1. See e.g. Manning, Robert, “Reagan's chance hit,” Foreign Policy, No. 59 (Spring 1984)Google Scholar.

2. See e.g. Goldstein, Steven M., “Foreign policy,” in Goldstein, Steven M. (ed.), China Briefing, 1984 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p. 60Google Scholar; Johnson, Chalmers, “East Asia: living dangerously,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 3 (1984)Google Scholar.

3. Ikle, Fred Charles, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 27, 30–35Google Scholar. Note that this type of bargaining between security partners differs from the type discussed by Snyder and Diesing, in which the bargaining focuses on the appropriate response by one of the two security partners toward an adversary in a crisis situation. Snyder, Glenn H. and Diesing, Paul, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 429–440Google Scholar.

4. For a discussion of the impact of détente among the superpowers on relations among the NATO states, see Snyder, Glenn H., “The security dilemma in alliance politics,” World Politics, No. 36 (07 1984), pp. 461–495CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On the mix of concession and standing firm in crisis bargaining, see Snyder, and Diesing, , Conflict Among Nations, pp. 288–89Google Scholar.

5. Ikle, , How Nations Negotiate, p. 48Google Scholar; Snyder, and Diesing, , Conflict Among Nations, pp. 282–89Google Scholar. Also see, generally, Lockhart, Charles, Bargaining in International Conflicts (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979)Google Scholar. On bargaining with incomplete information using a game-theoretical analysis, see Harsanyi, John C., “Advances in understanding rational behavior,” in Elster, Jon (ed.), Rational Choice (New York: New York University Press, 1986)Google Scholar. This learning process is distinct from that discussed by Jervis, which concentrates on changing perceptions of the image of an adversary, the threat it poses and its responsiveness to coercion versus co-operation, rather than the utility the counterpart negotiator, be it adversary or security partner, attaches to a particular outcome in an immediate bargaining situation. Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), especially ch. 7Google Scholar.

6. For a discussion of the transformation of U.S.-China relations in the post-Cold War era, see Robert Ross, S., “National security, human rights, and domestic politics: the Bush administration and China,” in Oye, Kenneth, Lieber, Robert J. and Rothchild, Donald (eds.), Eagle in a New World (New York: HarperCollins, 1992)Google Scholar

7. Jervis, Robert, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 218–240Google Scholar.

8. Ibid. p. 26.

9. For an analysis of the impact of détente on Chinese security and of this period in U.S.-China relations, see Ross, Robert S., “International bargaining and domestic politics: U.S.-China relations since 1971,” World Politics, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2 (01 1986)Google Scholar. For a discussion of intense Soviet concern for China and Moscow's efforts to enlist U.S. support in case of a Sino-Soviet war, see Hyland, William, Mortal Rival: Superpower Relations from Nixon to Reagan (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 62–66, passim.Google Scholar On China's relatively sanguine response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, see Segal, Gerald, “China and Afghanistan,” Asian Survey, Vol. XXI, No. 11 (11 1981)Google Scholar. For Chinese criticism of détente during this period, see e.g. Enlai's, premier Zhou comments in The Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1973), pp. 23–24Google Scholar; Guping, Ren, “The Munich tragedy and contemporary appeasement,” Renmin ribao (People's Daily), in Peking Review, Vol. 20, No. 50 (9 12 1977)Google Scholar. Also see Henry Kissinger's reports of his various meetings with Zhou, and Zedong, Chairman Mao in White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), passimGoogle Scholar; Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), passim.Google Scholar

10. Bianzhou, Yi, Cong Haolaiwu dao Baigong (From Hollywood to the White House) (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 1981), pp. 56–59Google Scholar. Note that Chinese analysts were aware of the changes in U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union under Jimmy Carter. See, for example, Qubing, Zhuang, “Meiguo dui Su zhengce de xin quxiang” (”The new trend in United States policy toward the Soviet Union”), Shijie zhishi (World Affairs), No. 3 (1 02 1980)Google Scholar; Xiang, Huan, “New development of U.S. military posture toward the Soviet Union,” RMRB, 25 03 1980Google Scholar, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, People's Republic of China/Daily Report (hereafter FBIS/DR), 27 March 1980, pp. B 1–4.

11. Qubing, Zhuang, “Ligen de waijiao qiju,” (“Reagan's diplomatic chessboard”), Shijie zhishi, No. 6 (16 03 1981), pp. 2–3Google Scholar.

