¹ Writers who have commented on the fact that the Overseas Chinese may present certain problems to China, have not usually gone beyond this observation to examine the Chinese Government's response to these problems. See, for example, Hinton, Harold C., Communist China in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1966), p. 402Google Scholar; Bell, Coral, “The Foreign Policy of Communist China,” in F. S., Northedge (ed.), The Foreign Policies of the Powers (London: Faber and Faber 1968), p. 133Google Scholar. Maurice, Freedman, however, in a review of Lea E., Williams, The Future of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, in The China Quarterly, No. 31 (07–09 1967), p. 172, makes the judgement that for China “the Overseas Chinese have become more of an embarrassment than anything else.”Google Scholar

² Overseas Chinese policy is concerned almost exclusively with the Chinese in South-East Asia, since that is where more than 95 per cent. of them live, and since it is in South-East Asia that Overseas Chinese present the greatest obstacles to the advancement of China's foreign policy interests. With a few exceptions, the Chinese in other parts of the world have not influenced the policies of the CCP.Google Scholar

³ The most extreme statement of this proposition is contained in Robert, Elegant, The Dragon's Seed. Peking and the Overseas Chinese (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1959)Google Scholar. But it was also expounded by academics and western political leaders, one of the most notable proponents being the former U.S. Secretary of State, Dulles. See, for example, Dulles' statement in U.S. Government Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1017 (22 12 1958), p. 991.Google Scholar

⁴ An outline of the policies and objectives of the Kuomintang in the period before 1949 may be found in a number of post-1949 Taiwan publications, notably in a number of “gazetteers” of Overseas Chinese in each country of the world and in the Hua-ch'iao-chih tsung-chih (General Gazetteer of the Overseas Chinese) (Taipei: Hua-ch'iao-chih Editorial Committee, 1956). The KMT's retrospective account of its relations with the Overseas Chinese tends to over-emphasize its own care and protection and the enthusiastic response of the compatriots abroad, but it does provide a good deal of information on major decisions and objectives.Google Scholar

⁵ G. William, Skinner, “Overseas Chinese in Southwest Asia,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 321 (01 1959), p. 138Google Scholar. One of the first and most vitriolic expressions of this “anti-Sinitic tradition” was the pamphlet attributed to the Thai King, Rama VI, in which the Overseas Chinese were labelled “The Jews of the East.” The pamphlet is summarized in Victor, Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia (second edition, London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 120–121.Google Scholar

⁶ The Chinese have been rather vague about the number of domestic Overseas Chinese, but there appear to have been between 10 and 11 million relatives and dependants, probably over 60,000 students, and from 400,000 to 500,000 returned Overseas Chinese. See Jen-min jih-pao (People's Daily) (Peking), 6 10 1954, 15 04 1960, p. 16Google Scholar, and Ch'iao-wu pao (Overseas Chinese Affairs Journal), No. 5 (10 1963), p. 3. They were concentrated in the provinces of Fukien and Kwangtung, with small numbers scattered in Kwangsi, Shangtung, Chekiang and Yunnan.Google Scholar

⁷ Kao, Ming-hsüan, Chairman of the Fukien Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, in an address to the first class of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Cadre Training School. Fu-chien ch'iao-hsiang pao (Fukien Overseas Chinese District News) (Foochow), 28 07 1956.Google Scholar

⁸ Jen-min jih-pao editorial, 19 06 1956.Google Scholar

⁹ In addition to the national media, a great deal of attention is devoted to Overseas Chinese affairs in the provincial and local media in the provinces of Kwangtung and Fukien. There were also special newspapers for Overseas Chinese affairs in these two provinces and in Kwangsi Province, and below province level special news sheets in the Overseas Chinese home districts The official organ of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, the Ch'iao-wu pao, was also concerned mainly with domestic rather than external matters, and the reporting of the special news agency for the Overseas Chinese press, Chung-kuo hsin-wen she (China News Service) (CNS), was devoted almost exclusively to events in China and the policies of the Chinese Government.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Kung-t'ung kang-ling (The Common Programme), Preamble and Article 13, in Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo k'ai-kuo wen-hsien (Documents on the Founding of the People's Republic of China) (Hong Kong: Hsin min-chu ch'u-pan she, 1949), pp. 261, 264.Google Scholar

¹¹ In the Common Programme, protection of Overseas Chinese, Article 58, was included in the section on foreign policy, towards the end of a long list of foreign policy objectives. Ibid. p. 274.

