1. The term “thought work” originally denoted the exertion of influence in small study groups, but is now used in China to refer to propaganda and persuasion in general. See Whyte, Martin King, Small Groups and Political Rituals in China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974)Google Scholar; and Quan Zhongguo xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo huiyi wenjian huibian (Collected Documents from the All-China Thought Work and Propaganda Work Conference) (Beijing: Xuexi chubanshe, 1994; for internal circulation only).Google Scholar

2. The terms “central party-state” and “the Centre” in this article refer to the Beijing-based, higher-level networks and hierarchies charged with the task of macro-managing communications flows. These agencies include, most importantly, the Communist Party's Central Propaganda Department, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Information Industries, the General Bureau of Radio, Film, and Television, the State Press and Publications Administration and the Politburo members whose portfolios include propaganda and the information industries.Google Scholar

3. The term “telecommunications” refers here to messages sent point-to-point by an electronic medium over relatively long distances, while the term “mass media communications” refers to messages – electronic or otherwise – sent from a single point to large audiences. Traditionally, telecommunications primarily denoted telephony, but in the 1980s, as the capacity of telecommunications transmission systems expanded, telecommunications lines began to be used to transmit messages containing a great deal more information than the traditional telephone call, telegraph or fax. The marriage of telecommunications with the computer soon allowed for sophisticated forms of electronic data interchange, e-mail and the Internet.Google Scholar

4. Calhoun, Craig, “On colonial culture,” Qiushi (Seeking Truth), 1 March 1996, pp. 26–33Google Scholar; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 4 September 1996. This is, of course, the essence of “peaceful evolution.”Google Scholar

5. The ubiquity of so-called “vulgar” (disu) media content is documented and lamented in issue after issue of such specialized publications as Xinwen zhanxian (News Front), Zhongguo jizhe (The Chinese Journalist) and Xinwen yu chuanbo yanjiu (News and Mass Media Research), as well as in mainstream newspapers and magazines. Crude sexual themes and gratuitous violence are prevalent on television and in films, especially those broadcast or shown in the counties and towns far from Beijing and low in the administrative hierarchy. There, the central government's monitoring capabilities are highly attenuated. As one informant explained: “The people like media products that ‘say no’ to the government. They like to do abnormal and ugly things” (interview no. 174).Google Scholar

6. On the distinction between legal property rights and economic property rights, see Calhoun, Craig, Economic Analysis of Property Rights (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).Google Scholar

7. Interviews 111 and 138. For a detailed discussion, see Lynch, Daniel C., After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and “Thought Work” in Reformed China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).Google Scholar

8. “Internet becomes part of daily life,” Xinhua, 27 June 1996Google Scholar; reprinted in FBIS Daily Report (China), 1 July 1996.Google Scholar

9. “Li Ruihuan tongzhi zai quanguo zhengdun qingli shu-bao-kan he yinxiang shichang dianhua huiyi shang de jianghua” (“Comrade Li Ruihuan's speech at the all-China teleconference on the rectification of book, periodical, audio and video markets”), Zhongguo gaige quanshu, 1978–1991 (China Reforms, 1978–1991), Vol. 3 (Dalian: Dalian chubanshe, 1992), p. 219.Google Scholar

10. Cited in Zhao Lanying, “In the midst of improvement and rectification, Shanghai news publishing enterprises focus on development,” Liaowang (Outlook), Vol. 10 (5 March 1990), pp. 25–26Google Scholar; translated in JPRS China Report, 19 June 1990, pp. 82–84.Google Scholar

11. “Regulations penalizing pornography announced,” Xinhua, 16 July 1990Google Scholar; translated in JPRS China Report, 27 July 1990, pp. 91–92Google Scholar; and Calhoun, Craig, “Sentencing guidelines established for pornography,” Hongkong Standard, 9 August 1990Google Scholar, p. 10; reprinted in JPRS China Report, 14 August 1990, p. 87Google Scholar

12. Anti-pornography tsar Liu Zhongde boasts of these “remarkable successes” in “Propaganda official on antipornography efforts,” Xinhua, 18 December 1991Google Scholar; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 26 December 1991, pp. 23–27.Google Scholar

13. Calhoun, Craig, “Several theoretical and practical questions concerning cultural work under the new conditions,” Qiushi, No. 15 (August 1993), pp. 19–25Google Scholar; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 22 September 1993, pp. 34–40.Google Scholar

