1. Examples of standard works using one or another of these approaches are Craig, Gordon A., The Politics of the Prussian Army (Oxford, 1955), pp. 137ff.;Google ScholarSimon, Walter, The Failure of the Prussian Reform Movement, 1807–1819 (Cornell, 1955), pp. 181ff.;Google ScholarRosinski, Herbert, The German Army (New York, 1940), pp. 77ff.;Google ScholarRitter, Gerhard, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk: Das Problem des “Militarismus” in Deutschland (Munich, 1954–1968), I, 124ff.;Google Scholar and Höhn, Reinhard, Verfassungskampf und Heereseid: Der Kampf des Bürgertums um das Heer (Leipzig, 1938).Google Scholar For East German approaches to the problem see Heitzer, Heinz, “Arbeiten über die Geschichte der Befreiungskrieg,” Historische Forschungen in der DDR, Sonderheft, Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, VIII (1960);Google ScholarKahn, S. B., “Die Befreiungskrieg in der deutschen historischen Literatur,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, III (1955), 358–73;Google Scholar and Dorpalen, Andreas, “The German Struggle against Napoleon: The East German View,” Journal of Modern History, XLI (1969), 485–516.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2. Cf. the trenchant discussion of this problem in Paret, Peter, “Hans Delbrück on Military Critics and Military Historians,” Military Affairs, XXX (1966), 148–52, especially 148–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3. The most comprehensive treatment of this subject remains the work of Lehmann, Max, particularly Scharnhorst, II (Leipzig, 1887);Google ScholarKnesebeck und Schön (Leipzig, 1875);Google Scholar and three articles: “Preussen und die allgemeine Wehrpflicht im Jahre 1809,” Historische Zeitshrift, LXI (1886), 97–109;Google Scholar“Preussen und die allgemeine Wehrpflicht im Jahre 1810,” Historische Zeitschrift, LXIX (1892), 431–61;Google Scholar and “Zur Geschichte der preussischen Heeresreform von 1808,” Historische Zeitschrift, CXVI (1922), 254–89.Google Scholar Contemporary interpretations include Shanahan, W. O., Prussian Military Reforms, 1786–1813 (New York, 1945);Google ScholarParet, Peter, Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform (Priceton, 1966);Google ScholarHöhn, Reinhard, Revolution—Heer—Kriegsbild (Darmstadt, 1944), pp. 590ff.;Google Scholar and Wohlfeil, Rainer, Vomstehenden Heer des Absolutismus zur Allgemeinen Wehrpflicht (1789–1814), Vol. IIGoogle Scholar of Handbuch zur deutschen Militärgeschichte, 1648–1939, ed. Meier-Welcker, Hans (Frankfurt a.M., 1964), pp. 102ff.Google Scholar

4. “Vorläufiger Entwurf der Verfassung der Reserve-Armee,” in Vaupel, R., ed., Die Reorganisation des Preussischen Staates unter Stein und Hardenberg, Part II, Das Preussische Heer vom Tilsiter Frieden bis zur Befreiung: 1807–1814 (“Publikationen aus den Preussischen Archiven,” XCIV, Leipzig, 1938), pp. 82ff.Google Scholar (hereafter cited as Preussisches Archiv). For a more detailed presentation of the Commission's thinking, see its “Vorläufiger Entwurf zur Verfassung der Provinzial-Truppen” of Mar. 15, 1808, ibid., pp. 330ff.

5. “Circular-Verordnung an die sämbtliche Creysse und Comissarios wegen Anrichtung der Land-Militze sambt denen dazu gehörigen Puncten,” Feb. 1, 1701, in von Frauenholz, Eugen, ed., Das Heerwesen in der Zeit des Absolutismus, vol. IV of Entwicklungsgeschichte des deutschen Heerwesens (Munich, 1940), pp. 100ff.;Google Scholar “Ordre über Abschaffung der Landmilitz,” Mar. 7, 1713, ibid., p. 194.

6. Schwartz, F., Organisation und Verpflegung der Preussischen Landmilizen in siebenjährigen Kriege (Leipzig, 1888);Google ScholarJany, Curt, Geschichte der königlich-preussischen Armee bis zum Jahre 1807 (2nd rev. ed., Osnabrück, 1967), II, 465ff.Google Scholar The units raised are listed in Gieraths, Gunther, Die Kampfhandlungen der Brandenburgisch-preussischen Armee 1626–1807 (Berlin, 1964), pp. 340ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7. de Courbière, R. de l'Homme, Geschichte der Brandenburgisch-Preussischen Heeresverfassung (Berlin, 1852), pp. 139ff.;Google ScholarZiekursch, J., “Die Preussischen Landreservebatailone 1805/06—eine Reform vor der Reform?” Historische Zeitschrift, CIII (1909), 85–89;Google Scholar Wohlfeil, Vom stehenden Heer, pp. 98–99.

