1. Jeffrey Kopstein made this argument by studying the latter half of the GDR (i.e., 1970s and 1980s) but his claim holds true for the earlier period as well.Kopstein, Jeffrey, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945–89 (Chapel Hill, 1997).Google Scholar

2. Jürgen Kocka posits that mass mobilization efforts were an essential part of the regime's method of ruling. See Kocka, Jürgen, “Eine durchherrschte Gesellschaft,” in Sozialgeschichte der DDR, ed. Kaelble, Hartmut, Kocka, Jürgen and Zwahr, Hartmut (Stuttgart, 1994).Google Scholar For Communist use of campaigns in the former Soviet Union see Viola, Lynne, The Best Sons of the Fatherland (New York, 1987)Google Scholar; and Siegelbaum, Lewis, Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity in the USSR, 1935–1941 (Cambridge, 1988).Google Scholar

3. The concept of Eigen-Sinn was first developed by Alf Lüdtke and was applied to the GDR by Thomas Lindenberger. Lüdtke, Alf, Eigen-Sinn: Fabrikalltag, Arbeitererfahrungen und Politik vom Kaiserreich bis in den Faschismus (Hamburg, 1993)Google Scholar; and Lindenberger, Thomas, ed., Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in der Diktatur (Cologne, 1999).Google Scholar

4. This methodology attempts to move beyond the concept of resistance, which often explicitly or implicitly represents a dichotomy between populace and government that on the local level did not always exist. For a more in-depth analysis of this trend see Ross, Corey, The East German Dictatorship (London, 2002), 44–68.Google Scholar

5. Here I am following James Scott's definition of high modernism as a “sweeping vision of how the benefits of technical and scientific progress might be applied to all aspects of human activity.” It is a sort of “supersized” modernism that posits that humanity can order both nature and society. For more on high modernism, which appealed to individuals of various political persuasions, see Scott, James, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, 1998), 88–89.Google Scholar

6. Bauerkämper, Arnd, “Neue und traditionelle Führungsgruppen auf dem Lande,” in Berliner Debatte 4, no. 5 (1995): 82.Google Scholar

7. For more on the disputes within the party leadership, see Grieder, Peter, The East German Leadership 1946–73: Crisis and Conflict (Manchester, 1999).Google Scholar

8. Bericht über die Entwicklung der Arbeitskräfte in der Landwirtschaft, Bundesarchiv Berlin (Barch) DQ-2 852, pages 1–2 of the report.

9. Many of those who left were so-called new peasants, who had little experience farming before they received their plot through the Land Reform. For more on the difficulties of the new peasants see Bauerkämper, Arnd, “Die Neubauern in der SBZ/DDR 1945–52,” in, Die Grenzen der Diktatur, ed. Bessel, Richard and Jessen, Ralph (Göttingen, 1996), 108–36.Google Scholar About 14,000 peasants left the GDR in 1952, leaving 13 percent of the cultivated land abandoned and creating a food crisis in the GDR. See Baring, Arnulf, Uprising in East Germany: June 17, 1953 (Ithaca, 1972), 14.Google Scholar In 1953 almost 12 percent of all who fled the GDR were peasants. Because only about 60 percent of those who fled were working in the GDR (the rest were retirees, children, students etc.) the effect is greater than first appears. See Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen, Die Flucht aus der Sowjetzone und die Sperrmassnahmen des kommunistischen Regimes vom 13.August 1961 in Berlin (Berlin, 1961), 16–17.Google Scholar

10. For more on the food crisis see Barthel, Horst, “Die Versorgungskrise: Bevölkerungsversorgung und Systemstabilisierung im Umfeld des 17. Juni 1953,” in Czerny, Jochen, Brüche, Krisen und Wendepunkte (Leipzig, 1990), 110–16Google Scholar; and Pence, Katherine, “You as a Woman will Understand: Consumption, Gender and the Relationship between State and Citizenry in the GDR Crisis of 17 June 1953,” in German History 19, no. 2 (2001): 218–52, especially 234–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