12. Qianqi, Wang, “Ligen zhengfu de junshi zhanlue” (“The military strategy of the Reagan administration”), Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contemporary International Relations), No. 1 (10 1981), p. 22Google Scholar. Also see Bo, Gao and Lei, Yu “Sulian nanxia zhanlue ji qi mianlin de zuli” (“The Soviet strategy of thrusting southward and the impediments it faces”), Xiandai guoji guanxi, No. 1, 1981 (10), pp. 12–15Google Scholar.

13. junhui, jin, “Ligen zhengfu de duiwai zhengce” (“The foreign policy of the Reagan administration”), Guoji wenti yanjiu (Journal of International Studies), No. 1, 1982 (01, p. 3Google Scholar.

14. Yebai, Zhang, “Commenting on the contradictions in the Reagan administration's foreign policy,” Renmin ribao, 31 07 1982Google Scholar, FBIS/DR, 2 August 1982, pp. Bl–6. Zhang repeatedly emphasized Washington's “passive position.” Also see, for example, Youlin, Mu, “Opposing hegemonism,” Beijing Review, 9 08 1982, p. 3Google Scholar.

15. On this and other developments in Sino-Soviet relations, see Barnett, A. Doak, The FX Decision, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution: 1981) p. 29Google Scholar; Zagoria, Donald, “The Moscow-Beijing detente,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Spring 1983), p. 856CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Barnett, A. Doak, “China's international posture,” in Bush, Richard C. (ed.), china Briefing 1982 (New York: The Asia Society, 1983), pp. 92–93Google Scholar.

16. “Quarterly chronicle and documentation,” The China Quarterly, No. 91 (09 1982), pp. 564–65Google Scholar; Barnett, , “China's international posture,” p. 90Google Scholar.

17. Qubing, Zhuang, Hongzeng, Zhang and Tongwen, Pan, ‘Ping Meiguo de 'Yu Taiwan Guanxi Fa’” (“Criticize the U.S. ‘Taiwan Relations Act’”), Guoji wenti yanjiu (Journal of International Studies), No. 1, 1981, p. 25Google Scholar.

18. Haig, Alexander M. Jr, Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 204–207, 209–210Google Scholar.

19. Agence France Presse (AFP), 4 August 1982, FBIS/DR, 4 August 1982, pp. B1–2.

20. See the April 1983 PRC Foreign Ministry note in Xinhua, 6 April 1983, FBIS/DR, 7 April 1983, pp. B1–2.

21. Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), 21 April 1987, p. 10.

22. New York Times, 5 April 1983, pp. 1, 10.

23. Xinhua, 6 April 1983, FB1S/DR, 7 April 1983, pp. B1–2; New York Times, 7 April 1983, p. 4.

24. The cancelled exchanges are reported in Xinhua, 7 April 1983, FBIS/DR, 7 April 1983, pp. B2–3. Note that although Washington refused to compromise, it tried to minimize any appearance of political overtones. See comments, Schultz's in American Foreign Policy Documents (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1985), p. 1002Google Scholar. “Yet another instance of endangering Sino-U.S. relations,” short commentary, RMRB, 9 April 1983, FBIS/DR, 11 April 1983, pp. B2–3.

25. Xinhua, 9 February 1983, FBIS/DR, 9 February 1983, pp. B1–2; Washington Post, 19 August 1983, p. 2. The court agreed with the PRC and set aside the US$43 million judgment. Washington Post, 29 February 1984, p. C1.

26. Xinhua, 12 February 1983, FBIS/DR, 14 February 1983, p. B1.

27. For a serious and authoritative treatment of the issue, see Daqun, Liu, “The odious nature of the Huguang Railway loan,” Guoji wenti yanjiu, No. 4, 1983Google Scholar, RMRB, 13 September 1983, FBIS/DR, 14 September 1983, pp. B1–7.

28. Washington Post, 19 August 1983, p. 2.

29. Xinhua, 26 April 1983, FBIS/DR, 26 April 1983, p. A1; Xinhua, 8 March 1983, FBIS/DR, 8 March 1983, p. A1.

30. Xinhua, 23 March 1983, FBIS/DR, 23 March 1983, p. B1.

31. Tiqiang, Chen, “It is impermissible for the Taiwan authorities to continue to usurp the seat in the Asian Development Bank,” Renmin ribao, 4 05 1983Google Scholar, FBIS/DR, I 4 May 1983, pp. U1–2.