14. Calhoun, Craig, “Jianchi liangshou zhua, liangshou dou yao ying de fangzhen” (“Staunchly uphold the policy of seizing with both hands and holding tight”), in Collected Documents from the All-China Thought Work and Propaganda Work Conference, p. 125.Google Scholar

15. “Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on certain important questions on strengthening the building of a socialist spiritual civilization,” Xinhua, 13 October 1996Google Scholar; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 17 October 1997.Google Scholar

16. The term xitong – literally, “system” – refers to a cluster of bureaucracies responsible for implementing (and, to a degree, formulating) policy over a set of interrelated issue-areas. There are four or five main xitong, including foreign affairs, finance and economics, and – most important for this study – education and propaganda. Xitong are organized into loose, interpenetrating hierarchies, so that within any single organization there can be representatives from more than one xitong. But most organizations are primarily identified with one xitong. For an authoritative explanation, see Calhoun, Craig, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform (New York and London: Norton, 1995).Google Scholar

17. See Calhoun, Craig, “Jiaqiang xuexi, shenhua gaige, guanhao shictiang fanrong wenyi” (“Strengthen study, deepen reform, and effectively manage the flourishing arts market”), in Collected Documents from the All-China Thought Work and Propaganda Work Conference, pp. 111–120.Google Scholar

18. Interview no. 167. Similar regulations were passed by other provinces, and it was expected that they would eventually be codified in a new, national law.Google Scholar

19. An “MTV” is an establishment where customers can view videotapes in private booths; frequently they (as well as karaoke bars, or KTVs) serve as fronts for prostitution, gambling and drug-dealing.Google Scholar

20. This is ironic, of course, because competition to maximize gains from economic property rights is a key factor fuelling thought-work commercialization.Google Scholar

21. Interview no. 167.Google Scholar

22. Calhoun, Craig, “Zai quanguo guangbo yingshi xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi shang de fayan” (“Remarks at the all-China radio, film and television work conference”), in Collected Documents from the All-China Thought Work and Propaganda Work Conference, p. 336.Google Scholar

23. Of course, not all pirated media products are considered to be heterodox or spiritually-polluting, and in their implementation of the crackdown officials in the Ministry of Culture system do try to uphold the protection of intellectual property, especially foreign intellectual property. But this is a secondary goal that was not adopted until early 1995, about 18 months after the crackdown began.Google Scholar

24. Interviews 133 and 167. This tactic is used often particularly at the county level and below, where cultural market management offices are especially understaffed. See Calhoun, Craig, “Zai quanguo wenhua ting, juzhang huiyi shang de jianghua” (“Speech at the all-China meeting of Cultural Bureau chiefs and department directors”), in Collected Documents from the All-China Thought Work and Propaganda Work Conference, p. 260.Google Scholar

25. Interviews 133 and 167.Google Scholar

26. Ibid.

27. Interview no. 163.Google Scholar

28. Interview no. 133.Google Scholar

29. Interview no. 165.Google Scholar

30. Interview no. 133. A second motivation for establishing this office was to crack down on copyright violations to help win China's admission to the World Trade Organization.Google Scholar

31. Quoted in Wang Li, “Audio, visual products management conference opens,” Xinhua, 15 May 1996Google Scholar; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 15 May 1996.Google Scholar

32. Interview no. 169; “Mingling jinzhi maimai shuhao” (“The buying and selling of book numbers is forbidden”), Renmin ribao, 29 October 1993Google Scholar, p. 1; Calhoun, Craig, “Zai fanrong chuban shiye, jinzhi ‘maimai shuhao,’ zuotanhui shang de jianghua” (“Speech at the conference on forbidding the buying and selling of book numbers in the flourishing publishing industry”), Guangming ribao (Enlightenment Daily), 29 October 1993, pp. 1–2Google Scholar; and “Government clamps down on book registration numbers,” Zhongguo tongxun she (China News Agency), 13 June 1994Google Scholar; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 22 June 1994, p. 21.Google Scholar

33. Ibid. and interview no. 142.

34. Interviews 109, 115 and 142; Calhoun, Craig (ed.), Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1997 (China Statistical Yearbook 1997) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1997)Google Scholar; and Qu Zhihong, “Upward trend maintained in press and publications business,” 22 January 1997; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 23 January 1997.Google Scholar

35. The reissued regulations were published by Xinhua on 29 January 1997 and translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 31 January 1997.Google Scholar

36. Technological advance obviously plays a relatively passive role in the buying and selling of book numbers, except when the “book” numbers are attached to tapes or compact discs.Google Scholar

