Research for this study was supported by a Ford Foundation Humanities Grant and by a fellowship from the Alexander von Humboldt–Stiftung.

1. The process by which the Jews were excluded from German society was given its most influential theoretical treatment in Hilberg, Raul, The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago, 1961, 1967)Google Scholar, in which it was seen as the prelude and the model for the ultimate development of the final solution. Important studies of the details of the exclusion process have appeared more recently, including Genschel, Helmut, Die Verdrängung der Juden aus der Wirtschaft im Dritten Reich (Göttingen, 1966)Google Scholar; Schleunes, Karl A., The Twisted Road to Auschwitz (Urbana, Ill., 1970)Google Scholar; and Adam, Uwe Dietrich, Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich (Düsseldorf, 1972)Google Scholar. Adam's work in particular contains important supplements to, and revisions of, the picture given by Hilberg.

2. The best continuing sources of information on the details of German Jewish politics in the Nazi period are Yad Washem (later Vashem) Studies on the European Jewish Catastrophe (abbr. below: YWS) and Leo Baeck Institute of Jews from Germany: Year Book (abbr. below: LBI: YB), as well as the other publications of the Leo Baeck Institute. The articles in YWS and LBI: YB are frequently memoirlike accounts best treated as primary material, although this has changed in recent years. The works cited in n. 1, above, all fail to consider German Jewish politics and institutions in an adequate way, when the subject is dealt with at all, and they therefore give a rather one-sided view of the exclusion process. They have not so far been balanced by an equivalent study of the Jewish participants in the process. Still important despite its age and obvious methodological inadequacies is Lamm, Hans, “Über die innere und äussere Entwicklung des deutschen Judentums im Dritten Reich” (diss., Erlangen, 1951)Google Scholar. Valuable first-person accounts are in Ball-Kaduri, Kurt Jakob, Das Leben derjuden in Deutschland 1933 (Frankfurt a.M., 1963)Google Scholar. Specialized studies of some general importance include: Herrmann, Klaus J., Das Dritte Reich und die deutsch-jüdischen Organisationen 1933–1934 (Cologne, 1969)Google Scholar, and Freeden, Herbert, Jüdisches Theater in Nazideutschland (Tübingen, 1964)Google Scholar. The situation has been improved somewhat by the impressive number of local histories of the Jewish persecution that have been appearing in Germany. One local history that gives a good account of the interaction between Jewish institutions and Nazi persecutors is Fliedner, Hans-Joachim, Die Judenverfolgung in Mannheim 1933–1945 (Stuttgart, 1971)Google Scholar. Information on German Jewish politics under the Nazis is given from the Zionist perspective in Lichtheim, Richard, Die Geschichte des deutschen Zionismus (Jerusalem, 1954)Google Scholar; Tramer, Hans, ed., In Zwei Welten: Siegfried Moses zum Fünfundsiebzigsten Geburtstag (Tel Aviv, 1962)Google Scholar; Landauer, Georg, Der Zionismus im Wandel dreier Jahrzehnte (Tel Aviv, 1957)Google Scholar. Cf. Laqueur, Walter, A History of Zionism (New York, 1972).Google Scholar

3. Franz Meyer, “Bemerkungen zu den ‘Zwei Denkschriften,’” In Zwei Welten, p. 115.

4. Despite the important posts he held, Kareski's name appears only once in the newest standard Jewish reference work, in a completely “harmless” context. See Encyclopedia Judaica (Jerusalem, 1971), 10: 464. A number of published articles by German Jews refer to him only fleetingly and ambiguously, e.g., Ball-Kaduri, Kurt Jacob, “Leo Baeck and Contemporary History,” YWS 6 (1967): 127–28Google Scholar; Simon, Ernst, “Comments on the Article on the Late Rabbi Baeck,” YWS 6 (1967): 134Google Scholar; Cohen, Benno, “Einige Bemerkungen über den deutschen Zionismus nach 1933,” In Zwei Welten, p. 53Google Scholar (Kareski is referred to negatively, but not named). A brief, but relatively specific, negative evaluation of Kareski's role is given in Lichtheim, Geschichte des deutschen Zionismus, pp. 258–59. The most talkative published source is a memoir written during the Second World War but recently published, Stern, Heinemann, Warum hassen sie uns eigentlich? Jüdisches Leben zwischen den Kriegen (Düsseldorf, 1970), pp. 115, 119, 139, 216–21Google Scholar, with a note on Kareski by the editor, Hans Chanoch Meyer, pp. 360–64. Kareski's role is also touched in Freeden, Jüdisches Theater, pp. 62–65. The Kareski case was discussed by leading former German Zionists in Israel in 1959, but publication was considered undesirable for political reasons. See remarks by K. J. Ball-Kaduri in “Protokoll No. VI. Sitzung des Arbeitskreises von Zionisten aus Deutschland (Benno Cohen und andere) am 5. März 1959,” in the collection of the Yad Washem (abbr. below: YW) in Jerusalem, 01/245. Ball-Kaduri collected the Kareski material in Yad Washem. Kareski's personal papers are in the Central Archives for the History of the Jewish People (abbr. below: CA) in Jerusalem, P 82.