11. For Schäfer's speech see Bundesarchiv/Stiftung und Archiv für Partei und Massenorganisationen (SAPMO-Barch) DY 30 2/1 108,112–67. The published record of his speech is in, Schäfer, Albert, Die Arbeit auf dem Lande (Berlin, 1953).Google Scholar

12. Schäfer, Die Arbeit, 40–47. For examples of the failures of the collectives in the early period see the Bericht über die Unterstützung der Arbeit der örtlichen Organe der Staatsanwalt zur Bildung und Unterstützung der landwirtschaftlichen Produktionsgenossenschaften, Barch DK-1 5893, 10–20. For some of the difficulties getting the peasants in collectives to work according to work units see Osmond, Jonathan, “Kontinuität und Konflikt,” in Bessel and Jessen, Die Grenzen, 137–69.Google Scholar

13. Beschluss des Sekretariats des Zentralkomitees über die Delegierung von Arbeitern auf das Land zur unmittelbaren Hilfe bei der sozialistischen Umgestaltung des Dorfes, 18 April 1953, SAPMO-Barch DY 30 IV 2/5 2,133. For a more general party Statement on the roles of the working class and party see Protokoll der II Parteikonferenz der SED (Berlin, 1952), 100–11Google Scholar as cited in Schäfer, , Die Arbeit, 11.Google Scholar

14. Lenin emphasized the importance of an alliance between peasants and workers and this became a mantra of East German leaders. For more on Lenin's views see Lenin, V.I. “A Draft Programme of Our Party” in Collected Works, vol. 4 (Moscow, 1960), 227–54.Google Scholar

15. For more on the 25,000ers campaign see Viola, Best Sons of the Fatherland. It should be noted that in terms of collectivization in general, the Soviet Union was clearly the model but in regard to IaL no evidence indicates direct copying.

16. Beschluss des Sekretariats des Zentralkomitees über die Delegierung von Arbeitern auf das Land zur unmittelbaren Hilfe bei der sozialistischen Umgestaltung des Dorfes, 18 April 1953, SAPMO-Barch DY 30 IV 2/5 2,133.

17. Ibid., 134–35.

18. Officially the government could not appoint anyone LPG director as, in contrast to other socialist enterprises, LPG members owned the collective and thus elected their own leaders. Therefore, in theory, the campaign participant had to be voted into office but, as my research indicates, in practice the appointees were immediately “elected” to the job.

19. Beschluss des Sekretariats des Zentralkomitees über die Delegierung von Arbeitern auf das Land zur unmittelbaren Hilfe bei der sozialistischen Umgestaltung des Dorfes, 18 April 1953, SAPMO-Barch DY 30 IV 2/5 2, 134–35.

20. Zentralkomitee der SED-Abteilung Propaganda, ed., “Die Festigung des Bündnisses der Arbeiterklasse mit der werktätigen Bauernschaft: Die Aufgaben in der Landwirtschaft beim Aufbau des Sozialismus,” in Politische Grundschulen, vol. 7 part 2 (03 1953), 6.Google Scholar

21. For instance, according to Erich Mückenberger, who in 1953 replaced Schäfer as head of the SED Department of Agriculture, only 60 percent of collectives had a party organization by the start of 1954, Protokolle des 17.Plenum des Zentralkomitees der SED, 22–23 January 1954, SAPMO-Barch DY 30 J IV 2/1 125, see especially 93–95, 122. Some villages in District Schwerin (among others) also did not have a party organization. Ibid., 126, 45. For an example in Saxony, SED Kreisleitung (KL) Abt. Landwirtschaft Neumann, 22 February 1953, Sächsisches Staatsarchiv Leipzig (SächsStAL) Bezirksleitung (BL) SED Leipzig IV 2/7 483, 29.