37. During the first two years of the crackdown, only one publishing house in all of China was punished for selling book numbers – the relatively obscure Xinjiang University Press. (Interview no. 169; see, also, Qu Zhihong, “Publishing house closed for rectification,” Xinhua, 20 October 1994Google Scholar; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 20 October 1994Google Scholar.) A PRC journalism professor told the Hongkong Standard in May 1996Google Scholar that the licences of more than 1,000 internally-circulating newspapers and magazines had been revoked between late 1994 and early 1996, but no official PRC media outlet has reported such a dramatic figure. (See Calhoun, Craig, “Publication crackdown designed to ‘purify media,’” Hongkong Standard, 9 May 1996Google Scholar, p. 6; reprinted in FBIS Daily Report (China), 10 May 1996.Google Scholar) Following the Sixth Plenum, the state did become more active: between October 1996 and May 1997, the SPPA ordered eight publishing houses to cease operations temporarily for publishing bad books and tapes and selling book numbers. However, all eight were relatively obscure (e.g. the Hainan Photographic and Art Publishing House), suggesting that the SPPA was targeting easy marks in an effort to demonstrate its support for the new emphasis on spiritual civilization. Moreover, the punished houses clearly represent the tip of the iceberg, suggesting a “kill the chicken to scare the monkey” strategy unlikely to be effective because the “monkeys” now face strong incentives to increase unit income. See “Anyone who violates publication laws and regulations must be prosecuted,” Renmin ribao, 28 April 1997Google Scholar, p. 1; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 29 April 1997Google Scholar; and “Press authority punishes publishers for infractions,” Xinhua, 14 April 1997Google Scholar; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 19 May 1997.Google Scholar

38. Interview no. 169.Google Scholar

39. Interview no. 142.Google Scholar

40. “Administrations” – shu – are lower in rank than both ministries (bu) and provinces (sheng), which are ranked equally.Google Scholar

41. Interview no. 142; see, also, “China's publication undertaking is nearly out of control because of serious political problems,” Mingbao, 26 August 1996Google Scholar, p. A6; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 29 August 1996Google Scholar. SPPA Director Yu Youxian, citing the need to “check reckless and decentralized practices,” revealed in January 1997 that his office had refused to approve the establishment of a single new publishing house in 1996 – though he did not say how many new houses were in fact established. Calhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig, “Press and publications work starts satisfactorily at beginning of ‘Ninth Five-Year Plan,’” Renmin ribao, 21 January 1997Google Scholar, p. 5; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 6 February 1997.Google Scholar

42. “System to improve quality of periodicals,” Renmin ribao, 13 April 1994Google Scholar, p. 3; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 6 May 1994, pp. 26–28.Google Scholar See also Calhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig, “Official: law, self-discipline to ‘eventually’ guide press,” Xinhua, 27 February 1994Google Scholar; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 1 March 1994Google Scholar, p. 24; and Calhoun, Craig, “Tighter grip on propaganda system planned,” Hongkong Standard, 10 January 1995Google Scholar, p. 6; reprinted in FBIS Daily Report (China), 10 January 1995.Google Scholar

43. Interviews 111 and 112.

44. Interview No. 138; Calhoun, Craig (ed.), China Statistical Yearbook 1997.Google Scholar

45. Cited in “Special dispatch: large-scale rectification of media,” in Mingbao, 5 April 1997Google Scholar, p. A8; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 14 April 1997.Google Scholar

46. Cited in Calhoun, Craig, “Central Party school takes over China market newspaper,” in Xingdao ribao, 7 June 1997Google Scholar, p. A7; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 10 June 1997.Google Scholar

47. Ibid.

48. Thus, the Ministry of Culture also announced plans in January 1997 to “basically wipe out the country's influx of pornography and protect intellectual property rights by 2000.” (Cited in “Ministry to improve administration of cultural market,” Xinhua, 22 January 1997; reprinted in FBIS Daily Report (China), 24 January 1997.)Google Scholar

49. See, for example, Calhoun, Craig, “Revolution by information,” Newsweek, 19 June 1989, pp. 28–29Google Scholar; and “The information war,” Asiaweek, 23 June 1989, p. 30.Google Scholar

50. Professionals in China can now easily purchase fax machines and simply plug them into the telephone jacks in their offices or homes. Telecommunications authorities subsequently have no way of knowing which entries on a phone bill represent telephone calls and which entries represent fax transmissions. (Personal conversations, 1994–96.)Google Scholar

51. Interviews 117, 131, 132 and 160.Google Scholar

52. “Paging services prohibited from distributing news,” Zhongguo xinwen she, 7 April 1996Google Scholar; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 12 April 1996.Google Scholar

