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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 December 2008
Historians have generally limited their interest in the Fashoda Crisis to the Anglo-French diplomatic confrontation, which they believe ultimately led to a general understanding on African matters and to the Entente Cordiale. The crisis itself, however, had ramifications which went far beyond the complexities of British-French relations and which historians have yet to appreciate fully. The incident on the Nile precipitated a complete, if temporary, turnabout in France's revanchist policy toward Germany, and equally important, it offered Germany two possible options to defuse the antagonism France had held toward her since the treaty of Frankfurt twenty-seven years before: Germany could encourage war between the two nations or she could join France in an understanding, if not an alliance, against Great Britain in order to counter British dominance in Africa.
1. The best monographic treatments of the diplomacy of the crisis are Brown's, RogerFashoda Reconsidered (Baltimore, 1970)Google Scholar and Giffen's, Morrison B.Fashoda (Chicago, 1930)Google Scholar. For more on the Marchand mission, see Wright's, PatriciaIncident on the Nile (London, 1972)Google Scholar. Langer's, W. L.Diplomacy of Imperialism (London, 1935), vol. 2, holds essentially this view and gives a good bibliographical note of memoirs and special studies, pp. 578–80.Google Scholar For a broader overview of the whole African question, there is Sanderson's, G. N.England, Europe and the Upper Nile, 1882–1899 (Edinburgh, 1965)Google Scholar; for the interpretation above, see pp. 31 and 335; also see Sanderson's, article, “The Origin and Significance of the Anglo-French Confrontation at Fashoda, 1898,” in Gifford, Prosser and Louis, William Roger, eds., France and Britain in Africa (New Haven, 1971), pp. 285–331.Google Scholar An excellent examination of Anglo-French relations and the effect on the future entente is chaps. 5ff. of Andrew's, ChristopherThéophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale (New York, 1968).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2. The major works pay scant attention to Germany's role. Even Giffen's study, which includes a chapter entitled “Germany and the Disputants,” deals mostly with the role of Germany before the crisis and makes no allusions to Germany's attempts to foment war. Bittner's, L. “Neue Beiträge zur Haltung Kaiser Wilhelms II in der Faschodafrage,” Historische Zeitschrift 162 (1940): 540–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar, while alluding to William's efforts, mainly examines events in the early fall of 1898 before the Kaiser really perfected his policy. Only Eyck, Erich in Das persönliche Regiment Wilhelms II (Erlenbach-Zurich, 1948), pp. 247–48Google Scholar, implies in passing that William actively encouraged war, yet he never develops the point. Winzen's, Peter excellent work Bülows Weltmachtkonzept (Boppard am Rhein, 1977)Google Scholar, never addresses Germany's role in the affair. Garvin, James L. in The Life of Chamberlain (London, 1934), 3: 236Google Scholar, states only casually that the Kaiser wanted war.
3. Salisbury to Queen Victoria (cabinet report), Oct. 27, 1898, The Victoria Archive, Windsor Castle; Chamberlain memorandum of Salisbury to Monson, Oct. 12, 1898, Joseph Chamberlain Papers, JC 7/2/1/15, University of Birmingham Archives, Birmingham, Great Britain.
4. Brown, p. 126.
5. Sanderson, England, p. 344.
6. Blunt, Wilfred S., My Diaries (London, 1921), p. 303.Google Scholar
7. For a detailed examination of this point, see Brown, p. 131 n. and passim.
8. For the French reaction, see Russie: dossier général, Aug. 24, 1898, vol. 16, no. 174, Archives du Ministère des affaires étrangères, Paris (hereafter cited AMAE).
9. Toutain to Delcassé, Sept. 12, 1898, Russie: l'alliance franco-russe, vol. 34, no. 374, AMAE. For the resulting stiffening of the French position, see Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 28, 1898, Foreign Office Records, Public Record Office, London, FO 27 (hereafter cited as FO 27), vol. 3400, no. 154, Oct. 21, 1898, no. 183, and Oct. 27, 1898, no. 189.
10. See Krasnyi arkhiv 54–55 (1932): 72Google Scholar; Faure, Félix, “Fachoda (1898),” Revue l'historié diplomatique 69 (1955): 38.Google Scholar
11. Castell to Foreign Office (Hohenlohe), Oct. 27, 1898, Frankreich 116: Frankreichs Beziehungen zu England, Jan. 1. – Dec. 20, 1898 (hereafter cited as Frankreich 116), Bd. 6, no. 709, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Bonn, Germany (hereafter cited as PA); Scott to Salisbury, Nov. 17, 1898, Foreign Office Records, Public Record Office, London, FO 65 (hereafter cited as FO 65), vol. 1156, no. 373; also see vols. 1153, 1154, and 1155 passim.
