The author acknowledges gratefully the support of the Social Sciences Research Grants Subcommittee of the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, McGill University, which made possible archival research for this article.

1. Foerster, Wolfgang, Generaloberst Ludwig Beck: Sein Kampf gegen den Krieg (Munich, 1953). pp. 9–29Google Scholar; Keilig, Wolf, Das deutsche Heer 1939–1945: Gliederung—Einsatz—Stellenbesetzung (Bad Nauheim, 1956– ), 211/18Google Scholar; Beck, Ludwig, Studien, ed. Speidel, Hans (Stuttgart, 1955), p. 18.Google Scholar

2. Cf. Müller, Klaus-Jürgen, Das Heer und Hitler: Armee und nationalsozialistisches Regime 1933–1940 (Stuttgart, 1969), passimCrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem, “Staat und Politik im Denken Ludwig Becks,” Historische Zeitschrift 215 (1972): 607–31Google Scholar; idem, General Ludwig Beck: Studien und Dokumente zur politisch-militärischen Vorstellungswelt und Tätigkeit des Generalstabschefs des deutschen Heeres 1933–1938, Bundesarchivs, Schriften des, vol. 30 (Boppard am Rhein, 1980), pp. 53, 56–57, 103, 143–50, 154–64, 185–87, 194, 197–204Google Scholar. Müller's latest book adds volume and detail to his earlier dissertations on Beck, but little new except more contradiction; the collection of documents reproduced in an extensive appendix represents the most valuable part of the work. See also Reynolds, Nicholas, Treason Was No Crime: Ludwig Beck: Chief of the German General Staff (London, 1976), passimGoogle Scholar; Irving, David, The War Path: Hitler's Germany 1933–1939 (New York, 1978), pp. 79–124.Google Scholar

3. Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv, Freiburg i.Br. (BA/MA) N 39/84.

4. Engel, [Gerhard], Heeresadjutant bei Hitler 1938–1943, ed. Kotze, Hildegard von (Stuttgart, 1974), p. 33Google Scholar; Heiber, Helmut, ed., Hitlers Lagebesprechungen: Die Protokollfragmente seiner militärischen Konferenzen 1942–1945 (Stuttgart, 1962), pp. 603–4, 786.Google Scholar

5. Beck, Studien, p. 62; Paret, Peter, Clausewitz and the State (New York, 1976), pp. 369, 379–80Google Scholar; see below, pp. 344–45; Müller, Heer, p. 223.

6. Beck's submissions and memoranda are in BA/MA N 28, those for July 1938 particularly in N 28/4.

7. Reichs-Gesetzblatt 1921 (Berlin, [1921]), no. 35Google Scholar; the prohibition was repeated in 1935: Reichsgesetzblatt Teil I 1935 (Berlin, 1935), no. 52.Google Scholar

8. Colonel (ret.) Wolf Eberhard (served under Beck in Ulm and was in close contact while serving as Keitel's adjutant), interview, Aug. 19, 1979.

9. Bucher, Peter, Der Reichswehrprozess: Der Hochverrat der Ulmer Reichswehroffiziere 1929/30 (Boppard am Rhein, [1967]), pp. 4, 15, 17, 23–24, 85–86, 110–13, 150, 153, 215, 221–26, 251–52, 270–72, 313–23, 508Google Scholar; Gebhardt, Bruno, Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte, vol. 4, 9th ed. (Stuttgart, 1976), pp. 832–33Google Scholar; Bracher, Karl Dietrich, Sauer, Wolfgang, and Schulz, Gerhard, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung: Studien zur Errichtung des totalitären Herrschaftssystems in Deutschland 1933/34, 2nd ed. (Cologne and Opladen, 1962), p. 716 n. 96, p. 734 n. 183Google Scholar; von Hammerstein, Kunrat Freiherr, Spähtrupp (Stuttgart, 1963), pp. 16, 19Google Scholar; Reynolds, pp. 42–43; Alexander [Freiherr] von Falkenhausen, [Bericht über meine Stellung zur N.S.D.A.P. und ihrem Regime], typescript, no place, Nov. 15, 1946, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Record Group 338 Ms. No. B-289; Max von Viebahn, Generaloberst Ludwig Beck 29.6.1880–20.7. 1944, signed typescript, no place, June 29, 1928 (in the author's possession); Groscurth, Helmuth, Tagebücher eines Abwehroffiziers 1938–1940, ed. Krausnick, Helmut and Deutsch, Harold C. (Stuttgart, 1970), pp. 168–69Google Scholar; Foerster, p. 23.