5. Press extracts, CA/P 82/8.

6. Testimony of Franz Meyer, YW/01/245.

7. Die Stimme (Vienna), Oct. 12, 1937.

8. Hitachduth Olej Germania to Beth Din (rabbinical court), “Schriftsatz der HOG in Sachen Kareski,” Dec. 20, 1937, CA/P 82/25.

9. Mitteilungsblatt der Hitachduth Olej Germania (Tel Aviv), Oct. 1937.

10. Undated German translation of judgment, YW/01/112; CA/P 82/28.

11. Meyer, H. C., in Stern, Warum hassen sie uns?, p. 361.Google Scholar

12. Ibid., p. 362.

13. Cohen, Benno, “Um die Leitung des jüdischen Kulturbundes in Deutschland—ein Kapitel des Kampfes um jüdische Autonomie nach 1933,” 1945Google Scholar, YW/01/6.

14. “Betar” is a shortened form of Brit Trumpeldor. The organization was named after a friend of Jabotinsky who had been killed in the Palestinian fighting during the First World War and whose life was used as a model of national heroism. After 1933 the German Betar had no formal connection with the international organization, and was known officially as the Nationale Jugend Herzlia.

15. For a concise, objective discussion of Revisionism, see Laqueur, Walter, A History of Zionism (New York, 1972), chap. 7, and the bibliography, pp. 608–10Google Scholar. For a history of the Revisionist movement from the inside, see Schechtman, J. B., The Vladimir Jabotinsky Story, vol. 1: Rebel and StatesmanGoogle Scholar; vol. 2: Fighter and Prophet (New York, 1956, 1961); and Schechtman and Benari, Y., History of the Revisionist Movement, vol. 1 (Tel Aviv, 1970).Google Scholar A convenient summary of the Revisionist program is in Basic Principles of Revisionism (London, 1929).

16. “Liberal” in the sense used here does not refer to general German politics, but to an internal Jewish political group, as here described. The “liberal” belief that Jewishness was a matter of religion, not nationality, distinguished liberals from all Zionists, of whatever faction. This use of “liberal” is liable to misinterpretation, but it is the term which was used by Jewish contemporaries to describe the dominant political faction within German Jewry, and there is no entirely suitable substitute.

17. Klee, Hans, “Georg Kareski und die Jüdische Volkspartei,” 1958, YW/01/217Google Scholar, is the most complete account, but the dating is confused. See also Lichtheim, Geschichte des deutschen Zionismus, pp. 169, 243–44, 255. Kareski actually held the post of chairman of the congregational directorate from early 1929 to early 1931.

18. Klee, YW/01/217, and extract from Hamaschkif, Aug. 3, 1947, CA/P 82/8.

19. Before 1933 Kareski urged Jews to vote for the Catholic Center party and avoid the Social Democrats. He was himself a Center candidate for the Prussian Landtag in 1932. See extract from Hamaschkif, Sept. 1, 1947, CA/P 82/8; a Nazi pamphlet against the Center, Rudolf Jordan, Das demaskierte Zentrum (Professor Dr. Dessauer, Professor Dr. Ludwig Kaas, Synagogen-Vorsteher Kareski) (n.p., n.d.), in CA/P 82/46; Paucker, Arnold, Der jüdische Abwehrkampf gegen Antisemitismus und Nationalsozialismus in den letzen Jahren der Weimarer Republik (Hamburg, 1968), p. 102.Google Scholar Revisionist sources are reticent about Kareski. His name appears only once, in a minor context, in Schechtman, Jabotinsky Story, 2: 29.

