1. .There is some confusion about the total number of casualties. On 6 June State Council spokesman Yuan Mu claimed that 300 people were killed, 23 of whom were students, and that 5,000 soldiers and 2,000 civilians had been injured. At the same press conference reporters were told that no students died in Tiananmen on 4 June between 4:30 am and 5:30 am. (See Wenhui bao (Hong Kong), 8 June 1989.) On 14 June the Beijing Party committee announced that 100 soldiers and 100 civilians were killed, and 1,000 civilians and “thousands” of troops were wounded. (See South China Morning Post (Hong Kong) 15 June 1989.) Eyewitnesses and hospital spokesmen reported many more deaths and injuries. According to the Far Eastern Economic Review (15 June 1989), p. 10, hospitals could verify at least 700 deaths. Hong Kong's Wenhui bao (8 June 1989) estimated that 3,000 to 4,000 people were killed and up to 10,000 were injured.

2. .For reports of the “panic” after controls on prices were lifted in July 1988, see Jingji ribao (Economic Daily), 24 August 1988, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, China–Daily Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce [hereafter FBIS–CHI]), 7 September 1988, p. 39 and Zhongguo xinwen she (China News Agency), 1 September 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 8 September 1988, p. 42. On China's rate of inflation see Thomas Chan, “The reform dilemma,” South China Morning Post,13 June 1988.

3. For a review of the economic reforms, see Harding, Harry, China's Second Revolution: Reform After Mao (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 99–130.Google Scholar

4. Listed in the 1982 State Constitution, these are: adherence to Marxism–Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought; Communist Party rule; the people's democratic dictatorship; and the socialist road.

5. Gucheng, Li, Zhonggong cuigao lingdaoceng (The Highest Leadership Stratum of the Chinese Communist Party) (Hong Kong: Ming bao chubanshe, 1989), p. 269.Google Scholar

6. These seven were identified by Yang Shangkun in his speech to the Central Military Commission, 24 May 1989. For the full text of his speech, see Mingbao (Hong Kong), 29 May 1989. The seven elders were convened on 8–9 May 1989 to discuss Zhao Ziyang's public repudiation on 3 and 4 May of Deng's position on the student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square.

7. In 1989 Bo Yibo was deputy chairman of the Central Advisory Commission.

8. On 24 June 1989 the Party Central Committee removed Zhao Ziyang as Party secretary–general and appointed Jiang Zemin, mayor of Shanghai, to the post. See Wenhui bao (Hong Kong) 25 June, 1989.

9. See Schurmann, Franz, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 55–56.Google Scholar

10. Representative of the many reports on this issue in the Hong Kong press are Li Shui, “Deng Xiaoping admonishes senior cadres to support the General Secretary: Zhao Ziyang updates ideas, tackles enterprise mechanism,” Ching bao (Hong Kong), No. 9, 10 September 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 12 September 1988 pp. 19–22; Li Yu, “Li Peng is suspected of opposing the Party – a comment on the government work report delivered at the Seventh NPC Session,” Zhengming (Contending) (Hong Kong), No. 127, 1 May 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 9 May 1988, pp. 16–20. See also Timothy Lee's discussion of Deng Xiaoping's 17 January 1989 speech to senior cadres during which he backed further reforms, and Chen Yun's December 1988 “eight–point” counter–attack, in South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 30 January 1989 and 11 February 1989. For a recent scholarly treatment of these conflicts see Lawrence R. Sullivan, “Assault on the reforms: conservative criticism of political and economic liberalization in China, 1985–86,” The China Quarterly (CQ), No. 114 (June 1988), pp. 198–222.

11. See Li Shui, “Deng Xiaoping admonishes senior cadres to support the general secretary,” pp. 19–20; and Lo Ping, “Zhao Ziyang suffered setbacks in the summer capital,” Zhengming (Hong Kong), 1 September 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 31 August 1988, pp. 18–21.

12. Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, pp. 333–34.

