1. Chien, Yang Hsin and Ch'en, “Exposing and criticizing the fallacious reasoning of imperialists on questions concerning national sovereignty,” Cheng-fa yenchiu, No. 4 (1964), pp. 6–11Google Scholar; transl. in Chinese Law and Government, Vol. I, No. 2 (1968–69), p. 13Google Scholar;

2. Ibid. pp. 14–15.

3. “What is 'Independence'? What is ‘Neutrality’?” Under the section “Answers to readers' questions,” Kung-jen jih-pao, 9 July 1961, p. 3, in Joint Publications Research Services (JPRS) (Washington D.C.), No. 10,237 (1961), p. 77Google Scholar;

4. Yueh, T'iao, “A preliminary appraisal of the bourgeois concept of international law” (Washington, D.C.) Kuo-chi wen-t'i yen-chiu (09 1959)Google Scholar; translated in URS, Vol. 16, No. 21, p. 302. The big capitalist states had among themselves, moreover, “provisions for effecting mutual restraint, easing tensions and the like, as e.g. the open-door policy, most-favoured-nation treatment, and spheres of influence.”

5. For example Oppenheim, L., International Law, 7th ed., Vol. I, Book I (1948), p. 36Google Scholar;

6. Meng, K'ung, “A criticism of the theories of capitalist international law on international entities and the recognition of states,” Kuo-chi wen-t'i yen-chiu, No. 2 (3 02 1960), pp. 44–53Google Scholar; in JPRS, No. 3, 453 (27 06 1960), p. 34Google Scholar; He is here referring to the translation of Wheaton into Chinese.

7. Oppenheim, , International Law, Vol. I (1905), pp. 33, 71 and 164Google Scholar;

8. Meng, K'ung, “A criticism of theories,” p. 39Google Scholar; The Chinese view coincides with the view of the UN expressed in the UN General Assembly Resolution of 1960 “Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.” This states that “Inadequacy of political, economic, social, or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.” This Declaration effectively expresses the Soviet anti-colonial thesis as well.

9. Ibid. p. 42. It should be noted, however, that since becoming a member of the United Nations, the first veto which the People's Republic of China (PRQ) cast was against admission of Bangla Desh as a member. Huang Hua cited Chap. II, Art. 4 of the UN Charter on membership, which declared that applicants “must not only declare their readiness to ‘accept the obligations contained in the present Charter’ but also ‘in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations’ before they will be qualified to be admitted as a member of the United Nations. … How can the ‘Bangla Desh’ authorities which have shown open contempt for the principles of the UN Charter and refused to comply with the relevant resolutions expect the Security Council to shut their eyes, asserting that they ‘are able and willing’ to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter?” See “Soviet social-imperialism's attempt to further control South Asian subcontinent exposed,” Peking Review, No. 35 (1 09 1972), p. 7Google Scholar;

10. Meng, K'ung, “A criticism of theories,” p. 39Google Scholar; Also see Kozhevnikov, F. I. (ed.), International Law (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, no publication date), p. 90Google Scholar; for a similar view.

11. Chou En-lai, speech at plenary meeting of the Afro-Asian Conference, as mentioned by Yang Hsin and Ch'en Ch'ien, pp. 12–13. See also Keng-sheng, Chou, New Trends in Contemporary Anglo-American Theory of International Law (1963)Google Scholar transl. in Chinese Law and Government (April 1970), p. 88; and K'ung Meng, pp. 39, 42. The increasingly popular school of thought in strict judicial circles likewise holds the view that nations or national movements are subjects of international law, even before they become “states.” Every nation which is a cohesive and distinct social unit “inherently” possesses the right to national sovereignty and hence, the right to self-determination. A community which becomes dominated by another state, as in the case of a colony, though it lacks “political sovereignty” (i.e. the attributes of a state), at the level of “national sovereignty” it “remains the equal of its independent counterparts, notwithstanding the loss of its facilities for self-government.” Presumably the latter cannot be lost forever by any nation. And, since every nation has “national sovereignty,” the Soviets reason, they are full subjects of international law. See Ginsbergs, George, “Wars of national liberation and the modern law of nations—the Soviet thesis,” Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Autumn 1964), pp. 911–14Google Scholar;