8. von Vincke, Georg to Stein, , Sept. 30, 1808,Google Scholar in Preussisches Archive, XCIV, 598ff.;Google Scholar Götzen's letter of Dec. 1, 1808, to Gneisenau, on opposition to universal service in Silesia, ibid., p. 749; and the petition submitted to the King by thirteen nobles of Kreis Mohrungen on Nov. 17, 1808, ibid., pp. 748–49.

9. Paret, Yorck, pp. 134–35. Shanahan, p. 123, claims that Frederick William had decided against organizing a militia even before the end of 1807. However, the “Kriegs-Artikel für die Unter-Officiere und gemeinen Soldaten,” issued on Aug. 3, 1808, declared that every Prussian subject was obliged to perform military service “under conditions yet to be determined.” von Frauenholz, E., Das Heerwesen des XIX. Jahrhunderts, vol. V of Entwicklungsgeschichte des Deutschen Heerwesens (Munich, 1941), p. 101.Google Scholar

10. For details of the debate see Shanahan, pp. 152ff; Paret, Yorck, p. 134; and Lehmann, , Scharnhorst, II, 90–91; “Zur Geschichte der preussischen Heeresreform,” pp. 437ff.; and the documents in “Preussen und die Allgemeine Wehrpflicht im Jahre 1810.”Google Scholar

11. Lionnet, Albert, Die Erhebungspläne preussischer Patrioten Ende 1806 und Frühjahr 1807 (Berlin, 1914);Google Scholarvon Wiese, H. und Kaiserwaldau, , Friedrich Wilhelm Graf v. Götzen: Schlesiens Held in der Franzosenzeit, 1806 bis 1807 (Berlin, 1902).Google Scholar For the Spanish influence see Wohlfeil, Rainer, Spanien und die deutsche Erhebung 1808–1814 (Wiesbaden, 1965);Google Scholar and Rassow, P., “Die Wirkung de Erhebung Spaniens auf die deutshce Erhebung gegen Napoleon I,” Historische Zeitschrift, CLXVIII (1943), 310–25. One of Scharnhorst's sons served in Spain with the King' German Legion.Google Scholar

12. Thimme, Friedrich, “Zu den Erhebungsplänen der preussischen Patrioten im Sommer 1808: Ungedrückte Denkschriften Gneisenau's und Scharnhorst's,” Historische Zeitschrift, LXXXVI (1901), 78–111;Google Scholarvon Clausewitz, Carl, “Über die künftigen Kriegs-Operationen Preussens gegen Frankreich,” Hahlweg, Werner, ed., Carl von Clausewitz. Schriften—Aufsätze—Studien—Briefe, Dokumente aus dem Clausewtiz- Scharnhorst- und Gneisenau-Nachlass sowie aus öffentlichen und privaten Sammlungen (Göttingen, 1966), pp. 66ff.;Google Scholar and Stein's memoranda of Aug. 11, Aug. 14, and Aug. 15, 1808, in Hubatsch, Walther, ed., Freiherr vom Stein: Briefe und amtliche Schtiften (Stuttgart, 1957ff.), II, 2, 808ff., 817f.Google Scholar See also Ritter, Gerhard, Stein: Eine politische Biographie (Stuttgart, 1931), II, 43ff.;Google ScholarLehmann, Max, Freiherr vom Stein (Leipzig, 1902–1905), II, 550ff.;Google ScholarHausherr, H., Erfüllung und Befreiung: Der Kampf um die Durchführung des Tilsiter Friedens 1807–1808 (Hamburg, 1935).Google Scholar

13. See particularly Gneisenau's eloquent memorandum in the subject of a popular uprising in Pertz, G. H. and Delbrück, Hans, Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen Neithardt von Gneisenau (Berlin, 1864–1880), II, 112ff.Google Scholar (hereafter cited as Pertz), and Clausewitz's letters to Gneisenau between Aug. 18 and Sept. 18, 1811, in Hahlweg, Clausewitz, pp. 651–68. The changing mood of the Prussian army is dicussed in Godefroy Cavaignac, La formation de la prusse contemporaine, II (Paris, 1898), 133ff.;Google Scholar and Craig, pp. 56ff.

14. Paret, Yorck, pp. 156–57. The text of the report is in Droysen, J. G., Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen York von Wartenburg, I (Berlin, 1851), 520–27.Google Scholar

15. Cf. Herrmann, Alfred, “Friedrich Wilhelm III. und sein Anteil an der Heeresreform bis 1813,” Historische Vierteljahrsschift, XI (1908), 484–516;Google ScholarHintze, Otto, Die Hohenzollern und ihr Werk (Berlin, 1915), pp. 459ff.Google ScholarThimme, Friedrich, “König Friedrich Wilhelm III.: Sein Anteil an der Konvention von Tauroggen und an der Reform von 1807–1812,” Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte, XVIII (1905), 1–59, is an overdone attempt to present the King as a forceful, intelligent monarch.Google Scholar

16. Cf. Seyffarth, Ursula, Zur Aussenpolitik des Staatskanzlers Freiherrn von Hardenberg 1810–1812 (Würzburg, 1939);Google ScholarHausherr, Hans, “Stein und Hardenberg,” Historische Zeitschrift, CXC (1960), 267–89,Google Scholar and Die Stunde Hardenbergs (Hamburg, 1943);Google Scholar and Blumenthal, Maximilian, Der pruessische Landsturm von 1813 (Berlin, 1900), pp. 96ff.Google Scholar