13. See Yang Shangkun's speech to the Central Military Commission, 24 May 1989.

14. South China Morning Post, 24 May 1989.

15. South China Morning Post, 26 May 1989 and Ming bao, 22 May 1989. According to these accounts, Admiral Ye Fei, Generals Zhang Aiping, Yang Dezhi, Xiao Ke, Chen Zaidao, Song Shilun and Li Xugui, and 100 other officers sent a letter of protest to the Central Military Commission. Marshals Nei Rongzhen and Xu Xiangqian were also reportedly opposed to the declaration of martial law in Beijing.

16. For Deng's statement that these policies would continue, see Wenhui bao (Hong Kong), 10 June 1989, and policy statements adopted by the Central Committee on 24 June 1989 as reported in Wenhui bao (Hong Kong), 25 June 1989.

17. He Wei, “Tentative views on separating the functions of government from enterprises,” Guangming ribao (Guangming Daily), 10 September 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 27 September 1988, pp. 39–40.

18. Wang Huning, “Non–economic reflection on problems of reform in China,” Shijie jingji daobao (World Economic Herald), 29 August 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 18 October 1988, p. 21. See also Xia Yang and Wang Zhigang, “Initial study of local economic ‘independence’ in China, Part 1,” Liaowang (Outlook) (overseas edit.), No. 39, 26 September 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 4 October 1988, pp. 34–36. Xia and Wang provide many examples of regional trade barriers.

19. The policy to develop China's coasjal areas, first closely identified with Zhao Ziyang, is controversial and, as i result of opposition, has been modified. For a discussion of its pros and cons, see Zeng Zhongjian, “Some thoughts on the implementation of the strategy for coastal economic development,” Guangming ribao, 24 September 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 4 October 1988, pp. 43–45. See also, Hu Xuwer “Several questions concerning the development and construction of coastal regions,” Renmin ribao (People's Daily), 8 April 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 15 April 1988, pp. 34–35 and Li Tieying, “Coastal areas should take the lead in establishing new systems,” Zhongguo jingji tizhi gaige (China Economic System Reform), No. 5, 23 May 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 22 June 1988, pp. 23–25. For evidence of opposition, see “Zhao Ziyang's coastal development plan criticized,” Kyodo (Tokyo), 2 October 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 3 October 1988, p. 23.

20. See, e.g., Radio Urumqi, 31 August 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 1 September 1988, p. 49, which reports that “there is a very small number of people who make a great fuss about the exploitation of Xinjiang's resources, babbling that Xinjiang's oil is flowing eastward and its cotton is being shipped elsewhere; a great deal of material is shipped out of Xinjiang, but not much is shipped in” On 6 April 1988 Hong Kong's South China Morning Post quoted Huang Baozhang, a vice–chairman of Xinjiang's government, as observing: “If the coastal policies only look to exports, how are we in the western areas going to be able to modernize?”

21. For the figures for 1981–87, see Ju, Guojia Tongji (ed.), Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 1988 (China Statistical Yearbook, 1988) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1988), p. 806.Google Scholar

22. Beijing Review, 15–21 August 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 16 August 1988, p. 36.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., and Ni Di, Li Baoshi and Shi Xiaomin, “The situation of unfair social distribution and how to deal with it,” Guangming ribao, 31 March 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 18 April 1988, p. 18.

25. Ibid.

26. Jin Xiaoming, “Observations and thoughts on the changes in individual income on the mainland,” Liaowang (overseas edit.), No. 32, 8 August 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 12 August 1988, p. 35.

27. . The top of the “state organ administrative cadre” pay scale, adopted in 1956, when average per–capita incomes were much lower than they are today, was 560 yuan per month. Forty years later, and after three major levelling exercises in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the top salary is now only 530 yuan per month. See Beijingshi Renshiju, Renshi guanli (Personnel Management) (Beijing: Beijingshi renshiju, 1985), pp. 422 and 435. These figures do not include subsidies, bonuses, seniority payments, and the like.

28. Zhang Wei, “Thoughts concerning the wages of office cadres,” Shijie jingji daobao, 27 June 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 15 July 1988, p. 40.

