of Political Interest in the People's Republic of China, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 10–17 August 1977, pp. 39–58.Google Scholar