¹² Chuang, Hsi-ch'üan, Vice-Chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (OCAC), “Chung-hua ch'üan-kuo kuei-kuo hua-ch'iao lien-ho-hui tang-ch'ien ti chi-pen jen-wu”Google Scholar(“The Present Basic Tasks of the All-China Returned Overseas Chinese Association”), Report to the inaugural meeting of the All-China Returned Overseas Chinese Association (ACROCA), 10 1956, Ch'iao-wu pao, 17 10 1956, p. 15.Google Scholar

¹³ Fang Fang, Vice-Chairman of the OCAC and Deputy Director of the United Front Work Department (UFWD), Speech to a group of visiting Overseas Chinese, Peking, 3 October 1962, CNS, 4 October 1962, p. 7; and Liao Ch'eng-chih, speech to Overseas Chinese students, Peking, 7 February 1965, Ch'iao-wu pao, No. 1 (02 1965), p. 39.Google Scholar

¹⁴ The OCAC was represented in the State Council Staff Office of Foreign Affairs by Liao Ch'eng-chih, and does not appear to have had independent authority for decision-making even on minor matters affecting the Chinese abroad. Negotiations with foreign governments and consular matters were handled by the Foreign Ministry or its representatives abroad. The leading Party organ for Overseas Chinese affairs was the United Front Work Department, but this appears to have shared, or even surrendered, its responsibilities to the Party organ responsible for foreign affairs.Google Scholar

¹⁵ The one possible exception was the period in 1967 when revolutionary rebels and other militants of the Cultural Revolution responded with frenzied outbursts to a series of incidents involving Overseas Chinese in Mongolia, Burma, Indonesia and, although not strictly Overseas Chinese areas, Hong Kong and Macao.Google Scholar

¹⁶ For example: “expression of concern for the affairs of Chinese residing abroad still takes second place to the maintenance of good relations with the host nations concerned. Where relations are not particularly good, Overseas Chinese problems receive more attention, and actions against their interests may attract more vehement protests” (Somers Heidhues, Mary F., “Peking and the Overseas Chinese; the Malaysian Dispute,” Asian Survey (Berkeley, Calif.), Vol. VI, No. 5, pp. 285–286)Google Scholar; “Only the Chinese in countries hostile to the People's Republic, however, are called upon to be disobedient to their governments. Elsewhere, Chinese are encouraged to be inconspicuous, decent settlers” (Williams, Lea E., The Future of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966), p. 69)Google Scholar; “Peking's protests over anti-Chinese measures are made with great vehemence against governments aligned with the west …; they are non-existent or sotto voce against neutral regimes” (Willmott, W. E., “The Chinese in Southeast Asia,” Australian Outlook (Melbourne), Vol. 20, No. 3 (12 1966), pp. 260–261).Google Scholar

¹⁷ “Hua-ch'iao t'ung ch'iao-chü-kuo jen-min yu-hao kuan-hsi ti fa-chan” (“The development of friendly relations between Overseas Chinese and the peoples of the countries of residence”), Ch'iao-wu pao, 20 07 1959, p. 14.Google Scholar

¹⁸ The CCP did, of course, make some distinctions, and these were usually between the Chinese in South-East Asia and those in all other parts of the world. For example, on the question of investment, in 1958 the Party stated that its policy of encouraging Overseas Chinese to invest in local industry was intended for the Chinese in South-East Asia, out of consideration for their long-term interests in the region, while its appeals for Overseas Chinese to invest in China were intended mainly for those in Europe and the Americas. Ch'iao-wu pao, 20 10 1958, p. 38.Google ScholarPubMed

