1. The broader aspects of the debate on the nature of National Socialism are examined in Sauer, Wolfgang, “National Socialism: Totalitarianism or Fascism?,” American Historical Review, LXXIII (12 1967), 404–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2. For examples of this trend, see Nyomarkay, Joseph, Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party (Minneapolis, 1967),Google ScholarSchoenbaum, David, Hitler's Social Revolution (Garden City, N.Y., 1966),Google Scholar Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Anatomy of the SS State, by Broszat, Martin, Buchheim, Hans, Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf, and Krausnick, Helmut (New York, 1968),Google Scholar and Peterson, Edward N., The Limits of Hitler's Power (Princeton, 1969).Google Scholar

3. The juridical aspect is particularly clear in Broszat et al., SS State.

4. Peterson, , op. cit., pp. 442–46.Google Scholar

5. The vast extent of the literature dealing with German state and army during the later years of the Third Reich defies summary. Particularly valuable for their political analyses are accounts in Craig, Gordon A., The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640–1945 (corrected impression, New York, 1964), pp. 481–503,Google Scholar and Deutsch, Harold C., The Conspiracy Against Hitler in the Twilight War (Minneapolis, 1968).Google Scholar On the German economy before and during the war, see Schweitzer, Arthur, Big Business in the Third Reich (Bloomington, 1964),Google ScholarKlein, Burton, The German Economic Preparation for War (Cambridge, 1959),Google Scholar and Milward, Alan, The German Economy at War (London, 1965).Google Scholar

6. Hannah Arendt insists Hitler was following a deliberate policy. See The Origins of Totalitarianism (rev. ed., Cleveland and New York, 1958), pp. 367ff.

7. The best account of the Himmler-Hitler relationship is still in Trevor-Roper, H. R., The Last Days of Hitler (3rd ed., New York, 1962).Google Scholar

8. “The Ideology of Elitism in the SS” was the subject of papers by James J. Weingartner, George C. Browder, and Larry V. Thompson, and a commentary by Robert Wolfe, presented at the December 1969 meeting of the American Historical Association in Washington, D.C.

9. On the SS in general, see Broszat et al., SS State, and Höhne, Heinz, Der Orden unter den Totenkopf (Gütersloh, 1967).Google Scholar Special aspects are discussed in Stein, George H., The Waffen SS (Ithaca, 1966),Google ScholarGeorg, Enno, Die wirtschaftlichen Unternehmungen der SS (Stuttgart, 1963),CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Koehl, Robert, RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy 1939–1945 (Cambridge, Mass., 1957).Google Scholar

10. Rauschning, Hermann, Die Revolution des Nihilismus (rev. ed., ed. Mann, Golo, Zurich, 1964), p. 78,Google Scholar and Gespräche mit Hitler (New York, 1940), pp. 203–205.Google Scholar Rauschning believes that the Gauleiter as a group were powerful enough to limit Hitler's freedom of action. Rauschning was president of Danzig in 1933 and 1934, and his impression of the Gauleiter and their power was certainly derived primarily from his unfortunate experiences with Forster in Danzig.

11. Nyomarkay, , op. cit., pp. 31–32.Google Scholar This situation was only slightly altered during the war, when Bormann was able to have a number of subservient protégés appointed as Gauleiter.

12. Although this situation existed to some extent in the Old Reich, it was far more prevalent in the East.

13. “Erlass des Führers und Reichskanzlers über Gliederung und Verwaltung der Ostgebiete vom 8.10.39.,” Reichsgesetzblatt, 1939, p. 2042. The ordinance took effect on Oct. 26, and the Reichsgau was thereafter treated for economic and other purposes as a single unit, an integral part of the Reich. See Reichswirtschaftsminister, confidential circular, Nov. 1, 1939, in U. S. National Archives Microcopy T-71, Roll 88, Serial 88, frames 591813–14, RWM 18/47 (cited below as NA/T-71/88/88/501813–14/RWM 18/47).