20. Jewish leadership in Gemeinden and Zionism is discussed in Loewenstein, Kurt, “Funktionäre im Zionismus,” In Zwei Welten, pp. 71–83.Google Scholar The tendency of German Jewish leaders toward discreet oligarchy is a major theme of Lamberti, Marjorie, “The Attempt to Form a Jewish Bloc: Jewish Notables and Politics in Wilhelmian Germany,” Central European History 3 (1970): 73–93CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On Kareski, see Klee, YW/01/217; Benno Cohen, YW/01/6; Franz Meyer, Hans Pomeranz, and an unnamed participant, YW/oi/ 245; and a brief, remarkably hostile comment on a confrontation with Kareski in 1929, in Blumenfeld, Kurt, Erlebte Judenfrage (Stuttgart, 1962), p. 188.Google Scholar

21. Testimony of Franz Meyer and Georg Lubinsky, in Ball-Kaduri, K., “The National Representation of Jews in Germany—Obstacles and Accomplishments at Its Establishment,” YWS 2 (1958): 168–69, 173–74.Google Scholar

22. On the Central-Verein in the Weimar period, see Paucker, Der jüdische Abwehrkampf. Two good additional sources of information on German Jewish organizations before the Nazi period are Schorsch, Ismar, Jewish Reaction to German Anti-Semitism 1870–1914 (New York, 1972)Google Scholar, and Mosse, Werner E., ed., Entscheidungsjahr 1932 (Tübingen, 1965).Google Scholar

23. On the founding of the Reichsvertretung, see Hahn, Hugo, “Die Gründung der Reichsvertretung,” In Zwei Welten, pp. 97–105Google Scholar; Ball-Kaduri, “National Representation of Jews in Germany”; Brodnitz, Friedrich S., “Die Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden,” In Zwei Welten, pp. 106–13Google Scholar; Klee, YW/01/217; correspondence of Willy Katzenstein (Bielefeld) with Ernst Herzfeld (Essen), July–Sept. 1933, in the Wiener Library (abbr. below: WL) documentary collection in London, 603.

24. The peculiar history of this small organization is a major theme of Herrmann, Die deutsch–jüdischen Organisationen.

25. See letter by Kareski's ally Leo Kreindler to R.-A. Stern, Sept. 18, 1933, WL/603.

26. “Assimilationist” was a term used by the Zionists to describe their Jewish enemies, other than those who followed Orthodox religious practices. In some of its implications the term could as well apply to most German Zionists, and it has little objective meaning.

27. The little information available on Kareski's break with the Zionistische Vereinigung and his founding of the State Zionist Organization is in Lichtheim, Geschichte des deutschen Zionismus, p. 258; Cohen, YW/01/6; Ball-Kaduri, YW/01/245; Kurt Blumenfeld to Kareski, May 21, 1933, Zionistische Vereinigung to Kareski, July 25 and 31, Aug. 30, 1933, CA/P 82/17; Georg Loewenberg to Samy Groneman, June 23, 1933, CA/P 82/21. Blumenfeld had long regarded Kareski's (or any Zionist's) participation in the congregational directorate as an error, and even as a distortion of Zionism. See Blumenfeld, Erlebte Judenfrage, p. 188.

28. The Jewish Agency for Palestine, “Memorandum on the Problem of the Jewish Refugees from Germany,” Nov. 12, 1935, in the collection of the Archives de la Société des Nations (abbr. below: ASDN), 33–46: 50/18812/20701 (R 5630).

29. See “Arbeitsbericht des Zentralausschusses der deutschen Juden für Hilfe und Aufbau, 1. Januar – 30. Juni 1934,” in the microfilm collection of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich (abbr. below: IZ), MA 727/1, for detailed information on Palestine certificate distribution in the period in question. See further Meyer, YW/01/245; Kareski to Reichsvertretung, July 13, 1934, and to Kurt Tuchler, Nov. 14, 1934, CA/P 82/17; Kareski to Ernst Hamburger, Nov. 21, 1937, and Hamburger to Kareski, Dec. 1, 1937, CA/P 82/27; Marcus, Ernst, “The German Foreign Office and the Palestine Question in the Period 1933–1939,” YWS 2 (1958): 182–83Google Scholar. For a sample of a pro–State Zionist communication to a Nazi official, see Dr. Friedrich Stern (Berlin) to Dr. med. Gross (Rassenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP), Aug. 6, 1934, IZ/F 71 (Handakten Lösener)/2. Stern pointed out Marxist tendencies in the Zionistische Vereinigung, contrasted this with the anti-Marxist ideology of the State Zionists, and supposed that the latter were hampered in their growth primarily by the monopoly of the Zionistische Vereinigung over immigration to Palestine. Stern gave membership estimates of 2,100 for the Betar and over 10,000 for the State Zionist Organization. These figures may be too high, but no more reliable ones are available (membership of the Zionistische Vereinigung was ca. 30,000). Stern attacked both the Reichsvertretung and the Zionistische Vereinigung as unrepresentative, and recommended instead the Jüdische Volkspartei, “of which the Berlin chairman is also president of the State Zionist Organization” (i.e., Kareski).