10. Falkenhausen; cf. Reynolds, p. 43.

11. Hammerstein, p. 64; Spuler, Bertold, Regenten und Regierungen der Welt: Minister-Ploetz, pt. 2, vol. 4, 2nd ed. (Würzburg, 1964), pp. 148–52Google Scholar; BA/MA N 34/21; Foerster, p. 25.

12. Röhm, Ernst, Die Geschichte eines Hochverräters (Munich, 1928), passimGoogle Scholar; Foerster, pp. 24–25; Reynolds, pp. 48–51.

13. Müller, Heer, p. 110; cf. below, section III; Müller, Heer, p. 118; Reynolds, pp. 53–54 (with contradictory language).

14. Foerster, pp. 26–27; Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof Nürnberg 14. November 1945–1. Oktober 1946, 12 (Nuremberg, 1947): 266Google Scholar; Müller, Heer, p. 136; for the following, see below, section IV.

15. Just, Leo, Handbuch der Deutschen Geschichte, 4, pt. 2 (Constance, [1965]): 38–39Google Scholar; Ploetz, Karl, Auszug aus der Geschichte, 25th ed. (Würzburg, [1956]), p. 994Google Scholar; Rönnefarth, Helmuth K. G. and Euler, Heinrich, Konferenzen und Verträge: Vertrags-Ploetz, pt. 2, vol. 4, 2nd ed. (Würzburg, [1959]), passimGoogle Scholar; Just, pp. 38–43.

16. The Statesman's Year-Book: Statistical and Historical Annual of the States of the World for the Year 1934 (London, 1934), pp. 796, 873–78, 950, 1217–18, 1247, 1260–61, 1377.Google Scholar

17. Rönnefarth and Euler, pp. 56–57, 120–22, 130–32.

18. Salewski, Michael, Entwaffnung und Militärkontrolle in Deutschland 1919–1927, Schriften des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik e.V., vol. 24 (Munich, 1966), passim.Google Scholar

19. General Curt Liebmann, Niederschriften von Besprechungen mit den Befehlshabern usw. des Heeres vor und nach 1933 (here: Statements by Chef des Ministeramts im Reichswehrministerium, October 25, 1930), Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Munich), ED I/1–2; Hitler's assessment of the military worth of the SA, Feb. 27, 1934, as “equal to zero” in Besprechung des Chef HL (Fritsch) und Hitlerrede am 27.2.1934, Institut für Zeitgeschichte, ED I/1–2.

20. Bennecke, Heinrich, Hitler und die SA (Munich and Vienna, [1962]), pp. 213–14Google Scholar; Bracher Sauer, and Schulz, p. 929; Hoffmann, Peter, Hitler's Personal Security (London and Basingstoke, and Cambridge, Mass., 1979), pp. 26, 47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

21. Reynolds, pp. 67–68; Rönnefarth and Euler, p. 120.

22. Foerster, p. 51; Keitel, Wilhelm, Testimony, typescript, Nuremberg, 08 27, 1945, National Archives Record Group 238Google Scholar; Müller, Heer, pp. 207–8; Reynolds, p. 87.

23. Foerster, pp. 35–38; Manstein to Foerster, May 1, 1952 in Foerster, pp. 37–38.

24. Beck's draft in BA/MA N 28/1.

25. Gebhardt, p. 456.

26. [Stülpnagel], Notizen zur augenblicklichen militärpolitischen Lage, typescript, [Berlin], Apr. 11, 1935, BA/MA N 28/2.

27. Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal Nuremberg 14 November 1945–1 October 1946, 34 (Nuremberg, 1949): 485–86Google Scholar; Müller, Heer, p. 211.

28. Beck to Fritsch, May 3, 1935, BA/MA N 28/2.

29. Reynolds, pp. 99–100, omits the last sentence which rules out “Schulung” for the future, nor does he seem to have grasped the meaning of “an aid in the conduct of war.” Reynolds' contention that Beck's memorandum showed “that Beck did not reject the concept of a surprise attack against Czechoslovakia” conveys the impression that Beck agreed with the idea of an armed invasion of Czechoslovakia without provocation and independently of other conditions such as a French attack upon Germany, in which case a surprise operation against France's ally, Czechoslovakia, would be part of German operational projections. In reality, Beck made even the consideration of an operation like “Schulung” unequivocally dependent upon the assumption of another prior involvement of Germany, “as an aid in the conduct of war,” that is, as a secondary operation. The issue of German initiation of military action is not raised by Beck, but it is ruled out by his last sentence. Beck reiterated these thoughts in an undated ms. note following this exposé in the file (BA/MA N 28/2). Müller, Heer, p. 212 points out that Beck did not attack the political leadership of the State but the military leadership, Blomberg—a questionable classification of the War Ministry—and that the political leadership had indeed not come forward as giving a directive. Müller continues in contradictory terms: “Beck's comments should not be taken so much as a criticism of Hitler's foreign policy—although naturally they apply to it in point of fact.” Müller contends that Beck rather meant to counterattack in the internal conflict over military leadership structure at the highest level.