14. There were some changes after Hitler's Erlass of Oct. 8, 1939, especially in nomenclature. Only in November did the Reichsgau Westpreussen become the Reichsgau Danzig-Westpreussen, and it remained the Gau Danzig for party purposes until March 1940. The Warthegau became the Reichsgau Wartheland early in 1940, but this study uses the earlier name throughout, following a common contemporary usage, and avoiding confusion of the two Reichsgaue. See the two “Erlasse über Gliederung und Verwaltung der Ostgebiete,” Nov. 2, 1939, and Jan. 29, 1940, Reichsgesetzblatt, 1939, p. 2135, and 1940, p.251. See also Bormann, “Anordnung,” Mar. 19, 1940, NA/T-580/548/Ordner 673. For the details of political and territorial structure, see Diewerge, Wolfgang, Der neue Reichsgau Danzig-Westpreussen (Berlin, 1940),Google Scholar NA/T-580/20/Ordner 200, and Janowicz, Zbigniew, Ustrōj administracyjny ziem polskich wcielonych do Rzeszy Niemieckiej 1939–1945 Poznań, 1951).Google Scholar

15. The following three paragraphs, on the NSDAP in Danzig before World War II, are based upon the author's unpublished doctoral dissertation, “The Nazis in Danzig, 1925–1939” (Yale, 1969). Published sources on the Free City and the Danzig NSDAP include:Löbsack, Wilhelm, Albert Forster (Hamburg, 1934),Google ScholarRauschning, Hermann, The Conservative Revolution (New York, 1941),Google ScholarMorrow, Ian F. D., The Peace Settlement in the German Polish Borderlands (London, 1936),Google ScholarLeonhardt, Hans L., Nazi Conquest of Danzig (Chicago, 1942),Google ScholarDenne, Ludwig, Das Danzig Problem in der deutschen Aussenpolitik, 1934–1939 (Bonn, 1959),Google ScholarDopierala, Bodgan, Gdańska polityka Józefa Becka (Poznań, 1967),Google Scholar and Kimmich, Christoph M., The Free City (New Haven, 1968).Google Scholar

16. The officials of the Free City who followed Greiser to the Warthegau included the head of the Foreign Department and his deputy, and the Chief of Police. Greiser continued to protect Forster's enemies. When Otto Andres, deputy Gauleiter of Danzig-West Prussia, fell out with Forster in 1942, he emigrated to Poznań. See the personnel files of the NSDAP, in the Berlin Document Center of the U. S. State Department (cited below as BDC), PK-Andres.

17. Storr, “Vermerkung,” Feb. 9, 1940, in the Bundesarchiv, Koblenz (cited below as BA), Hauptamt für Kommunalpolitik/NS 25/202.

18. Diewerge, , op. cit., pp. 66–67,Google Scholar NA/T-580/20/Ordner 200.

19. The analogy of National Socialism with feudalism has been attempted in Koehl, Robert, “Feudal Aspects of National Socialism,” American Political Science Review, LIV (12 1960), 921–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Nyomarkay, , op. cit., pp. 33–34.Google Scholar The concept has much to recommend it, but the analogy should not be pressed. Hitler bore no resemblance to a feudal monarch. If historical analogies are to be sought, it might be better to compare the Führer with one of the less pleasant Roman emperors.

20. See BDC /SSO-Lorenz, and Greiser.

21. See the correspondence between von dem Bach and Himmler's staff in BDC/SSO-Kluck, Dr. Helmut, and von dem Bach-Zelewski to Himmler, telegram, Apr. 8, 1935, BDC/SSO-von dem Bach.

22. Grötzner was originally appointed a Kriminaldirektor in the Danzig police department. See BDC/PK-Grötzner. Letters to be found in the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts in Bonn, Dt. Generalkonsulat Danzig/Pol 4 no. 5, show that an Unterabschnitt Danzig of Reinhard Heydrich's SD existed in Danzig from 1938, at least, and was headed by Grötzner. On the struggle with Froböss, see Forster to Himmler, letter, Apr. 22, 1939, BDC/SSO-Forster.

23. Koehl, , RKFDV, pp. 37–38.Google Scholar On the Polish German minority, see Breyer, Richard, Das Deutsche Reich und Polen 1932–1937 (Würzburg, 1955).Google Scholar

24. Erich Kordt to Ernst von Weizsäcker, minute, May 30, 1938, and Ribbentrop, minute, May 31 1938, NA/T-120/120/116/66363–64/Büro RAM: Danzig.

25. Koehl, , RKFDV, p. 37.Google Scholar

26. See the numerous photographs of Forster in the Nazi daily newspaper, the Danziger Vorposten, and in Löbsack, op. cit.

27. Forster to Himmler, letter, Apr. 22, 1939, Obergruppenführer Dr. Rudolf Brandt to Forster, letter, May 3, 1939, Dr. med. K. Fahrenkamp (Munich), medical report, May 8, 1939, BDC/SSO-Forster.

