1 For the political changes prior to the 1992 election, see Tun-jen, Cheng, “Democratizing the quasi-Leninist regime in Taiwan,”World Politics, No. 42(July 1989);Google ScholarHung-mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China(Stanford: Hoover Institutions,1989);Google ScholarStephan Haggard(eds.), Political Change in Taiwan (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers,1991);Google ScholarCrafting Democracy in Taiwan(Taipei:Institute for National Policy Research,1992);Google ScholarHung-mao, Tien and Yun-han Chu, ‘Taiwan's domestic political reforms, institutional change, and power realignment,” in Gary Klintworth, Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s(Sidney:Allen Unwin, 1994), andGoogle Scholarand Cheng-yi Lin, “Political change on Taiwan: transition to democracy?” The China Quarterly, No. 136(December 1993), pp. 805–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 On the concept of founding election, see Guillermo, O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies(Baltimore:John Hopkins University Press,1986).Google Scholar

3 As much of the literature suggests, transition to democracy can be understood as a complex historical process with analytically distinct, if empirically overlapping, stages of breakdown, transition, consolidation and persistence. Each stage is “punctuated” by specific events or accomplishments. See, for example, Terry, Lynn Karl and Philippe Schmitter, ”Modes of transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe,” International Social Science Journal, No.138(May 1990), p.8.Google Scholar

4 For the origin of intra-party cleavage and the evolution of the so-called mainstream and non-mainstream faction, see Yun-han Chu, Crafting Democracy, ch. 2 and Hung-mao Tien and Yun-han Chu, “Taiwan's domestic political reforms.”Google Scholar

5 For the two previous leadership reshufflings, i.e., the ouster of Premiers Yu Kuo-hua and Lee Huan, see Hung-mao Tien and Yun-han Chu, “Taiwan's domestic political reforms”.

6 According to Alfred Stepan, the scope of regime transition can be analysed in terms of three arenas of modern polity: civil society, political society and the state. Democratization involves civil society, but it refers fundamentally to political society. See Alfred, Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone(Princeton:Princeton University Press,1988), pp.3–5.Google Scholar

7 Juan, Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Eastern Europe(Yale University, photocopy,1993), pp. 3–4.Google Scholar

8 Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, p. 4 and Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, pp. 3–4.Google Scholar

9 By consolidation we mean that a new democracy achieves a level of legitimacy which is deep, unquestioning, comprehensive and enduring. Consolidation makes a democracy so secure, and its rule so widely agreed upon, that any retreat away from it appears virtually unthinkable. Most new democracies in the so-called Third Wave have not yet reached this democratic point of no return. For an elaborate treatment of the concept of democratic consolidation, see Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition.

10 This process is referred to by Adam Przeworski as democratization of the state, in contrast to the democratization of the regime. See Adam, Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.88.Google Scholar

11 This formulation is adopted from Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition.

12 Thomas, Gold,State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle(Armonk, NY:M. E. Sharpe, 1986); Cheng and Haggard, Political Change in Taiwan.Google Scholar

13 Edwin, A. Winkler, “Institutionalization and participation on Taiwan: from hard to soft authoritarianism?”, The China Quarterly, No. 99(September 1984), p. 481–499; Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition.Google Scholar

14 Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition, pp. 43–63.

15 For an analysis of the sequencing of democratic reform, see Tun-jen Cheng, “Democratizing the quasi-Leninist regime.”.

16 On the stateness problems in democratic consolidation, see Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, ch. 4.

17 Karl and Schmitter, “Modes of transition,” p. 81

18 Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu, “Electoral competition and political democratization,” in Cheng and Haggard, Political Change in Taiwan.

19 On this point, see Juan Linz and (eds.), Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers,1995), p. 161.Google Scholar

20 Harvey, Feldman,Constitutional Reform and the Future of the Republic of China (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1992) and Shao-chuan Leng and Cheng-yi Lin, “Political change on Taiwan.”.Google Scholar

21 See China Times, 31 October 1991.

22 A new Constitutional Court was established under the Council of Grand Justices and was entrusted with the power to rule on the “unconstitutionality” of political parties. See the Fourth Amendment, ss. 3 and 4.

23 For a descriptive account of the event, see China Times, 9 October 1991.

24 The most critical decision was made at the adoption of the National Unification Guidelines, where the pro-reunification council members wanted to make direct sea and air links a priority while the pro-status quo members insisted on political preconditions for lifting the ban. See China Times, 25 July 1992, p. 2.