17. For Prussian policy in 1809 see Bailleu, Pual, “Zur Geschichte des Jahres 1809,” Historische Zeitschrift, LXXXIV (1900), 451–59;Google ScholarGarde, Udo, Preussens Stellung zur Kriegsfrage im Jahre 1809 (Hannover, 1897);Google ScholarDuncker, Maximilian W., “Friedrich Wilhelm im 1809,” Abhandlungen aus der neueren Geschichte (Leipzig, 1887).Google Scholar For Austria's role in the war see Kraehe, Enno E., Metternich's Germen Policy, I, The Contest with Napoleon, 1799–1814 (Princeton, 1963), pp. 58ff.;Google ScholarRössler, Helmut, Oesterreichs Kampf um Deutschlands Befreiung: Die deutsche Politik der nationalen Führer Oesterreichs, 1805–1815. I (Hamburg, 1940);Google Scholar and the six-volume Austrian general staff history, Krieg 1809 (Vienna, 1907–1910).Google Scholar

18. Pertz, I, 492ff.; Lehmann, , Scharnhorst, II, 247ff.;Google ScholarDoebner, R., “Zu Gneisenaus Plan einer preussischen Legion,” Forschungen zur Deutschen Geschichte, XXV (1885), 333ff.,Google Scholar and Clausewitz's memorandum on the same subject in Hahlweg, Clausewitz, pp. 671ff.; Einslberger, A., Die Deutschen Freikorps in Böhmen (Amsterdam, Berlin, Vienna, 1942).Google Scholar For Stein's plans see Stein to Gentz, July 29, 1809; Stein to the Prince of Orange, Aug. 20 and 23, 1809, in Stein: Briefe und amtliche Schriften, III, 161ff., 171ff.

19. East German historians have shown that popular response to the war was wide-spread, and blame cautious governments for the failure of the risings in North Germany. They ignore or dismiss the question of the value of peasant levies against Napoleon's veterans. Cf. particularly Heitzer, Heinz, Insurrectionen zwischen Weser und Elbe: Volksbewegungen gegen die französische Fremdherrschaft im Königreich Westfalen (1806–1813) (Berlin, 1959);Google ScholarStreisand, Joachim, Deutschland von 1789 bis 1815 (Von der Französischen Revolution bis zu den Befreiungskriegen und dem Wiener Kongress) (Berlin, 1961), pp. 174ff.,Google Scholarpassim; and the analysis in Dorpalen, pp. 422ff.

20. For the nature and purpose of the Krümper system see Shanahan, pp. 159ff., passim; Wohlfeil, Vom stehenden Heer, pp. 122–23.

21. For the background of the East Prussian Landwehr see Stein to Schön, Dec. 12, 1812, in Stein: Briefe und amtliche Schriften, III, 834–35;Google Scholar Stein to Auerswald, Jan. 23, 1813, ibid., IV, 17; the general accounts in Ritter, Stein, II, 163ff., and Lehmann, Stein, III, 215ff.; and Hubatsch, Walther, “Stein und die ostpreussischen Liberalen,” in Conrad, Hermann, Freiherr vom Stein als Staatsmann im Übergang von Absolutismus zur Verfassungsstaat (Cologne-Braunsfeld, 1958), pp. 29–47.Google Scholar For an East German interpretation, cf. Stultz, Percy, Fremdherrschaft und Befreiungskampf: Die preussische Kabinettspoliltik und die Rolle der Volksmassen in den Jahren 1811 bis 1813 (Berlin, 1960), pp. 211ff.Google Scholar

22. “Verordnung über die Organisation der Landwehr,” Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlichen Preussischen Staaten (Berlin, 1813), pp. 36–37, 109–19.Google Scholar

23. The limited extent of the Volkserhebung is generally accepted by western historians. Cf., for example, Krieger, Leonard, The German Idea of Freedom (Boston, 1957), pp. 175–76;Google Scholar Wohlfeil, Vom stehenden Heer, p. 210; and Ritter, Gerhard, “Das Problem der ‘Militartismus’ in Deutschaland,” Historische Zeitschrift, CLXXVII (1954), 21–48,Google Scholar and Staatskunst, I 100ff. Ritter and Wohlfeil accept the conclusions of Ritter's student, Meurer, Karl Ulrich, “Die Rolle nationaler Leidenschaft der Massen in der Erhebung von 1813 gegen Napoleon” (unpub, diss., Freiburg, 1953).Google Scholar East German historians, on the other hand, have presented archival evidence suggesting that popular movements had a wider scope than previously conceded. See particularly scheel, Heinrich, “Zur Problematik des deutschen Befreiungkriegs 1813,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, XI (1963), 1277–98,Google Scholar and “Die nationale Befreiungsbewegung,” in Straube, Fritz, ed., Das Jahr 1813; Studien zur Geschichte und Wirkung der Befreiungskriege (Berlin, 1963), pp. 9–10;Google Scholar and Bock, Helmut, “1789 und 1813. Das Zeitalter der Französischen Revolution in der reaktionären deustchen Geschichtsschreibung,” Zeitschrift für Gerschichtswissenschaft, XII (1964), 1358–83.Google Scholar The proportion of actual volunteers for military service, however, was low. Cavaignac, II, 458, cites a table compiled from official figures by Gurlt, E., Zeitscheift für preussische Geshichte und Landeskunde, IX (1872), which gives a total of 18, 038 volunteers for line and Landwehr between 1813 and 1815, excluding the Volunteer Rifle Detachments. Over 300,000 men passed through the ranks of the Prussian army in the same period.Google Scholar