29. Summarized in Wenhui bao (Wenhui News) (Hong Kong), 4 September 1988. This survey and the others referred to in this article must be used with extreme caution. I Because the complete survey is unavailable to me, I do not know what sampling techniques were used, nor do I have a profile of those who responded. Nonetheless, the survey does give an indication of popular attitudes, and can be used to supplement s other sources of information. For a discussion of these problems, see Stanley Rosen, j “Survey research in the PRC: uses and limitations” (paper prepared for the Annual J Meeting of the Association of Asian Studies, Boston, 9–13 April 1987); and Stanley Rosen (ed.) “Youth socialization and political recruitment in post–Mao China, Chinese Law and Government, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Summer 1987), pp. 42–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

30. See Zhongguo tongxun she (China News Agency), 8 and 9 April 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 12 April 1988, p. 45; Xinwanbao (New Evening News) (Hong Kong), 7 March 1988 in FBIS–CHI, 7 April 1988, p. 22; and Mingbao (Hong Kong), 6 April 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 6 April 1988, p. 34.

31. On 5 September 1988 China Daily reported that more than 6,000 state–owned enterprises were running at a loss. Tens of thousands of workers have lost their jobs in some cities (e.g. Qingdao [Shandong] and Shuzhou [Hunan]) in industrial reorganization drives that have hit chronic overstaffing. See Shi Yongfeng and Xiao Binchen, “Chinese workers faced with the perplexity of unemployment,” Liaowang (overseas edit.), No. 36, 5 September 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 14 September 1988, p. 36.

32. South China Morning Post, 3 September 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 6 September 1988, p. 36.

33. Because of its secretive nature, the distribution of corruption is unknown. However, some senior leaders are apparently very worried about it. See, e.g., an interview with Zhao Ziyang in Xinhua, 1 July 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 12 July 1988, pp. 26–27. From 1983 to 1987 the Party expelled 150,000 members for corrupt practices, and disciplined a further 500,000. See, Xinhua 11 August 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 11 August 1988, p. 18. In December 1988 authorities announced that during the first eight months of the year they had investigated 11,000 cases of corruption. Wenhui bao (Hong Kong), 26 December 1988. Survey data (See Table 1) also indicate that the situation causing most dissatisfaction among ordinary people is the high level of official corruption.

34. Gong Xiangrui, “The key to political reforms lies in the introduction of democratic politics,” Shijie jingji daobao, 18 April 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 11 May 1988, p. 22.

35. . See State Economic Restructuring Institute, “Only through tackling difficult problems in reform can society be stabilized,” Shijie jingji daobao, 29 August 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 6 October 1988, p. 17.

36. State Economic Restructuring Institute, “Only through tackling difficult problems in reform can society be stabilized,” p. 17.

37. Chen Xiankui, “Political stability during the initial stage,” Guangming ribao, 1 August 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 19 August 1988, p. 21. See also China Economic Restructuring Research Institute, “Revelation for China's price reform from the experiences of Hungary and Yugoslavia: passing the price hurdle means in–depth tackling of the most difficult problems of structural reform,” Shijie jingji daobao, 15 August 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 29 August 1988, pp. 28–30. See also Hu Qili's comments to social scientists in April 1988: “Turbulence is apt to happen in the transition from a society whose people are adequately fed and clothed to a prosperous society. During this transition, the interests of all people grow intricate, and various types of friction often occur…,” in Xinhua, 21 April 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 4 May 1988, p. 26.

38. See Commentator's articles in Renmin ribao, 8 June 1988, in FBIS–CHI. 8 June 1988, p. 16 and Jingji ribao, 9 June 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 27 June 1988, p. 44.

39. Wu Guoguang, “Understanding reform with a high degree of rationality,” Shijie jingji daobao, 15 August 1988, p. 36.

40. State Economic Restructuring Institute, “Only through tackling difficult problems in reform can society be stabilized,” p. 17.

41. Liu Ruishao, “Public order problems in China growing more serious: big cities establish mobile armed police forces,” Wenhui bao (Hong Kong), 28 August 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 29 August 1988, p. 21.