28. Buchheim, in Broszat et al., SS State, pp. 213–21. See also Dallin, Alexander, German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945 (New York, 1957).Google Scholar

29. On Greiser and Himmler, see the correspondence in BDC/OPG-Greiser.

30. SS-Personalakten, and Himmler, SS-Befehl, Oct. 26, 1939, BDC/SSO-Hildebrandt.

31. Hildebrandt to Himmler, letter, Apr. 21, 1942, BDC/PK-Seeger, Gerhard.

32. See BDC/PK-Seeger, and Kampe.

33. Hildebrandt to Himmler, letter, Feb. 19, 1941, BDC/PK-Kampe. Hildebrandt was incensed that Kampe, who had made himself impossible as Kreisleiter of Bydgoszcz, was now to be Kreisleiter of Greater Danzig.

34. III. Kammer des Obersten Partei-Gerichts, “Urteil,” Sept. 16, 1943, BDC/PK-Seeger.

35. Himmler to Bormann, letter, Nov. 8, 1943, BDC/PK-Seeger.

36. The best study of Nazi population policies in Poland is in Broszat, Martin, National-sozialistische Polenpolitik 1939–1945 (Stuttgart, 1961).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

37. Hitler, decree, Oct. 7, 1939, and Himmler, decree, n.d., in Koehl, RKFDV, pp. 247–50. See also Broszat, , Polenpolitik, p. 126.Google Scholar

38. Koehl, , RKFDV, p. 139.Google Scholar

39. Broszat, , Polenpolitik, pp. 121–26.Google Scholar For an indication of party thinking on the population question along the lines eventually adopted by Himmler, see E. Wetzel and G. Hecht (Rassenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP), memorandum: “Die Frage der Behandlung der Bevölkerung der ehemaligen polnischen Gebiete nach rassenpolitischen Gesichtspunkten,” Nov. 25, 1939, NA/T-74/9/9/380571–611/RDV 57. The memorandum describes Greiser's policies with approval. See further, Reichministerium des Innern, circulars, Nov. 25, 1939, and Mar. 13, 1941, NA/T-81/265/483/2383994–96, 238397991/VOMI/39.

40. Broszat, , Polenpolitik, p. 127.Google Scholar

41. See Forster to Bormann, letter, May 31, 1943, BDC/SSO-Forster. The reasons advanced here by Forster to explain his original refusal seem clearly specious.

42. The five West Prussian Kreise which had been administered by East Prussia between the wars were exempt along with the rest of the Old Reich. The former territory of the Free City was also exempt. The proportion of Germans and Poles in the Free City has been variously estimated. It seems likely that approximately 6 per cent of the population was polish-speaking in 1934. See Mason, , op. cit., pp. 5–7.Google Scholar The problem is complicated by the presence in the Free City of numbers of Jews with Polish citizenship, and by the existence of a large Polish transient population. After the beginning of hostilities Polish citizens and Danzig citizens active in Polish organizations were simply expelled from the city of Danzig. Many were sent to the nearby concentration camp of Stutthof, and an uncertain number were executed in mass shootings near Wejherowo. See Datner, Szymon, Gumkowski, Janusz, and Leszczyński, Kazimierz, War Crimes in Poland; Genocide 1939–1945 (Warsaw and Poznań, 1962), p. 166,Google Scholar and numerous reports in the Danziger Vorposten, Sept.–Oct. 1939.

43. Diewerge, , op. cit., p. 15,Google Scholar NA/T-580/20/Ordner 200.

44. Wetzel and Hecht, memorandum, Nov. 25, 1939, NA/T-74/9/9/380581/RDV/ 57. Wetzel and Hecht seem to assume that there were no longer any Jews or Poles in the Reichsgau outside of the former Polish territories. Since they claim that the total population of Danzig-West Prussia was 61 per cent Polish and 1 per cent Jewish, we may arrive at a figure of 132,000 presumed Germans living in the former Polish territories.

45. “Anordnung des Gauleiters und Reichsstatthalters zur Durchführung der Wiedereindeutschungsaktion des Jahres 1941,” Dec. 1940, NA/T-74/15/15/387138–66/RDV/115.

46. Ibid., frame 387142 (p. 3).

47. Himmler's version of Forster's proposal, with his own opposing views, is given in Himmler to Bormann, letter, May 20, 1940, NA/T-580/20/Ordner 200.

48. BA /Ost-12/Gotenhafen, Stadt.

49. BA/Ost-12/Gotenhafen, Stadt/2, 68, 72. The causes of the decline in Gdynia's population cannot be precisely traced. The greatest single factor was undoubtedly the forced expulsion into the Government-General, early in the war, of Jews, and of Poles not native to the incorporated territories. The execution or imprisonment of masses of Polish “intellectuals” and “leaders” must also have played a role, along with Nazi forced labor policies.