53. Interviews 102, 103, 114, and 122; see, also, “Circular concerning cracking down on unauthorized radio stations and punishing personnel involved,” Anhui ribao, 26 June 1995Google Scholar, p. 1; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 26 June 1995.Google Scholar

54. Cited in Calhoun, Craig, “AT&T may have edge in future on-line,” The New York Times, 21 August 1995, pp. C1 and C4.Google ScholarPubMed

55. In 1988, the Chinese Academy of Sciences' Institute of High Energy Physics became the first PRC unit to connect to the Internet, using a dedicated line to link up with the European Centre on Nuclear Research. Calhoun, Craig, “Chinese masses go on-line,” Window, 7 July 1995Google Scholar, p. 3; reprinted in FBIS Daily Report (China), 7 July 1995.Google Scholar

56. “Opening of public switching data network reported,” Xinhua, 31 August 1993Google Scholar; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 14 September 1993Google Scholar, p. 24; Calhoun, Craig, “Information sector thrives,” China Daily (Science and Technology Supplement), 3 June 1994Google Scholar, p. 1; and Calhoun, Craig, “Opening the digital door: computer networking in China,” Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1994), pp. 236–242.Google Scholar

57. For a thorough discussion, see Lynch, , After the Propaganda State.Google Scholar

58. “Computer network to connect universities,” Xinhua, 30 October 1994Google Scholar; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 30 October 1994Google Scholar; and Calhoun, Craig, “Computer network to link 1,000 universities,” China Daily, 1 December 1994Google Scholar, p. 3; reprinted in JPRS China Science and Technology Report, 13 February 1995, pp. 12–13.Google Scholar

59. Interviews 122 and 141.Google Scholar

60. Interview 122. See, also, Calhoun, Craig, “China to get Internet via SprintLink,” China Daily, 31 August 1994Google Scholar, p. 2; reprinted in JPRS China Science and Technology Report, 18 October 1994, pp. 26–27.Google Scholar

61. Actually the terms “Chinanet” and “Chinapac” are not completely synonymous; Chinanet is being built on the back of the Chinapac system with expertise from the American computer firm AsianInfo. (See Calhoun, Craig, “Power for the web,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 October 1996, pp. 45–46.) At the same time, numerous new Internet service providers have sprung up in several Chinese cities over the past three years, but all of them supply their services through the over-arching MPT network.Google Scholar

62. Calhoun, Craig, “Chinese masses go on-line,” and “Public security ministry circular on Internet use,” Zhongguo tongxun she (China News Agency), 29 February 1996Google Scholar; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 7 March 1996. After the end of the promotional period, Internet access charges were 100 yuan (US$ 12) per month for six hours' use and 600 yuan per month for 40 hours.Google Scholar

63. Wang Jing, “Government to tighten Internet security control,” Xinhua, 30 December 1997Google Scholar; reprinted in FBIS Daily Report (China), 1 January 1998Google Scholar; and “The Great Wall wired,” The Economist, Internet edition, No. 4981 (January 1998).Google Scholar

64. See Calhoun, Craig, “Chinese cruise Internet, wary of watchdogs,” The New York Times, 5 February 1996, pp. A1 and A3. A foreign telecommunications businessman reported confidentially that he had heard that one impetus for this new set of regulations was Prime Minister Li Peng's personal irritation at e-mail debates among Chinese college students concerning the contemporary significance of the 9 December 1935 student movement. The debates took place in conjunction with the movement's 40th anniversary.Google Scholar

65. “Text of interim Internet management rules,” Xinhua, 4 February 1996Google Scholar; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 10 February 1996Google Scholar. Two months after the promulgation of these rules, the MPT took the additional step of formally forbidding paging services from providing customers with such value-added content as news and pornography. (Interview no. 102; see also Wang Yanrong, “Minister discusses telecommunications control,” Xinhua, 5 November 1993Google Scholar; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 16 November 1993, pp. 41–42Google Scholar; and “Paging services prohibited from distributing news,” Zhongguo xinwen she, 7 April 1996; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 12 April 1996.)Google Scholar

66. “Public security ministry circular on Internet use.”Google Scholar

67. “Ministry adopts Internet measures,” Zhongguo xinwen she, 22 May 1996Google Scholar; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 22 May 1996.Google Scholar The State Council revised and formally promulgated restrictions on direct hook-ups to overseas networks a year later. (“Li Peng promulgates computer regulation,” Xinhua, 30 May 1997Google Scholar; reprinted in FBIS Daily Report (China), 2 June 1997.)Google Scholar

