Article contents
Communist China's Attitude Towards Nuclear Tests
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2009
Extract
On October 15, 1957, Communist China and the Soviet Union signed an agreement on new defence technology according to which the Soviet Union would supply China with technical data for manufacturing nuclear weapons. In May 1958 Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi told German correspondents in Peking that China would make atomic bombs. On June 20, 1959, the Soviet Union, according to China, unilaterally abrogated the 1957 agreements on weapons development. On July 31, 1963, China issued a statement denouncing the Moscow Partial Test Ban Treaty as “a big fraud to fool the people of the world.” On October 16, 1964, China announced that an atomic device had been exploded in western China and proposed that “a summit conference of all the countries of the world be convened to discuss the question of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.”
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The China Quarterly 1965
References
1 The Chinese Government Statement of August 15, 1963, commented on the Soviet Government's Statement of August 3, 1963: “As far back as June 20, 1959 … the Soviet Government unilaterally tore up the agreement on new technology for national defence concluded between China and the Soviet Union on October 15, 1957, and refused to provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture.” Peking Review, No. 33, 1963.Google Scholar
2 See New York Times, October 17, 1964. The head of Chinese Communist Air Force, Liu Ya-lou, is quoted as making a similar statement. Ibid.
3 Peking Review, No. 31, 1963.
4 Peking Review, No. 42, 1964
5 Peking Review, No. 24, 1960.
6 Peking Review, No. 36, 1963
7 e.g., see Premier Chou En-lai's greetings to the 1964 Conference, Peking Review, No. 32, 1964.Google Scholar
8 e.g., see speech by Mao Tun, leader of Chinese Communist delegation, on “The Way to General Disarmament and World Peace,” before the Congress' meeting, Peking Review, No. 29, 1962.Google Scholar
9 e.g., see Liu Chang-sheng's speech quoted in note 5, supra.Google Scholar
10 Current Background (CB) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General), No. 342.Google Scholar
11 Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General), No. 19.Google Scholar
12 See note 10, supra.Google Scholar
13 Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, September 14, 1956. SCMP, No. 1373.Google Scholar
14 Joint Statement of People's Republic of China and Soviet Union, January 18, 1957. SCMP, No. 1456.Google Scholar
15 Joint Statement of People's Republic of China and People's Republic of Poland, April 11, 1957. SCMP, No. 1512.Google Scholar
16 Joint Statement of People's Republic of China and People's Republic of Hungary, October 4, 1957. SCMP, No. 1627.Google Scholar
17 Chinese Government Statement Supporting Soviet Peace Proposal, December 19, 1957. SCMP, No. 1678.Google Scholar
18 Peking Review, No. 8, 1958
19 Ibid. No. 43, 1959.
20 , Steiner, “Communist China in the World Community,” International Conciliation, May 1961.Google Scholar
21 Ibid..
22 Peking Review, No. 36, 1961.
23 Ibid., No. 13, 1962.
24 CB, No. 342.
25 Report on the Work of Government, 70 (Peking, 1958).Google Scholar
26 Peking Review, No. 32, 1960.Google Scholar
27 Ibid. No. 13, 1962. It should be noted that the proposed pact does not include Formosa which has been consistently considered as part of China and can be liberated, if necessary, by use of force.
28 Ibid. No. 31, 1962.
29 Ibid. No. 42, 1964.
30 e.g., see Chinese Government Statement Supporting Soviet Peace Proposals, December 19, 1957. SCMP, No. 1678.Google Scholar
31 See Statement of Chinese Government, August 15, 1963, commenting on Soviet Government Statement of August 3, 1963. Peking Review, No. 33, 1963.Google Scholar