12. France, , Ministère des affairs étrangères, Documents diplomatique français (hereafter cited DDF) (Paris, 1929–1959), 1ère série, 14: 618–19.Google Scholar
13. Ibid., p. 779.
14. Germany, Amt, Auswärtiges, Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1870–1914 (hereafter cited GP), ed. Lepsius, Johannes, Mendelsshon-Bartholdy, A., and Thimme, Friedrich, 14 (Berlin, 1924): 399.Google Scholar
15. Nachlass Bülow, vol. 151, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, cited by Winzen, p. 129. I myself examined Bülow's papers but confined my investigation to the chronological period in question. I also examined in Koblenz the Reichskanzleiarchiv at Potsdam on microfiche, “Angelegenheiten Frankreichs sowie Beziehungen zwischen Frankreich und Deutschland,” R 43/F/5, but found only two documents related to the question, and both were copies of letters in the Bundesarchiv.
16. Bülow to Eulenburg, Nov. 9, 1898, Nachlass Eulenburg, vol. 52, p. 318, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.
17. GP, 14: 218.
18. von Bülow, Bernhard, Memoirs (London, 1930), 1: 319Google Scholar; although officially disinterested the German government carefully observed the military actions of both powers in almost tiresome detail. See Memorandum, Oct. 22, 1898, Frankreich 116, Bd. 6, no. 282, and unnumbered notes on Oct. 31 and Nov. 1, 1898 in the same file and volume.
19. Bülow, , Memoirs, 1: 298–301Google Scholar; Rich, Norman, Friedrich von Holstein (Cambridge, 1965), 2: 442–43.Google Scholar
20. GP, 14: 371.
21. Salisbury to Queen Victoria, Oct. 29, 1898, O–31, Victoria Archive.
22. Bittner, p. 547.
23. Geiss, Emmanual, German Foreign Policy, 1871–1914 (London, 1976)Google Scholar; von Eckardstein, Baron, Ten Years at the Court of St. James (London, 1921), p. 93Google Scholar; Chamberlain memorandum, Mar. 29, 1898, Chamberlain Papers, JC 7/2/2A/3; Sanderson, p. 325; Porter, A. N., The Origins of the South African War: Joseph Chamberlain and the Diplomacy of Imperialism 1895–99 (New York, 1980)Google Scholar; Kennedy, Paul M., The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914 (London, 1982)Google Scholar; “Die deutsch-englischen Bündnisgespräche von 1898,” in Winzen, pp. 156–75; Papadaponious, G. S., “Lord Salisbury and the projected Anglo-German Alliance in 1898,” Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 26 (1953): 214–18Google Scholar; Beazley, Raymond, “Joseph Chamberlain und die englischen-deutschen Beziehungen im Jahre 1898,” Berliner Monatshefte 13 (1935): 1011–31.Google Scholar
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25. SirBeazley, Raymond, “Britain, Germany and the Portuguese Colonies, 1898–1899,” Berliner Monatshefte 14 (1936): 321–43Google Scholar; GP, 14: 347ff; von Hatzfeldt, Botschafter Paul Graf, Nachgelassene Papiere, 1838–1901, ed. Ebel, Gerhard (Boppard am Rhein, 1976), 2: 1186 n.Google Scholar; Foreign Office, Gooch, G. P., ed., British Documents on the Origins of the Great War, 1898–1914 (hereafter cited BD) (London, 1927), 1: 59.Google Scholar
26. Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 28, 1898, FO 27, vol. 4300, no. 154, and Oct. 24, 1898, no. 183; Oct. 21, 1898, vol. 3397, no. 532; Dec. 9, 1898, vol. 3398, no. 677.
27. Not that it mattered to Great Britain anyway. Castell to Foreign Office (Hohenlohe), Oct. 27, 1898, Frankreich 116, Bd. 6, no. 709.
28. Gooch, G. P., Before the War: Studies in Diplomacy (New York, 1936), 1: 96.Google Scholar The French foreign minister wrote to his wife that he felt that France would not have won a war with Britain even with Russian help. Delcassé Mss. Oct. 22, 1898, cited in Andrew, p. 102.
29. Cambon, Paul, Correspondence 1870–1924 (Paris, 1940), 2: 14.Google Scholar
30. Charles Scott to Salisbury, Nov. 17, 1898, FO 65, vol. 1556, no. 373.
31. Le Soleil, Nov. 13, 1898.
32. Lascelles to Salisbury, Nov. 8, 1898, Foreign Office Records, Public Record Office, London, FO 64 (hereafter cited as FO 64), vol. 1439, no. 299.
