1. The Provisional Government, formed on November 10, 1918, consisted of three Majority Socialists (SPD)—Friedrich Ebert, Philipp Scheidemann, and Otto Landsberg—and three Independent Socialists (USPD)—Hugo Haase, Emil Barth, and Wilhelm Dittmann. It was endorsed that same day at a meeting of about three thousand representatives of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils in the Circus Busch in Berlin. Kolb, Eberhard, Die Arbeiterräte in der deutschen Innenpolitik 1918–1919 (Düsseldorf, 1962), pp. 116–23.Google Scholar

2. Rosenberg, Arthur, Geschichte der deutschen Republik (Karlsbad, 1935), pp. 105ff.Google Scholar, suggested that the first few months of the revolution represented, if not a tabula rasa, at least a real Zwischenperiode in which the workers' movement possessed the opportunity to reform existing institutions. Twenty years later, Erdmann, Karl Dietrich, “Die Geschichte der Weimarer Republik als Problem der Wissenschaft,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, III (1955), 7Google Scholar, claimed that in December 1918 there existed only a choice between a proletarian revolution and a “parliamentary republic in union with conservative elements such as the old officer class.” Epstein, Klaus, “Three American Studies of German Socialism,” World Politics, XI (07 1959), 651Google Scholar, even suggested that “the problems confronting German Socialists [in 1918] were in fact insoluble.”

3. A good account of the proceedings of the Congress can be found in Bernstein, Eduard, Die deutsche Revolution (Berlin, 1921)Google Scholar. Of the accounts by people closely associated with the Congress, the most important are those by Müller, Richard, Vom Kaiserreich zur Republik, II (Vienna, 1925)Google Scholar; Oehme, Walter, Damals in der Reichskanzlei (Berlin, 1958)Google Scholar; and Brecht, Arnold, Aus Nächster Nähe. Lebenserinnerungen 1884–1927 (Stuttgart, 1966)Google Scholar. Haase's, Ernst biography of his father, Hugo Haase. Sein Leben und Wirken (Berlin, 1929)Google Scholar, is of secondary importance, and Cohen, Max, Der Aufbau Deutschlands und der Rätegedanke (Berlin, 1919)Google Scholar; Barth, Emil, Aus der Werkstatt der deutschen Revolution (Berlin, 1919)Google Scholar; and Laufenberg, Heinrich, Zwischen der ersten und der zweiten Revolution (Hamburg, 1919)Google Scholar, are all even greater disappointments. The entire SPD memoir literature of Braun, Severing, Scheidemann, Ebert, Noske, etc., suffers from a lack of documentation as well as from its heavy bias. Apart from Oehme, the only other monograph of the East German Marxist school worth citing is the study by Kolbe, Helmut, Sturmtage; die Novemberrevolution 1918 (Leipzig, 1958)Google Scholar. The recent West German studies on the Räte movement by Tormin, Walter, Zwischen Rätediktatur und sozialer Demokratie (Düsseldorf, 1954)Google Scholar; Kolb, Eberhard, Die Arbeiterräte in der deutschen Innenpolitik 1918–1919 (Düsseldorf, 1962)Google Scholar; and von Oertzen, Peter, Die Betriebsräte in der Novemberrevolution (Düsseldorf, 1964)Google Scholar, are by far the best studies on the development of council government in Germany in 1918. For the attitude of the military the most important works are Groener, Wilhelm, Lebenserinnerungen. Jugend. Generalstab. Weltkrieg (Göttingen, 1957)Google Scholar, and Carsten, Francis L., Reichswehr und Politik 1918–33 (Cologne, 1964)Google Scholar. Wrobel, Kurt, Die Volksmarinedivision (Berlin, 1957)Google Scholar, is only of peripheral interest.

4. Lutz, R. H., The German Revolution, 1918–1919 (Palo Alto, 1922)Google Scholar; Halperin, S. William, Germany Tried Democracy (Chicago, 1946)Google Scholar; and Eyck, Erich, Geschichte der Weimarer Republik, 1 (Zürich, 1956)Google Scholar, are a few examples.

5. It should be remembered that in March 1917 the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) split over the issue of support for war credits. The new splinter party took the name Independent Socialist Party of Germany (USPD). The members of the original SPD, which retained its old name, were usually called Majority Socialists. The USPD was a heterogeneous party. Its center was led by Hugo Haase. Eduard Bernstein was the spokesman of its right wing, while Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht were recognized leaders of its left wing, popularly referred to as the Spartacists. See Angress, Werner T., Stillborn Revolution. The Communist Bid for Power in Germany, 1921–1923 (Princeton, 1963), pp. 3–47.Google Scholar