32. Yaolin, Mu, “China should become a member of Asian Bank,” Beijing Review, No. 20 (16 05 1983), p. 4Google Scholar.

33. Xinhua, 25 November 1983, FBIS/DR, 25 November 1983, p. B1.

34. “Do not play a dangerous game that damages Sino-U.S. relations,” commentary, RMRB, 27 November 1983, FBIS/DR, 28 November 1983, pp. B1–2.

35. Xinhua, 18 November 1983, FBIS/DR, 21 November 1983, p. B1.

36. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (Washington, D.C.: GPO), 5 12 1983, p. 1627Google Scholar; Xinhua, 1 december 1983, FBIS/DR, 1 December 1983, pp. B3–4.

37. Commentary, “Yingdang yan er youxin” (“Words should be trustworthy”), Renmin ribao, 6 December 1983, p. 6 (author's emphasis). Also see Kyodo, 30 November 1983, FBIS/DR, 30 November 1983, p. A1.

38. Washington Post, 18 April 1983, p. 15; Xinhua, 16 June 1983, FBIS/DR, 16 June 1983, p. B1.

39. Xinhua, 16 June 1983, FBIS/DR, 16 June 1983, p. B2.

40. Interview with U.S. government officials. Also see Washington Post, 18 April 1983, p. 15; AFP, 14 September 1983, FBIS/DR, 15 September 1983, p. B1; Washington Post, 17 June 1983, pp. 21, 29.

41. “Yanshou xieyi, paichu zhang'ai,” Renmin ribao, 18 August 1982, p. 1.

42. Xinhua, 25 August 1982, FBIS/DR, 26 August 1982, p. B1.

43. Xinhua, 7 October 1982, FBIS/DR, 8 October, 1982, p. B2.

44. Commentary, “There can be no preconditions for implementing the Sino-U.S. joint communiqué,” Renmin ribao, 10 October 1982, FBIS/DR, 12 October 1982, FBIS/DR, 25 october 1982, p. B1.

45. Xinhua, 17 December 1982, FBIS/DR, 17 December 1982, p. B1. The meeting adjourned with no new agreements.

46. For reports of Shultz's conversations with PRC leaders, see Xinhua, 6 February 1983, FBIS/DR, 7 February 1983, pp. B7–9; Xinhua 5 February 1982, FBIS/DR, 7 February 1983, pp. B4–5; Xinhua, 3 February 1983, FBIS/DR, 3 February 1983, pp. B3–4; Xinhua, 4 February 1983, FBIS/DR, 4 February 1983, pp. B2–3. On Shultz's lack of initiatives, also see New York Times, 2 February 1983, p. 3. For Chinese praise for Shultz's “patience,” see assistant secretary of state Paul Wolfowitz's account of Shultz's, visit in United States House of Representatives, United States-China Relations 11 Years After the Shanghai Communiqué (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1983), p. 12Google Scholar.

47. Renmin ribao, 7 February 1983, FBIS/DR, 8 February 1983, p. B3.

48. See Washington Post, 13 February 1983, p. 25; New York Times, 6 February 1983, pp. 1, 8.

49. “The U.S. and East Asia: a partnership for the future,” Current Policy, No. 459 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1983)Google Scholar. Washington Post, 19 February 1983, p. 5. Similar statements were later made by assistant secretary of state Wolfowitz. See China News Analysis (Hong Kong), 16 04 1983Google Scholar, FBIS/DR, 20 April 1983, pp. V1–3

50. Document no. 468, American Foreign Policy Current Documents, 1983 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1985), pp. 1000–1002Google Scholar.

51. AFP, 21 March 1983, FBIS/DR, 2 1 March 1983, p. B1; Xinhua, 23 March 1983,: for p. B1.

52. Xinhua, 29 March 1983, and 30 March 1983, FBIS/DR, 30 March 1983, p. B1. For additional statements by Zhao, , see e.g. Xinhua, 11 05 1983Google Scholar, FBIS/DR, 11 May 1983, p. B1.

53. Di, Peng, “Whither U.S. China policy?” Liaowang, No. 26 (20 05 1983)Google Scholar, FBIS/DR, 4 August 1983, pp. B1–3.