22. Grossbauern is somewhat of a misnomer as these independent peasants had landholdings of 50–250 acres. However, after the large Junker estates were disbanded in the Land Reform Acts of 1945, the Grossbauern had the largest holdings and the most influence in the countryside. They also hired laborers and in this sense competed with the state enterprises. While these peasants were not as violent as the party's rhetoric portrayed them, they generally defended their right to farm independently and resisted collectivization.

23. See Ulbricht's speech at the politburo meeting, 17 March 1953, SAPMO-Barch DY 30 J IV 2/2 270, 113–16. In many cases the mayors supported those peasants who resisted collectivization. For instance in Ottendorf, Gadebusch County, the mayor was friends with those who did not want to join a collective and therefore offered no support to the LPG. In Roggendorf, Gadebusch County, the mayor backed the claim that collectives could only be formed with more than four peasants even though the law did not stipulate such a minimum. See Bericht über die Unterstützung der Arbeit der örtlichen Organe der Staatsgewalt zur Bildung und Unterstützung der LPG, Barch DK-1 5893, 12.

24. Even political leaders in the MTS did not spend enough time convincing others to join the party. Ulbricht did not mention but likely was aware of this trend. See the meeting of the secretariat of the SED district Leipzig on 7 April 1953, SächsStAL BL SED Leipzig IV 2/3/140, 150–51.

25. Scott, , Seeing Like a State, 218–22.Google Scholar

26. See protocol of the politburo meeting, 17 March 1953, SAPMO-Barch DY 30 J IV 2/2 270, 116–18.

27. Beschluss des Sekretariats des Zentralkomitees über die Delegierung von Arbeitern auf das Land zur unmittelbaren Hilfe bei der sozialistischen Umgestaltung des Dorfes, 18 April 1953, SAPMO-Barch DY 30 IV 2/5 2, 134–35.

28. For more information on the structures involved with recruiting for the campaign see Massnahmen zur Verwirklichung des Beschlusses des Zentralkomitees über die Entsendung von Arbeitern aufs Land, Mecklenburgisches Landeshauptarchiv BL SED Schwerin IV 2/3 311, 3–4; Bekanntmachung des Beschlusses über Massnahmen zur weiteren Entwicklung der Landwirtschaft, Regierungskanzlei der DDR, ed., Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1954 no. 20 (23 02 1954): 145–68Google Scholar; and Richtlinien zur Aktion Industriearbeiter aufs Land, Ministerium für Landwirtschaft, ed., Verfügungen und Mitteilungen des Minisisteriums für Land und Forstwirtschaft 1955 no. 8 (21 03 1955): 2–4.Google Scholar

29. For the declaration itself see the secretariat's meeting, 23 April 1953, SAPMO-Barch DY 30 J IV 2/3 378 or the published version, “Über die Entsendung von Arbeitern auf das Land zur unmittelbaren Hilfe bei der sozialistischen Umgestaltung des Dorfes,” in Zentralkomitee der SED, ed., Dokumente der SED vol. 4 (Berlin, 1954), 356–60.Google Scholar

30. Delegierung von Industriearbeitern as of 31 December 1959 and Jahresbericht zur Aktion Industriearbeiter aufs Land, Stadtarchiv Leipzig StVuR 12129, 20.

31. Throughout the campaign LPG members and administrative officials repeatedly criticized the selection of the workers at the factories. Examples of how factory directors avoided sending their best are found in SED KL Borna department IaL to the secretariat, 11 June 1953 SächsStAL BL SED Leipzig IV 4/02 152; and a situation report by the Rat des Bezirkes (RdB) Leipzig Abt. Landwirtschaft, 17 August 1954 SächsStAL BL SED Leipzig IV 2/7 473, 44.