30. Rudolf Beck, Beiträge zur Lebensgeschichte und Charakteristik des Generaloberst Ludwig Beck, typescript, no place, undated [before 1952] (in the author's possession); Rudolf Beck to the author Feb. 28, 1979.

31. Beck's notes of Nov. 12, 1937 in BA/MA N 28/4; cf. Beck's notes of June 26, 1935 in BA/MA N 28/2; Reynolds, pp. 100–102; Foerster, p. 55. Reynolds misstates the evidence and is led to imputing to Beck views that Beck recorded as those of others. The directive of Dec. 7 and 21, 1937 is in Trial, 34: 745–47, and in Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945, ser. D (ADAP, D), 7 (Baden-Baden, 1956): 547–51Google Scholar; cf. Jodl's diary in Trial, 28 (1948): 355–56 for Nov. 5 and 13, 1937.

Müller, Heer, pp. 249–54, discerns an “agreement in principle” on Beck's part with “some of Hitler's ideas,” but finally concludes that “the method issue was for him [Beck] ultimately a question of ethics,” having said also (p. 252) that “behind the tension between principles and opportunity which emerge from [Beck's] memorandum there was more than mere disagreements on questions of methods or timing.” Müller's evidence does not support his statement (p. 251) that “Beck obviously did not in principle object unconditionally to a war policy.” It is absurd to speak of Beck's “aggressive plans” as does Reynolds, p. 120, and recently Müller, Beck, pp. 187, 242–43, 245, 248–50.

32. In his notes of Nov. 12, 1937, commenting on Hitler's announcements of Nov. 5, 1937 (see n. 31), Beck wrote: “Policy is the art of the possible, all three of the peoples are in the world at the same time, moreover [together] in Europe, this must mean that first of all every possibility for an arrangement is to be exhausted, particularly in view of the relative strengths.”

33. See n. 26 above; Foerster, p. 57; Manstein, Erich v[on], Aus einem Soldatenleben 1887–1939 (Bonn, 1958), pp. 227–28Google Scholar; Müller, Heer, pp. 213–14.

34. Ms. draft and typed carbon copy in BA/MA N 28/2; Müller, Heer, p. 235.

35. Rönnefarth and Euler, pp. 40–49; Ed. Heilfron, , ed., Die Deutsche Nationalversammlung im Jahre 1919 in ihrer Arbeit für den Aufbau des neuen deutschen Volksstaates, 8 vols. (Berlin, [1920]), 2: 253; 4: 2096, 2652, 2668; 7: 79–80; 8: 319Google Scholar. See also Prozess, 14 (1948): 300; 15: (1948): 566.

36. Cf. above, at note 24.

37. Cf. Just, pp. 44–45.

38. Keitel, in Prozess, 10 (1947): 566Google Scholar; [Keitel, Wilhelm], Generalfeldmarschall Keitel: Verbrecher oder Offizier? Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente des Chefs OKW, ed. Görlitz, Walter (Göttingen, Berlin, Frankfurt, [1961]), pp. 95, 178.Google Scholar

39. Spuler, p. 437; Just, pp. 135–38.

40. Jodl's diary for Jan. and Feb. 1938 in Trial, 28: 356–68; Deutsch, Harold C., Hitler and His Generals: The Hidden Crisis, January–June 1938 (Minneapolis, [1974]), passimGoogle Scholar; Hoffmann, Peter, review of the preceding in Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 1976, no. 2, pp. 196–201.Google Scholar

41. See n. 40.

42. Eberhard, [Diary Notes], Mar. 10, 1938, Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Sammlung Irving; Graf [Rüdiger von der] Goltz, Darstellung Prozess Generaloberst v.Fritsch (n.p., n.d.), Institut für Zeitgeschichte, ZS 49, p. 11; judgement published in Der Spiegel, no. 36, Sept. 1, 1965, pp. 46–57; an English translation appeared in Schlabrendorff, Fabian von, The Secret War Against Hitler (New York, [1965]), pp. 373–416Google Scholar; [Johann, A.] Kielmansegg, Graf, Der Fritschprozess 1938: Ablauf und Hintergründe (Hamburg, [1949]), pp. 86–90Google Scholar; Schellenberg, Walter, Aufzeichnungen (Wiesbaden and Munich, 1979), pp. 39–41.Google Scholar

43. Irving, p. 82, based on information from Eberhard who was a witness: Irving to the author Nov. 2, 1979; confirmed by Eberhard to the author, interview Aug. 18, 1980.