54. Washington Post, 21 May 1983.

55. Washington Post, 21 June 1983, p. 8. The PRC report on the meeting is in Xinhua, 26 May 1983, FBIS/DR, 27 May 1983, pp. B1–2.

56. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Trends in Communist Media, 2 June 1983, pp. 6–8, which also observes China's effort to separate economic issues from the more conflictual aspects of relations; Xinhua, 23 July 1983, FBIS/DR, 25 July 1983, pp. B1–2. Also recall that in June China threatened that Pan Am service to Taiwan would “inevitably cause damage” to U.S.-China relations.

57. Xinhua, 1 August 1983, FBIS/DR, 2 August 1983, p. B1.

58. Deng's remarks are in Xinhua, 28 September 1983, FBIS/DR, 28 September 1983, pp. B3–4. Zhao's, statement is in Renmin ribao, 28 09 1983Google Scholar, FBIS/DR, 28 September 1983, p. B1.

59. New York Times, 28 September 1983, p. 3; Xinhua, 28 September 1983, Renmin 1983, pp. B2–4; New York Times, 27 September 1983, p. 3; New York Times, 30 September 1983, p. 3; New York Times, 29 September 1983, p. 3.

60. Renmin ribao, 28 September 1983, FBIS/DR, 28 September 1983, pp. B5–6.

61. American Foreign Policy Documents, 1983, document no. 474, pp. 1008–1010; Xinhua, 12 October 1983, FBIS/DR, 12 October 1983, p. B2–3; Xinhua, 15 October 1983, FBIS/DR, 17 October 1983, pp. B1–2; Washington Post, 11 October 1983, p. 7.

62. Xinhua, 7 December 1983, FBIS/DR, 8 December 1983, pp. K13–15.

63. New York Times, 30 December 1983, p. 5.

64. Renmin ribao, 12 January 1984, FBIS/DR, 13 January 1984, p. B1. Author's emphasis.

65. Xinhua, 12 January 1984, FBIS/DR, 12 January 1984, p. B8.

66. Xinhua, 16 January 1984, FBIS/DR, 17 January 1984, p. B9.

67. Xinhua, 16 January 1984 and 17 January 1984, FBIS/DR, 17 January 1984, pp. B9–11. Also see editorial, , “A significant visit,” Renmin ribao, 18 01 1984Google Scholar, FBIS/DR, 18 January 1984, pp. B3–5.

68. See the account of Reagan's speech at the welcoming banquet hosted by President Xiannian, Li in Xinhua, 26 04 1984Google Scholar, FBIS/DR, 26 April 1984, pp. B4–5. Xinhua, 27 April 1984, FBIS/DR, 27 April 1984, p. B5. Zhao's, banquet speech and Deng's remarks are in Xinhua, 28 04 1984Google Scholar, FBIS/DR, 30 April 1984, pp. B13–14, 16–18 (my emphasis). The warning that U.S.-Taiwan relations might disrupt relations 1984, in the future evolved into China's standard treatment of the issue. See e.g. Deng's, statement reported in the New York Times, 2 10 1984Google Scholar.

69. Zengzhi, Dai, “The contradiction-ridden U.S. diplomacy,” Ban Yue Tan, 25 08 1982Google Scholar, FBIS/DR, 10 September 1982, pp. B1–3.

70. Jin, Wu, “The United States has not realized its wish to rebuild its strength,” Liaowang, 20 12 1983, FBIS/DR, 24 January 1983, pp. A1–2Google Scholar.

71. Xinghao, Ding, “Mei Su kangzheng zhong Meiguo ruhe kan ‘Zhongguo yinsu’” (“How the United States sees the ‘China factor’ in the U.S.-Soviet contention”), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi neican (neibu) (Internal Materials on World Economics and Politics), No. 2, 1983 (10 02), pp. 24–25Google Scholar. Also see the September 1982 article, Yan, Wang, “Dangqian Mei Su dui Hua zhengce de bijiao yanjiu” (“Comparative study of current I U.S. and Soviet policy toward China”), Shijiejingji yu zhengzhi neican, No. 9, 1982 (10 09), pp. 7–11Google Scholar, which argued that in the U.S.-Soviet struggle, the “only advantageous choice” for the U.S. is “to unite with China to resist the Soviet Union.” Overall, “China's position in the triangular relationship is extremely beneficial” (emphasis in original).