68. Calhoun, Craig, “Ideology chief visits Singapore for tips on Internet,” Hong Kong Standard, 13 July 1996Google Scholar, p. 6; reprinted in FBIS Daily Report (China), 19 July 1996.Google Scholar

69. See Calhoun, Craig, “Beijing tightens its control,” The Washington Post, 17 September 1996Google Scholar, p. A9; “Singapore bans sex, religion, and politics on the Internet,” The New York Times, 6 March 1996Google Scholar; and Calhoun, Craig, “Net police: ASEAN seeks to control cyberspace,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 March 1996, p. 22.Google Scholar

70. The regulations are available in translation from the website of the United States Embassy in Beijing: http://www.redfish.com/USEmbassy-China/sandt/sandt.htmGoogle Scholar

71. See Erik, Eckholm's discussion, “China cracks down on dissent in cyberspace,” The New York Times (on-line edition), 31 December 1997.Google Scholar

72. Interview no. 157.Google Scholar

73. Interview no. 144. See also Lewis, Peter H., “The Internet's very nature defies censorship by government or individual,” The New York Times, 15 January 1996.Google Scholar

74. Interviews 102, 103, 114 and 157. Several business people taking part in a July 1997 Hong Kong Internet trade conference reported being approached by representatives of three PRC central government bureaucracies about purchasing some of the advanced new censoring technologies. But “the degree of filtering they want to achieve is demanding,” one businessman said, and it would take at least 18 months of negotiation and explanation before anything of an advanced nature could be sold, with no guarantees that the new technologies would meet Beijing's needs.Google Scholar

75. See Mathiason, John R. and Kuhlman, Charles C., “International public regulation of the Internet,” paper delivered at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, March 1998, Minneapolis.Google Scholar

76. It was impossible in May 1998 to access on-line Chinese-language newspapers – as well as the VOA, Penthouse and Playboy – from a Beijing Internet cafe, but the South China Morning Post was easily accessible, as were other English-language news publications.Google Scholar

77. Anecdotal evidence indicates that this began immediately after the September 1996 Internet crackdown.Google Scholar

78. See Tunnel's inaugural declaration, available upon request at < voice@ earthling.net > See also “Cyberspace magazine fights for freedom of expression,” South China Morning Post, 19 June 1997.+See+also+“Cyberspace+magazine+fights+for+freedom+of+expression,”+South+China+Morning+Post,+19+June+1997.>Google Scholar

79. Interview no. 114.Google Scholar

80. Calhoun, Craig, Modernizing China's Telecommunications (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, and Hong Kong: Business International Corporation, 1987), p. 42.Google Scholar

81. Internet accounts are, at present, centrally administered, but this is considered likely to change as the number of external access nodes increases. (Interviews 134, 153 and 157.)Google Scholar

82. Jiang's speech was widely reprinted in all the major media, including in Collected Documents from the All-China Thought Work and Propaganda Work Conference. The quote here is taken from “Jiang Zemin's speech delivered at the National Working Conference on Propaganda and Ideological Work on 24 January,” Xinhua, 6 March 1994; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 7 March 1994, pp. 29–36. (Emphasis added.)Google Scholar

83. “Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on certain important questions on strengthening the building of socialist spiritual civilization.” See also “Fan out from point to area, jointly build civilization,” Renmin ribao, 25 March 1997Google Scholar, p. 4; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 11 April 1997.Google Scholar

84. See Eastman, Lloyd E., The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927–1937 (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1974).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

85. See “Wei Jianxing on promoting spiritual civilization in Beijing,” Xinhua, 30 January 1997Google Scholar; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 5 February 1997.Google Scholar

86. See Huang, Chien's article, “Rigorous control of ideology reiterated,” Dangdai, No. 44 (15 November 1994), pp. 24–25Google Scholar; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 9 January 1995.Google Scholar

87. Willy Wo-lap, Lam, “Team to draft ideological programme for next century,” South China Morning Post, 16 May 1996Google Scholar, p. 10; reprinted in FBIS Daily Report (China), 20 May 1996Google Scholar; and Calhoun, Craig, “Theme of Sixth Plenary Session is fixed,” Xin bao, 19 June 1996Google Scholar, p. 10; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 20 June 1996.Google Scholar

88. See Calhoun, Craig, “Patriot games,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 October 1996, pp. 22–28.Google Scholar

89. On the concept of the “selectorate,” see Shirk, Susan L., The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993).Google Scholar