30. The fact of a certain agreement between National Socialist ideology and Zionism is frankly acknowledged by former German Zionists, e.g., Cohen, “Einige Bemerkungen über den deutschen Zionismus,” p. 46, although Cohen stresses that Zionists were careful to avoid outright collaboration, with the implied exception of Kareski (p. 53). For a less sympathetic view of Zionist behavior, see Simon, Ernst, “Jewish Adult Education in Nazi Germany as Spiritual Resistance,” LBI: YB 1 (1956): 69–70Google Scholar. The matter is potentially embarrassing, and some former German Zionists have simply ignored the problem. Thus, the memoirs of Kurt Blumenfeld, Erlebte Judenfrage, stop short in January 1933. By contrast, embittered Landauer, Zionist Georg, Zionismus, pp. 324–26Google Scholar, in effect denounces the Zionist ideology, and therefore his own former beliefs and hopes, for far too great a similarity to National Socialism. Lichtheim, Geschichte des deutschen Zionismus, pp. 253ff., simply describes the increasing receptivity of German Jews to Zionism, and is quite prepared to admit that government favoritism played a part. Cf. Lamm, “Entwicklung des deutschen Judentums,” pp. 53–54, 149.

31. Laqueur, Zionism, p. 500.

32. Convincing evidence of police favoritism toward Zionists and repression of “assimilationists” (including police adoption of Zionist terminology) is provided by Mommsen, Hans, “Der nationalsozialistische Polizeistaat und die Judenverfolgung vor 1938,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 10 (1962): 68–87Google Scholar. Confirmation may be found in IZ/MA 172 (Polizeipräsidium Göttingen) and in the files of Department II 112 (“Juden”) of the Sicherheitsdienst-Hauptamt (the main office of the “Security Service,” a Nazi party intelligence gathering unit closely connected with the Gestapo and the SS). SD-HA II 112 records are scattered throughout the microfilm collection of the National Archives in Washington (abbr. below: NA), T–175. This police position had, by 1935, developed into a hard-and-fast line, which prevented any public expression of “assimilationist” views, and even prevented the use of the phrase “German Jew” (hence the change in that year from Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden to Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland).

33. “Äusserung der Zionistischen Vereinigung für Deutschland zur Stellung der Juden im neuen deutschen Staat,” June 21, 1933, reprinted by Meyer, Franz, In Zwei Welten, pp. 116–19Google Scholar, and by Herrmann, Die deutsch-jüdischen Organisationen, pp. 15–17. The document represents a concerted Zionist attempt to establish a “special relationship” with the Nazis. As Herrmann shows throughout his documentation, the Verband nationaldeutscher Juden and the Reichsbund jüdischer Frontsoldaten made similar efforts, based in their case on their record of German nationalism. The Nazis rejected these claims as ideologically in admissable, since a Jew could not, by his nature, be a true German nationalist.

34. Marcus, “The German Foreign Office and the Palestine Question”; Pinner, Ludwig, “Vermögenstransfer nach Palästina 1933–1939,” In Zwei Welten, pp. 133–66Google Scholar; Yisraeli, David, “The Third Reich and the Transfer Agreement,” Journal of Contemporary History 6 (1971), no. 2: 129–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

35. Klee, YW/01/217.

36. Cohen, YW/oi/6. Gestapo suspicion of Stahl confirmed by Gestapa (Gestapo-Amt) Berlin to Staatskommissar Hans Hinkel, Aug. 15, 1934, WL/575. Kareski had himself opposed the Nazis before 1933 (as had his political friends in the Center party), and had even been more vigorous in his demands for effective opposition to Nazi anti-Semitism than had most other Zionist leaders. See Paucker, Der jüdische Abwehrkampf, pp. 39, 252–53 (nn. 59, 67). This does not seem to have affected his later relationship with the police. The most likely reason was ideological. A Jew who had opposed Nazism before 1933 on a “Jewish national” basis was more acceptable to the Nazis than a supporter of Social Democracy, and far more acceptable than a Jew who might support the NSDAP on the basis of German nationalism.

