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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2009
During my brief stay in the People's Republic of China I sought to obtain systematic and reliable information which would enable me to begin to answer the following questions: (1) How are decisions about drug safety, distribution, production levels, and price made and what have been the implicit or explicit trade-offs? (2) How do the pharmaceutical, research, public health, and population bureaucracies interrelate, how is inter-agency co-ordination achieved, and what have been the successes and problems encountered in this regard? (3) How are decisions made to initiate and discontinue research? (4) How extensive has decentralization of drug research and pharmaceutical production become in the post-Cultural Revolution period? If decentralization has occurred, what tangible consequences has it had? (5) What mechanisms exist to assure public health and environmental quality and what problems have arisen in the process of trying to achieve results in these areas? While there is much that I was unable to learn, if for no other reason than I had no opportunity to meet with relevant government officials, I was able to learn a great deal from the factory managers, researchers, doctors, and administrators with whom I spoke.
* The Steroid Chemistry and Biochemistry Delegation representing the Committee on Scholarly Communications with the People's Republic of China was in China from 10–29 October 1976. We visited research institutes, pharmaceutical factories, hospitals, and medical schools to learn about the production, testing, distribution, and effectiveness of pharmaceuticals in China, especially steroid products. During our stays in Peking, Kweilin, Canton, and Shanghai we learned a great deal about these subjects and found our Chinese hosts particularly responsive in the wake of the purge of the “gang of four.” I would like to thank all of the individuals associated with the Committee on Scholarly Communications for their work, especially Ms Pat Tsuchitani. The views and observations contained in this report are my own and do not necessarily represent those of the Committee or other members of the delegation. This report is my contribution to the delegation's trip report distributed by the National Academy of Sciences.
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3. I was told this at the International Women's and Child Peace Hospital, Shanghai, 25 October 1976.Google Scholar
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5. I was told this at the Institute of Materia Medica in Peking, 13 October 1976.Google Scholar
6. I was told this at the Shanghai Scientific Exchange Station, 27 October 1976.Google Scholar
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11. This is not to suggest, however, that bureaucratic participants are indifferent to the outcomes of decisions. Many factors, besides economic stake, may give an organizational actor a perceived stake in an outcome.Google Scholar
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