¹⁹ The militancy of Chinese statements on Overseas Chinese policy reached a high point in the report of Liao Ch'eng-chih, then a Vice-Chairman of the OCAC, to the First Enlarged Conference of the OCAC in June 1951. See Jen-min jih-pao, 12 July 1951. Subsequently, the revolutionary content was progressively toned down, and when a new version of Liao's 1951 report appeared in October 1954, it was completely shorn of its revolutionary trimmings. See “Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo pao-hu kuo-wai hua-ch'iao ti cheng-tang ch'üan-li ho li-yi. Ch'iao-wu kung-tso ti hui-ku” (“The People's Republic of China protects the rights and interests of the Chinese resident abroad. A review of Overseas Chinese work”), by the Propaganda Team of the OCAC, Jen-min jih-pao, 6 10 1954, p. 3.Google Scholar

²⁰ There was also the fact that the organizations responsible for Overseas Chinese affairs were preoccupied with the domestic scene, and even in this field, according to later admissions, policies had not been implemented correctly, and in some areas had not even penetrated to the basic level. See, for example, report to the First Session of the First National People's Congress (NPC) by Ho Hsiang-ning, then Chairman of the OCAC, in Jen-min jih-pao, 27 09 1954, p. 2.Google Scholar

²¹ Despite many claims that the MCP was the creature of Peking, an examination of these claims fails to reveal any substantiating evidence. Gene Hanrahan, for example, who is quoted by a number of other writers on this particular point, cites as evidence of the CCP's “hegemony” over the MCP an unidentified but “usually reliable source” to the effect that “the real command of the Malayan struggle is now (1954) based in Nanning, South China, functioning under a so-called ‘United Operations Department’ of the Chinese Communist Party” (The Communist Struggle in Malaya, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, p. 80). In Hinton (Communist China in World Politics, p. 403) this becomes: “There can be no serious doubt that the MCP has always been and is still under Communist Chinese (not Soviet) influence, if not outright control.” Victor Purcell, on the other hand, possibly the leading authority in the field, pointed out in his revision of The Chinese in Southeast Asia that even in 1963 the question of external direction and control had still not been established (p. 329).Google Scholar

²² For a good example of the Chinese Government's refusal to commit itself, see a statement by Ho Hsiang-ning on the closure of two Chinese newspapers in Singapore, in Nan-fang jih-pao (Southern Daily) (Canton), 5 10 1950.Google Scholar

²³ From the beginning of 1951, Chinese statements informed the Overseas Chinese that they would have to protect themselves, protests about deportations from Malaya were reduced to a formality and the CCP no longer demanded, as it had in 1949, that the deportees be allowed to return. From the middle of 1951, Chinese statements on foreign policy and Overseas Chinese policy tended to avoid all reference to the Malayan question or Chinese support for the Overseas Chinese struggle against imperialist oppression and persecution. For example, see Chou En-lai's statement at the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, in Hsüeh-hsi (Study), Vol. 5, No. 2 (16 11 1951), p. 7.Google Scholar

²⁴ Hinton, , Communist China in World Politics, p. 404.Google Scholar

²⁵ P'i Liao chan-pao (Criticize Liao Combat Bulletin), 18 June 1967, translated in Survey of the China Mainland Press (SCMP) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate General), No. 4013 (1 09 1967), pp. 5–11Google Scholar. For a discussion of this document, see Stephen FitzGerald, “Overseas Chinese Affairs and the Cultural Revolution,” The China Quarterly, No. 40 (10–12 1969).Google Scholar

²⁶ The details of this meeting were not given in the Chinese press, but in September 1954, Nehru put the substance of his views in a speech to the Lok Sabha. See Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 3, 03 1953–08 1957 (New Delhi: Government of India Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1958), pp. 271–272.Google Scholar

²⁷ Hinton, Harold C., “The Overseas Chinese and Peking,” Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), Vol. XIX, No. 14 (6 10 1955), p. 422.Google Scholar

²⁸ Ssu-t'u, Mei-t'ang, “Yü kuo-wai hua-ch'iao t'an ai-kuo ta t'uan-chieh” (“A talk with Overseas Chinese about great patriotic unity”), Ta kung pao (Shanghai), 1 01 1952.Google Scholar