33. von Bülow, Bernhard, Imperial Germany (New York, 1914), p. 106.Google Scholar
34. GP, 13: 243.
35. Bittner, p. 541.
36. See marginals throughout the crisis, GP, 14: 389ff.; (signature illegible) to Foreign Office, Dec. 7, 1898, Frankreich 116, Bd. 6, no. 842, marginals, PA.
37. Willy to Nicky, Oct. 29, 1898, Botschaft St. Petersburg: Korrespondenz S. M. des Kaisers und Königs mit Kaiser Nikolaus, 1898, no. 760, PA; Deutsches Auswärtiges Amt, Dokumente der Deutschen Politik und Geschichte von 1848 bis zur Gegenwart (Berlin, 1935), 2: 89.Google Scholar
38. GP, 14: 385–86.
39. Ibid., p. 395.
40. There are several versions of this telegram for reasons that will be shown. GP, 14: 394–95; Willy to Nicky, Nov. 14 (possibly 19, the date it was finally transmitted from Berlin to St. Petersburg), Korrespondenz … (see n. 37), no. 922; Letters of the Kaiser to the Czar, p. 63.
41. GP, 14: 395–96.
42. Ibid., 14: 397–98; even with this change, the German ambassador to St. Petersburg advised against delivering the note.
43. Lascelles to Salisbury, Oct. 13, 1898, FO 64, vol. 1439, no. 271; BD, 1: 192; the empress may have had a health problem that also hastened his return, or at least that was what the Foreign Office reported. Richthofen to Hohenlohe, Nov. 6, 1898, Nachlass Hohenlohe, vol. 1610, no. 201, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz.
44. GP, 14: 393. The Kaiser's marginal: “A bit late. That would have been possible three years ago in the Transvaal Crisis.”
45. Carroll, Eber M., French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs (New York, 1931), p. 176Google Scholar; for the logic of it, see Farrar, L. L., Arrogance and Anxiety (Iowa City, 1981), p. 25.Google Scholar
46. Wienefeld, Robert W., Franco-German Relations, 1878–1885 (Baltimore, 1929), p. 148.Google Scholar
47. The Times (London), 10 10, 1884.Google Scholar
48. Langer, W. L. writes, “There is no question that the mood of revanche receded precipitously during and after the crisis.” Langer, 2: 567Google Scholar.
49. de Staal, Baron, Correspondence diplomatique de Baron de Staal (Paris, 1929), 2: 402.Google Scholar
50. Lascelles to Salisbury, Jan. 21, 1899, FO 64, vol. 1469, no. 19.
51. Carroll, French Public Opinion, pp. 176–80; Langer, 2: 566; The Times (London), 11 14, 1898Google Scholar; Brown, p. 122.
52. Fauchille, Paul, “L'Europe nouvelle,” Revue Générale de Droit International Public, 6 (01 16, 1899): 5–8.Google Scholar
53. Anon., “La Question d'Alsace-Lorraine, est-elle insoluble?” Revue Générale de Droit International Public 5 (1898): 744–49.Google Scholar
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55. Brown, pp. 120 and 122–24.
56. Monson to Salisbury, Dec. 9, 1898, FO 27, vol. 3398, no. 677; Langer, 2: 555; Andrew shows that Delcassé was not a blind Germanophobe in “German Policy and the Reshaping of the Dual Alliance,” Journal of Contemporary History 1, no. 3 (1966): 137–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
57. Benson, E. F., The Kaiser and English Relations (New York, 1936), p. 186.Google Scholar
58. William's, marginals on the question are condescendingly sarcastic: “You may whistle for it!” “O poor France!” etc. GP, 13: 256, 392, and 412.Google Scholar
59. Bernard, , von Bülow, Fürst, Memoirs of Prince von Bülow, trans. Voigt, F. A. (Boston, 1931–1932), 1: 318 and 401.Google Scholar
60. Bülow, Imperial Germany, p. 106.
61. Ibid., p. 31.
62. Hatzfeldt, Nachgelassene Papiere, 2: 1196–97.
63. GP, 13: 58.
64. Ibid., p. 242.
65. Viktor, Chlodwig Karl, zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, Fürst, Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit, ed. von Müller, K. A. (Stuttgart, 1931), p. 483Google Scholar; Carroll, Germany and the Great Powers, p. 425. By the time he had committed his thoughts to paper, Hohenlohe's memory had apparently become hazy. Diplomatic dispatches show that he was indeed knowledgeable about the negotiations. See GP, 13: 242, 254–56; 266–68; also see DDF, 14: 853.