6. Schulthess' Europäischer Geschichtskalender, N.S., XXXIV, 1918 (Munich, 1922), Pt. 1, pp. 511–12. The Berlin Executive Council was the representative body of all the Workers' and Soldiers' Councils in Berlin. The Council claimed leadership over the rest of the German councils, which, however, were not centrally organized. Its members, seven Majority Socialists, seven Revolutionary Shop Stewards, and fourteen soldiers, were elected at the same Circus Busch meeting mentioned in n. I. The dual control established by the existence of both the Berlin Executive Council and the Provisional Government in Berlin was roughly similar to the rivalry in 1917 between the Petrograd Council and the Provisional Government in Russia. The rivalry in Berlin has recently been analyzed by Friedlander, Henry Egon, “Conflict of Revolutionary Authority: Provisional Government vs. Berlin Soviet, November–December 1918,” International Review of Social History, VII (1962), 163–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7. Müller, Vom Kaiserreich, II, 203. The invitation is reprinted in Allgemeiner Kongress der Arbeiter-und Soldatenräte in Deutschland vom 16. bis 21. Dezember im Abgeordnetenhaus zu Berlin. Stenographischer Bericht (Berlin, 1919), p. IV, hereafter cited as Räte Kongress, St. B. In contrast to the appendix, the verbatim reports were numbered by columns (two per page), and all reference to them will be by column rather than page number.

8. Except for two soldiers representing the “Mobilized Baltic Forces,” the United Revolutionary Workers and Soldiers (Vereinigte Revolutionäre Arbeiter und Soldaten) came exclusively from Hamburg, Wilhelmshaven, and Oldenburg. They claimed to be an independent party and were more or less under the leadership of Dr. Heinrich Laufenberg from Hamburg. Räte Kongress, St. B., pp. 198–205.

9. These figures are taken from an analysis of the “Index of Delegates” found in the appendix of Räte Kongress, St. B., pp. 198–205. Besides the elected delegates, the six members of the Provisional Government, 26 members of the Berlin Executive Council, and the following representatives of the Reich and Prussian governments were also present: Karl Kautsky from the Foreign Office; Paul Hirsch and Eugen Ernst from the Prussian Government; Curt Baake, Heinrich Schulz, Walter Oehme, and Rausch from the Reichskanzlei; Josef Herzfeld from the Reich Ministry of the Interior; Rudolf Breitscheid from the Prussian Ministry of the Interior; Gustav Noske and Captain Selchow from the Reichsmarineamt. Ibid., p. 206.

10. The Revolutionary Shop Stewards consisted of a small group of highly skilled metal workers from Berlin. Nominally under the leadership of Richard Müller, they never became a mass organization and were, instead, loosely organized in the USPD. They took a position between the center and the extreme left wing of the party. Like the Spartacists, they also carried on an independent policy. They yearned for a social revolution, including socialization and military reform, but regarded both the moderation of Haase and the putschist tendencies of Liebknecht as incompatible with their own policy. Kolb, Arbeiterräte, pp. 38–42.

11. Räte Kongress, St. B., pp. 198–205. The SPD delegation included 23 city councillors (Stadtverordnete), that of the Independents four, and that of the Democrats and of the “United Revolutionary” group one each. In addition, the SPD sent 18 electoral district chairmen (Wahlkreis Vorsitzende), one electoral district treasurer, one medical insurance treasurer, one city secretary, and a privy councillor. The USPD sent two electoral district chairmen. Furthermore, the SPD had 11 party secretaries, seven former Reichstag members, one former Reichstag candidate, eight former Landtag members, and nine local district leaders at the Congress. In comparison, the USPD sent two party secretaries, one former Reichstag member, two former Landtag members, and six local district chairmen. The “United Revolutionary” faction had one party secretary and the Democrats had one former Landtag member at the Congress.

12. An exception is Ryder, A. J., The German Revolution of 1918. A Study of German Socialism in War and Revolt (Cambridge, England, 1967), p. 177Google Scholar, who calls the Congress the “climax of the revolution.” Unfortunately the chapters dealing with the Congress and with military reform contain numerous errors. For example, Ryder states that Point 8 of the Hamburger Punkte was, in fact, passed by the Congress. Ibid., p. 182. Cf. p. 160, below.

13. It should be remembered that Ebert took for himself the departments of the Interior and of Military Affairs. Hence he was the member of the Provisional Government most directly concerned with the military reform issue. Kolb, Arbeiterräte, p. 123.

14. Groener, Lebenserinnerungen, pp. 472–78. The author was unable to find any other references to this alleged agreement aimed at combatting the urban workers. It should not, however, be confused with the agreement reached between Ebert and Groener via telephone on November 10, 1918. The latter agreement, commonly called the Ebert-Groener “Pact,” constituted a verbal understanding whereby the army agreed to bring the troops home and maintain order and security in Germany, provided that the SPD curb the revolutionary ardor of the left wing of the labor movement and assist the army in maintaining the officers' authority and military discipline. Kolb, Arbeiterräte, pp. 120–21.