²⁹ See So Hsiang-ning's New Year Broadcast to Overseas Chinese, in Ch'iao-wu fa-kuei hui-pien (Collected Laws and Regulations on Overseas Chinese Affairs), Vol. 1 (Peking: Lien-ho shu-tien, 1951), p. 6.Google Scholar

³⁰ Between 1929 and 1941 remittances had ranged between U.S.$80 and $100 million annually, and in 1938 had reached $200 million. Hsin Chung-kuo kung-shang-yeh-chia ti tao-lu (The Path for Industrialists and Businessmen in New China) (Hong Kong: Hua-ch'iao ching-chi ch'u-pan she, 1950), p. 89.Google Scholar

³¹ Jen-min jih-pao, 27 10 1949, p. 5.Google Scholar

³² Although no figures are available from Chinese sources, the fall was referred to in a number of Chinese statements at the end of 1953 and in 1954. See, for example, Feng Pai-chü, Vice-Chairman of the Kwangtung People's Government, Report to an Overseas Chinese Dependants' Rural Production Conference, in Nan-fang jih-pao, 30 October 1953, pp. 1, 2; and Ho Hsiang-ning's report to the First Session of the First National People's Congress. A list of selected western estimates for varying periods between 1950 and 1965 is given in Chun-hsi Wu Dollars, Dependents, and Dogma. Overseas Chinese Remittances to Communist China (Stanford: The Hoover Institution, 1967), pp. 18–19Google Scholar. Wu's own estimate is given in Ibid. p. 142. See also, a set of estimates of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, in “Communist China's Balance of Payments,” An Economic Profile of Mainland China (Washington: United States Congress Joint Economic Committee, 02 1967), p. 654. For the period 1950 to 1954, Wu estimates a fall from U.S.$60·1 million to $41·22 million, and the Central Intelligence Agency from $133 million to $100 million.Google ScholarPubMed

³³ For a somewhat coloured account of some of these pressures, see Lu, Yu-sun, Programs of Communist China for Overseas Chinese (Hong Kong: The Union Research Institute, 1956).Google Scholar

³⁴ Williams, , Future of the Overseas Chinese, p. 74. Williams defines his term as “the participation of Chinese in government and politics.”Google Scholar

³⁵ Skinner, , “Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia,” p. 137, above, n. 5.Google Scholar

³⁶ An analysis of the changing attitudes of Overseas Chinese is given in Wang, Gungwu, “Chinese Politics in Malaya,” The China Quarterly, No. 43 (07–09 1970).Google Scholar

³⁷ For almost 12 months before September 1954, the Chinese Government made no major statement on external Overseas Chinese policy. In this period there were, however, two enlarged conferences of the OCAC, the Second, in November 1953, and the Third, in July 1954, and from subsequent reports it appears that major policy questions were discussed at both these conferences.Google Scholar

³⁸ See report by Feng Pai-chü to the Overseas Chinese Dependants' Rural Production Conference, above, n. 32.Google Scholar

³⁹ Chou, En-lai, Cheng-fu kung-tso pao-kao (Government Work Report), Report to the First Session of the First NPC (Peking: Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1954), pp. 30–31.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ For the text of the treaty and related documents, see Ch'iao-wu cheng-ts'e wen-chi (Collected Documents on Overseas Chinese Policy) (Peking: Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1957), pp. 20–43Google Scholar. This includes the Jen-min jih-pao editorial of 23 April 1955 and a statement on the treaty by Ho Hsiang-ning issued on 26 April. See also, Chang Hsi-jo, “Hsin Chung-kuo ti ho-p'ing wai-chiao cheng-ts'e ho hua-ch'iao shuang-ch'ung kuo-chi wen-t'i” (“New China's peaceful foreign policy and the question of Overseas Chinese dual nationality”), Jen-min jih-pao, 10 05 1955, p. 4.Google Scholar

⁴¹ The offer is discussed in Ho Hsiang-ning, “Kuan-yü shuang-ch'ung kuo-chi wen-t'i ti t'iao-yüeh ti t'an-hua” (“A talk on the Dual Nationality Treaty”), in Ch'iao-wu cheng-ts'e wen-chi, pp. 34–38.Google Scholar

