¹ Ta Kung Pao, 08 29, 1957Google Scholar, in Survey of the China Mainland Press (SCMP) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General), No. 1604, p. 34.Google Scholar

² People's Daily, 08 30, 1957, NCNA, August 30, 1957.Google Scholar

³ Pravda, 11 29, 1957Google Scholar, in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. 9, No. 46, p. 13.Google Scholar

⁴ See, for example, Ta Kung Pao, 10 6, 1957, in SCMP, No. 1627, p. 25Google Scholar; Kuang-ming Jih-pao, 10 7, 1957, in SCMP, No. 1628, pp. 40–41Google Scholar; and People's Daily, 10 7, 1957Google Scholar, ibid.

⁵ See Chap. 3, “The Soviet View of Deterrence,” in Dinerstein, Herbert S.'s War and the Soviet Union (New York: Praeger, 1960).Google Scholar

⁶ Pravda, 09 8, 1957.Google Scholar

⁷ Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush have concluded this in a study on Soviet military strategy they are preparing for the RAND Corporation.

⁸ For these contentions and a reflection of the impact of the ICBM on Soviet military strategy, see Talensky, Maj-Gen. N., “Military Strategy and Foreign Policy,” International Affairs, No. 3, 1958.Google Scholar

⁹ ProfIlyichov, L., “The Sputniks and International Relations,” International Affairs, No. 3, 1958.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 11.

¹¹ In Khrushchev's 40th anniversary report to the Supreme Soviet on November 6, 1957, an occasion which could have provided the perfect backdrop for a dramatic announcement of the superiority of the bloc over the West, Khrushchev appraised the year 1957 not as a turning point but as a year of “outstanding victories.” One Soviet writer, in assessing the impact of the sputnik on the balance of forces, wrote that the balance was now “tipping still further in (the bloc's) favour. …” See V. Korimov, “The Crisis of the ‘Positions of Strength’ Policy,” International Affairs, No. 3, 1958. As late as March 4, 1959, Khrushchev told an East German audience that if it were possible to invent an instrument which would measure with precision the political and military strength of the bloc and the West, it “would show that both sides are sufficiently strong at present.” (Pravda, March 5.)

¹² People's Daily, 11 20, 1957, in SCMP, No. 1662, p. 2.Google Scholar

¹³ Excerpt from speech contained in Mao Tse-tung, “Imperialists and All Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers,” NCNA, 10 31, 1958Google Scholar, in FBIS supplement, No. 25, November 3, 1958, p. 17.

¹⁴ For the latest reiteration of this formula, see the Moscow Declaration of December 6, 1960.

¹⁵ Tse-tung, Mao, “Imperialists and All Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers,” op. cit.Google Scholar

¹⁶ People's Daily editorial, 11 24, 1957, in SCMP, No. 1660, pp. 26–30.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Hu Pin, “The New World Situation,” World Culture (Shih-chieh Chih-shih), No. 24, 12 20, in JPRS, 507-D, 01 27, 1959, “Chinese Communist Articles on World Situation.”Google Scholar

¹⁸ Hsueh-hsi, “The East Wind Overpowers the West Wind (Chief Characteristics of the Current International Situation),” 01 3, 1958.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Kuang-ming Jih-pao, 02 9, 1958, in JPRS, DC-263, 08 22, 1958, Translations of Political Articles from the China Mainland Press, p. 44.Google Scholar

²⁰ See Khrushchev's interview with Reston, James, The New York Times, 10 10, 1957.Google Scholar

²¹ Kuang-ming Jih-pao, 12 8, 1957, in SCMP, No. 1669, p. 45.Google Scholar

²² People's Daily, 11 24, 1957, op. cit.Google Scholar

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Hsueh-hsi, 01 3, 1958, op. at.Google Scholar

²⁵ People's Daily, 11 24, 1957, op. cit.Google Scholar

²⁶ People's Daily, 11 24, 1957, op. cit.Google Scholar

²⁷ Pin, Hu, “The New World Situation.”Google Scholar

²⁸ Lung, Chi, “U.S. Strategy is in a Blind Alley,” World Culture, No. 23, 12 5, 1957Google Scholar, in Extracts from China Mainland Magazines (ECMM) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General), No. 121, pp. 1–6.Google Scholar

²⁹ Premier Bulganin's message to President Eisenhower was published in Pravda, 12 12, 1957.Google Scholar

³⁰ Bulganin's message to Turkish Premier Menderes, September 10 (Pravda, 09 14, 1957)Google Scholar; see also Gromyko's statement to the Press on the same date in which he spoke of the danger of escalation and also Khrushchev's interview with a Brazilian newspaper on November 21, 1957, when he said, “We must not think that under present conditions minor wars would be localised. Should such wars break out, they could soon grow into a world war.” (Tass, December 5, 1957.)

³¹ The writer is indebted to Speier, H., “The Soviet Threat to Berlin,” The RAND Corporation, 04 15, 1961, for this formulation.Google Scholar

³² On July 27, 1957, Yeh said: The equipment of our army today is much improved compared with the past. But we must realise that the present stage of industrial development in our country is still inadequate for the production of large quantities of the most modern equipment for our army. This situation naturally is not in keeping with the needs of modern national defence. To improve this backward situation, we cannot but accelerate the development of our industry, particularly heavy industry. Pending the full establishment of our industry, within certain limits it is necessary for us to resort to the expedient measure of placing orders with foreign countries … (emphasis supplied). Yeh Chien-vying, speech delivered to the second session of the First National People's Congress, July 27, 1955, Current Background (CB) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General), No. 347, pp. 29–30.Google Scholar

³³ For more detail, see Hsieh, Alice L., “Communist China and Nuclear Warfare,” The China Quarterly, No. 2, 04–06 1960.Google Scholar

³⁴ Article by General Liu Ya-lou, Commander of the PLA Air Force, “Seriously Study Mao Tse-tung's Military Thinking,” Chieh-fang-chün Pao, 05 23, 1958Google Scholar; SCMP, No. 1900, p. 10. See also Alice L. Hsieh's “Communist China and Nuclear Warfare,” loc. cit.

³⁵ Lung, Marshal Ho, People's Daily, 08 1, 1958Google Scholar; NCNA, 08 1, 1958.Google Scholar

³⁶ Tass, November 27, 1957.

³⁷ Ibid.