66. Giffin, p. 146.
67. Brown, p. 75; GP, 13: 105.
68. Monson to Salisbury, Dec. 9, 1898, Salisbury Papers, 3M/A116. In July Hanotaux had had talks with Germany about an understanding before he fell from office, yet after replacing him, Delcassé had not resumed them. See Giffen, pp. 149–51.
69. GP, 13: 247–54.
70. Ibid., p. 253.
71. Ibid.
72. Langer, 2: 568.
73. GP, 13: 408–9.
74. Carroll, Germany and the Great Powers, p. 426.
75. Monson to Salisbury, Dec. 16, 1898, FO 27, vol. 3398, no. 689.
76. Lalance, A., “La Nouvelle Triplice,” Grande Review, 12 1, 1898Google Scholar, cited in Carroll, French Public Opinion, p. 178.
77. DDF, 14: 853.
78. GP, 14: 411–12.
79. See Richthofen to Bülow, Nov. 8, 1898, Frankreich 116, Bd. 6, no. 134; GP, 14: 388.
80. Eulenburg to Kaiser, Nov. 15, 1898, Nachlass Eulenburg, vol. 52, pp. 319–20; for other encouragement see GP, 14: nos. 3924–29. Using this alleged influence, William never let pass an opportunity to inform the British that they could depend on Germany in the event of an Anglo-French conflict.
81. Lascelles to Salisbury, Dec. 10, 1898, Salisbury Papers, 3M/121; he restated this position in a letter to the queen. William II to Queen Victoria, Dec. 20, 1898, 1–61, Victoria Archive.
82. Memorandum, Dec. 26, 1898, Chamberlain Papers, JC 7/2/2A/13; Holstein confirms that William's claims about the Portuguese loan question were bluster. Rich, Norman, ed., The Holstein Papers (Cambridge, 1955–1963), 4: 101.Google Scholar
83. BD, 1: 102.
84. Memo to Salisbury, Dec. 16, 1898, Salisbury Papers, 3M/121.
85. Monson to Salisbury, Nov. 21, 1898, FO 27, vol. 3398, no. 633.
86. Lascelles to Salisbury, Dec. 21, 1898, FO 64, vol. 1439, no. 339.
87. Copy of letter from the Kaiser to the Tsar, Dec. 2/14, 1898, Nachlass Bulow, vol. 112, p. 53; Bülow quotes the letter in full in his Memoirs, 1: 316.
88. Montebello to Delcassé, Dec. 22, 1898, Grande Bretagne: relations avec Angleterre, vol. 11, no. 132, AMAE. Muraviev continued his warnings into January. See DDF, 15: 41–42.
89. Scott to Lascelles, Jan. 12, 1899, Lascelles MSS, FO 800, vol. 9, British Library, London.
90. Noailles to Delcassé, Jan. 8, 1899, Allemagne: dossier général, vol. 15, no. 13, AMAE; within a few days of his gratuitous show of friendship, William privately referred to President Faure as “ce foutu president.” GP, 13: 408–9.
91. GP, 13: 262. Kaiser's marginal.
92. Hatzfeldt, Nachgelassene Papiere, 2: 1196–97.
93. DDF, 15: 135.
94. Ibid., pp. 135–36.
95. Ibid., pp. 139–41.
96. New York Herald, Feb. 26, 1899; Monson to Salisbury, Feb. 27, 1899, FO 27, vol. 3456, no. 119.
97. Hatzfeldt, Nachgelassene Papiere, 2: 1196 n.
98. Monson to Salisbury, Feb. 3, 1899, FO 27, vol. 3455, no. 67.
99. T. H. Sanderson to Lascelles, Jan. 25, 1899, Lascelles MSS, FO 800, vol. 9.
100. GP, 14: 425, Kaiser's marginal.
101. Lascelles to Salisbury, Mar. 31, 1899, Salisbury Papers, 3M/121.
102. Lt. Col. Grierson to Sir A. Bigge, Apr. 1, 1899, 1–62, Victoria Archive.
103. Kölnische Zeitung, Feb. 24, 1899, cited in Carroll, French Public Opinion, pp. 179–80.
104. DDF, 15: 434–37.
105. The Holstein Papers, 4: 396.
106. von Tirpitz, Admiral A., My Memoirs (New York, 1919), 1: 260Google Scholar; Graham, Stuart, French Foreign Policy (New York, 1921), p. 27.Google Scholar