⁴² Chou, En-lai's exchange with the Thais is discussed in David Wilson, “China, Thailand, and the Spirit of Bandung,” Part II, The China Quarterly, No. 31 (07–09 1967), p. 98.Google ScholarThe offer to the Philippines is reported in Jen-min jih-pao, 30 10 1955, p. 1. The cases of Singapore and South Vietnam are discussed in more detail below.Google Scholar

⁴³ “Ho-p'ing hsieh-shang kuo-chi wen-t'i yu yi fan-li” (“Another example of solving international problems through peaceful consultation”), Jen-min jih-pao editorial, 23 04 1955.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ In the only statement ever issued on this subject, in 1960, it was claimed that only 40 per cent. of the Overseas Chinese were pure Chinese nationals. See Fang, Fang, talk with domestic Overseas Chinese, in Ta kung pao, 23 12 1960, p. 1.Google ScholarThe Chinese census figure, calculated by “indirect investigation,” is given in Jen-min jih-pao, 1 11 1954, p. 1.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ See, for example, Jen-min jih pao editorial, 19 06 1956.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ A comprehensive summary of domestic Overseas Chinese policies in the mid-1950s is given in Fang Fang's report to the Fourth Enlarged Conference of the OCAC in June 1956, “Kuan-yü kuo-nei ch'iao-wu kung-tso ti jo-kan cheng-ts'e” (“Concerning certain policies in domestic Overseas Chinese work”), in Ch'iao-wu cheng ts'e wen-chi, pp. 47–65.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ The Fourth Enlarged Conference of the First OCAC was convened in June 1956. It was the first such conference since the introduction of the new policies at the end of 1954, and it reviewed those policies and probably discussed the more radical initiatives which began to emerge three months later.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Lyman Van Slyke has suggested that Liao's resignation may have indicated that Overseas Chinese affairs was no longer a principal concern of the UFWD. See Enemies and Friends. The United Front in Chinese Communist History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 241. This was not the case, however, with domestic Overseas Chinese affairs, where the UFWD continued to play a leading role.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Jen-min jih-pao, 26 09 1956, p. 3.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ This article was by Ch'en Pi-sheng, a member of the Nanyang Research Institute of Amoy University. Kuang-ming jih-pao, 17 12 1956.Google Scholar

⁵¹ “Chung-hua ch'üan-kuo kuei-kuo hua-ch'iao lien-ho-hui chang-ch'eng” (“Regulations of the ACROCA”), in Ch'iao-wu pao, 20 01 1957, p. 32.Google Scholar

⁵² Ch'iao-wu pao, 20 04 1958, pp. 9–10.Google ScholarPubMed

⁵³ Fang Fang, talk with visiting Overseas Chinese, CNS, 4 October 1960, p. 6.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Ch'iao-wu cheng-ts'e wen-chi, pp. 45–46.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Ibid. p. 3.

⁵⁶ Ch'iao-wu pao, 20 01 1957, p. 23,Google Scholar 20 February 1957, p. 8, and Jen-min jih-pao, 6 03 1957, 19 April 1959, p. 4.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ See Ho, Hsiang-ning's statement in Jen-min jih-pao, 21 05 1957, p. 1, and the editorial in the same issue on p. 5. See also the account of this affair in the P'i Liao chan-pao.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Ta kung pao, 22 11 1957.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Kuang-tung ch'iao-pao (Kwangtung Overseas Chinese News) (Canton), 1 03 1958.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ See decisions of the First Plenary Conference of the Second OCAC, in Jen-min jih-pao, 12 12 1957, p. 4,Google Scholar and Ho, Hsiang-ning's New Year Broadcast “Tsai hsin-ti hsing-shih hsia sheng-li ch'ien-chin” (“Advance victoriously in the new situation”), Ch'iao-wu pao, 20 01 1958, pp. 3–4.Google Scholar

⁶¹ In references to the racial troubles in Malaysia in 1969, for example, the Chinese media referred, not to hua-ch'iao, but to hua-jen, and explained the term as “Malayan citizens of Chinese blood” (Chung-kuo hsüeh-t'ung ti ma-lai-ya kung-min), CNS, 21 05 1969, p. 4.Google Scholar

⁶² For example, Mary F. Somers Heidhues, “Peking and the Overseas Chinese; the Malaysian Dispute,” above, n. 16.Google Scholar

⁶³ Ch'iao-wu cheng-ts'e wen-chi, p. 3.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Ibid. p. 8.