24. The above account of the organization and training of the Landwehr is based on “Errichtung der Landwehr und des Landsturms in Ostpreussen, Westpreussen, am rechten Weichselufer und Litthauen im Jahre 1813,” Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt, 1845; “Geschichte der Organisation der Landwehr in der Kurmark nebst den drei vorpommerschen Kreizen und in der Neumark im Jahre 1813,” Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt, 1845; “Geschichte der Organisation der Landwehr in Pommern und Westpreussen im Jahre 1813,” Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt, 1858. One of the best of the many narrative histories of the Prussian Landwehr written during the first half of the nineteenth century is Bräuner, P., Geschichte der preussischen Landwehr (Berlin, 1863);Google Scholar other representative accounts are Lange, E., Geschichte der preussischen Landwehr seit Entstehung derselben bis zum Jahre 1856 (Berlin, 1857),Google Scholar and Closen, Karl, Die preussische Landwehr (Munich, 1855).Google Scholarvon Prittwitz, C. L. W., Beiträge zur Geschichte des Jahres 1813, von einem höheren Offizier der preussischen Armee, I (Berlin, 1843),Google Scholar offers a slightly different interpretation. Cf. also Cavaignac, II, 454ff., and Shanahan, pp. 201ff., passim, for briefer narratives.

25. A Cabinet Order of June 8, 1813, authorized local commanders to form the best men of each Landwehr battalion into composite Feldbataillone, but it was not widely followed for fear that severing the men's ties with their local units would damage their morale. Cf. von Boyen, H., Erinnerungen aus dem Leben des General-Feldmarschalls Hermann von Boyen, ed. Nippold, F. (Leipzig, 1889–1890), III, 419;Google ScholarMeinecke, Friedrich, Das Leben des Generalfeldmarschalls Hermann von Boyen (Stuttgart, 1896–1899), I, 286–87;Google Scholar Pertz, III, 14ff.

26. The Landwehr-Verordnung expressed the King's confidence that Landwehr officers would be chosen from those best qualified through education, character, and the confidence of their fellow citizens. Höhn, Revolution—Heer—Kriegsbild, p. 617. Cavaignac, II, 475–76, describes the Landwehr as embodying the “quasi-feudal social order of peace-time.”

27. Cf. von Treitschke, Heinrich, Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert (Leipzig, 1894), I, 432ff.;Google ScholarKohm, Hans, Prelude to Nation-States: The French and German Experience, 1789–1815 (New York, 1967), pp. 279ff.;Google ScholarKressmann, Eckhart, Die Befreiungskrieg in Augenzeugenberichten (Düsseldorf, 1966), passim.Google Scholar

28. von Fransecky, H., “Die Formation der freiwilligen Jägerdetachements bei der preussischen Armee in Jahre 1813,” Beihefte zum Militär-Wochenblatt, 1845 and 1847;Google Scholar and Ulmann, H., “Die Detachements der freiwilligen Jäger in den Befreiungskriegen,” Historische Vierteljahrsschrift, X (1907), 483–505.Google Scholar See also Lehmann, , Scharnhorst, II, 533;Google Scholar Höhn, Revolution—Heer—Kriegsbild, pp. 609ff.

29. Das Preussische Heer der Befreiungskrieg, pub. by Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung II, Grossen Generalstab (Berlin, 1912–1914), II, 143ff.;Google Scholar Ulmann, p. 493; Droysen, York, II, 54–55.

30. The appellation is borrowed from Schiller's Wallensteins Lager, and refers to a regiment described as consisting of “Gevatter Schneider und Handschuhmacher.” [Mebes], “Die Tiefenbächerei der Landwehr,” Jahrbücher fur die Deutsche Armee und Marine, LX cited in Cavaignac, II, 470.

31. Das Preussische Heer der Befreiungskrieg, III, 60–61.

32. Cf. Cavaignac, II, 412ff.; Shanahan, pp. 199ff, passim; Prittwitz, I, passim, especially Beilage VIII; and Friedrich, R., Geschichte des Herbstfeldzuges 1813 (Berlin, 1903–1906), I, 40.Google Scholar Many officers of the reserve battalions held commands higher than their rank normally warranted. Cf. Prittwitz, I, 60, 258, 309.