42. Radio Beijing, 13 July 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 22 July 1988, p. 25.

43. On 1950s rural tax collection conflicts, see Shue, Vivienne, Peasant China in Transition: The Dynamics of Development Toward Socialism, 1949–1956 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).Google Scholar On the 1955 conflicts over the unified purchase and sales of grain see, Thomas Bernstein, P., “Cadre and peasant behavior under conditions of insecurity and deprivation: the grain supply crisis of the spring of 1955,” in Barnett, A. Doak (ed.), Chinese Communist Politics in Action (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), pp. 365–99.Google Scholar

44. An additional 47 cases (12%) occurred for other, unidentified reasons. Su Suining, “There are many causes of strained relations between cadres and the masses in rural areas,” Nongmin ribao (Peasant Dailv News), 26 September 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 7 October 1988, p. 12.

45. For the mid 1950s, see Bernstein, “The grain supply crisis.”

46. Commentator, “Urban bias in making policy decisions–behind doing things against the law of value,” Nongmin ribao, 1 April 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 15 April 1988, p. 48.

47. Guo Xianwen and Yi Kailin, “Investigation of rural areas in five central and southern provinces and regions–Part 1,” Nongmin ribao, 11 August 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 24 August 1988, p. 53. These problems are in addition to the illegal abuse of power by some local officials widely reported in the media. For a discussion of this problem see, “Correct approach towards agriculture and equal treatment to peasants– the key to acting in line with the law of value,” Nongmin ribao, 12 April 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 22 April 1988, pp. 19–21.

48. Commentator, “Urban bias in making policy decisions,” p. 48.

49. For an example of a riot, see Agence France Presse, 30 June 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 30 June 1988, p. 25. See also, Commentator, “Urban bias in making policy decisions,” pp. 47–49.

50. Chen Jinluo and She Dehu, “Social groups are an important force for building socialist democratic politics,” Renmin ribao, 29 April 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 12 May 1988, p. 27.

51. Ibid.

52. “On separating Party from government,” Beijing Review, 14–20 December 1987, p. 20. See Michel Oksenberg's comments in “China's 13th Party Congress,” Problems of Communism, Vol. 37, No. 6 (November–December 1987), p. 13.

53. Commentator, “Reform's risks,” China Daily, 10 June 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 10 June 1988, p. 18.

54. Zhao Ziyang, “Advance along the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” Beijing Review, No. 30, Vol. 45 (9–15 November 1987), p. V (insert).

55. See Xia Junshen, “Some views about the issuance of bonds,” Guangming ribao, 6 August 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 18 August 1988, p. 36, and Fan Wenhui and Hu Baidi, “Futures trading–an effective mechanism for stabilizing the economy,” Shijie jingji daobao, 14 March 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 13 April 1988, pp. 52–53.

56. See two land auctions in Shanghai, and similar auctions in Xiamen and Shenzhen in 1988. Authorities auction the right to use the land, subject to certain restrictions, for a limited period of time.

57. From 1979, when the post–Cultural Revolution policy permitting private enterprise began, their number has grown to 225,000, employing 3.6 million workers. See Xinhua, 23 June 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 24 June 1988, p. 28.

58. According to one writer, types of socialist ownership include: “social ownership” (shehui zhanyouzhi), for example of land; “socialist state ownership;” “socialist joint ownership” (shehui zhuyi lianhe suoyouzhi); and “labourers’ individual ownership” (laodongzhe de geren suoyouzhi). See Wenhui bao (Hong Kong), 30 December 1988. See also “Yu Guangyuan holds that state ownership should not be the basic system of socialism,” Shijie jingji daobao, 2 May 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 23 May 1988, p. 28. On the need to separate ownership of state enterprises from management and discussions of the difficulties, see Xin Wen, “Can state–owned enterprises attain total autonomous management and assume sole responsibility for profits and losses?” Jingji yanjiu (Economic Research), No. 5, May 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 21 July 1988, pp. 48–52; and Dong Fureng, “Reform of economic mechanism and reform of ownership,” Jingji yanjiu, No. 7, 20 July 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 9 September 1988, pp. 51 57.