32 Peking Review, No. 36, 1962.Google Scholar
33 Ibid. No. 4, 1960.
34 Ibid. No. 20, 1960.
35 Ibid. No. 17.
36 See Statement of Secretary of State Rusk before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, August 12, 1963. Hearings on Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 88th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 11–12 (1963). When the United States and Great Britain first presented the proposed treaty, it was then severely criticised by Kuznetsov, Soviet delegate to the Conference. See the summary of Kuznetsov's statement in Peking Review, No. 32, 1963.Google Scholar
37 International Legal Materials, 883 (1963).Google Scholar
38 Statement of Chinese Government Advocating the Complete, Thorough, Total and Resolute Prohibition and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons and Proposing a Conference of the Government Heads of All Countries of the World, July 31, 1963, Peking Review, No. 31, 1963; Premier Chou En-lai's Letter to All Government Heads, August 5, 1963, Ibid. No. 32, 1963; Statement of Chinese Government of August 15, 1963, Commenting on Soviet Statement of August 3, 1963, Ibid. No. 33, 1963; and Statement of Chinese Government of September 1, 1963, Commenting on Soviet Statement of August 21, 1963, Ibid. No. 36, 1963.
39 Editorials of July 19 entitled “U.S. Nuclear Fraud Exposed,” Peking Review, No. 30, 1963 Google Scholar; August 2 entitled “People of the World, Unite! Strive for the Complete Prohibition and Thorough Destruction of Nuclear Weapons!,” Ibid. No. 32, 1963; August 3 entitled “A Betrayal of the Soviet People,” Ibid. and of August 30 entitled “Further Exposure of Soviet Leaders' Act of Betrayal,” Ibid. No. 36, 1963. The article appeared in People's Daily, August 10, and was translated into English in Peking Review, No. 33, 1963.Google Scholar
40 The list of such materials is not exhaustive.Google Scholar
41 Observer, “Why the Tripartite Treaty Does Only Harm and Brings No Benefit,” Peking Review, No. 33, 1963.Google Scholar
42 Ibid..
43 Ibid. p. 22.
44 Ibid. p. 23.
45 Ibid..
46 Ibid..
47 Peking Review, No. 31, 1963.Google Scholar
48 Statement of the Chinese Government, August 15, 1963, Commenting on Soviet Statement of August 3, 1963.Google Scholar Peking Review, No. 33, 1963.Google Scholar
49 Peking Review, 42, 1964.Google Scholar
50 Ibid..
51 e.g., see President Johnson's Statement on Communist China's Bomb. New York Times, October 17, 1964.Google Scholar
52 Peking Review, No. 44, 1964.Google Scholar
53 Ibid. It may be noted that the Republic of China has adhered to the Treaty on August 23, 1963. Free China Weekly, August 27, 1963.Google Scholar Under such circumstance, Communist China will never accept the Treaty because that would create the impression of “two Chinas.” See People's Daily editorial of August 30, 1963 Google Scholar, in which, after indicating Nationalist China's adherence to the Treaty, it stated that “had the Chinese Government… wrongly believed in the deceptive talk about the great advantages of the treaty for the destiny of mankind and signed, then the Chinese Government would have fallen into the ‘two Chinas’ trap, bringing untold humiliation to the great Chinese people.” Peking Review, No. 36, 1963.Google Scholar
54 New York Times, October 23, 1964.Google Scholar On October 27, 1964, a United States State Department spokesman said that the United States would consider it “all right” to invite Communist China to the Geneva Conference if the other members so desired. New York Times, November 23, 1964.Google Scholar
55 Ibid. November 23, 1964, p. 12.
56 Ibid..
57 Ibid..
58 Chinese Communist scholar Chen T'i-ch'iang was of the opinion that it is illegal to use nuclear weapons under international law. See his “International Law Prohibits the Use of Atomic Weapon,” People's Daily, January 23, 1955.Google Scholar
59 See People's Daily editorial of November 22, 1964.Google Scholar
60 It is unlikely that the Soviet Union will now equip China with nuclear weapons or transfer technical information for manufacturing nuclear weapons to China.Google Scholar
61 The November 22 editorial made it clear that China would not adhere to any projected treaty even one that would include a prohibition on underground testing. New York Times, November 23, 1964, p. 12.Google Scholar
- 1
- Cited by