33. For the composition of the Landwehr officer corps see von Freytag-Loringhoven, F., “Das Preussische Offizierkorps der Befreiungskrieg,” Viertaljahrshefte für Truppenführung und Heereskunde, X (1913), 76;Google Scholar Bräuner, pp. 153ff.; Cavaignac, II, 471ff.; and for the Silesian Landwehr, Pertz, III, 55ff. Bräuner, p. 186, states that of a total of 237 senior officers in the Landwehr, 90% had seen service and only four were nonnoble. The aristocracy, at first disdainful of the Landweher, later supplied a large number of cavalry subalterns; the junior officers of the infantry were almost exclusively bourgeois.

34. Pertz, III, 53ff.; Meinecke, Boyen, II, 282ff.; Droysen, York, II, 107–108.

35. von Holleben, A. and von Caemmerer, R., Geschichte des Frühjahrsfeldzuges 1813 und seiner Vorgeschichte (Berlin, 1904–1909), II, 132;Google Scholar Shanahan, p. 212.

36. Jany, Curt, Geschichte der königlich-preussischen Armee, IV: Die königlich-preussische Armee und das deutsche Reichsheer 1807 bis 1914 (2nd rev. ed., Osnabrück, 1967), pp. 93–94;Google Scholar Shanahan, pp. 211–12, 218–19. Friedrich, I, 46–47, gives the stength of the Landwehr as 149 battalions and 116 squadrons.

37. Chareton, V., Comment la Prusse a préparé sa revanche 1806–1813 (Paris 1903), pp. 168ff.;Google Scholar Craig, p. 61; Shanahan, pp. 219–20.

38. Boyen, Erinnerungen, III, 93.

39. Yorck's I Corps had 24 Landwehr battalions out of a total of 45, Kleist's II Corps 16 out of 41, Bülow's III Corps 12 out of 41. Yorck's crops, to make up for its higher proportion of Landwehr, was given four of the army's six elite grenadier battalions. See Friedrich, I, Anlagen I, II, IV (pp. 569–70, 576–77, 585–86, 590), and Droysen, York, II, III.

40. Höhn, Verfassungskampf und Heereseid, passim; Meinecke, Friedrich, “Boyen und Roon: Landwehr und Landsturm seit 1814,” Preussen und Deutschland im 19. und 20. Jahrhuandert (Munich and Berlin, 1918),Google Scholar and Boyen, I, 375–413; Ritter, Staatskunst, I, ch. V, passim; Rudolf, von Gneist, Die Militärvorlage von 1892 und der preussischen Verfassungskonflikt von 1862–1866 (Berlin, 1893).Google Scholar

41. Meinecke, Boyen, I, 314ff. For more detailed accounts of the Landwehr's performance with the Nordarmee see Friedrich, I, 384ff., and II. 124ff., 160ff.

42. “Bericht des Oberst von Steinmnetz an General Gneisenau über den Rückmarsch der I. Brigade von Nostitz über Reichenbach…,” in Pertz, III, 703ff.

43. The above analysis is based on Fredrich, I, 286–87, II, 45–46, 259–60; and von Janson, A., Geschichte des Feldzuges 1814 in Frankreich (Berlin, 1903–1905), I, 15–16, and Anlage X, “Die neue Formation der Schlesischen Armee bei der 2. Vereinigung mit der Haupt-Armee.”Google Scholar

44. Sautermeister, R., Die taktische Reform der preussischen Armme nach 1806 (Tübingen, 1935), pp. 86–87.Google Scholar

45. The quotation is from a memorandum of June 24, 1813, in Boyen, Erinnerungen, III, 371. The Shortage of firearms was so great that Scharnhorst ordered the front rank of all Landwehr battalions to be armed with pikes, which remained part of the equipment of some units until the autumn of 1813. Lehmann, Scharnhorst, II, 541.

46. This is accepted even by general staff historians. Cf., for example, von Freytag Loringhoven, J., “Wert und Bedeutung des Drills für die Ausbildung unserer Infanterie einst und jetzt,” Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt, 1904; and Friedrich, I, 42.Google Scholar

47. Paret, Yorck, p. 208.

48. Cf. the enthusiastic account of the battle of Gross-Görschen by a future Chief of Staff of the Prussian army in von Müffling, Friedrich, Passages from My Life, Together with Memoirs of the Campaign of 1813 and 1814, ed. Col. Yorke, Philip (22nd rev. ed., London, 1853), pp. 34–35.Google Scholar

49. Huber, Ernst, Heer und Staat in der deutschen Geschichte (Hamburg, 1933), pp. 139–40, accurately describes the ideal Prussian soldier as a self-confident, independent member of a disciplined Wehrgemeinschaft, a force different in structure and substance both from the dynastic armies of the eighteenth century and the revolutionary citizens of 1793.Google Scholar

50. Lack of time for training, a shortage of qualified leaders, and numerous consolidations kept the Landwehr from forming separate fusilier battalions during the campaign of 1813–1814. As late as June 1815 some Landwehr regiments had no fusiliers. von Conrady, E., Leben und Wirken des Generals Carl von Grolman (Berlin, 1894–1896), II, 290–91.Google Scholar

51. E.g., the Landwehr of Steinmetz's brigade at Wartenburg and the 7th Landwehr of Brigade Klüx in front of Wachau on October 16. Droysen, York, II, 181ff.; Troschl, Colonel, “Das Korps Yorck bei Wartenburg und Möckern,” Vierteljahrshefte für Truppenführung und Heereskunde, x (1913), 748ff.;Google Scholar Friedrich, II, 287ff.; III, 33ff.