59. Zhao Ziyang, “Advance along the road,” pp. III–VI (insert).

60. Zheng Bijian and Jia Chunfeng, “Great change, further understanding–on the deepening and development of the study of the theory of the initial stage of socialism,” Renmin ribao, 20 May 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 1 June 1988, p. 28.

61. 14 May 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 8 June 1988, p. 23. As if to put the readers’ minds at ease, Commentator continues with the thought that by adopting any method that upholds the productive forces criterion, “we are actually upholding socialism.”

62. Zedong, Mao, “On New Democracy” (1940), in Selected Works of Mao Tse–tung, Vol. II (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), esp. pp. 347–52.Google Scholar

63. Zedong, Mao, “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party” (1939), in Selected Works of Mao Tse–tung, Vol. II, p. 329. See Stuart R. Schram, “China after the 13th Congress,” CQ, No. 114 (June 1988), pp. 191–93.Google Scholar

64. Mingbao (Hong Kong), 12 April 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 18 April 1988, p. 26. On Su Shaozhi's relatively early advocacy of the “primary stage of socialism” and its discussion in 1978 at the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee, see an interview with him in Xinbao jingji xinwen (Xinbao Economic News) (Hong Kong), 7 November 1988.

65. Schram, “China after the 13th Congress,” p. 193. Mao's call for a “joint dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes,” the central characteristic of the “new democratic” state, ceased to be meaningful when the Party collectivized the economy and, thus, eliminated the economic basis for class divisions.

66. One summary of “the primary stage of socialism” points to these political consequences: “The exploiting classes have been eliminated, but limited class struggle continues to exist. Although the political system of the people's democratic dictatorship is basically established, and people's democracy is greatly developed, it is still deficient, and development of a higher level of democracy will still take a relatively long time.” See Xinhua wenbao (New China News), No. 107 (November 1987), p. 20. See also Tang Daiwang, “Shehui zhuyi chuji jieduande guojia zhineng” (“State functions in the primary stage of socialism”), Zhengzhixue yanjiu (Studies in Political Science), No. 6 (1988), pp. 16–18. Tang argues that during this stage “social functions are handed over by the state to mass organizations (qunzhong tuanti).” The chief residual function of the state, he points out, is “protecting and guaranteeing the state's socialist direction.”

67. Xin Xiangyang and Ai Heming, “A probe into the characteristics of the contradictions among the people in the initial stage,” Guangming ribao, 23 May 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 14 June 1988, p. 25.

68. It can be inferred from Xu Shu's comments on the origins of the integration of the Party and government that this sort of integration is appropriate for “primary stage” socialist systems, where the “statutory power–holders” (i.e. government officials) suffered from “insufficient capacity,” while, for historical reasons, “theproletarian party had the capacity of exercising state power.” This would seem to contradict the contemporary policy of separating Party and state functions, a point not addressed by Xu. In Guangming ribao, 28 July 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 8 August 1988, p. 25.

69. See especially Xu Jiadun, “Zhongxin renshi ziben zhuyi, zijue jianshe shehui zhuyi” (“Renew our understanding of capitalism, conscientiously build socialism”), Qiushi (Seeking Truth) (Beijing), No. 5 (1 September 1988), pp. 2–6.

70. “Re–understand capitalism and socialism,” Liaowang(overseas edit.). No. 29, 19 July 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 25 July 1988, p. 30.

71. Li Zhen, “Viewing the tendency of convergence of the two systems by means of the productive forces criterion,” Guangming ribao, 12 September 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 29 September 1988, pp. 28–29. Returning to orthodoxy, Li concludes that the convergence will result in both systems realizing “communist society.”

72. On the positive aspects of “confusion,” see Yi Yunwen, “How to look at some of the current phenomena of confusion,” Guangming ribao, 1 September 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 22 September 1988, pp. 36–38.

73. The survey polled 4,000 students of institutions of higher learning in Guangdong. Wenhui bao (Hong Kong), 8 June 1988.