⁶⁵ For example, see Ho Hsiang-ning's report to the Fifth Session of the First NPC, “Ch'iao-chüan kuei-ch'iao t'ung-yang yao ku-ch'i-kan-ching li-cheng-shang-yu” (“Overseas Chinese dependants and returned Overseas Chinese must also go all out and aim high”), Jen-min jih-pao 7 02 1958.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ See, for example, Chou, En-lai's talk with Overseas Chinese in Bandung, in Jen-min jih-pao, 4 06 1955, p. 4.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ “1958 nien ch'iao-lien ti kung-tso fang-chen ho jen-wu” (“Work, policies and tasks for the ACROCA for 1958”), Ch'iao-wu pao, 20 01 1958, p. 7.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ See the two-part article by “Ai Hua” in Ch'iao-wu pao, 20 07 1959, pp. 12–15, and 20 August 1959, pp. 27–30.Google ScholarPubMed

⁶⁹ Jen-min jih-pao, 6 10 1954, p. 3; CNS, 1 January 1960.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Kuang-tung ch'iao-pao, 1 03 1958.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Ch'iao-wu pao, 20 04 1958, pp. 4–6.Google Scholar

⁷² Fang, Fang, “Tang-ch'ien hsing-shih yü ch'iao-wu kung-tso” (“The present situation and Overseas Chinese work”), Ch'iao-wu pao, 20 12 1959, p. 13. See also Liao Ch'eng-chih (CNS, 1 January 1960), Ho Hsiang-ning (CNS, 30 January 1960), and Wang Han-chieh, Chairman of the Fukien Province OCAC (CNS, 9 February 1960).Google Scholar

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ See, for example, Liao, Ch'eng-chih's speech at a May Day reception for Overseas Chinese in Peking in 1960, in Jen-min jih-pao, 4 05 1960, p. 4.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Fang, Fang in Ta kung pao, 23 12 1960, p. 1.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Fang Fang, “Tang-ch'ien hsing-shih yü ch'iao-wu kung-tso,” above, n. 72.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ “Kuo-wu-yüan kuan-yü chieh-tai ho an-chih kuei-kuo hua-ch'iao ti chih-shih” (“State Council Directive concerning Reception and Resettlement of Returned Overseas Chinese”), promulgated 2 02 1960, Ch'iao-wu pao, 20 February 1960, p. 2.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Ch'iao-wu pao, 20 02 1960, p. 4.Google ScholarPubMed

⁷⁹ Ibid. p. 5, and Fu-chien ch'iao-hsiang pao, 3 09 1962, p. 1.Google ScholarPubMed

⁸⁰ Fang Fang, “Tang-ch'ien hsing-shih yü hua-ch'iao kung-tso,” above, n. 72.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Report by Ho, Hsiang-ning, in Ta kung pao, 22 11 1957;Google Scholar and Ch'iao-wu pao, 20 12 1957, p. 2.Google ScholarPubMed

⁸² Fu-chien jih-pao (Fukien Daily), 26 11 1957;Google ScholarTa kung pao, 15 12 1957.Google Scholar

⁸³ According to a report in February 1957, one third of dependants relied primarily on remittances for their livelihood, and another third relied partly on remittances. Ch'iao-wu pao, 20 02 1957, p. 10.Google ScholarPubMed

⁸⁴ Ch'iao-wu pao, 20 01 1959, pp. 7–8.Google ScholarPubMed

⁸⁵ Wang, Han-chieh, Report to the First Conference of the Second Fukien Province OCAC, Ta kung pao, 11 08 1959.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Ho, Hsiang-ning, Report to the Fourth Session of the First NPC, “Teng-ch'ing tui ch'iao-wu kung-tso ti yi-hsieh hu-t'u ssu-hsiang” (“Clear up some muddle-headed thinking about Overseas Chinese work”), in Jen-min jih-pao, 12 07 1957.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Fang, Fang, Report to the First Enlarged Conference of the Second OCAC, Ch'iao-wu pao, 20 06 1958, p. 5.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Fang Fang, speech to returned Overseas Chinese, ibid. 20 October 1959, p. 4.