52. “Bericht des Vorhut des I. Korps unter Major v. Klüx über ihren Anteil in der Schlacht bei Möckern”; “Bericht der I. preussischen Brigade über ihren Anteil an der Schlacht bei Möckern”; “Bericht der 10. preussischen Brigade (I. Korps) über ihren Anteil an den Kämpfen des 16. bis 18. Oktober”; “Bericht der 12. preussischen Brigade (II. Korps) über ihren Anteil an der Schlacht von 16. Oktober,” printed, with some editing, in von Pflugk-Harttung, J., Leipzig 1813 (Gotha, 1913), pp. 307ff., 355ff.Google Scholar

53. The best-known of these revolves around the question of which battalion was the first through the Grimmaisches Tor into Leipzig—the Fusiliers of the 2nd Reserve Regiment or the 3rd Battalion of the 3rd East Prussian Landwehr Regiment. This incident is the source of the anecdote, most recently repeated in Ropp, Theodore, War in the Modern World (2nd rev. ed., New York, 1962), p. 138, of a Landwehr battalion led by a Prussian civil servant carrying a position the regulars refused to assault.Google Scholar

54. “Gesetz über die Verpflichtung zum Kriegsdient,” September 3, 1814, in Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlichen Preussischen Staaten (Berlin, 1814), pp. 79–82.Google Scholar For Boyen's concept of the Landwehr see Meinecke, Boyen, I, 376ff., and II, 164ff.; and the general accounts in Ritter, Staatskunst, I, 135ff., and Huber, Heer und Staat, pp. 143ff.

55. Meinecke, Boyen, II, 167ff.

56. The Russian active army, for example, included over 700 battalions; both the French and Austrian had over 250. Even the British regular army was stabilized at around 100 battalions in the postwar period.

57. Meinecke, Boyen, II, 219.

58. The youth of the Prussian army which fought the Waterloo campaign was considered as serious a handicap as its inexperience. Müffling, pp. 216–17; Pertz, IV, 381ff.

59. The relationship of the Landwehr to society was delineated in the Landwehrordnung of Nov. 21, 1815, in Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlichen Preussischen Staaten (Berlin, 1816), pp. 79–91;Google Scholar and Lange, pp. 252–65. Cf. the analysis in Meinecke, Boyen, II, 174ff. and the summary in Das Preussische Heer der Befreiungskrieg, III, 196ff.

60. A good example is Major Friccius, the civil servant who commanded a Landwehr battalion during the war and later became one of the Landwehr's foremost propagandists. See particularly his Geschichte des Krieges in den Jahren 1813 und 1814. Mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Ostpreussen und das Königsbergsche Landwehrbataillon (Altenburg, 1843). A general account of the emergence of the liberal ideal of the Landwehr is Höhn, Verfassungskampf und Heereseid, pp. 16ff.Google Scholar

61. Marshal Blücher's toast on the occasion of his receiving an honorary degree from the University of Berlin in 1814. von Ense, K. A. Varnhagen, Blücher (rev. ed., Berlin, 1933), p. 274.Google Scholar

62. von Pelet-Narbonne, C. F. G., Geschichte der brandenburg-preussischen Reiterei, II (Berlin, 1905), passim;Google Scholar and the detailed account by a Landwehr squadron commander in Wider Napoleon: Ein deutsches Reiterleben 1806–1815, II, ed. Kircheisen, F. M. (Stuttgart, n.d.), 182ff.Google Scholar

63. For the projected role of the Landwehr cavalry see Pelet-Narbonne, pp. 183–84; von Colomb, E., Beiträge zur Geschichte der Preussischen Kavallerie seit 1808 (Berlin, 1880), pp. 50ff.;Google ScholarKaehler, Lt. Col., Die Preussische Reiterei von 1806 bis 1876 in ihrer inneren Entwickelung (Berlin, 1876), p. 15 and “Die preussische Landwehrkavallerie,” Allgemeine Militär-Zeitung, Nov. 21, 1827.Google Scholar

64. Meinecke, Boyen, II, 246.

65. These reports are summarized ibid., pp. 218, 237.

66. Among many analyses of the conservative reaction see Ritter, Staatskunst, I, 125ff., passim; Meinecke, Boyen, II, 194ff., passim; Simon, pp. 185ff., passim; and Schnabel, Franz, Deutsche Geschichte im 19. Jahrhundert, II (Freiburg, 1933), 316ff.Google Scholar Cf. also Mürmann, A., Die öffentliche Meinung über das preussische Wehrgesetz von 1814 während der Jahre 1814–1819 (“Abhandlungen zur mittleren und neueren Geschichte,” XIX, Berlin, 1910), passim.Google Scholar

67. Meinecke, Boyen, II, 299ff.; Ritter, Staatskunst, I, 137. This fact has inspired an implied defense of Boyen's budgets on ideological grounds in Craig, p. 71, and Simon, pp. 192–93.