74. Evidence of the same scepticism is the following rhyme, popular among Beijing intellectuals in late 1988–early 1989:

Wuchan jieji zhuanzheng meiyoule duixiang;

Shehui zhuyi daolu meiyoule fangxiang;

Gongchandang lingdao meiyoule liliang;

Makesi liening zhuyi meiyoule sixiang

Roughly translated it means:

The dictatorship of the proletariat has no target;

The socialist road has no direction;

The Communist Party leadership has no strength; and

Marxism–Leninism has no idea.

75. Zhao Ziyang, “Advance along the road,” pp. XV–XXI (insert). From the erspective of political reform in Eastern Europe, the proposals appear strictly limited. hey do not include setting up a multi–party system, recently approved by authorities in ungary, nor do they include the abolition of the Party's nomenklatura system, which oland's Solidarity trade union demanded in talks with party authorities in Warsaw in 1989.

76. In Shijie jingji daobao, 15 August 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 1 September 1988, pp. 21–24. See also Wang Zhigang (ed.), Zhengfu zhineng zhuanbian yu jigou gaige (The Transformation of Government Functions and Organizational Reform) (Beijing: Guangming ribao chubanshe, 1988), esp. pp. 9–52.

77. Liu Zuoxiang and Zhang Rencheng, “A legal responsibility system for policymakers should be established,” Guangming ribao, 28 July 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 9 August 1988, p. 22.

78. For a more general discussion, which argues that the central state's functions should be handed over to local governments, economic enterprises, social organizations, and mass organizations, see, Cai Ta, “Zhengfu zhineng xintan” (“New exploration of government's functions”), Tianjin shehui kexue (Tianjin Social Science), No. 1 (1988), pp. 23–27, in Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Shubao Cailiao Zhongxin Fuyin Baokan Cailiao (Chinese People's University Book and Newspaper Materials Centre Photocopied Newspaper and Magazine Materials; hereafter, RD), Zhongguo zhengzhi (Chinese Politics) (D4), No. 3 (1988), p. 29.

79. “He Guanghui, vice–minister in charge of State Commission for Restructuring the Economic System, discusses reform of the State Council organs,” Liaowang (overseas edit.), No. 14, 4 April 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 14 April 1988, p. 57.

80. See Beijing TV, 23 July 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 3 August 1988, p. 20, for more details of the re–organized Ministry of Communication.

81. Dong Huanliang, “Brave exploration, positive progress – He Guanghui answers Renmin ribao reporter's questions on restructuring experiments in medium–sized cities,” Renmin ribao, 24 March 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 6 April 1988, p. 35.

82. Radio Changsha, 5 May 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 11 May 1988, p. 54.

83. “Zhonggong Beijing shiwei zhengzhi tizhi gaige di yi pu shishi fangan” (“The first trial plan of the Beijing municipal Party committee on political system reform”), 29 June 1988, in Zhonggong Beijing Shiwei Yanjiushi (ed.), Diaocha yanjiu (Investigation and Research), No. 4 (30 June 1988; hereafter, Reform Plan), p. 12.

84. Zang Zifeng, “How will China extricate itself from a difficult position on price reform?” Liaowang (overseas edit.), No. 23, 6 June 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 20 June 1988, p. 53.

85. These view points are summarized in Mo Cun, “On ‘enterprises without higher authorities,’” Renmin ribao, 15 September 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 22 September 1988, pp. 52–53.

86. Reform Plan, p. 11.

87. This issue is touched on in Zhang Zhanxin, “Some basic understanding of economic structural reform,” Guangming ribao, 11 August 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 26 August 1988, pp. 30–32.

88. See Goldman, Merle, Literary Dissent in Communist China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967).CrossRefGoogle Scholar For a slightly later period see, Nina Halpern, “Economists and economic policy–making in the early 1960s,” in Goldman, Merle, et al. (eds.), China's Intellectuals and the State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 45–64Google Scholar

89. The “Three Antis” Campaign opposed corruption, waste and bureaucratism, while the “New Three Antis” targeted “commandism,” violations of law and discipline, and bureaucratism. For a discussion of these campaigns see Harding, Harry, Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy, 1949–1976 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), pp. 47–64.Google Scholar

90. In the early 1950s one–third of those cadres holding the rank of minister of the State Council were reported to be members of democratic parties. Liaowang (overseas edit.), No. 1 (2 January 1989), p. 8.