37. In late September 1935 Stahl and Kareski's long-time close collaborator Alfred Klee signed the Reichsvertretung declaration on the Nuremberg laws, thus supporting the Reichsvertretung claim to represent all groups within German Jewry, and also supporting a reaction to the Nuremberg laws very different from Kareski's own (see below). See Lamm, “Entwicklung des deutschen Judentums,” pp. 106–9.

38. Kareski to Stahl, Oct. 4, 1935, CA/P 82/21; Kareski to Wolfgang von Weisl, Apr. 11, 1936, CA/P 82/17; Ball-Kaduri, “National Representation of Jews in Germany,” p. 162 and note. The law of 1847 had in the past caused tension between Prussian Jews and their government. See Lamberti, Marjorie, “The Prussian Government and the Jews: Official Behaviour and Policy-Making in the Wilhelminian Era,” LBI: YB 17 (1972): 5–17.Google Scholar

39. Freeden, Jüdisches Theater, gives the best account of the cultural leagues. Hinkel's files are in WL/575. Activities of the cultural leagues may be followed in the Berlin congregational newspaper, the Gemeindeblatt. See also Cohen, YW/01/6.

40. Freeden, Jüdisches Theater, pp. 62–65, follows Cohen, YW/01/6. See also Kareski-HOG trial material, CA/P 82/25. Before Kareski attempted to take over the cultural leagues, he had been opposed to using congregational funds to aid them. See Freeden, p. 90 and note. In August 1935 the Gestapo accepted Singer as president of the Reichsverband, but was worried about “assimilationist” influence in the Kulturbünde and supported an increase in Zionist and State Zionist participation at all levels. See Heydrich, circular, Aug. 13, 1935, IZ/MA 172. Kareski was apparently first proposed in late September or early October as Schulungsleiter in the Reichsverband, but his appointment was later escalated. See Kareski to Oskar Liskowski (Büro Staatskommissar Hinkel), Oct. 4, 1935, attached draft, CA/P 82/17. It took some time before the police gave up on the Kareski appointment and he was still described as president of the Reichsverband in SD-HA II 112, “Lagebericht der Abteilung II 112. April–Mai 1936,” June 25, 1936, NA/T–175/508/508/EAP 173-g-10–14/14/9374182–99. He never seems to have actually functioned in the Reichsverband in any capacity.

41. Friedrich Wolf (Paris) to Kareski, May 24, 1936, CA/P 82/16. Wolf suggested Bernhard was given the story by the former theatrical chief of the Berlin cultural league, Julius Bab. On Bab, a strong Central-Verein anti-Zionist, see Freeden, Jüdisches Theater, esp. pp. 17, 31–33.

42. The Times (London), Dec. 16, 1935; Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Dec. 17, 1935. The affair is discussed in Cohen, YW/01/6, and at length in Kareski–HOG trial materials, CA/P 82, esp. 25, 27.

43. Kareski to Liskowski, Oct. 4, 1935, and attached draft, CA/P 82/17.

44. Angriff (Berlin), Dec. 23, 1935, reprinted in Herrmann, Die deutsch-jüdischen Organisationen, pp. 9–11.

45. Press samplings, WL/G 15.

46. The Congress Bulletin (American Jewish Congress, New York), Jan 24, 1936.

47. From 1935, British policy was strongly opposed to large-scale Jewish immigration to Palestine. See Laqueur, Zionism, pp. 509ff. Even before 1935, the waverings of British policy helped to limit Jewish immigration.

48. Kareski's emphasis on total liquidation of the German Jewish community was relatively new. In the spring of 1933 he had still supposed that many or most Jews would remain in Germany. In regard to them, his position had been close to that of the Central-Verein. See Lamm, “Die Entwicklung des deutschen Judentums,” p. 147.