32. In the samples that 1 viewed, wages for workers in heavy industry generally were twice those for LPG members on a farm. Miners also received coal as payment in kind, which in the GDR was often more valuable than money due to incessant fuel shortages. For examples of the second and third reasons see Bericht über die am 12. und 13.3.1954 stattgefundene Werbung Industriearbeiter aufs Land, and Bericht über den Brigadeeinsatz Industriearbeiter aufs Land im VEB EKO am 12 und 13.3.1954, SächsStAL BL SED Leipzig IV 4/10 228; for the fourth see interview with participant, recording, Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv Berlin, Dokument 1859 and Adolf Ebbs, (pseud), author's interview notes, Eilenburg, August 1999. For the final reason see “An Euch alle die Ihr jung seid,” Mecklenburgisches Landeshauptarchiv (MLHA) RdB Schwerin 2104.

33. These data suffer from a number of methodological problems: 1) I had no control over the selection of the documents as I needed to take those that were accessible, 2) the sample includes some people who were placed in the southern industrial areas, 3) the database likely overrepresents participants who remained for their entire term if not longer as it was common for individuals to take their personal information when they left. The records themselves are preserved only because participants potentially have access to a larger pension as workers than as LPG members now that Germany has reunified. Database compiled by author from personnel documents in Kreisarchiv Parchim, Rat des Kreises (RdK) Schwerin-Land 1879, RdK Parchim 3314–3320, 2523, 3528, 4584, 4652, and Landkreis Delitzsch-Aussenstelle Eilenburg, RdK Eilenburg 126–30, 1762–1769. Hereafter I will cite this as author's database of participants.

34. For more on the women in the GDR see Langenhahn, Dagmar and Ross, Sabine, “The Socialist Glass Ceiling, Limits to Female Careers,” in Dictatorship as Experience: Towards a Socio-Cultural History of the GDR, ed. Jarausch, Konrad (New York, 1999), 177–91.Google Scholar

35. The leadership positions that I examined were brigade leader, director, bookkeeper, and mayor. Statistics taken from author's database of participants.

36. Bauerkämper, Arnd, Ländliche Gesellschaft in der kommunistischen Diktatur (Cologne, 2002), 396.Google Scholar

37. Author's database of participants.

38. Ibid. For more on unemployment in the GDR see Hoffmann, Dierk, Aufbau und Krise der Planwirtschaft (Munich, 2002).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

39. Author's database of participants.

40. Ibid.

41. The benefits remained essentially the same for the duration of the campaign. For the clearest explanation of them see Durchführing der Aktion Industriearbeiter aufs Land, Verfügungen und Mitteilungen des Ministeriums für Land und Forstwirtschaft 1955 no. 28 (28 11 1955), 1–4.Google Scholar

42. A number of both administrators and participants complained about the information given to workers during the recruitment process. Arbeitsberatung mit den jungen Industriearbeitern, 29 May 1956 MLHA RdB Schwerin 2100, 1 and 6 of report; and Protokoll über den stattgefundenen Kreiserfahrungsaustausch, 31 May 1956 Kreisarchiv Parchim RdK Parchim 3527, 2 of protocol.

43. Married participants may be overrepresented in my sample compared to the larger groups of participants. Families tended to settle in one area and at one job longer than single individuals, who were more likely to switch jobs. Thus personnel files from married participants are more likely to appear in archival sources on the campaign. Author's database of participants.

44. For example, see the letter from the Gesellschaft für Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft to the SED KL Oschatz, 13 March 1954 SächsStAL BL SED Leipzig IV 4/10 228. Campaign administrators also complained of participants' emphasis on the financial aspects of IaL, Protokoll des zentralen Erfahrungsaustausches, 21 October 1955 SächsStAL RdB Leipzig 2615, page 3 of protocol.

45. Bernhard Biering (pseud.), author interview, tape recorded, Bernberg, November 1998.

46. Günther Döring (pseud.), author interview, tape recorded, Güstrow, November 1999.

47. Bert Apfelbaum (pseud.), author interview, tape recorded, Bernberg, November 1998.

48. Author's database of participants. My sample shows that 90 percent of the tractor drivers were age 25 or younger. As this percentage is twice the participation rate for this age group generally, it appears that driving a tractor did appeal to many young men — though no woman took this position in my sample.