⁸⁹ “Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo kuo-wu-yüan kuan-yü kuan-ch'e pao-hu ch'iao-hui cheng-ts'e ti ming-ling” (“State Council of the Chinese People's Republic order concerning the implementation of the policy for protection of remittances”), promulgated 23 02 1955, in Ch'iao-wu cheng-ts'e wen-chi, pp. 94–95.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ “Hua-ch'iao t'ou-tzu yü kuo-ying hua-ch'iao t'ou-tzu kung-ssu ti yu-tai pan-fa” (“Preferential measures for Overseas Chinese investment in state-owned Overseas Chinese Investment Corporations”);Google Scholar and “Hua-ch'iao chüan-tzu hsing-pan hsüeh-hsiao pan-fa” (“Measures governing the financing of schools by Overseas Chinese”). Both promulgated on 2 08 1957, and published in Ch'iao-wu cheng-ts'e wen-chi, pp. 100–104.Google Scholar

⁹¹ For example, Ch'iao-wu pao, 20 01 1957, p. 2; CNS, 20 May 1957.Google ScholarPubMed

⁹² Statement by Fei, Chen-tung, member of the OCAC and Director of the Peking Overseas Chinese Supplementary Middle School, in Ta kung pao, 18 07 1957.Google Scholar

⁹³ Statement on investment and the establishment of schools by Overseas Chinese, by a responsible person of the OCAC, in Ch'iao-wu cheng-ts'e wen-chi, pp. 105–107.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ Jen-min jih-pao editorial, 13 08 1957.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Fang Fang, speech to visiting Overseas Chinese, CNS 4 October 1960, p. 3.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ Jen-min jih-pao editorial, 13 08 1957.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ Ho Hsiang-ning, “Tsai hsin-ti hsing-shih hsia sheng-li ch'ien-chin,” above, n. 60.Google Scholar

⁹⁸ Ho Hsiang-ning, “Ch'iao-chüan kuei-ch'iao t'ung-yang yao kuch'i-kan-ching li-cheng-shang-yu,” above, n. 65.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ CNS, 4 October 1960, p. 6.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ Letter to the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Subandrio, dated 15 03 1960, Ch'iao-wu pao, 20 March 1960, p. 2. See also on page 6 of the same issue a speech to a group of returnees from Indonesia by Liao Ch'eng-chih.Google ScholarPubMed

¹⁰¹ “Kuo-wu-yüan kuan-yü chieh-tai ho an-chih kuei-kuo hua-ch'iao ti chih-shih,” above, n. 77.Google Scholar

¹⁰² Kroef, Justus M. van der, for example, is one exponent of the theory of “Peking's … strategy of exporting revolution throughout Southeast Asia through its hua ch'iao” (“Nanyang University and the Dilemmas of Overseas Chinese Education,” The China Quarterly, No. 20 (10–12 1964), p. 126).Google ScholarSee also Frank, Trager: “Peking's use of the Overseas Chinese as a ‘fifth column’ is a standard ploy” (“Sino-Burmese Relations”, Orbis (Louvain), Vol. XI, No. 4 (Winter 1968), p. 1053);Google Scholar and Millar, T. B.: “There is considerable evidence that the government of the Chinese People's Republic uses the ‘Overseas Chinese’ … to provide from among their number a built-in fifth column, a source of agents for intelligence and subversion, a valuable instrument of foreign policy …” (Australia's Defence (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1965), p. 54). It is on the basis of such generalized statements and totally unsupported claims about “considerable evidence” that the fifth column theory persists.Google Scholar