68. E.g., the transfer in 1816 of the Gendarmerie to the civil budget, and the Finance Ministry's assumption in 1817 of the responsibility for purchasing bread and forage. The problem of determining the actual share of the budget devoted to military expenditures is further complicated by the inaccuracy of Prussian budgets in the first half of the nineteenth century. Neither borrowed money nor the income from some government-owned assets was included in published budgets, which dealt with expected current revenues. Further research in this area is badly needed, but existing statistical evidence appears to indicate that the army's share of the budget was significantly reduced only after 1819. Compare Meinecke, Boyen, II, 301ff.; Jany, IV, 149; and Tilly, Richard, “The Political Economy of Public Finance and the Industrialization of Prussia, 1815–1866,” Journal of Economic History, XXVI (1966), 490–92. Events followed a similar pattern in Austria, whose military budget in 1817 absorbed over half the state's income, but less than a fourth by 1830.Google ScholarRegele, Oskar, Feldmarschall Radetzky (Vienna, 1957), pp. 217–18.Google Scholar

69. As in Craig, p. 74. The maneuvers of the first-line Landwehr were reduced from four to two weeks; the eight-day drill period scheduled for the second line was cancelled.

70. Meinecke, Boyen, II, 223–24, 307.

71. This is a projection of the standards of the German army at the turn of the century, which excluded 40% of each annual contingent. These standards were extremely, perhaps artificially, high because the imbalance between budget and population made it impossible to conscript more than half of each class. For this reason the actual numbers fit for service after 1815 were probably considerably greater. Jany, IV, 328; Golovine, N. N., The Russian Army in the World War (New Haven, 1931), pp. 21–23.Google Scholar

72. For Boyen's views on the need for long-service soldiers and his adamant hostility to the idea of converting the standing army into a training cadre see Meinecke, Boyen, II, 125ff., 227ff., 302ff.

73. A battalion at war strength included only a thousand men, and since Boyen intended to form three field battalions from four peacetime battalions, he reasoned that the unfit and untrained could easily be left at the depots to complete their instruction. Ibid., pp. 219ff.

74. The mobilization of 1830 established that only 45% of the Landwehr had served in the active army. Eleven per cent had no military training at all; the rest had had anywhere from six weeks' to six months' service. Militärische Schriften weiland Kaiser Wilhelms des Grossen Majestäts, ed. Preuss, Kgl.. Kriegsministerium (2 vols. in I, Berlin, 1887), I, 45.Google Scholar See also Meinecke, Boyen, II, 220; Jany, IV, 251.

75. Meinecke, Boyen, II, 225ff.

76. Ibid., p. 224. For the efforts at overcoming the problem of training the Landwehr recruits of the Guard, see von der Wülbe, F., Das Garde-Fusilier-Regiment (Berlin, 1876), pp. 1ff., passim.Google Scholar

77. Meinecke, Boyen, II, 198ff., 240, 266; Das Preussische Heer der Befreiungskrieg, III, 206–207.

78. Clausewitz to Gneisenau, Sept. 26, 1817, in Pertz, V, 246–49; Meinecke, Boyen, II, 263ff. The Breslau outbreaks were blamed on “outside agitators,” foreigners, and Frenchmen—a surprisingly contemporary excuse.

79. For the haphazard nature of the conscription in the postwar years see Clausewitz to Gneisenau, Oct. 12, Nov. 14, and Dec. 27, 1816, Mar. 18 and Apr. 28, 1817, in Pertz, v, 153, 162ff., 178ff., 197ff., and 213ff. For a critical analysis of the shortcomings of Boyen's reforms see the memorandum of 1819 comparing the Prussian military system with that of Württemberg issued by the Württemberg Generalquartiermeisterstab, in the Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, E271–275, F96, Akten des Kriegsministeriums; and the comment in Sauer, Paul, “Das württembergischen Heer in der Zeit des deutschen Bundes” (unpub. diss., Freiburg, 1956), pp. 56ff.Google Scholar

80. The question of Sunday drills and the Landwehr's ambiguous legal position is discussed in Meinecke, Boyen, II, 244ff.