12. For the Communist Chinese position on Tibet, with particular attention to the matter of “suzerainty” and “sovereignty,” see Tieh-tseng, Li, “The legal position of Tibet,” American Journal of International Law (AJIL), Vol. 50 (1956), pp. 394–404Google Scholar; The Indian viewpoint is argued by Alexandrowicz-Alexander, C. H., “The legal position of Tibet,” AJIL, Vol. 48 (1954), pp. 265–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar;

13. See “Two interdependent resolutions on ‘Bangla Desh’ adopted,” Peking Review, No. 49 (8 12 1972), pp. 9–11Google Scholar; and “Soviet social-imperialism's attempt to further control South Asian subcontinent exposed,” Peking Review, No. 35 (1 09 1972), pp. 6–9Google Scholar;

14. This coincides with the Soviet view that the “inviolability of state territory” does not rule out “socialist change.” Territorial inviolability “does not mean and cannot mean recognition and preservation of the status quo. It does not rule out peaceful change.” Another Soviet writer states, “Contemporary international law accepts the possibility and necessity of territorial changes as part of the confirmation of the right of peoples and nations to self-determination as a basic principle.” And, “ … any nation has the right fully to determine its destiny and the destiny of its territory.” Ramundo suggests that the idea that “territory belongs to nations and people (not only to the sovereign state)” is implicit in these attitudes towards territorial sovereignty. In the idea of “popular sovereignty” is the notion that territory is used in accordance with the “real interests of the masses.” Ramundo, Bernard, Peaceful Coexistence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), pp. 93–94Google Scholar;

15. Meng, K'ung, “A criticism of theories,” p. 41Google Scholar; See Brierly, James L., Law of Nations, 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), p. 168Google Scholar on ILO. Note that it is really a “transnational” organization.

16. Keng-sheng, Chou, New Trends, pp. 84–85Google Scholar;

17. Ibid. p. 84.

18. Ibid. p. 85. See examples.

19. See, e.g. Shih-lin, Lu, “The modern school of international law serves imperialism,” Jen-min jih-pao (People's Daily), 29 06 1963Google Scholar; in Chinese Law and Government, Vol. 2 (Summer 1969), pp. 62–64Google Scholar; The author attacks the modern school of “natural law” as a tool for promoting “universalism” or “world law.” Among other accusations is that “the bilateral or multilateral treaties concluded between the U.S. and other states are ‘supranational’ law so far as these states are concerned.”

20. T'ao, Ying, “Criticism of capitalist international law in regard to theories of state sovereignty,” Kuo-chi wen-t'i yen-chiu. No. 3 (3 03 1960 pp. 47–52Google Scholar; in JPRS, No. 2,916 (25 06 1960), pp. 32–33Google Scholar; The author includes as evidence the U.S. invasion of Korea in the name of the UN in 1950; passing of resolutions which interfered in the domestic affairs of Hungary by the General Assembly “under the domination of the United States”; in 1950 the U.S. “compelled” the General Assembly to pass a “collective measures resolution” for the purpose of putting a UN force at the disposal of the U.S.; the U.S. proposed that both NATO and SEATO be put into the UN “collective measures committee.” And finally, Eisenhower's idea to form a UN army, and then the U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' statement that “there should be a UN force which can be sent to any place in the world where there is a threat of aggression,” struck the Chinese as showing the true intentions of the U.S. to use the UN for aggression and to destroy other states' sovereignty. Pp. 32–33.