72. Shuzhong, Wang, “Mei Su zhengba zhong de Meiguo dui Hua zhanlue” (“U.S. strategy towards China in the U.S.-Soviet struggle for hegemony”), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi neican, No. 3, 1983 (10 03), pp. 11–12, 27Google Scholar.

73. Ning, Li, “Gengjia jinzhang dongdang de yi nian” (“A year of increased tension and turbulence”), Guoji wenti yanjiu, No. 1 (01 1983), pp. 3–11Google Scholar. Also see the article by Junhui, Jin, also from the Institute of International Studies, “Kunjing de t chanwu” (“Outcome of predicament”), Shijie zhishi, No. 6 (16 03 1983), pp. 7–8Google Scholar.

74. Beijing Domestic Service, 3 January 1983, FBIS/DR, 14 January 1983, pp. A5–6. Also see for example, Fang, He, “Guoji xingshi de huigu he zhanwang” (“Review and outlook on the international situation”), Shijie zhishi, No. 1 (1 01 1983), pp. 2–4Google Scholar; the conclusions of analysts at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies in Guoji xingshi nianjian, 1983 (Yearbook of the International Situation, 1983) (Shanghai: Zhongguo Da Baike Quanshu Chubanshe, 1983), pp. 7–10Google Scholar.

75. He, Zong, “Guoji xingshi de bianhua yu fazhan qushi (“The trend in changes and developments in the international situation”), Shijie zhishi, No. 11 (1 06 1983), p. 5Google Scholar. This article went to press on 23 May. Also see e.g. Xiaochuan, Xie, “Su Mei: zhengdou de xin tedian” (“The Soviet Union and the United States: new characteristics of the struggle”), Shijie zhishi, No. 3 (1 02 1983), pp. 10–12Google Scholar; Wenhuan, Qi, “Xi Ou dui Meiguo de duli zuzhu qingxiang (“The trend of West European independence and initiative towards the United States”), Shijie zhishi, No. 8 (6 04 1983), pp. 10–12Google Scholar.

76. See Segal, Gerald, Sino-Soviet Relations After Mao, Adelphi Papers, No. 202 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985), pp. 11–12Google Scholar.

77. Baoqin, Wang, Yumei, Yan and Liandi, Liu, “Bashi niandai de Zhong, Mei, Su guanxi chutan” (“The origins and an exploration of China-U.S.-Soviet relations in the 1980s”) Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi neican, No. 11, 1983 (10 11), pp. 36–37Google Scholar. Although this article appeared after the peak of this trend in Chinese strategic thinking, its analysis of the implications for Chinese security of the superpower stalemate applies to the earlier period. The mention of the “three strategic tasks” is a reference to Deng Xiaoping's January 1980 speech in which he laid out these three items as China's primary concerns for the 1980s. See Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping), (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1983), pp. 203–204Google Scholar.

78. Xinhua, 15 April 1983, FBIS/DR, 20 April 1983, p. A1.

79. Xinhua, 31 May 1983, FBIS/DR, 3 June 1983, p. A1. For a later report offering a similar view, see Zhongren, Jiang, “Xinping jiujiu: ping Andeluopofu de caijun jianyi” (“Old wine in a new bottle: on Andropov's new disarmament proposal”), Shijie zhishi, No. 19 (1 10 1983), p. 5Google Scholar. Also see the discussion of West German chancellor Helmut Kohl's July visit to Moscow in Guangming ribao, 11 July 1983, FBIS/DR, 19 July 1983, pp. A1–2.

80. Dezhen, Zhang, “MX missiles and U.S.-Soviet nuclear talks,” Renmin ribao, 24 08 1983Google Scholar, FBIS/DR, 25 August 1983, pp. A1.

81. Shuhai, Huang, “Huan Xiang zongtang dangqian guoji xingshi” (“Huan Xiang talks freely on the current international situation”), Shijie zhishi, No. 16 (16 08 1983), pp. 2–4Google Scholar. For a similar analysis strongly stressing U.S. initiative, see Dezhen, Zhang, special commentary, “Superpowers’ arms race threatens world peace,” Renmin ribao, 11 10 1983Google Scholar, FBIS/DR, 12 October 1983, pp. A1–3, which argues that modernization of nuclear weapons in the U.S. is “in full bloom” and emphasizes the magnitude of increased U.S. defence spending. Also see Min, Fang, “The chequered strategic nuclear arms talks,” Renmin ribao, 8 07 1983Google Scholar, FBIS/DR, 9 June 1983, pp. A4–5.