50. “Verzeichnis des Grundvermögens von Volksdeutschen der Gruppe III der Deutschen Volksliste,” 1942–1943, “Entschädigung in Grundbesitz für solche Eingedeutschte, deren früherer Grundbesitz an die Stadt übergangen ist und aus Planungsgründen nicht rückübereignet werden kann,” 1943–1944, and “Verzeichnis der von der Zweigstelle der Deutschen Volksliste in Gotenhafen in die Deutsche Volksliste Eingetragenen—Erstschriften,” 1941–1944, BA/Ost-12/Gotenhafen, Stadt/32, 48, 185–88.

51. The actual percentage must have been larger, since it seems certain that the total population of the area declined considerably between 1939 and 1945. According to one official source, 1,200,000 people, almost the entire population, were examined by the DVL commissions, and only 300,000 were rejected. See Walther Wohler Oberlandesgerichtspräsident) to Minister of Justice, “Lagebericht,” Dec. 7, 1943, BA/Reichsjustizministerium/R 22/3360, p. 114.

52. Broszat, , Polenpolitik, p. 134.Google Scholar

53. Reichsminister des Innern, circular, Oct. 24, 1942, NA/T-81/265/483/238394346/VOMI/39.

54. A good summary of the campaign is in Broszat, , Polenpolitik, pp. 126–131.Google Scholar See also BA/Schumacher/396, BA/Hauptamt für Kommunalpolitik/NS 25/202, and BA/Reichsjustizministerium/R 22/3360.

55. Forster, Albert and Löbsack, Wilhelm, Die Volkstumsfrage im Reichsgau Danzig-Westpreussen (Danzig, 1942), in microcopy, NA/T-580/20/Ordner 200, pp. 3–5.Google Scholar

56. Keyser, Erich, Das Werk der Deutschen an der Weichsel (Danzig, n.d., ca.1940),Google Scholar and Beyl, Edmund, Deutsche Polenpolitik im 19. Jahrhundert (Danzig, n.d., ca.1940).Google Scholar

57. Forster, and Löbsack, , op. cit., pp. 9–11.Google Scholar

58. The best source for the behavior of the DVL 3's, and for the private and official reactions of the Germans, is the collection of “Lageberichte” sent by the Oberlandesgerichtspräsident and the Generalstaatsanwalt to the Reich Minister of Justice, 1942–1943, BA/Reichsjustizministerium/R 22/3360.Google Scholar

59. See the Danziger Vorposten, Feb. and Mar. 1943.

60. Himmler to Forster, letter, June 2, 1943, BDC/SSO-Forster. For Hildebrandt's opinions, see BDC/PK-Seeger, and Kampe.

61. The resettlement program is the principal subject of Koehl, RKFDV.

62. List of camps, Jan. 1943, NA/T-81/278/496/2399351/VOMI/197.

63. For statistical information, see RkfdFdV, Stabshauptamt, “Volkstum und Boden in den eingegliederten Gebieten des Deutschen Reiches,” 1943, NA/T-81/264/482/2382137–45/VOMI/9.

64. RkfdFdV, Stabshauptamt, “Bericht über die Um-und Ansiedlung im Jahre 1942,” Apr. 30, 1943, and “Bericht über den Stand der Um- und Ansiedlung am 1.6.1944,” n.d., NA/T-81/264/482/2382113–36, 2382366–75/VOMI/9, 12. See Broszat, , Polenpolitik, p. 134,Google Scholar for somewhat different figures. The most interesting files on the subject of resettlers in Danzig-West Prussia are NA/T-81/278/496/VOMI/198–199.

65. Datner, et al., op. cit., pp. 127ff.Google Scholar

66. This is an East German interpretation. See Braunbuch; Kriegs-und Naziverbrecher in der Bundesrepublik (rev. ed., Berlin, 1965), pp. 297–98.Google Scholar

67. BDC/PK-Kampe, especially Reinhard Heydrich to Himmler, letter, Apr. 10, 1940.

68. See the lists of Kreisleiter and members of the Gauleitung in the Reichsband, 3rd ed.,1941/1942 (Berlin, 1943), section 4, pp. 9–11, 26–46.Google Scholar Almost all of these individuals were active National Socialists in the Free City before the war, with the exception of those in the West Prussian area retained by the Reich.

