Research for this article was supported by a National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Stipend for Young Humanists and by a grant from the American Philosophical Society's Penrose Fund.

1. Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik, 1918–1945, Series B (Göttingen, 1966), 1/2: 115–16, from Stresemann's notes on a conversation with the French chargé d'affaires, Aug. 22, 1926. Series B of the German foreign policy documents (hereafter Akten DAP), although a rich source overall, begins only with Dec. 1925).

2. Castellan, Georges, L'Allemagne de Weimar 1918–1933 (Paris, 1969)Google Scholar, accepts Locarno as a guarantee of the status quo, pp. 33off. Such an interpretation persists even in specialized studies. See, for example, Enssle, Manfred, “Germany and Belgium, 1919–1929: A Study of German Foreign Policy” (diss., University of Colorado, 1970), p. 162:Google Scholar “Was it possible to guarantee the status quo along the Belgo-German frontier and, at the same time, seek the return of Eupen-Malmédy?” The assumption behind the rhetorical question leads Enssle to a series of misjudgments concerning German policy on Eupen-Malmédy. See his chaps. V and VI.

3. Jacobson, Jon, Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West, 1925–1929 (Princeton, 1972)Google Scholar, advances the argument that Stresemann's revisionism and Briand's desire for French security were incompatible and that the opportunities for peace presented by the Locarno accords “were more apparent than real” (p. 373 but also passim), as well as the assertion that Briand defended the treaty “in a manner worthy of Poincare” (p. 382). While Jacobson's book overall is excellent, I do have reservations about this aspect of his argument. See my review of his book in Journal of Modem History 45, no. 2 (June 1973): 350–52.

4. Miller, Jane Kathryn, Belgian Foreign Policy between the Two Wars, 1919–1940 (New York, 1951), pp. 94–98Google Scholar; Wambaugh, Sarah, Plebiscites since the World War (Washington, 1933), PP. 519–38Google Scholar; Price, Arnold H., “The Belgian-German Frontier during World War II,” The Maryland Historian 1, no. 2 (Fall 1970): 145–53Google Scholar, discusses in detail the actual territorial extent of the enclave.

5. Miller, p. 150.

6. United States National Archives, Washington, D.C., microcopy T-120 (Auswärtiges Amt), roll 2259, series 4503, frames E121337–40 (hereafter cited AA, 2259/4503/ E121337–40). The information is taken from a report submitted in November 1924 by Embassy Counselor Kurt Rieth and quoted extensively in a long study of the occupation mark question prepared for the German foreign ministry in July 1926 by former Reichsbank Vice-President Otto Glasenapp.

7. Enssle, “Germany and Belgium, 1919–1929,” p. 162f., citing Pabst, Klaus, “Eupen-Malmedy in der belgischen Regierungs- und Parteienpolitik 1914–1940,” Zeitschrift des Aachener Geschichtsschriftvereins 76 (1964): 457.Google Scholar Pabst's “article” is over 300 pages long.

8. AA telegram Apr. 4, 1925, Stresemann to London, Paris, and Brussels, filed in the Politisches Archiv, Bonn, under Büro des Reichsministers, Aktenzeichen 15, Nummer 1, Band 3. This document, originally consulted by the writer in Bonn, bears the microframe numbers D642965–68. In cases involving documents consulted in Germany the abbreviations RM (or StS in the case of documents filed under Büro des Staatssekretärs), Az., Nr. and Bd(e). will be used hereafter, with the addition of microframe numbers where such appear on the original documents. See also AA, 2258/4503/E120522–25, a handwritten list of contacts between Belgium and Germany prepared on July 18, 1926. See also Wambaugh, Plebiscite, pp. 535–36.

9. AA, StS, Az. 88, Bd. 1, telegram Hoesch to Stresemann, Apr. 4, 1925 (unfilmed). Filmed in 1459/3015/D590532–34; Delacroix had associated Francqui with his November proposal as well. See above, n. 6.

10. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Benjamin Strong Papers, Trip July 1925, Strong to Case, Brussels, July 28, 1925.

11. Telegram, Apr. 4, 1925, cited in n. 8.

12. Stresemann's notes on the conversation, Mar. 31, 1925, AA, RM, Az. 15, Nr. 1, Bd. 1, D642923–27. Using the same documents I have cited in nn. 11 and 12, Enssle argues that Stresemann tried to “conceal German intentions on the Eupen-Malmédy question” (p. 161) and that he tried to isolate Belgium from her allies in order to facilitate the return of Eupen-Malmédy (p. 156). I find both interpretations incompatible with the evidence.