21. See e.g. “Challenge to superpowers' power politics,” Peking Review, No. 52 (29 12 1972), pp. 10–12Google Scholar; “China's stand on disarmament,” Peking Review, No. 44 (3 11 1972), pp. 22–24Google Scholar; “Third World countries play increasingly important role in international affairs,” Peking Review, No. 43 (27 10 1972), pp. 15–16Google Scholar; and “The first (political and security) committee adopts 52-nation draft resolution,” Peking Review, No. 48 (1 12 1972), pp. 8–9Google Scholar;

22. ”China's principled stand on monetary problem,” Peking Review, No. 42 (20 10 1972), pp. 11–12Google Scholar;

23. Meng, K'ung, “A criticism of theories,” p. 41Google Scholar;

24. See Keng-sheng, Chou, New Trends, p. 25Google Scholar;

25. This is not to say the Chinese do not want to change the status quo; for while they do not advocate wars between states, which could eventually lead to world war, they do support internal wars – wars of national liberation, revolutionary wars and war between a colony and its mother country (which by their definition is not an international war but an internal affair). As Mao says, to eliminate war, one must “oppose war with war.” Thus in their dispute with the Soviet Union, the Chinese accuse the Soviets of attempting to maintain the status quo in order to avoid nuclear war, for which purpose they uphold the general line of peaceful co-existence,” whereas the Chinese propose that the general line of “peaceful co-existence” can only be applied between slates with different social systems, it cannot be applied to the relationship between oppressor and oppressed classes or nations. “For an oppressed nation of people, the question is one of waging a revolutionary struggle or overthrow the rule of imperialism and the reactionaries; it is not, and cannot be, a question of peaceful co-existence with imperialism and reactionaries.” “The differences between comrade Togliatti and us,” Peking Review, No. 1 (01 1963), p. 15Google Scholar;

26. On the question of Marx's reconciliation of international socialism with nationalism, and his distinction between nations and states, see Berki, R. N., “On Marxian thought and the problem of international relations,” World Politics, Vol. 24, No. 1 (10 1971), pp. 80–105CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Bloom, Solomon F., The World of Nations: A Study of the National Implications in the Work of Karl Marx (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941)Google Scholar;

27. Social imperialism is the external behaviour resulting from internal “revisionism.” See Chun, Shih, “On studying some history of the national liberation movement,” Peking Review, No. 45 (10 11 1972), p. 7Google Scholar; on the “qualitative change” which the Soviet Union has undergone under Khrushchev-Brezhnev revisionism.

28. Chun, Shih, “On studying some history,” p. 7Google Scholar;

29. Hsin, Yang and Chien, Ch'en, “On exposing and criticizing,” pp. 16, 20Google Scholar;

30. Percy E. Corbett, who discusses the position of the individual in classical international law, notes that “the idea of the populus as a corporate person, of which the ruling individual or group is merely the highest agent,” was first expressed in the works of Althusius, in the early 17th century, but never really developed until the writings of Wolff and Vattel in the latter part of the 18th century. The theory of the individual as an “object” encountered serious obstacles in a number of areas, including piracy, military occupation, contraband and blockade-breaking. Now, in the 20th century, the creation of a large number of “stateless” individuals from wars and revolutions presents a further obstacle to the idea of individuals as mere objects of international law. See Corbett, Percy E., Law and Society in the Relation of States (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1951), pp. 54–57Google Scholar; It should be noted that the Chinese do favour the existence of some regional organizations such as the European Economic Community, and now even NATO (to balance off Soviet power in Europe). They have not, however, commented on whether or not these regional organizations should have the rights of states.