49. Jewish Agency, memorandum, Nov. 12, 1935, ASDN/33–46: 50/18812/20701 (R 5630); Tuchler, Kurt, “Ordnung in der Auflösung,” In Zwei Welten, pp. 128–32Google Scholar. In 1935 the Reichsvertretung decided to plan for a Jewish emigration of 12,000 to 20,000 per year for the period 1936–41. After the revival of active persecution in the summer of 1935 there was no shortage of prospective emigrants, but only of places to send them. Actual Jewish emigration in 1936 reached 24,000 according to the Reichsvertretung compilations, and continued to climb thereafter. See the “Arbeitsberichte des Zentralausschusses für Hilfe und Aufbau bei der Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland,” esp. 1935 and 1936, IZ/MA 727/2.

50. Information on Kareski's speeches and plans comes from the Staatszionist, early 1935; Pomeranz, Hans, “Zionistische Arbeit in Frankfurt/M von 1932–1939,” 1960, YW/01/275Google Scholar; Klee, YW/01/217; Pomeranz, YW/01/245; anonymous undated memorandum on the Staatszionist, WL/G 15; Kareski-HOG trail material, CA/P 82/25, 28; Kareski, “Liquidation des deutschen Judentums,” Mar. 1935, and undated memorandum on emigration plan (by internal evidence, early 1935), CA/P 82/31. Earlier attempts by the Verband nationaldeutscher Juden and the Reichsbund jüdischer Frontsoldaten (esp. by the former) to gain some sort of Nazi-sanctioned control over German Jewish life bear some similarity to Kareski's plan, although the latter was certainly developed independently.

See Herrmann, Die deutsch-jüdischen Organisationan, esp. pp. 66–67, 74–80, 94–98, 100. The Kareski plan differed from these proposals in its highly detailed nature, in its suggestions for economic and police control over individual Jews, and in its essential purpose, the liquidation of the German Jewish community (rather than its survival within Germany as a participating section of society). It is not possible to say what influence, if any, Kareski's plans had on official German planning in 1935.

51. Mommsen, “Der nationalsozialistische Polizeistaat,” doc. no. 5.

52. Schleunes, Twisted Road, chaps. 7, 8; Ball-Kaduri, , “Von der ‘Reichsvertretung’ zur ‘Reichsvereinigung,’” Zeitschrift für die Geschichte der Juden 1 (1964): 191–99Google Scholar; Esh, Shaul, “The Establishment of the ‘Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutscbland’ and Its Main Activities,” YWS 7 (1968): 19–38Google Scholar; Adam, Judenpolitik, pp. 229–32. Important documents on the change are in WL/602, 604. The Reichsvereinigung plan was developed in early 1939 through Gestapo and SS channels, and presumably built on previous German confiscatory legislation (esp. the one billion mark fine imposed after the Kristallnacht), as well as on the experiences of Eichmann in organizing massive emigration in Vienna and Prague. But the genesis of the plan remains somewhat obscure.

53. Suggested by Cohen, YW/01/245.

54. SD-HA II 112, “Lagebericht der Abteilung II 112, April-Mai 1936,” June 25, 1936, NA/T–175/508/508/EAP 173-g-10–14/14/9374182–99; Kareski to Wolfgang von Weisl (Vienna), Apr. 11, 1936, CA/P 82/17; Weisl to Kareski, Apr. 14, 1936, CA/P 82/16. Weisl had for years been a well-known Revisionist activist in Europe and Palestine. See scattered references in Schechtman and Benari, Revisionist Movement, and Schechtman, Jabotinsky Story, vol. 2.

55. Claimed by Meyer, H. C., in Stern, , Warum hassen sie uns? p. 362Google Scholar, on information from Wolfgang von Weisl. The police appear to have been aware of, and to have approved of, Kareski's desire for illegal Palestinian immigration. See Mommsen, “Der nationalsozialistische Polizeistaat,” doc. no. 5. No details of the scheme are available, and it may have been no more than a vague notion, never applied.

56. Jabotinsky's insistence on an economic boycott of Nazi Germany was absolute and grew out of a genuine moral commitment, as well as out of an effective propaganda campaign aimed against the WZO and its program of transfering German Jewish property to Palestine by means of massive purchases of German goods. Jabotinsky would allow for no lapses in the matter, but he continued to use Kareski as his contact in Germany, despite their obvious policy differences. See Schechtman, , Jabotinsky Story, 2: 29.Google Scholar

57. Kareski speech, “Haben wir eine Reichsvertretung?” Feb. 2, 1937, CA/P 82/31.

58. Loc. cit.; Gemeindeblatt, Jan.-May 1937, esp. Stahl speech, Jan. 17, and Kreindler editorial, “Der Erlösungsmarsch,” May 30, 1937, as examples.