13. AA, 1510/3123/D643483–85, Stresemann's notes on a conversation with Edgar Lord D'Abernon, June 10, 1925.

14. British Museum, London, D'Abernon Papers, 48928, telegram, D'Abemon to Chamberlain, Jan. 23, 1925. See also ibid., Jan. 26, 1925, the document labeled in longhand in the upper left “Note by H[is]. E[xcellency].,” as well as a translation of the German memorandum labeled in longhand “To F.O. No. 118 of Feb. 12 Communicated to the French Government Feb. 9, 1925,” in which the crucial line reads “a pact expressly guaranteeing the present territorial status (‘gegenwärtiger Besitzstand’) on the Rhine.” For a similar Belgian version see Archives générales du Royaume, Brussels, Paul Hymans Papers, Dossier 466/III, conversation between German charge d'affaires and Hymans, Feb. 23, 1925, with attached translation, in which the key phrase reads: “un pacte qui guarantisse explicitement l'état actuel des possessions sur le Rhin.”

15. Ibid., 466/V, copy of a telegram, Ruzette to Gaiffier (Paris) and Moncheur (London), Brussels, May 26, 1925. A similar document is printed in Documents Diplomatiques Belges, 1920–1040: La Politique de Securité extérieure, ed. de Visscher, Ch. and Vanlangenhove, F. (Brussels, 1964Google Scholar; hereafter cited as DDB), 2: 190ff., no. 57. The published document does not, however, contain the passage cited here and suffers from other significant omissions when compared to the document in the Hymans Papers.

16. See, for example, Stresemann's specific discussion of the status of Eupen–Malmédy in the cabinet meeting of June 24, 1925, Germany, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, documents of the Alte Reichskanzlei (hereafter ARK), R431/1403/D765053–54.

17. The original text of the French note is available in DDB, 2: 216–19; the German translation in German Democratic Republic, Foreign Office, Locarno-Konferenz 1925: Eine Dokumentensammlung (Berlin, 1962), pp. 100–103. For the German reply of July 20 see ibid., pp. 107–13. Stresemann's reference to the League Charter is to Article 19, which reads: “The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.” This provision was seen by the Germans as conceding the possibility of revision, a point of view the Allies also accepted. For a recent review and discussion of Stresemann and revision see this writer's “Gustav Stresemann: Reflections on His Foreign Policy,” Journal of Modern History 45, no. 1 (Mar. 1973): 52–70.

18. AA, RM, Az. 15, Nr. 1, Bd. 5, telegram, Stresemann to Hoesch, July 18, 1925.

19. Ibid., Hoesch to Stresemann, June 30, 1925, D643772, marginal note signed Str[esemann], who read the memorandum on July 3, 1925.

20. DDB, 2: 263–65, Gaiffier (Paris) to Foreign Minister Vandervelde, July 23, 1925.

21. On the jurists' conference in London, see Gaus's, Friedrich report, Locarno-Konferenz, pp. 120–38Google Scholar, Belgian jurist Henri Rolin's report, DDB, 2: 316–25, and British jurist Cecil Hurst's semiofficial printed summary, in Nachlass Stresemann, 3114/7132/148600–611, as well as in AA, RM, Az. 15, Nr. 1, Bd. 7, D644592fF.

22. DDB 2: 316–25, no. 104.

23. Locamo-Konferenz, p. 122.

24. Ibid., p. 155, third plenary meeting at Locarno, Oct. 7, 1925.

25. Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Nachlass Hermann Pünder, vol. 65, pp. 73–74, report of the discussions at Locarno, prepared from daily notes by Franz Kempner, Oct. 25, 1925.

26. Akten DAP, B, 1/1: 310, n. 4, Stresemann notes, Oct. 20, 1925. On the conversation with Schubert, held in Berlin on Oct. 22, 1925, on the Belgian envoy's initiative, see Schubert's notes, AA, 2258/4503/E120426–27, and also Stresemann's Oct. 22 telegram to Schacht in Washington, D.C., AA, RM, Az. 15, Nr. 1, Bd. 7, D644970. The Belgian documents create quite a different impression of Everts's attitude. See DDB, 2: 399, aidememoire on Eupen-Malmédy, prepared for communication to the French and British governments and dated Oct. 23, 1926, that is, after the failure of the projected exchange involving Eupen-Malmédy. The entire memo has the character of an apologia. Moreover, a comparison of the published Belgian documents with the German records strongly suggests that much material on the Eupen-Malmédy project remains in the unpublished Belgian files.