31. Coplin, William D., “International law and assumptions about the state system,” in Rosenau, James N. (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 149Google Scholar; Coplin notes that most modern writers believe the individual's relationship to international law is no longer simply that of object, but that as Wolfgang Friedmann notes, “the rights of the individual in international law are as yet fragmentary and uncertain.” “The changing dimensions of international law,” Columbia Law Review, Vol. LXII (11 1962), pp. 1,160–62Google Scholar; Corbett argues that, based on international practice, one cannot say simply “that individuate are, or that they are not, ‘persons in international law.’ It is only possible to say that in some contexts they are treated as persons, in others not.” Corbett, , p. 58Google Scholar;

32. Coplin, , “International law and assumptions,” p. 149Google Scholar; references Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (New York, 1959), pp. 9–13, 114–48Google Scholar on the role of collective responsibility in international law.

33. See, e.g. their views on anarchism as the assertion of individual rights: “All anarchists are against leadership and authority, negating and overthrowing everything. … What the anarchists want is democracy and freedom, not democratic centralism and discipline.“ Yung-ping, Hung and Tung-piao, Wei, “Down with anarchism,” People's Daily, Peking, 1 03 1967, in JPRS, No. 41,450, p. 101Google Scholar;

34. Chen-chiang, Chao, “The reactionary nature of the ‘legal theory of social solidarity’” (extracted from People's Daily, 20 12 1962)Google Scholar; transl. in Chinese Law and Government, Vol. 2 (1969–1970), pp. 65–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chao, references Ti-chi, (Duguit), Hsien-fa lun (Droit Constitutionnel) (Shanghai: Shang-wu yin-shu kuan, 1959), Vol. I, p. 518Google Scholar;

35. “Imperialism, colonialism, Zionism is terrorism,” Peking Review, No. 49 (8 12 1972), p. 12Google Scholar;

36. “Chairman of Chinese delegation Chiao Kuan-hua's speech,” Peking Review, No. 41 (13 10 1972), p. 6Google Scholar;

37. “Challenge to superpowers' power politics: a Hsinhua correspondent commentary on the 27th Session of UN General Assembly,” Peking Review, No. 52 (29 12, 1972), p. 11Google Scholar; also see “What stands in the way of real detente?” Peking Review, No. 42 (20 10 1972), p. 10Google Scholar;

38. “Imperialism, colonialism, Zionism is terrorism,” Peking Review, No. 49 (8 11 1972), p. 12Google Scholar; When referring to violence, the Chinese demand that a distinction be drawn between “the military aggression and violent repression by the aggressors and oppressors and the struggle of resistance by the victims of aggression and oppression.” “On the so-called prevention of ‘terrorism’,“ Peking Review, No. 40 (6 10 1972), p. 30Google Scholar;

39. Meng, K'ung, “A criticism of theories,” p. 40Google Scholar;

40. Ibid. pp. 40–41.

41. Ibid. p. 40.

42. Ibid.

43. Ssu, Ch'ien, “Criticizing the stand of capitalist international law in regard to the problems of residents,” Kuo-chi wen-fi yen-chiu, No. 5 (3 05 1960), pp. 40–9Google Scholar; in JPRS, No. 6,024 (5 10 1960), p. 78Google Scholar; Also see Corbett, Percy E., “Social basis of a law of nations,” The Hague Academy Recueil des Cours (1954), Vol. 1, pp. 471–540Google Scholar; and Jenks, C. Wilfred, The Common Law of Mankind (1958)Google Scholar; referred to in Keng-sheng, Chou, New Trends, pp. 35–39Google Scholar;

44. Keng-sheng, Chou, New Trends, p. 40Google Scholar;

45. The Chinese have, however, invoked “the principles of international law and humanitarianism” in emphasizing responsibilities, as in the sentencing of war criminals, e.g. in the 1956 trial of Japanese war criminals in the PRC. See “Trial of 28 Japanese in Shenyang,” New China News Agency, Shenyang (20 05 1956)Google Scholar; in Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1,336 (25 07 1956), p. 23Google Scholar; For more detail, see Jih-pen wen-t'i wen-chien hui-pien (Collection of Documents on the Japanese Problem) (Peking: World Knowledge Publishing House, 1958)Google Scholar;