81. Ibid., pp. 201ff.; Das Preussische Heer der Befreiungskrieg, III, 200ff. Around 1300 Landwehr officers were given regular commissions after 1815. In 1817 the officer corps of the active army consisted of 4,138 nobles and 3,367 non-nobles; by 1819 the ratio was 3,605 to 3,053—a bare majority for the aristocracy. Demeter, Karl, Das Deutsche Offizierkorps in Gesellschaft und Staat, 1650–1945 (2nd rev. ed., Frankfurt a.M., 1962), pp. 11–12.Google Scholar

82. Before 1819, at least, this neglect of the volunteers seems to have been motivated more by disinterest than caste hostility. Meinecke, “Boyen und Roon,” pp. 19–20, and Boyen, II, 205ff.; Sossidi, Eleftherios, Die staatsrechtliche Stellung des Offiziers im absoluten Staat und ihre Abw andlungen im neunzehnten Jahrhundert (Berlin, 1939), pp. 71ff.Google Scholar

83. Cf. the references cited above in n. I.

84. For Boyen's constitutional theories see Meinecke, Boyen, II, 337ff., passim. His relationship to Humboldt is discussed ibid., pp. 371ff., and Kaehler, S. A., Wilhelm von Humboldt und der Staat (Munich, 1927), pp. 398ff., passim.Google Scholar

85. Cf. the ministers' memoranda of July 16 and 30 and Aug. 26, 1819, in Gebhardt, Bruno, Wilhelm von Humboldt als Staatsmann, II (Stuttgart, 1899), 371ff., 396ff.Google Scholar

86. Meinecke, Boyen, II, 374ff.

87. For the background of the constitutional crisis and the conflict between Humboldt and Hardenberg see Simon, pp. 197ff.; Kaehler, Humboldt, pp. 395ff.; Haake, Paul, “König Friedrich Wilhelm III., Hardenberg und die preussische Verfassungsfrage,” Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte, XXXII (1920), 109–80;Google ScholarHuber, E. R., Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789, I, Reform und Restauration 1789 bis 1830 (Stuttgart, 1957).Google Scholar

88. Clausewitz to Groeben, Dec. 26, 1819, in Kessel, Eberhard, “Zu Boyens Entlassung,” Historische Zeitschrift, CLXXV (1953), 53;Google Scholar Haake, pp. 535ff.; Meinecke, Boyen, II, 381; Craig, pp. 73ff.

89. Conrady, III, 74.

90. Meinecke, Boyen, II, 187–88, 381–83. Boyen felt it unnecessary to inform the King of this fact until he learned of the proposed reorganization in October. This omission did not improve Boyen's relationship with Frederick William once the King learned of it.

91. The King's directive, embodied in a Cabinet Order of Dec. 22, 1819, was reprinted in the Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlichen Preussischen Staaten (Berlin, 1820), pp. 5ff.;Google Scholar and Lange, pp. 301–304.

92. Boyen to Gneisenau, Dec. 16, 1819, in Pertz, V, 398; Boyen to Gibsone, Jan. 14, 1820, ibid., p. 406; Meinecke, Boyen, II, 383ff.

93. Meinecke, Boyen, II, 174ff.

94. Ibid., pp. 143ff., 304ff.; Helfritz, Hans, Geschichte der preussischen Heeresverwaltung (Berlin, 1938), pp. 301–302.Google Scholar

95. As was to be the case after 1870. Cf. Kehr, Eckart, “Zur Genesis des kgl. preussischen Reserveoffiziers,” Die Gesellschaft, V (1928), 492–502;Google Scholar and Ritter, Staatskunst, II, 117–31.

96. Meinecke, Boyen, II, 386–89. Boyen's closest collaborator in the War Ministry, Carl von Grolman, resigned simultaneously.

97. Clausewitz to Grolman, Dec. 26, 1819, in Kessel, pp. 51ff.; Gneisenau to Groeben, Jan. I, 1820, in Pertz, V, 402ff.

98. Cf. Clausewitz to Gneisenau, Sept. 18 and Oct. 1, 1824, in Pertz, v, 50ff.; Gneisenau to Schmidt, Apr. 21, 1828, ibid., pp. 549–50; and the evaluation of the Silesian Landwehr in 1824 by a future Chief of Staff in von Ollech, Major, Carl Wilhelm Friedrich Reyher, IV (Berlin, 1879), 52–53.Google Scholar

99. For the history, structure, and role of the British militia see Fortescue, Sir John, The County Lieutenancies and the Army, 1803–1814 (London, 1909);Google Scholar and Western, J. R., The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century: The Story of a Political Issue, 1660–1820 (London and Toronto, 1965).Google Scholar The origins of the Volunteer Force are summarized in Dunlop, John K., The Development of the British Army, 1899–1914 (London, 1938), pp. 55ff.,Google Scholar and Fortescue, , History of the British Army, XIII (London, 1930), 527ff.Google Scholar A perceptive contemporary analysis is Engels, Friedrich, “The Volunteer Movement,” in Engels as Military Critic, ed. Chaloner, W. H. and Henderson, W. O. (Manchester, 1959), pp. 1–43.Google Scholar General analyses of French military policy in the period are Monteilhet, Joseph, Les Institutions militaires de la France (1814–1932) (2nd ed., Paris, 1932);Google Scholar and Girardet, Raoul, La Societé militaire dans la France contemporaine (1815–1932) (Paris, 1953).Google Scholar The Austrian Landwehr, established in 1809, was allowed to decay after 1815. It was regarded as a depot and garrison force until its abolition in 1831. Rothenberg, Gunther, “The Austrian Army in the Age of Metternich,” Journal of Modern History, XL (1968), 159.Google Scholar