1 The debates are in Franz Wigard, ed., Stenographischer Bericht über die Verhandlungen der deutschen consitituirenden Nationalversammlung zu Frankfurt am Main, 9 vols. (Frankfurt, 1848–49), cited hereafter as SB; the constitution is conveniently available in Ernst, Rudolf Huber, ed., Dokumente zur deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte (Stuttgart, 1961), 1:304–26.Google Scholar See the bibliography of primary sources in Eyck, Frank, The Frankfurt Parliament 1848–1849 (New York, 1968).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 “Konstitutionelle Monarchie oder parlamentarische Demokratie: Die Auseinandersetzung um die deutsche Nationalversammlung in der Revolution von 1848,” Historische Zeitschrift 216 (1973): 551–622, and Die Anfänge des deutschen Parteiwesens: Fraktionen, politische Vereine und Parteien in der Revolution 1848 (Paderborn, 1971). Boldt adheres rather closely to the usual Marxian view that the Frankfurt moderates did not want to seize power in 1848 because they had allied with the old regime against the revolution even before March 1848: see Dorpalen, Andreas, “Die Revolution von 1848 in der Geschichtsschreibung der DDR,” Historische Zeitschrift 210 (1970): 330–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Non-Marxian scholars, however, have also long noted strong conservative elements in German liberalism which might account for a rightward-leaning stance, for example, Bussman, Walter, “Zur Geschichte des deutschen Liberalismus im 19. Jahrhundert,” Historische Zeitschrift 186 (1958): 527–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 Boldt, Anfānge, p. 24.

4 Boldt, “Konstitutionelle Monarchie,” p. 621.

5 “Die Parlamentarismusmodelle der deutschen Parteien 1848/49,” in Ritter, Gerhart A., ed., Gesellschaft, Parlament und Regierung (Düsseldorf, 1974), pp. 121–43Google Scholar; and Deutscher Parlamentarismus in der Revolutionszeit 1848–1850 (Düsseldorf, 1977). In attributing to the moderates an intention to establish parliamentary government in the German constitution Botzenhart goes a step beyond earlier studies which merely pointed out that the German Provisional Government was responsible in a political sense to the Frankfurt Parliament. See Ziebura, Gilbert, “Anfänge des deutschen Parlamentarismus,” in Ritter, Gerhart A. and Gilbert, Ziebura, eds., Faktoren der politischen Entscheidung (Berlin, 1963), pp. 184–236Google Scholar, and Kramer, Helmut, Fraktionsbindungen in den deutschen Volksvertretungen 1819–1849 (Berlin, 1968)Google Scholar, passim.

6 Botzenhart, Deutscher Parlamentarismus, pp. 51–52.

7 See Anderson, Lee F. and others, Legislative Roll-Call Analysis (Evanston, 1966)Google Scholar, chap. 6, and Duncan, MacRae Jr., Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting (New York, 1970)Google Scholar, chap. 2.

8 Out of a sample of 150 votes—about 50 percent of the assembly's roll calls, including some on every major issue addressed in this way by the assembly—84 fit the main scale according to the criterion that each should have a Yule's Q relationship with all others of .8 or higher. Another 19 votes would fit the scale at the very low threshhold for Q of .5. Eleven more votes fit another smaller scale that measures attitudes on the famous conflict between Kleindeutscher and Grossdeutscher. The remaining 36 fit no scale. This dualistic voting pattern was confirmed by factor analysis: a single factor accounts for 70.4 percent of the common variance, and the second factor for 12.4 percent (using principal component factoring with quartimax rotation, reporting percentages from the rotated matrix).

9 Using the 84 votes with minimum Q-value of .8, and constructing contrived items and assigning scale positions according to the conventions suggested in Anderson and others, Legislative Roll-Call Analysis. The coefficient of reproducibility for this scale is .987. One man was excluded as a non-scale type.

10 Here are some of the better-known deputies in each scale score category: Bernhard Eisenstuck, Friedrich Schott, Ludwig Simon, Max Simon, Jacob Venedey, Carl Vogt, Hugo Wesendonck, Franz Wigard (all 9); Johann Gottfried Eisenmann, Julius Froebel, Moritz Mohl, Franz Raveaux (8); Karl Mittermeier, Gustav Höfken (7); Ernst Gottschalk (6); Karl Biedermann, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn (5); Wilhelm Jordan, Gabriel Riesser (4); Carl Heinrich Jürgens, Heinrich Laube, Karl Mathy (3); Georg Beseler, Hermann von Beckerath, Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann, Johann Gustav Droysen, Rudolph Haym, Robert Mohl, Georg Waitz, Heinrich Zachariä (2); Ernst Moritz Arndt, Friedrich Daniel Bassermann, Alexander von Soiron (1); Ignatz von Döllinger, Wilhelm Grävell, Joseph Maria von Radowitz, and Georg von Vincke (0).