49. I conducted twelve interviews with participants in and around Güstrow, Bernburg, Leipzig, and Berlin. These interviews suffer from a methodological bias in that I could only find those who chose to remain in the villages and not the many who left before or after completing their two year commitment.

50. The party leadership at the local, regional, and central levels, as well as campaign participants repeatedly criticized recruiters who misled workers, as they felt it contributed to a high turnover rate. See Erfahrungsaustausch mit Industriearbeitern aufs Land, 6 February 1957 SächsStAL BL SED Leipzig IV 4/12 134, pages 2–3 of the protocol; and Arbeitsberatung mit den jungen Industriearbeitern, 29 May 1956 MLHA, RdB Schwerin 2100, page 2 of the protocol.

51. See letter from RdK Döbeln Abteilung Arbeit und Berufsausbildung to Vorsitzender RdB Schwerin, 29 December 1955 MLHA RdB Schwerin 172, 1; Rat der Stadt Leipzig IaL office, 19 September 1955, MLHA RdB Schwerin 172, 60; and letter from Vorsitzender RdK Hagenow to Vorsitzender RdB Schwerin Bick on 29 November 1955 MLHA RdB Schwerin 172, 50–53.

52. For one example of complaints by participants that they did not receive sufficient support from the local administration, see the letter from Heinz Z. to Schlichter 10 January 1955 Kreisarchiv Leipziger Land, RdK Borna 16.

53. Arbeitsberatung und Erfahrungsaustausch mit den Patenkreisen des Bezirkes Schwerin, 22 January 1958 SächsStAL RdB Leipzig 3555, 22 (reverse side); and Protokoll über die Aussprache mit den Industriearbeitern, 24 November 1955 Landkreis Nordwestmecklenburg-Kreisarchiv Grevesmühlen RdK Gadebusch 126. For further examples of the difficulties facing the campaign participants in Mecklenburg see Protokoll über den stattgefundenen Kreiserfahrungsaustausch, 31 May 1956 Kreisarchiv Parchim RdK Parchim 3527 p. 3 of protocol; and Protokoll über das stattgefundene Forum der Industriearbeiter aufs Land für den Bereich Wiebendorf, 30 March 1961 Landkreis Ludwigslust-Aussenstelle Hagenow, RdK Hagenow 19331, p. 2 of protocol.

54. For some examples of the relationship between the participants and the local villagers see Protokoll über die Aussprache mit den Industriearbeitern, 24 November 1955 Landkreis Nordwestmecklenburg-Kreisarchiv Grevesmühlen RdK Gadebusch 126; and Arbeitsberatung und Erfahrungsaustausch mit den Patenkreisen des Bezirkes Schwerin, 22 January 1958 SächsStAL RdB Leipzig 3555, 22 (reverse side).

55. For more on these difficulties see Palmowski, Jan, “Building an East German Nation: The Construction of a Socialist Heimat, 1945–61,” in this issue, 365–99.Google Scholar

56. Erfahrungsaustausch der Kader in der Aktion Industriearbeiter aufs Land, 30 January 1961 MLHA RdB Neubrandenburg 1644, 12. During the 1950s, the Ministry for State Security (Stasi) was rapidly built up so that some of the campaign participants may have been Stasi agents but it seems unlikely that many were. A list of five hundred names that I sent to the archivist in one of the Stasi archives turned up no informants.

57. For more on the persecution of peasants in the process of collectivization see Wekentin, Falco, Politische Strafjustiz in der Ära Ulbricht, 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1997).Google Scholar The economie benefits given to peasants who joined an LPG included lower quotas, a reduction in taxes, better access to fertilizer and to the services of the tractor stations, and loans from the government. For more on this see “Vergünstigungen für die landwirschaftlichen Produktionsgenossenschaften und ihre Mitglieder,” in Dokumente der SED, vol. 4, 81–84.Google Scholar

58. For more on this practice, see Jonathan Osmond, “Kontinuität und Konflikt in der Landwirtschaft der SBZ-DDR zur Zeit der Bodenreform und der Vergenossenschaftlichung, 1945–61” in Bessel and Jessen, Die Grenzen.