59. Paltreu and Haavara had been functioning quite well, in agreement with the German government. In February 1937, coincident with Kareski's first attack, the government changed the rules greatly to the disadvantage of emigrants, and the two institutions enencountered increasing government opposition thereafter. The opposition came from two sources, operating on diametrically opposed policy considerations. The Foreign Office and other ministries began to speculate on the advantages of Arab friendship, while they developed hesitations about encouraging the formation of a new center of Jewish power in Palestine. The SS and police circles in contact with Kareski still desired to encourage Jewish settlement in Palestine in order to remove Jews from Germany, and opposed stirring up Arab nationalism in Palestine for that reason. This policy was altered only slowly, with great reluctance. But the police did approve of making difficulties for the Haauara transfer, as a ploy to convince the British to issue more labor certificates in order to empty Germany of its poorer Jews first, rather than giving favored treatment to the wealthy. The change in policy toward Haavara in early 1937 allowed Kareski to attack the transfer with impunity. See SD-HA II 112, “Zum Judenproblem,” Jan. 1937, NA/T-175/508/508/EAP 173−g-10–14/12/9374067–86; Pinner, “Vermögenstransfer,” esp. p. 152; Yisraeli, “Transfer Agreement,” pp. 136–40.

60. “Summary of Budget of Reichsvertretung for Work inside Germany in 1937,” March 1937, WL/606.

61. The Reichsvertretung is frequently identified with Baeck alone, but Otto Hirsch played a vital political and organizational role. On Hirsch, see Zelzer, Maria, Weg und Schicksal der Stuttgarter Juden (Stuttgart, 1964), pp. 275–80.Google Scholar

62. Gemeindeblatt, May 30,1937; Gemeindevorstand to Reichsvertretung, June 1, 1937, and Reichsvertretung to Gemeindevorstand, June 4, 1937, WL/603.

63. Central-Verein Zeitung, June 10, 1937; Jüdische Rundschau (organ of Zionistische Vereinigung), June 4 and 11, 1937; Gemeindeblatt, June 13, 1937. Despite considerable and increasing limitations, the Jewish press in the Third Reich was relatively free to express differing opinions on internal Jewish questions until its virtual disappearance after the Kristallnacht. The most important limitation, by 1935, was directed against those Jews who tried to convince their fellows to remain in Germany. See Lamm, “Die Entwicklung des deutschen Judentums,” pp. 134–35.

64. Lord Herbert Samuel to Baeck, June 11, 1937, and see also Samuel and O. E. d'Avigdor Goldschmid to Felix Warburg, draft telegram, n.d. (June 10, 1937?), Meyer Stephany (Joint Secretary, Council for German Jewry) to Samuel, June 11, 1937, WL/606.

65. “Protokoll der Sitzung des Präsidialausschusses und des Rats der Reichsvertretung … vom 15. Juni 1937,” and “Protokoll der Sitzung der Ratskommission vom 28. Juni 1937,” WL/602; Council for German Jewry, unsigned memorandum, June 29, 1937, WL/606.

66. Das Jüdische Volk, first issue, July 2, 1937, and issues following. See also Jüdische Rundschau, June 18, 1937, and Gemeindeblatt, June 20, 1937, for continuing press war.

67. As was pointed out in a well-informed, carefully nonpartisan memorandum by World Jewish Congress, Secretariat of the International Centre (Geneva), “The Position of the Jews in Germany (end of October 1937),” submitted to League of Nations officials, Nov. 25 and Dec. 13, 1937, ASDN/33–46: 50/7100/31721 (R 5720).

68. The murder threat was a major subject at the Kareski-HOG trial. See CA/P 82/25, and Kareski to Zoltán Illés (editor, Das Jüdische Volk), Nov. 11, 1937, CA/P 82/27.

69. “Protokoll der Sitzung der Ratskommission vom 28. Juni 1937,” and “Protokoll der gemeinsamen Sitzung von Rat und Präsidialausschuss am 7·7·37,” WL/602; Das Jüdische Volk, July 9, 1937.

70. Major sources for the Iwria scandal: contemporary issues of Gemeindeblatt and Das Jüdische Volk; anonymous undated contemporary memorandum, “Der Fall Kareski,” WL/G 15; Kareski-HOG trial material, CA/P 82/25–28. Other references scattered throughout CA/P 82 and YW/01/245.