27. On the details of this attack see Grathwol, Robert, “DNVP and European Reconciliation, 1924–1928: A Study of the Conflict between Party Politics and Government Foreign Policy in Weimar Germany” (diss., Chicago, 1968), pp. 217–61Google Scholar; Dörr, Manfred, “Die Deutschnationale Volkspartei 1925 bis 1928” (diss., published by the author, Marburg, 1964), pp. 158–80Google Scholar; and Stürmer, Michael, Koalition uni Opposition in der Weimarer Zeit (Düsseldorf, 1967), pp. 124–27.Google Scholar

28. See specifically the private papers of Count Kuno von Westarp, in the possession of his grandson, Dr. Friedrich Freiherr Hiller von Gaertringen, Gärtringen, Bundesrepublik Deutschland, speech to the Reichstag Committee on Foreign Affairs, Oct. 22, 1925.

29. Telegram, Hoesch to Stresemann, Nov. 5, 1925, AA, 2258/4503/E120429.

30. Telegram, Stresemann to Hoesch, Nov. 7, 1925, ibid., E120430–31.

31. AA, 1459/3015/D590634–35, telegram, Köpke to Brussels, Jan. 16, 1926. See also Bavaria, Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Munich, “Berichte der bayerischen Gesandschaft in Berlin,” Abgabe 1935, Politische Akten 1926, vol. 108, report of Jan. 14, 1926, on a meeting of the foreign affairs committee of the Reichstag.

32. Pabst, “Eupen-Malmédy,” p. 469, citing the German edition of D'Abernon's memoirs.

33. For a general discussion of the involvement of foreign central bankers in the Belgian franc question, see Meyer, Richard H., Banker's Diplomacy: Monetary Stabilization in the Twenties (New York, 1970), pp. 16–41Google Scholar; more generally, see Sheppard, Henry L., The Monetary Experiences of Belgium, 1914–1936 (Princeton, 1936).Google Scholar

34. Akten DAP, B, 1/1: 310.

35. DDB, 2:400. Foreign Minister Vandervelde's instructions, as cited after the project had fallen through, urge Everts to object that any modification of the Rhineland borders would constitute a violation of the terms of the Locarno accords just negotiated. The German records show no sign that Everts ever mentioned this. It is hardly a matter which the Germans would have ignored. The Belgian documents were unavailable as of summer 1972 despite efforts within the Belgian foreign office to open them to research.

36. Akten DAP, B, 1/1: 435–36, Stresemann's notes, Mar. 25, 1926. I have used throughout the currency referred to in the original conversations rather than converting all to dollars or marks.

37. The Belgian published documents leave the impression that Stresemann spoke to Delacroix before the latter spoke with Schacht, thus conveying the idea that Stresemann initiated discussion of the topic. See DDB, 2: 401, aide-memoire of Oct. 23, 1926.

38. Akten DAP, B, 1/1: 438, Stresemann's notes on talks with Delacroix on Mar. 26, 1926.

39. Akten DAP, B, 1/1: 438.

40. Ibid., pp. 438–39.

41. AA, 2258/4503/E120453, Apr. 24, 1926. Stresemann notes that Everts seemed well prepared for his question on Eupen-Malmédy. For a slightly different version of the exchange, see DDB, 2: 401, the Oct. 23, 1926, aide-memoire.

42. Akten DAP, B, 1/1: 557–58, Stresemann's notes on the conversation of May 27, 1926. For the account of Vandervelde's instruction of May 8, 1926, to Everts, which differs in tone from Stresemann's account of the actual talk, see the aide-memoire of Oct. 23, 1926, printed in DDB, vol. 2, particularly pp. 4O2ff.

43. Akten DAP, B, 1/1: 557–58.

44. Great Britain, Foreign Office, General Correspondence: Political (F.O. 371), registry no. W5314/5314/4. Chamberlain to Sir William Tyrell, from Geneva, June 9, 1926. This document and several others used subsequently were obtained by mail, through the courtesy of the Public Records Office, London.

45. Akten DAP, B, 1/1: 595ff., commentary of German consular officer Ow-Wachendorf, June 22, 1926, on a report submitted by Germania editor Richard Kuenzer. In the Belgian documents the Flemish spelling Alois van de Vijvere is used.