59. Zusammenstellung der Aktion IaL, Barch DE-1 20134, 158.

60. Gerhard Biermann (pseud.) author interview, tape recorded, Güstrow, November 1999.

61. Protokoll der Verhandlungen des V.Parteitages der SED (Berlin, 1959), 1375.Google Scholar

62. For an example of the recruitment attempts for agricultural specialists see Beschluss über die Ausbildung, die Aufgaben, den Einsatz, die Verteilung und Umverteilung landwirtschaftlicher Fachkader, in Gesetzblatt der DDR (22 June 1962): 373–80.

63. For more on the Northern Land campaign, see the politburo declaration in March 1964, SAPMO DY 30 J IV 2/3 1964: 48–51; and Vorlage an das Sekretariat des Zentralkommites der SED, 26 March 1964 SAPMO DY 30 2/3A 1046.

64. SAPMO-Barch DY 30 IV 2/5 2, 125–26. The participants of IaL were remembered even 30 years later in the press. See “Industriearbeiter gehen aufs Land,” in Leipziger Volkszeitung, Deutsches Landwirtschaftsmuseum Markkleeberg, Dokumentationszentrum, Carton 10.

65. Zusammenstellung der Aktion IaL, Barch DE-1 20134, 158. These are official numbers tallied for internal use. Nonetheless there are a number of factors that influence their veracity. First, one participant would often be reported by multiple organizations (for example the factory, trade union, and city council), inflating the figures. At the same time, many socialist enterprises simply did not submit reports, meaning that official statistics did not include all participants. On balance, I think that the numbers are slightly inflated and have therefore chosen 100,000 as a likely baseline for the number of participants for the entire duration of the campaign. For figures on LPG membership see Staatliche Zentralverwaltung fur Statistik, Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR 1964 (Berlin, 1964), 245.Google Scholar

66. Productivity probably did improve throughout the 1950s. It would be inaccurate to credit IaL entirely for this increase but a combination of mechanization and better organization likely led to advances in efficiency. It is difficult to measure production gains, and therefore changes in productivity, as official statistics reported yields as the sum of deliveries and losses that supposedly occurred during storage and transportation. These tallies are not reliable as the SED used this method to disguise the low productivity on collective compared to private farms.

67. Zusammenstellung der Aktion IaL, Barch DE-1 20134, 158.

68. For instance, in the first ten months of 1956 in the District Schwerin, 1,300 tractor drivers took positions in the cities. As cited by Wolfgang Steinke at the Konferenz der jungen Arbeiter der Landwirtschaft, 25 May 1957 SAPMO-Barch DY 24 151, page 17 of his speech.

69. For more on the production brigades see Roesler, Jörg, “Die Produktionsbrigaden in der Industrie der DDR: Zentrum der Arbeitswelt?” in Sozialgeschichte, ed. Kaelble, Kocka, and Zwahr, 144.Google Scholar

70. Foucault, Michel, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of a Prison 2nd ed. (New York, 1995)Google Scholar and Bourdieu, Pierre, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge, 1977).CrossRefGoogle Scholar Dorothee Wierling has argued that the GDR was an Erziehungsdiktatur or “educational dictatorship,” that emphasized the political education of its populace. In German the term Erziehungsdiktatur already has some of these connotations of socialization. For a discussion of the GDR as educational dictatorship see Dorothee Wierling, “The Hitler Youth Generation in the GDR: Insecurities, Ambitions and Dilemmas,” in Jarausch, 307–24; and her article “Die Jugend als innerer Feind: Konflikte in der Erziehungsdiktatur der sechziger Jahre,” in Sozialgeschichte, ed. Kaelble, , Kocka, , and Zwahr, . 404–25.Google Scholar