44. Trial, 34: 743; ADAP, D, 7: 549–51; Jodl's diary for Mar. 11, 1938, in Trial, 28: 371; Conwell-Evans, T. P., None so Blind (London, 1947), pp. 91–92.Google Scholar

45. Telephongespräche Generalfeldmarschall Göring—Generalmajor Bodenschatz 13. März 1938, ADAP, D, 7: 510–14.

46. Keitel, Verbrecher, p. 178.

47. Müller, “Staat,” passim; Müller, Heer, p. 311; Reynolds, p. 152; cf. Irving, p. 117.

48. See n. 5 above. See Beck's memorandum of Jan. 15, 1934 in Müller, Heer, pp. 627–33, also for the following.

49. Müller, “Staat,” p. 610, states that Beck discussed a disturbed relationship; in fact, Beck discussed the absence of a balance; cf. Beck's memorandum of Dec. 9, 1935, in BA/MA N 28/2; see also Müller, Heer, pp. 216–36, on Beck's alleged ambitions and on the alleged predominance of administrative and power issues in the leadership of the Wehrmacht; Müller, Heer, p. 205.

50. Adam, Wilhelm, Erinnerungen, typescript, n.d., n.p., Institut für Zeitgeschichte, ED 109/5, p. 743.Google Scholar

51. Hossbach, Friedrich, Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler 1934–1938, 2nd ed. (Göttingen, 1965), p. 193.Google Scholar

52. Müller, Heer, p. 237; Müller even maintained that, at least in the opinion of Beck and other military leaders, there existed in 1933–34 an alliance between military and political authority, and that the realization on the part of military leaders, especially on the part of Beck, that the alliance was endangered or no longer in existence led to conflict with the regime: Klaus-Jürgen Müller, “Der militärische Widerstand,” paper read at Historikertag Hamburg 1978, pp. 5–8.

53. Müller, Heer, pp. 309–13; Reynolds, p. 100.

54. Beck, Studien, p. 62; cf. Paret, pp. 369, 379–80; “Zwei Briefe des Generals von Clausewitz: Gedanken zur Abwehr,” Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau 2 (1937)Google Scholar, Sonderheft, pp. 8–9.

55. Trial, 34: 745–47; ADAP, D, 7: 547–51; Jodl's diary in Trial, 28: 355–56.

56. Trial, 25: 414–18, 421–27; Prozess, 10: 569–70.

57. Beck's ms. notes in BA/MA N 28/3; Trial, 25: 433–39; Keitel, Verbrecher, pp. 183–85; Engel, pp. 24–25; Müller, Heer, pp. 300–309.

58. BA/MA N 28/3; Foerster, pp. 99–106; Keitel, Verbrecher, pp. 182–84; Müller, Heer, pp. 300–309.

59. Keitel, Verbrecher, p. 184; Müller, Heer, p. 304.

60. Ms. draft and typed copy in BA/MA N 28/3. Beck must have been aware of the effects of his memorandum of May 5, but felt compelled to try again, using lip service to the aims of the policy as a basis. Müller, Heer, p. 309, contends that Beck's agreement that Germany needed space indicated his support for some of Hitler's aims, and an agreement in principle. This interpretation disregards what followed Beck's “agreement” on Nov. 12, 1937: that the problem of space could be solved by incorporating Austria and the Sudeten area in the Reich, that this could be done without war, and that war could be contemplated only on conditions that did not exist and would not exist (it was true that one must always be prepared to be forced to act against one's will). The conclusions Beck reached always ruled out Hitler's proposed course of action, and whatever “agreement” Beck expressed was always invalidated by the consequences he predicted for German military aggression.

61. BA/MA Wi/IF 5.1502 Bll. 1–109, esp. 81, 83, 86; Müller, Beck, pp. 299–300.

62. Foerster, p. 115, based on General Warlimont's account which is cited verbatim; Müller, Beck, doc. no. 47, pp. 528–37, and doc. no. 48, pp. 539–40.