46. They have e.g. endorsed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

47. For example, the purpose of the American, British and Belgian “task force” operation in the Congo in 1964 was to evacuate missionaries endangered in the rebel-held territory of Stanleyville during the civil war, with the help of the Congo Government. It was meant to be limited intervention and withdrawal which was not supposed to interfere in the “internal strife”; but most states did not approve of it. See Higgins, Rosalyn, “Internal war and international law,” in Black, Cyril and Falk, Richard (eds.), The Future of the International Legal Order, Vol. III (Princeton, 1971), p. 102Google Scholar;

48. T'ao, Ying, “Criticism of capitalist international law,” p. 31Google Scholar;

49. Ssu, Ch'ien, “Criticizing the stand,” p. 72Google Scholar;

50. Ibid. pp. 73, 83. Ch'ien Ssu notes that, like “human rights,” genocide has a “class basis.” In 1948 the General Assembly of the UN signed a covenant against genocide, but it concealed its class basis and failed to define criminal responsibility. Thus the American “extermination” of the Indians was not termed “genocide”; but the Soviet “racial extermination (murdering as well as exiling large groups of Hungarians to Siberia)” was called genocide by the U.S. and U.K. at the 11th Session of the General Assembly. Similarly, the International Law Commission in 1959 alleged that the PRC had attempted” to exterminate the Tibetan race and religion by means of murder and physical and spiritual torture,” and demanded UN intervention. See Ibid. pp. 76–77. Since I Hsin's, K'ung Meng's and Ch'ien Ssu's articles were written in 1960 and are the first lengthy articles in which the Chinese international legal theorists deal with the question of subjects of international law and individuals as subjects, it would seem that it was the 1959 events in Tibet which made this clarification necessary, and that the Hungarian events are added now only for additional emphasis and evidence.

51. Lauterpacht's, quoting of Oppenheim, , International Law, 7th ed. (1948), pp. 279–80Google Scholar; in I Hsin, , “ What does bourgeois international law explain about the question of intervention,” in Kuo-chi wen-t'i yen-chiu, No. 4 (1960), pp. 47–54Google Scholar; as transl. in Cohen, Jerome A. and Chiu, Hungdah, People's China and International Law: A Documentary Study (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), Chap. IX, Item 4, p. 166Google Scholar;

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid. Ch'ien Ssu points out that the Americans also accused the revolutionary governments of Iraq and Cuba of “encroachment on human rights” when they sentenced counter-revolutionaries to prison terms. Ssu, Ch'ien, “Criticizing the stand,” p. 79Google Scholar;

54. Cohen notes that the Chinese have not translated this correctly. Oppenheim does not say since or because “‘human rights’ … have become a persistent feature,” but “possibly, to the extent to which ‘human rights’ …” Lauterpacht, H., Oppenheim's International Law, 7th ed. (1948), p. 280Google Scholar; and Brierly, , The Law of Nations, 5th ed. (London: Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1955), p. 309Google Scholar; as quoted by I Hsin, Cohen and Chiu, p. 168 and note d.

55. Ssu, Ch'ien, “Criticizing the stand,” p. 73Google Scholar;

56. Ibid. pp. 73–74.

57. For the PRC's attitude towards the Hungarian and Polish events of 1956, see “Several questions in the current movement of international Communism,” by the Eds, Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien No. 23 (1 12 1956)Google Scholar; ECMM, No. 64 (1957), pp. 1–7Google Scholar; Nan, Sun, “What is the principle of non-intervention in other nation's internal affairs?” Shih-chieh chih-shih, No. 23 (5 12 1956)Google Scholar; ECMM, No. 74 (1957), pp. 1–3Google Scholar; and Pao-chen, Tien, “Is the dispatch of the Soviet army to Hungary an ‘intervention’ in another nation's internal affairs?” Shih-shih shou-tse, No. 2 (21 01 1957)Google Scholar; in ECMM, No. 76 (1957), pp. 1–3Google Scholar;

58. Ssu, Ch'ien, “Criticizing the stand,” p. 74Google Scholar; referring to the attempt of the International Law Commission to allege Chinese suppression of human rights and freedom, in the documents “Summary on the report on the Tibet question” and “The Tibet question and the rule of law.”