25 The idealistic New Tide faction eventually gave up its long-term commitment to parliamentarianism because it was convinced by other factions of the DPP that a strong presidency is imperative for the independence cause. See Lin Tso-shui, “Zongtong zhixuan yu xianzheng gaizao” (“Presidential election and constitutional reconstruction”), paper delivered at a conference on presidential election and constitutional reconstruction, sponsored by the Chinese Association for Comparative Legal Studies, 1993, p. 4.

26 The issue became so contentious in part because the non-mainstream faction was caught by surprise. The KMT Constitutional Reform Working Group had all along promoted the “proxy vote” method under the false assumption that it was also the favoured system of President Lee, who did not reveal his preference until the concluding stage of the Working Group, less than a month before the third plenary session.

27 Nevertheless, as a last-ditch effort to constrain the power of his rival, President Lee, Hau claimed that the main purpose of his voluntary resignation was setting a constitutional precedence in accordance with a parliamentarian reading of the ROC constitution.

28 Tun-jen Cheng and Yung-ming Hsu, “Issue structure, the DPP factionalism and party realignment,” inHung-mao, Tien(ed.), Elections and Democratization in Taiwan: Riding on the Third Wave Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe,1995.Google Scholar

29 See Medhi, Krongkaew, “Income distribution in East Asian developing countries: an update,”Asian Pacific Economic Literature, Vol. 2, No. 8 (November 1994), pp. 58–73.Google Scholar

30 On the corruption in electoral politics, see Ming-tong Chen and Yun-han Chu, “Quyuduzhan jingji, difang paixi yu shengyiyuan xuanju: yixiang shengyiyuan houxuanren beijing zhi fenxi” (“Regional oligopoly, local factions and provincial assembly elections: an analysis of the socio-economic background of candidates, 1950–1986”), National Science Council Proceedings-C: Social Sciences and Humanity, Vol. 3 (January 1992), and Joseph Bosco, ‘Taiwan factions: guanxi, patronage and the state in local politics,“ inGoogle ScholarMurray Rubinstein(ed.),The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present(Armonk, NY:M. E. Sharpe, 1994)Google Scholar

31 For example, in the 1989 and 1993 local elections, under Lee Teng-hui's chairmanship, of the 42 KMT nominees for county magistrate and city mayor, only four (9.5%) were not affiliated with local factions. This nomination strategy was in stark contrast to the KMT strategy for the earlier four local elections under Chiang Ching-kuo's chairmanship. Over the 1972–85 period, of the 77 KMT nominees for county magistrate and city mayor (for the four elections held respectively in 1972,1977,1981 and 1985) 45 (58%) were not affiliated with local factions. See Julian Kuo. “The reach of the party-state: organizing local politics in Taiwan,” Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Yale University, 1995, p. 132.Google Scholar

32 See Chian-chung, Chen, “The politics of the legislation of the financial disclosure law,” M.A. thesis, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University, 1994.Google Scholar

33 According to one statistic released by the Ministry of Justice in 1995, of the 800 incumbents in the 21 county and city councils island-wide, more than 300 have been prosecuted for vote-buying. Of the 42 speakers and deputy speakers of these councils, more than one-third have criminal records. See United Daily, 19 May 1995.

34 on the post-election surveys conducted by the electoral study team led by Professor Fu Hu of National Taiwan University.

35 The original text of the Article 37 requires the premier's counter-signature for all legal actions of the president without exception.

36 These include, under the structure of a five-power government, the president, vice-president and members of the Control Yuan, the president, vice-president and members of the Examination Yuan, and the president, vice-president and grand justices of the Judicial Yuan.

37 It is still unclear if the new amendment really does this, because the same amendment also stipulates that the resignation of a sitting premier does not go into effect until the Legislative Yuan approves the appointment of a new premier. This qualification makes it politically impossible for a president to dismiss a premier who continues to enjoy a solid majority support in the Legislative Yuan.

38 The constitutional convention that the Cabinet must resign after each re-election of the Legislative Yuan was firmly established after the Council of Grand Justices delivered Ruling 387 in October 1995.

39 Under the French system, cohabitation occurs when the president's party no longer controls a majority in the National Assembly. See Matthew, Shugart and John Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).Google Scholar

40 40. Ibid..