11 Die Parteyen der teutschen Reichsversammlung, ihre Programme, Statuten, und Mitglieder Verzeichnisse (Erlangen, 1848).

12 Ziebura, “Anfänge des deutschen Parlamentarismus,” p. 216, points out that each bloc of parties developed close ties, and that their cooperation was in fact leading in the direction of a two-party system by December 1848. Kramer, Fraktionsbindungen, has described these ties in some detail.

13 The questionnaires were all produced on the Guttman Scale program of SPSS: see Nie, Norman and others, SPSS: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, 2nd ed. (New York, 1975)Google Scholar, chap. 26. Each questionnaire uses only those men who were present and voting on the roll calls involved, and therefore the total number of deputies with scale scores is different on each questionnaire. Occasionally there were two or three relevant votes in the main scale pattern that fit the questionnaire scale and would have produced similar results, and I have parenthetically identified those cases. Sometimes the phrasing of the questions differs from that actually voted on by the assembly—for instance, I sometimes had to translate a negatively phrased answer into its equivalent affirmative, and vice versa. But I believe that my formulations accurately convey the substance of what was being voted on. All the questionnaires were made from extremely good scales: the coefficients of reproducibility range from .958 to 1.000, the coefficients of scalability from .910 to 1.000.

14 Bammel, Ernst, “Der Pakt Simon-Gagern und der Abschluss der Paulskirchen-Verfassung,” in Alfred, Herrmann, ed., Aus Geschichte und Politik (Düsseldorf, 1954), pp. 57–87.Google Scholar

15 The provisions that passed are in Paragraphs 101 and 196 of the Frankfurt constitution.

16 The votes on the final reading of the veto question are in SB, pp. 6030 and 6049. These two votes scale well with one another, and would produce a questionnaire like the first one above, but with the following numbers: Because the voting pattern departs from the usual ideological lineup these votes fit not the main scale but rather the small scale that separates Kleindeutscher from Grossdeutscher.

17 Paragraphs 75 through 77, together with section 5 of Paragraph 102 of the constitution. See the democratic alternatives to these measures that would have provided for parliamentary participation in SB, p. 4676.

18 SB, pp. 4878–80.

19 Wedekind's motion is in SB, pp. 6638ff. The committee report is in Hassler, K. D., ed., Verhandlungen der deutschen verfassunggebenden Reichsversammlung zu Frankfurt am Main, 2 (Frankfurt, 1848–49): 145ff.Google Scholar Manfred Botzenhart believes that the moderates were inclined toward instituting ministerial responsibility in the political sense, and he does show that several moderates and even some conservatives advocated such a measure as long as it was coupled with appropriate restrictions on the franchise: Deutscher Parlamentarismus, pp. 54ff., 164ff., 656ff. But it is not clear how many of their colleagues agreed with them.

20 See Rose, Carol, “The Issue of Parliamentary Suffrage at the Frankfurt National Assembly,” Central European History 5 (1972): 127–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Hamerow, Theodore, “The Elections to the Frankfurt Parliament,” Journal of Modern History 33 (1961): 15–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

21 Votes on the secret ballot are in SB, pp. 5529, 5532. These votes do not fit the main scale because a number of otherwise conservative Catholics from Austria and Bavaria, convinced of the basic conservatism of the masses, voted with the democrats. See Rose, “Parliamentary Suffrage,” p. 144.

22 The electoral law is printed in Huber, Dokumente, 1:324–26.

23 See Paragraph 137 of the constitution for the results. Some 60 deputies did declare that they had voted against these measures only because the first section of the paragraph under consideration read, “There is no distinction of class before the law,” that it had already been adopted, and that it made redundant any further specification such as these votes attempted to do. SB, p. 3915.

24 SB, p. 4916.

25 Respectively, SB, pp. 2451, 4273, 4276, 2565, 5605.

26 See Paragraphs 164 to 174 of the constitution. The greatest amount of moderate support was for the abolition of the hunting rights of the nobility, and of the traditional obligations of the peasants to assist in the hunt. This measure passed on roll-call vote by 244 to 137, that is, by a majority of 64 percent (SB, p. 2458). The vote fits the main scale, so about one-third of the moderates voted for abolition. They may have been influenced by the fact that the peasants were already taking things into their own hands, however, even to the point of armed resistance to military intervention in some places. See Ziegert's comments in SB, p. 2405, and the discussion in Reis, Karl, Agrarfrage und Agrarbewegung in Schlesien im Jahre 1848 (Breslau, 1910), p. 64Google Scholar and passim.

27 “Konstitutionelle Monarchie,” pp. 620–21.

28 SB, pp. 1339, 1347, 1395, 3964. See Paragraphs 137, 138, 139, and 143 of the constitution.