Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 June 2021
The Chinese government has placed workforce upskilling at the core of its reform agenda to sustain the Chinese “economic miracle.” As such, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS) and Ministry of Education (MOE) have each launched separate apprenticeship reforms geared towards enhancing China's oft-criticized vocational education and training system. Using a self-constructed theoretical framework, this article examines the two reforms and ascribes their divergent outcomes to the two ministries’ distinct approaches to institutionalizing their central initiatives (i.e. the top-down model followed by the MOHRSS versus the collaborative model of the MOE). However, given the absence of industry-level civil society governance in China, neither of these models has delivered ideal training outcomes, although the collaborative model has satisfied more employers and apprentices. China's skills-development reforms have thus become trapped in an institutional dilemma which is likely to impede the long-term economic restructuring efforts of the central state.
中国政府已经将劳动力技能升级放在了其改革议程的核心位置,以期延续中国的“经济奇迹”。由此,劳动和教育部门各自开启了独立的学徒制改革,试图强化中国长期以来因其低效而饱受诟病的职业教育和培训体系。使用一个自创的理论框架,我考察了这两个改革项目,并将其改革结果的差异归因于两个部委截然不同的制度化中央改革倡议的方式,即劳动部门的自上而下模式和教育部门的合作模式。然而,鉴于中国缺少行业层面的公民社会治理机制,两种模式都未能产出理想的技能开发成果,虽然合作模式获得了更多雇主和学徒的满意。中国的经济改革因此陷入了一个技能形成的困境,这一困境很有可能阻碍中央政府长期的结构性改革的努力。