46. For a general discussion of Belgium's financial crisis see Meyer, Banker's Diplomacy, pp. 16–41, and Shepherd, Monetary Experience of Belgium 1914–1936, pp. 147ff. For specific references to the impact on the diplomatic developments involving Eupen-Malmédy, see above, and Akten DAP, B, 1/1: 595ff.

47. Ibid., pp. 612–13, consular report from The Hague on the Schacht-Delacroix meeting, June, 28 1926.

48. ARK/R431/1410, minutes of the cabinet meeting of Mar. 26, 1926, microfilmed as D768375–76; Akten DAP, B, 1/1: 635, and July 8, 1926, n. 2.

49. Meyer, pp. 24–25; Miller, pp. 42–43.

50. See above, at n. 7, and AA, 2258/4503/E120517–18.

51. Akten DAP, B, 1/1: 649, n. 4; Great Britain, PRO, F.O. 371, registry no. W7023/5314/4.

52. Akten DAP, B, 1/1: 645–46.

53. Ibid., pp. 646–48, Schacht's report on his talks with Franqui and Delacroix, July 14, 1926. The agreement described by Schacht corresponded closely to that worked out between him and Delacroix earlier, except that Schacht agreed to a German contribution of $50 million, $30 million as a flat grant, $20 million to be retired by Belgium's surrender of her Dawes plan annuities from the fifth year of payment. Other terms included a general friendship treaty to be made public at Geneva, immediate return to Germany of Eupen-Malmédy without a plebiscite but with the exception of certain Walloon villages—Francqui thought four or five were involved—on which specific understanding would have to be reached beforehand.

54. AA, 2258/4503/E120502–6. For a substantial evidence of the flurry of activity Schacht's talks set off see adjacent documents in this serial, as well as in Akten DAP, B, 1/1, from mid to late July 1926.

55. Akten DAP, B, 1/1: 659–65, Schubert's notes of July 24, 1926, with related material.

56. Ibid., pp. 659–65, 667–72. See also above, at n. 47.

57. Schacht's letter gives Sept. 1, 1928, as the date on which interest would begin, Delacroix's last draft treaty Sept. 1, 1929. See Akten DAP, B, 1/1: 669, 683.

58. Ibid., p. 673, Schubert's notes of July 27, 1926. See also the preceding documents no. 285 and no. 287. On stabilization see Meyer, Banker's Diplomacy, pp. 16–41.

59. Akten DAP, B, 1/1: 668, n. 3; DDB, 2: 198, Gaiffier to Ruzette, May 28, 1925.

60. Great Britain, PRO, F.O. 371, registry no. W7023/5314/4. The ambassador's description to the British of Franco-Belgian exchange of information regarding Eupen and Malmédy was written well after the fact and is largely inconsistent with other documentary evidence.

61. Augur (pseudonym for Wladimir Poljakow), “France and Germany,” Fortnightly Review, n.s. 126 (Aug. 1926): 177–84. See also Pabst, “Eupen-Malmedy,” pp. 469–71, in which continental press reactions are traced. For clippings and commentary on the press reaction, see also AA, 2260–4503/E120650–52 and E120715ff., as well as Great Britain, PRO, F.O. 371, registry nos. W7023/W7313/W7556/W7777/5314/4. Excerpts from the press are scattered through the relevant files in both the British and German diplomatic papers. Pabst, p. 478, speculates, while admitting a lack of hard evidence, that French opponents of the German-Belgian accord may have furnished Augur with the information for his article, “which appeared exactly two days before the visit of the Belgian ministers” in Paris. A less likely explanation, he suggests, is that Poljakow's article was a “clever move” by the British foreign office to prevent revision of the Versailles boundaries without having to bear the omis of direct intervention. My examination of the British files revealed no substantiation of this latter suggestion. At a conference on European security in the Locarno era, held in mid-October 1975 in Mars Hill, N.C., shortly before this article went to press, Jacques Bariéty of the University of Strasbourg, reported on significant information in newly accessible French archives on this point and the entire Eupen-Malmédy question.

62. No direct accounts are currently available of either this meeting or the earlier consultations of July 9, in which Poincaré played no role (see above, at n. 51). Belgian documents, in which one might expect to find minutes of both these crucial exchanges, are closed to scholars beyond 1922 at this writing. This account draws, however, on a Belgian “Note Verbale” delivered to the British foreign office on Aug. 21, 1926, Great Britain, PRO, F.O. 371, registry no. W7861/1730/4. See also ibid., W7563/5314/4, and Akten DAP, B, 1/2: 24–25, 241–42, conversations between Schacht and Delacroix, Aug. 4, 1926, and between Rieth and Delacroix, Aug. 24, 1926.