91. The Anti–rightist Campaign followed the “Hundred Flowers” period (from May to early June 1957), during which the CCP actively encouraged intellectuals to criticize Party and state policies. See Harding, Organizing China, pp. 148–49.

92. Interview with Tan Jian, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, 5 August 1988.

93. These comments are based on a series of insightful articles written by Liu Minyi that appeared in Wenhui bao (Hong Kong) on 9, 10, 12, 13, 14 and 15 November 1988. Liu traces the evolution of the influence of young intellectuals on the policy process through three “high tides”: the democracy movement; the agricultural reforms; and political reform. Members of the Study Group included: Wang Xiaojiang, Lo Xiaopeng, Deng Yingtao, Du Ying, Bai Nansheng, Bai Nanfeng, Sun Fangming and Bai Ruobing.

94. One of their reports was the Xu Xian Investigation Report (Xuxian Diaocha Baogao), submitted to senior Party leaders in 1980, and providing a rational basis for the household contracting system. The report was published in 30 mainland newspapers, and had “wide influence.” Wenhui bao (Hong Kong), 12 November 1988.

95. South China Morning Post, 27 and 29 May 1989.

96. Zhang Weiguo, Fei Xiaodong and Mou Jun, “Reform: there is no more cheap way,” Shijie jingji daobao, 12 September 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 29 September 1988, p. 33. Emphasis added.

97. For a short article on the role of think–tanks (zhinang jigou) in contemporary China, see Wang Zhigang (ed.), Zhengfu zhineng zhuanbian yu jigou gaige (The Transformation of Government Functions and Organization Reform), pp. 130–38.

98. . Liu Minyi, “Tan nanfang xuepai xindongxiang” (“Talking about new trends among southern scholars”), Wenhui bao (Hong Kong), 30 December 1988.

99. . Daniel Kwan, “Editor of critical paper replaced,” South China Morning Post, 8 March 1989.

100. . Wenhui bao (Hong Kong), 27 April 1989.

101. . Ibid. 7 May 1989.

102. . Ibid. 16 May 1989. See also South China Morning Post, 26 May 1989.

103. . See Chen Xitong's speech to the 8th Standing Committee of the 7th NPC, 30 June 1989, in Wenhui bao (Hong Kong), 7 July 1989.

104. China Daily (Beijing), 8 August 1988.

105. Liaowang (overseas edit.), No. 1 (2 January 1989), p. 11.

106. See Lizhou, Yuan, Tongzhan zhishi yu zhengce (United Front Knowledge and Policies) (Harbin: Harbin gongye daxue chubanshe, 1986), p. 226.Google Scholar

107. . Ibid. p. 228.

108. . The parties should submit their budgets first to the CPPCC and then to the Ministry of Finance for approval before the request is entered in the state budget. Ibid. p. 229.

109. . See Wenhui bao (Hong Kong), 15 June 1989.

110. See Barnett, A. Doak, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967)Google Scholar, and Schurmann, Franz, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 309–364.Google Scholar

111. See the “Regulations for the suppression of counter–revolutionaries” (1951) and “Provisional measures for the control of counter–revolutionaries” (1952) in Theodore Chen, H. E. (ed.), The Chinese Communist Regime: Documents and Commentary (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 293–98.Google Scholar

112. See Townsend, James R., Political Participation in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 115–18.Google Scholar

113. See Burns, John P., Political Participation in Rural China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 87–121.Google Scholar

114. . See, e.g., Zhang Kewen, “Finally, elections with competition.” China Daily, 8 August 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 8 August 1988, p. 26.

115. . See many articles in the Chinese press in April 1988, including “NPC deputies urge changing the NPC image as a ‘rubber stamp,’ “ Zhongguo xinwen she (11 April 1988), in FBIS–CHI (14 April 1988), p. 35. Changes implemented in 1988 included: permitting contested elections (for junior positions only); voting against candidates, and abstentions; encouraging delegates to speak out on significant policy issues (which they did in record numbers); opening up NPC plenary sessions and group discussions to press coverage; and expanding the number of specialized standing committees of the NPC.