59. For the most recent regulations concerning aliens in the PRC, see “An act regulating the entry, exit, transit, residence, and travel of foreign nationals,” passed by the 114th meeting of the National People's Congress Standing Committee (15 March 1964); and promulgated by the Premier of the State Council, 13 April 1964. Text in People's Daily, 20 April 1964, p. 2. The most relevant articles for this discussion are Art. 2: “Foreign nationals in China shall observe the laws and decrees of China”; and Art. 17, which concerns punishment of foreign nationals who violate the provisions of this act. This formal act, however, omits the political considerations which go into the Chinese Communists' evaluation of the seriousness of the crime committed by an alien. For example, the foreign relations between the state of the alien committing an offence and China is a very important factor in how severely the alien will be punished by China's domestic courts:” it must be made clear that when applying punishment to a foreigner or a stateless person who commits a crime in our country, we should not only take the degree of his offence into account but should also consider the situation of the international struggle.” Chung-yang cheng-fa kan-pu hstteh-hsiao hsing-fa chiao-yen-shih pien, Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo hsing-fa tsung-tse chiang-i (Peking: 1957), pp. 213–14Google Scholar; transl. in Cohen, and Chiu, , People's China, Chap. XV, Item 1, pp. 5–10Google Scholar; (Emphasis added.) A change in the domestic political climate, as during the Cultural Revolution, may also affect the manner in which an alien who has allegedly committed an offence is treated (although if his state has friendly state relations with China, he will probably not be severely punished). Chap. XIX of the Cohen and Chiu documents have an excellent collection of cases concerning the Chinese treatment of aliens accused of offences, such as the Downey-Fecteau Espionage Case.

60. Min-ch'ien, Tyau, The Legal Obligations Arising Out of Treaty Relations Between China and Other States (Shanghai: Shanghai Commercial Press, Ltd, 1917)Google Scholar; for the view of a Chinese international legal scholar on the matter of rights of “reciprocity,” in the 19th and early 20th-century treaties, pp. 189–95.

61. Ssu, Ch'ien, “Criticizing the stand” pp. 81–83Google Scholar; Art. 2 of the “Sino-American treaty on trade and navigation” states: “nationals of either party to this treaty shall be permitted, in the territory of the other party without intervention, to conduct and manage such activities as have been organized in accordance with the local laws and are permitted by the officially promulgated laws and regulations relating to trade, manufacturing, processing, scientific research, education, religious propagation, and philanthropy.” In order to achieve the above enumerated objectives, each state will enjoy “the rights to secure, main' tain, construct, or lease and occupy proper housing and to lease proper real estate.” It is further stipulated that both parties “may not prevent the nationals of one party to this treaty from entering, traveling, or residing in the territoryof the other party.” For the text of this treaty, see the Department of State, United States: Treaties and Other International Acts, series No. 1871.

62. Yeuh, Tiao, “A preliminary appraisal,” p. 303Google Scholar;

63. Ssu, Ch'ien, “Criticizing the stand,” p. 86Google Scholar;

64. Constitution of the People's Republic of China (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), Art. 99Google ScholarPubMed; and the “Revised Draft” of the “Constitution of the People's Republic of China,” Art. 29. Note that the 1954 Constitution with the wording “in the peace movement” reflects that era's policy of peaceful co-existence.

65. Ssu, Ch'ien, “Criticizing the stand,” pp. 86–87Google Scholar; Thus the counter-revolutionaries Nagy and Mindszenty were granted asylum in the Yugoslavian Embassy and American Embassy respectively during the “reactionary” Hungarian ”incident” in 1956.