63. On Poincaré's view of Locarno as of June 1927, see Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy, p. 174. On the finassieren controversey see this writer's “Gustav Stresemann: Reflections on His Foreign Policy,” Journal of Modem History 45, no. 1 (Mar. 1973): 52–70. Finassieren is the German word used by Stresemann in a 1925 letter to Crown Prince William to describe the exigencies of German foreign policy in the light of Versailles's restrictions. Because the connotation of the word is vague in German but pejorative in French, suggesting duplicity, a considerable controversey grew up around the word and the general belief that Germans, of whom Stresemann was a “typical” representative, are not to be trusted. For an additional note on its application to the French by Stresemann, see Jacobson, p. 323, n. 43.

64. On the stabilization question see Meyer, pp. 16–41; Fraser and Gilbert figure in reports submitted by Hoesch (Paris) to Schubert, Akten DAP, B, 1/1: 689–90 (July 29, 1926), ibid., 1/2: 7, n. 1 (July 27, 1926), and AA, 2260/4503/E120663 (dated in longhand July 30, 1926, but in fact it may be the first line of the preceding telegram of July 27).

65. Akten DAP, B, 1/2: 24–25, Schubert to Brussels, London, and Paris, Aug. 6, 1926. Schacht's conversation with Delacroix took place on Aug. 4.

66. Ibid., pp. 15–19, unsigned notes on the exchange in Bad Wildungen, Aug. 5, 1926.

67. Ibid., p. 18, n. 10, Hesnard to Stresemann, Aug. 7, 1926.

68. Great Britain, PRO, F.O. 371, registry no. W7563/5314/4, note of Aug. 11, 1926; and ibid., registry no. W7624/5314/4, Aug. 12, 1926, for a fuller version.

69. Ibid., W7624/5314/4, Aug. 12, 1926, Wellesley's notes on a conversation with the French ambassador.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid., W7658/5314/4, memorandum by H. W. Malkin on the effect of Versailles and Locarno on the transfer of Eupen-Malmédy, Aug. 12, 1926, and Chamberlain's handwritten minute.

72. Akten DAP, B, 1/2: 58–60, Schubert's notes reviewing the state of negotiations, Aug. 13, 1926.

73. Ibid., p. 107, n. 1, text of Delacroix's letter of Aug. 19, 1926.

74. Great Britain, PRO, F.O. 371, registry no. W7961/5314/4, press clipping from Le Soir (Belgium), Aug. 21, 1926.

75. See for example AA, 1459/3115/D642965–68.

76. On the conversations at Thoiry see ARK/R431/1415, 178ff., Stresemann's notes prepared Sept. 20, 1926 in Geneva, filmed as D770125–39.

77. Pabst, “Eupen-Malmedy,” pp. 476ff., concludes that the Belgian government supported Delacroix's moves in July 1926.

78. Akten DAP, B, 1/2: 125–37, Keller (Brussels) to Berlin, Aug. 27, 1926.

79. Great Britain, PRO, F.O. 371, registry no. W7658/5314/4, Chamberlain's minute, Aug. 12, 1926, emphasis in the original. See also registry no. W7878/5314/4, Aug. 19, 1926.

80. Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy, pp. 59, 125–26; both quotations are Chamberlain's own comments cited by Jacobson. For further descriptions of anti-German feeling in the foreign office see ibid., pp. 212–14, and the index.

81. Ibid., pp. 63, 80, 124, and passim.

82. Akten DAP, B, 1/2: 74, conversation with D'Abernon, Aug. 15, 1926; ibid., pp. 76–78, 109–15, conversations with Laboulaye, Aug. 16 and 22, 1926. Laboulaye's comments, unlike those made earlier for the record to the British by French diplomats, include the argument that a retrocession would violate the Locarno pact's guarantee of the Rhenish status quo.

83. See above, at n. 1.

84. DDB, 2: 390, report of Oct. 24, 1926.

85. See Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy, who entitles part III of nine parts “The Decline of the Spirit of Locarno: 1927,” pp. 99ff. Although Jacobson and I disagree in part on the reasons for this decline, as indicated in the early paragraphs of this essay, the decline is unmistakable.