116. . On the short and glorious history of the Ministry of Control (1954–59), see Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, pp. 353–64.

117. . Many Chinese intellectuals believe that societies in transition are inherently corrupt. Some level of corruption must, therefore, be tolerated they argue.

118. . Li Chun and Wang Jianrong, “Shanxi holds provincial discussion on political structural reform,” Shanxi ribao (Shanxi Daily), 7 September 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 29 September 1988, pp. 64–66.

119. . Guangjiaojing (WideAngle) (Hong Kong), No. 184 (16 January 1988), p. 7.

120. Bianzhiju, Laodong Renshibu (ed.), Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyuan zuzhi jigou gaiyao 1987 (Outline of the Organizations and Organs of the State Council of the People's Republic of China) (Beijing: Gongren chubanshe, 1988), p. 341.Google Scholar

121. The state Central Military Commission was created in 1982. Before 1982, constitutionally, the state had no army. In spite of the constitutional change, the People's Liberation Army continues as an army of the Party, a situation inherited from the civil war era.

122. For the evolution of the nomenklatura system during the 1950s, see Burns, John P. (ed.), The Chinese Communist Party's Nomenklatura System (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1989), pp. ix–xviii.Google Scholar

123. See John P. Burns, “Chinese civil service reform: the 13th Party Congress proposals,” CQ (forthcoming).

124. Lingfeng, Du, Zhongguo shehui zhuyi caizheng guanli (China's Socialist Financial Management) (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1985), p. 428. Emphasis added.Google Scholar

125. See Xinhua, 30 March 1988, inFBIS–CHI, 1 April 1988, pp. 30–31. In 1988 the authorities reported a substantial deficit for People's Daily.

126. For an authoritative statement of the policy, see Zhao Ziyang, “Advance along the road,” pp. XV–XVI (insert).

127. Reform Plan, pp. 4–5.

128. Party core groups are to be retained in municipal government “culture and political and legal work departments.” Reform Plan, pp. 6–11.

129. See, e.g., Zhang Zhenhuan, “Separation of Party and government and the Party's leadership over economic work,” Renmin ribao, 28 March 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 27 May 1988, p. 17; Wang Maolin, “Several questions of ideological understanding of pushing forward reform of the political structure in our province,” Shanxi ribao, 3 May 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 27 May 1988, pp. 45–48; and Li Chun and Wang Jianrong, “Shanxi holds provincial discussion on political structural reform,” Shanxi ribao, 7 September 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 29 September 1988, pp. 64–66.

130. Li Chun and Wang Jianrong, “Shanxi holds provincial discussion on political structural reform,” p. 64.

131. Ibid. p. 65.

132. See Harding, Organizing China, pp. 87–115.

133. These figures, because they do not include a host of temporary, ad hoc organizations, are misleading, however. For the 1952 figure, see Wang Zhigang (ed.), Zhengfu zhineng zhuanbian yu jigou gaige (The Transformation of Government Functions and Organizational Reform), p. 247. For the 1988 pre–reform figure, see Liaowang (overseas edit.), No. 51 (12 December 1988), p. 3.Google Scholar

134. The population: cadre ratio went from 403:1 in 1948 to 200:1 in 1988. Wenhui bao (Hong Kong), 28 February 1989.

135. “He Guanghui, vice–minister in charge of the State Commission for Restructuring the Economic System, discusses reform of the State Council organs,” Liaowang (overseas edit.), No. 14, 4 April 1988, in FBIS–CHI, 14 April 1988, pp. 57–58.

136. Liu Jinghuai and Liu Junkai, “Zhongguo jijou gaige de xin dongxiang” (“The new trend of organization reform in China”), Liaowang (overseas edit.). No. 51 (12 December 1988), p. 4.

137. See Burns, “Chinese civil service reform: The 13th Party Congress proposals.”

138. Ibid.