71. Das Jüdische Volk, July 23, 1937; Gemeindeblatt, Oct. 24, 1937; “Schriftsatz der HOG,” Nov. 24, 1937, CA/P 82/25; Stern, Warum hassen sie uns?, p. 217.

72. See n. 52, above. After the Kristallnacht the Jewish political organizations were dissolved. The State Zionist Organization, of no use to the Nazis after the Kareski debacle, had already been disbanded by the authorities on Aug. 31, 1938, on the grounds that it had maintained connections with the international Revisionist movement, which was hostile to Germany. See Hagen (SD–HA II 112), “Die Organisationen der Judenheit, ihre Verbindungen und politische Bedeutung,” Sept. 1938, NA/T–175/411/411/EAP 173-b-16–14/63/2936219–56.

73. There is very strong, but not conclusive, evidence that Kareski used blackmail and secret denunciations in 1935 against Alfred Kupferberg, editor of the Israelitisches Familienblatt. The Familienblatt was eventually taken over by Kareski's friend Leo Kreindler. See Kareski-HOG trial material, CA/P 82/25, 27, esp. Kupferberg affidavit, Oct. 28, 1937 (P 82/25), and Mrs. Kreindler to Leo Kreindler, Nov. 11, 1937 (P 82/27).

74. Kareski, letter to the editor, Sept. 28, 1937, Israelitisches Wochenblatt für die Schweiz, Oct. 1, 1937. Kareski may have planned his attack on the Reichsvertretung in cooperation with the police, since an important meeting between Kareski and an associate and police officials on Nov. 24, 1936, is recorded in SD-HA II 112, “Tätigkeitsbericht 1.10.1936–15.2.1937,” Feb. 17, 1937, IZ/EICH (Eichmann-Prozess. Beweis-Dokumente) 1451. No indication of the subject of the meeting is given. In June 1937 Kareski offered to provide two free tickets to the SD for a trip to the Middle East (eventually made by Hagen and Eichmann of SD–HA II 112), but this offer was rejected for fear Kareski's involvement would make it obvious that the German “journalists” to be sent to the Middle East were actually police intelligence operatives. See Hagen (SD–HA II 112), report, June 17, 1937, NA/T–175/411/411/EAP 173–15–16–14/62/2936189–94.

75. Meyer, H. C., in Stern, Warrum hassen sie uns?Google Scholar

76. Meyer, loc. cit., cites Weisl. On later Revisionist activities in Danzig, where a Revisionist did succeed in taking over Jewish leadership in collaboration with the police, see Levine, Herbert S., Hitler's Free City (Chicago, 1973), pp. 136–37Google Scholar. The British closely watched illegal Zionist immigration to Palestine, Revisionist and otherwise, and important material is in the Public Record Office, London, esp. in FO (Foreign Office) 371, file 1369/48, part of which is still closed until 1990.

77. Nevile Henderson (British ambassador, Berlin) to Lord Halifax (British foreign minister), Mar. 23, 1938, Public Record Office, FO 371/21693/C 2112/251/18, reports conversation of Mar. 19, 1938, between embassy official and Hans Friedenthal, then head of the Zionistische Vereinigung. On partition plans, see Laqueur, Zionism, pp. 516–27.

78. Weltsch, Robert, “Deutscher Zionismus in der Rückschau,” In Zwei Welten, pp. 27–42Google Scholar. Weltsch himself, as editor of the Jüdische Rundschau during the Nazi period, regularly disparaged the notion of an exclusively Jewish state in Palestine, and this “cultural Zionist” position caused some difficulty within the Zionistische Vereinigung. See Lichtheim, Geschichte des deutschen Zionismus, pp. 236–41. Weltsch, like fellow German Zionist Georg Landauer, was badly disillusioned by the manner in which the Zionist movement developed and the state of Israel was founded. The process of disillusionment may be followed closely in Landauer, Zionismus.

79. Hannah, Arendt, “Zionism Reconsidered,” Menorah Journal 33 (1945)Google Scholar, reprinted in Michael, Selzer, ed., Zionism Reconsidered (New York, 1970), pp. 213–49, esp. pp. 213–14.Google Scholar

80. Cohen, YW/01/6.

81. Trunk, Isaiah, Judenrat (New York, 1972), pp. 570–75Google Scholar. Cf. Levine, Herbert S., “Comments [on the European Jewish Holocaust],” Societas—A Review of Social History (1972): 277.Google Scholar