66. T'ao, Ying, “Criticism of capitalist international law,” p. 31Google Scholar; The reference here is probably to Chinese Nationalists and White Russians. On this topic also see Ssu, Ch'ien, “Criticizing the stand,” p. 80Google Scholar; Recently, however, the Chinese Communists seem to be making a different point about Chinese who leave the mainland and reside in Hong Kong and Macao: they are called neither “reactionary elements” nor “refugees”: “Both Hong Kong and Macao are China's territories. There has always been interflow of Chinese between Hong Kong, Macao and other parts of China. The Chinese living in Hong Kong and Macao are by no means ‘refugees,’ and the so-called ‘question of Chinese refugees’ simply does not exist.” See “Essence of the so-called ‘Chinese refugees' question,” Peking Review, No. 31 (4 08 1972), p. 18Google Scholar;

67. The reference here is to Oppenheim's, International Law, 7th ed., Vol. I, Book 2 (1948), p. 181 (Chinese edition)Google Scholar: “Inasmuch as a stateless person is stateless, he is in no tangible way linked with the benefits of international law. It follows, therefore, that as far as international law is concerned, he has no protection. … However maltreated they may be, international law can be of no help in accordance with its practice.” Quoted in Ssu, Ch'ien, “Criticizing the stand,” p. 79Google Scholar; Note that a copy of the Chinese translation is not available.

68. Ssu, Ch'ien, “Criticizing the stand,” p. 80Google Scholar; In support of this argument Ch'ien Ssu gives the following information: After the Second World War, the UNRRA (later called the Office of the UN High Commissioner in Charge of Refugee Affairs), under the control of a number of imperialist states, used illegal means to prevent refugees of socialist countries from returning to their fatherlands. “Fo r instance, between 1948 and 1949, UNRRA repatriated only 72,000 of the 1,679,000 persons to be repatriated; in 1951, only 1,039 were repatriated; and by the end of 1953, there were still millions of refugees and displaced persons imprisoned in more than 300 camps in West Germany and Austria.” Most of the correspondence concerning the final wording of this treaty can be found in the files of the Department of State under 711.932. It should be noted that the Chinese view is not the usual perspective on the question of aliens and the problems involved with the question of alien status. The usual approach generally ignores this question of inequality. This shows the different preoccupation of the Chinese Communists.

69. See supra, note 37, at pp. 193–94; and Brierly, , International Law, p. 220Google Scholar; referenced in Ssu, Ch'ien, “Criticizing the stand,” p. 84Google Scholar;

70. See, e.g. Chun-ju, Shen, People's Daily, 30 10 1951Google Scholar; referred to in Chiu, Hungdah, “The nature of,” p. 12Google Scholar;

71. Ssu, Ch'ien, “Criticizing the stand,” pp. 82, 84Google Scholar; Note that the concept of international law governing the relationships among “civilized” countries was a view held until the 1950s. See for example, Lauterpacht's, Oppenheim International Law, 7th ed. (London: Longmans Green, 1948), p. 4Google Scholar;

72. Hsiung, James C., Law and Policy in China's Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 83Google Scholar; referring to Slusser, Robert and Triska, Jan, The Theory, Law, and Policy of Soviet Treaties (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 347Google Scholar;

73. Chou En-lai's report on his African trip to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, excerpts released by the New China News Agency (25 April 1964); also “Eight principles governing China's economic and technical aid to other countries,” Peking Review, (21 08 1964), p. 16Google Scholar; as referenced in Hsiung, p. 345.

74. “China's stand on the question of human environment” Peking Review No. 24 (1972), p. 5Google Scholar; While the PRC abstained from voting on the Declaration on the Human Environment, they did express an interest in co-operating in inter-national efforts to curtail pollution. See “China's ten cardinal principles on amending' Declaration on Human Environment',” Peking Review, No. 25 (1972), p. 9Google Scholar;

75. “China's ten cardinal principles,” pp. 9–11.