69. Broszat, , Polenpolitik, p. 130.Google Scholar

70. On German policy towards Poles after the Partitions, see Broszat, Martin, 200 Jahre deutscher Polenpolitik (Munich, 1963).Google Scholar

71. See the author's dissertation (above, n. 15), especially pp. 195–204.

72. Broszat, , Polenpolitik, p. 127.Google Scholar

73. Siegmund (Persönlicher Referent beim Gauleiter und Reichsstatthalter im Reichsgau Wartheland) to Brandt, letter with enclosure, July 20, 1943, BDC/SSO-Forster. See also Broszat, , Polenpolitik, p. 130 and notes.Google Scholar

74. Lochner, Louis P., ed., The Goebbels Diaries (New York, 1948), pp. 403, 418, 443.Google Scholar Goebbels thought the replacement of Frank by Greiser an excellent idea. Hitler, however, decided to retain Frank.

75. On the good relationship between Greiser and Himmler, see BDC/OPG-Greiser.

76. SS-Hauptsturmführer Meine, “Vermerk für… Dr. Brandt,” Feb. 15, 1943, Hildebrandt to Brandt, letter, Apr. 16, 1943, Brandt to Hildebrandt, letter, Mar. 12, 1943, Röhrig, report, Jan. 7,1943, Erwin Schwager (Bezirksstelle der DVL), protocol, May 25, 1943 (copy forwarded in Katzmann to Brandt, letter, July 6, 1943), BDC/SSO-Forster.

77. Himmler to Hildebrandt, letter, May 15, 1942, BDC/PK-Seeger. The letter predated Forster's remark about Himmler and race, and was a reaction to the Kampe case. No arrests were ever made.

78. Forster to Bormann, telegram, Apr. 24, 1943 (copy forwarded in Bormann to Himmler, letter, Apr. 25, 1943), Forster to Bormann, letter, May 31, 1943, BDC/SSO-Forster.

79. He did dismiss Kampe. See Kampe to Himmler, letter, Feb. 19, 1942, BDC/PK-Kampe.

80. On Streicher, see Peterson, op. cit., ch. 4.

81. Himmler to Bormann, letter, May 20, 1940, NA/T-580/20/Ordner 200.

82. Bormann-Himmler correspondence, BDC/PK-Kampe.

83. Speer, Albert, cited in Trevor-Roper, op. cit., p. 100.Google Scholar

84. On Greiser and Bormann, see Buchheim, in Broszat et al., SS State, pp. 224–25. Greiser seems to have gotten on well with almost everybody of real importance during the war—possibly a unique achievement.

85. The papers cited in n. 8, above, make it abundantly clear that the SS was not free from the confusion of authority which characterized the Third Reich as a whole. Nonetheless, the SS did remain a unique organizational entity, cohesive enough to justify the term “SS State.”

86. Trevor-Roper, op., cit., chs. 3, 4, and 6.

87. For published accounts of Forster's early career, see Löbsack, op. cit., and Das Deutsche Führerlexikon 1934/1935 (Berlin, 1934), p. 128.Google Scholar

88. Oberlandesgerichtspräsident and Generalstaatsanwalt Danzig, “Lageberichte,” 1944, BA/Reichsjustizministerium/R 22/3360.

89. The grim conditions in the German East have been thoroughly described in the series published by the West German government: Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa. The standard German statistical study is Die deutschen Vertreibungsverluste (Wiesbaden and Stuttgart, 1958). For a detailed Polish refutation, see Schimitzek, Stanislaw, Truth or Conjecture? German Civilian War Losses in the East (Poznań, 1966).Google Scholar Expulsion is not to be compared with extermination, but there is nonetheless an ironic similarity between the population policy adopted by the Poles and that advocated by Himmler. Both solutions were, or would have been, final. In both cases the solutions aimed at changing the nationality of the territory, and abandoned the more traditional aim of changing the nationality of the already resident inhabitants.

Forster's own fate is not entirely clear. He apparently escaped to western Germany from his encircled Gau capital in March 1945. He was interned, and then extradited to Poland, where he was sentenced to death in 1948. The sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. See Broszat et al., SS State, p. 583. A confidential communication to the author from a former member of the Danzig opposition repeats a report that Forster was living under house arrest in a farmhouse near Danzig as late as 1955. His old rival, Greiser, was not so fortunate. He was reportedly badly mistreated by the Poles, and was executed in Poznań in 1946. See SS State, p. 584, and Burckhardt, Carl J., Meine Danziger Mission (Munich, 1960), p. 75.Google Scholar