82. Huang Shuhai, “Huan Xiang zongtang dangqian guoji xingshi.”

83. Xinghao, Ding, “Meiguo zhengfu dui Yazhou zhengce de tiaozheng” (“Adjustment in the U.S. government's Asia policy”), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi neican, No. 8, 1983 (10 08), p. 3Google Scholar.

84. Xinhua, 5 November 1983, FBIS/DR, 7 November 1983, p. B4; Xinhua, 9 November 1983, FBIS/DR, 9 November 1983, pp. J1–2.

85. Fang, He, “Lun Mei Su zhengduo de xin taishi” (“On the new situation in the U.S.-Soviet contention”), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi neican No. 11, 1983 (10 11), pp. 1–3Google Scholar.

86. Ning, Li, “Mei Su dangqian de zhengduo taishi ji tamen dui Zhongguo zuoyong de jiliang” (“The current situation in the U.S.-Soviet contention and their evaluation of China's impact”), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi neican, No. 12, 1983 (10 12), pp. 27–28Google Scholar. The gongkai analysis is in “Mei Su zhengduo jihua he guoji jinzhang jushi (“Intensified U.S.-Soviet contention and the tense world situation”), Guoji wenti yanjiu, No. 1 (01 1984), pp. 1–6Google Scholar. Also note the gongkai analyses by Li's institute colleagues: Zhuang Qubing, “Cong Ligen guoqing ziwen kan Meiguo de waijiao zhengce” (“U.S. foreign policy seen from Reagan's state of the union message”), Shijie zhishi, No. 4 (16 02 1984), pp. 8–9Google Scholar (compare Zhuang's appraisal of Reagan's 1984 speech with Jin Junhui's highly negative assessment of the 1983 speech); Dai, Li, “1983 nian guoji xingshi de tedian” (“Characteristics of the 1983 international situation”) Shijie zhishi, No. 1 (1 01 1983) p. 4Google Scholar. Also note that this consensus was shared by analysts at the influential Institute of Contemporary International Relations: Jirong, Zhou, Wang Baoqin and Gu Guanfu, “Su Mei zhengba taishi de bianhua yu qianjing” (“Change and prospect in the U.S.-Soviet struggle for hegemony”), Shijie zhishi, No. 23 (1 12 1983), pp. 2–5Google Scholar; and Xiandai guoji guanxi, No. 6 (03 1984)Google Scholar, where it was argued that there had been a “conspicuous change in the U.S.-Soviet struggle for hegemony. The U.S. counter-attack has clearly increased and, due to the increase in its internal and external difficulties, the Soviet offensive has weakened…” Also see the analysis in Shanghai Institute of International Studies (ed.), Guoji xingshi nianjian, 1984 (Yearbook of International Situation, 1984) (Shanghai Zhongguo Da Baike Quanshu Chubanshe, 1984), p. 4Google Scholar.

87. Dezhen, Zhang, “From exploratory moves to the drawing of swords-a year of acute U.S.-Soviet tension,” Renmin ribao, 13 12 1983Google Scholar, FBIS/DR, 14 December 1983, A1–4. On the situation in Europe, also see Xinhua, 28 December 1983, FBIS/DR, 29 December 1983, p. A1.

88. Ning, Li, “Mei Su dangqian de zhengduo taishi ji tamen dui Zhongguo zuoyong de jiliang,” p. 29Google Scholar.

89. Fang, He, “Lun Mei Su zhengduo de xin taishi,” pp. 3, 5Google Scholar.

90. For a discussion of the importance of policy from this perspective, see Deutsch, Karl, The Analysis of International Politics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1978)Google Scholar; Jervis, , Perception and Misperception in International Politics, ch. 4, especially pp. 154–181Google Scholar.

91. See Ross, Robert S., “From Lin Bao to Deng Xiaoping: elite instability and China's U.S. policy,” The China Quarterly, No. 118 (06 1989), pp. 265–299CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

92. For a discussion of the role of Zhao Ziyang and Deng Xiaoping in foreign policy-making during this period, see Barnett, A. Doak, The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), ch. 2Google Scholar.

93. Interview with a former Chinese Foreign Ministry analyst.

94. Xinhua, 26 November 1983, FBIS/DR, 28 November 1983, p. B1.