41 See China Times, 30 July 1994, p. 2.

42 See China Times, 1 January 1993, p. 1.

43 For example, during the recent presidential campaign, Peng Min-ming, the DPP presidential candidate, vowed to rewrite the constitution if elected. See China Times, 15 October 1995, p. 2.

44 On 2 August 1993, the Broadcast and Television Law was substantially revised, and the Cable Television Law was enacted about a week later.

45 The only symbolic presence of the military on the committee is Admiral C. T. Soong, the former Joint Chief-of-Staff.

46 See China Times, 2 June 1996

47 The figures were first reported in a feature story in Cai xun (Fortune News), December 1991. The figures matched a recent report submitted by the Central Finance Committee to the Central Standing Committee.

48 On both the sociology and economics of vote-buying, see Yun-han Chu, “SNTV and the evolving party system in Taiwan, Chinese Political Science Review, No.22(June 1994), pp.33–52.Google Scholar

49 This figure is based on various journalist accounts. See, for example, a special report in New Journalist, 28 November 1992.

50 In the 1992 election, for the first time close to 20% of seats were allocated according to the proportional representation (PR) rule, while all the remaining seats were still allocated under the SNTV system. The PR seats were distributed among parties that won at least 5% of the popular vote nation-wide under the SNTV system.

51 For an analysis of the DPP factionalism, see Tun-jen Cheng and Yung-ming Hsu, “Issue structure, the DPP factionalism and party realignment.

52 See Yun-han Chu and You-chung Chang, “Beipan guomindang: Taibei shizhang xuanju zhi fenxi” (“Defecting the Kuomintang: a case study of the Taipei mayoral election”) paper presented at the 1995 annual meeting of the Taiwanese Political Science Association, Taipei.

53 The PRC's first-wave military exercise and its harsh verbal attack on Lee Teng-hui did have some impact on Lee's re-election bid. Around mid-August, the support level for Lee's candidacy dropped at one time to 31.9%, from a high of 43% a few months before. At the same time, the percentage of undecided voters rose significantly. See the analysis by China Times, 16 September 1995.

54 See China Times, 2 February 1993, p. 2.

55 See Yun-han, Chu, “The realignment of business-government relations and regime transition in Taiwan,” in Andrew, Maclntyre(ed.), Business and Government in Industrializing Asia(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).Google Scholar

56 At the start of the second Legislative Yuan, the KMT controlled 101 seats (63%). After the breakaway of the New Party in August 1993, the KMT still controlled 95 seats (59%).

57 See Chen Chian-chung, “Yangguang faan Ufa guocheng yanjiu” (“The legislative politics of the Financial Disclosure Rule”), M.A. thesis, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University, 1994.Google Scholar

58 In the beginning of the third Legislative Yuan, the DPP leadership proposed a grand coalition government, called the Grand Reconciliation, and entered talks with the New Party. The move drew harsh criticism from some quarters of the party and was later dropped.

59 On the first ballot, the DPP and KMT candidates were on a 80 vs. 80 tie. On the second ballot, the KMT incumbent speaker won by one vote (82 vs. 81). See China Times, 2 February 1996

60 See China Times, 30 January 1996.

61 On this point, see Yun-han Chu and Tse-min Lin, “The process of democratic consolidation in Taiwan: social cleavage, electoral competition and the emerging party system,” in Hung-mao Tien, Elections and Democratization in Taiwan.

62 See Yun-han Chu, “The political economy of Taiwan mainland policy,” paper presented at an international conference on Cross-Straits Relations and Implications for the Asia-Pacific Region, sponsored by the Mainland Affairs Council and the Institute for National Policy Research, 27–29 March 1995, Taipei.

63 In the early part of 1992, President Lee instructed the Research Committee under the National Unification Council to formulate a timely reinterpretation of the one-China principle to underscore the point that China has been divided since 1949, and that the PRC has neither succeeded nor replaced the ROC. See Mainland Affairs Council, Taihai liangan guanxi shouming shu (The White Paper on Cross-Strait Relations), 1994.

64 Personal communication with Shieh Chang-ting, the DPP vice-presidential nominee and factional leader.

65 This is a direct quotation from a speech by Qian Qichen, the PRC's vice-premier, at an internal working meeting of Taiwan Affairs officials. See Ming bao, 14 May 1994.Google Scholar