63. Müller, Heer, p. 311, gives a superficial interpretation to Beck's statements by saying that Beck's primary concern was the reorganization of the hierarchy at the highest level and the demand of a monopoly for the highest military leaders in advising the Head of State and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht. If, on the contrary, Beck's primary concern was to avoid war, he had to take those steps short of the most extreme that were likely to succeed; as each effort successively ended in failure, the measures Beck attempted to take became increasingly more drastic and extreme. An immediate uncompromising confrontation, which Müller seems to expect of Beck if he is to believe in his “principles” and peaceful intentions, would have destroyed all future chances of trying again if it had not achieved the desired result.

64. For this and the following: Beck's ms. notes and drafts in BA/MA N 28/4; Buchheit, Gert, Ludwig Beck, ein preussischer General (Munich, 1964), pp. 147–52Google Scholar; Foerster, pp. 116–21; Müller, Heer, pp. 317–21.

65. I.e., the unlikely case of the nonintervention of France, Britain, and the United States.

66. Cf. Prozess, 20: 679.

67. Beck's minute of July 19 in BA/MA N 28/4; cf. Foerster, p. 124; Müller, Heer, pp. 326–29.

68. Beck's minute in BA/MA N 28/4.

69. Generalleutnant K. H. von Stülpnagel, Deputy Chief of the General Staff II, was working out detailed plans with General von Witzleben; Foerster, pp. 127–28, 170 n. 3; Gisevius, Hans Bernd, Bis zum bittern Ende, 2, (Zurich, 1946): 20Google Scholar; Krausnick, Helmut, “Vorgeschichte und Beginn des militärischen Widerstandes gegen Hitler,” Vollmacht des Gewissens, vol. 1, ed. Europäische Publikation e.V. (Frankfurt a.M. and Berlin, 1960), pp. 320–21Google Scholar; and in contrast, Müller, Heer, pp. 326–32.

70. Beck's draft of Brauchitsch's speech in BA/MA N 28/4; Foerster, pp. 128–37; Müller, Heer, pp. 333–38. Reichenau and Busch disagreed. Beck said later: “Brauchitsch left me in the lurch!” Foerster, pp. 142–43.

71. Manstein to Beck July 21, 1938, Beck to Manstein July. 31, 1938, communicated orally on Aug. 9 as Beck noted, BA/MA N 28/4.

72. Halder in “Protokoll aus der Verhandlung Halder [vor der] Spruchkammer X München [15–21. September 1948],” mimeographed [Munich, 1948], in the author's possession, p. 67.

73. Kielmansegg, pp. 129–30; Deutsch, pp. 410–11.

74. Jodl's diary Aug. 10, 1938, in Trial, 28: 373–74; Eberhard diary Aug. 15, 1938; Krausnick, p. 329.

75. Information from Harold C. Deutsch.

76. Hoffmann, Peter, The History of the German Resistance 1933–1945 (London and Cambridge, Mass., 1977), pp. 81–96.Google Scholar

77. Beck noted in August 1938, after his resignation, appending these words to his memorandum of July 16: “In order to make our position clear to the historians of the future and to keep clean the reputation of the High Command, I wish to place on record that I, as Chief of the General Staff, have refused to give my approval to any war on behalf of the National Socialist adventurers. A final German victory is an impossibility.” Westphal, Siegfried, The German Army in the West (London, 1951), p. 45Google Scholar. Foerster, pp. 143, 171 n. 96, cites the passage from the German edition: Westphal, Siegfried, Heer in Fesseln: Aus den Papieren des Stabschefs von Rommel, Kesselring und Rundstedt (Bonn, 1950, 2nd ed. 1952), p. 75Google Scholar. Westphal confirmed the facts to Foerster in a letter with the added information that Beck's adjutant, Captain Schultze-Büttger, had shown Westphal the sheet of paper with Beck's words. Sauerbruch, Ferdinand, Das war mein Leben (Bad Wörishofen, [1951]), p. 532Google Scholar, may have drawn his version that Beck's words were meant as the preamble for Brauchitsch's speech [on Aug. 4] but were not read by Brauchitsch from Horn, Martin, Halder: Schuld oder Tragik? (Munich, 1948), p. 33Google Scholar; cf. Foerster, p. 171 n. 96. Beck, Studien, p. 118.

78. Müller, Heer, p. 254.