15. Reichskanzlei. Vorakten zu R. Min. 2b: Protokolle der Kabinettssitzungen, vol. I. Microfilmed in U.S. National Archives Microfilm Publication, Microcopy No. T–120, Records of the German Foreign Office Received by the Department of State, Roll 3417, Serial 8935, frames E627036–50. Hereafter cited as Kabinettsprotokolle, with volume and frame number.

16. Müller-Franken, Hermann, Die Novemberrevolution. Erinnerungen (Berlin, 1928), p. 174.Google Scholar

17. Kabinettsprotokolle, 1, frames E627064–75, E627156; II, frame E627160. On December 6 a small band of soldiers, directed neither by the SPD nor by the Supreme Command, opened fire on a peaceful workers' demonstration, attempted to put the Berlin Executive Council under arrest, and planned to proclaim Ebert president of the Reich. Since Ebert had not openly denounced the attempted coup, his actions appeared suspect to many workers and tended to strengthen revolutionary feeling in Berlin. Bernstein, Die deutsche Revolution, pp. 71ff.

18. The directive, signed by one “Zogrost,” is reproduced in the appendix of Räte Kongress, St. B., p. 196. “Zogrost” (actually “Zegrost”) is an abbreviation for Zentralstelle Grenzschutz Ost, which seems to have been a headquarters for the entire Grenzschutz organization.

19. Räte Kongress, St. B., cols. 12–14. On December 19 the Central Council (Zentralrat) was elected. It was the supreme council in Germany and its primary task was to supervise the execution of the resolutions passed by the Congress until the time when a National Assembly could convene. The USPD insisted that the Central Council should have veto power over any decrees passed by the Provisional Government, and when Ebert successfully opposed this stipulation the USPD refused to participate in the election to the Council. As a result, all 27 members elected were from the SPD. Ibid., cols. 288ff.

20. Ibid., cols. 107–112.

21. The telegram is contained in the appendix of Räte Kongress, St. B., p. 195. The decree is entitled “Number 151: Demobilization.”

22. Räte Kongress, St. B., col. 116.

23. Ibid., col. 137.

24. Ibid., cols. 175–76.

25. Ibid., col. 123.

26. Ibid., col. 125.

27. The dissolution order is reproduced in the appendix of Räte Kongress, St. B., p. 194.

28. Räte Kongress, St. B., cols. 140–41. The actual vote on the seven points is in ibid., col. 190. The final, accepted version is given in ibid., p. 181.

29. Müller, Vom Kaiserreich, II, 211.

30. Räte Kongress, St. B., col. 186.

31. Ibid., cols. 190–91.

32. Kabinettsprotokolle, II, frame E627164.

33. Ibid., frames E627166–75.

34. Ibid., frames E627176–88.

35. Ibid., frame E627185.

36. Ibid., frames E627188–89.

37. Groener, Lebenserinnerungen, p. 475. The Kabinettsprotokolle do not, however, mention Barth's demand for Groener's arrest.

38. Ebert's sentiments were shared by the majority of bourgeois newspapers. The extremes of both the left and right registered their reactions, leaving a large bloc of lukewarm support in the center of the political spectrum. Indeed, neither the Kölnische Zeitung, the Berliner Tageblatt, nor the Frankfurter Zeitung paid much attention to the military reform program. The Münchner Neueste Nachrichten (December 18) dismissed the whole issue as merely another example of the negative role of Berlinertum in German politics. The Majority Socialist newspaper Vorwärts, seemingly more concerned with maintaining the integrity of the pre-war borders of Germany than with the need for reform of the military, concentrated its attention (December 16–23) on attacking the Berlin Executive Council, the Poles, and the Bolsheviks. The Spartacist organ Die Rote Fahne (December 17) stressed only the basic issue of National Assembly versus Räte movement, while the Independent Freiheit (December 19) was prematurely enthusiastic over the reform resolutions. Another Independent journal, the Leipziger Volkszeitung (December 21), warned that the reform program had been passed not by the strength of the votes commanded by the USPD but by the revolutionary energy of the Berlin soldiers. The Prussian conservative Neue Preussische Zeitung (Kreuzzeitung) (December 17) reminded the socialists that the bureaucracy cooperated with the Provisional Government merely because the Hohenzollerns had instructed it to do so. Alfred Hugenberg's Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger (December 21) feared for the end of the officer corps, “that part of the ‘hated’ Prussian militarism that was good and strong and indispensable for the future and the security of the German Reich.”

39. A recent West German historian has quite rightly pointed out that, as a result of these pressures, “in the military issue Ebert, to a certain degree, pursued two different policies.” Heidegger, Hermann, Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie und der nationale Staat 1870–1920 (Göttingen, 1956), p. 184.Google Scholar

40. Sauer, Wolfgang, “Das Bündnis Ebert-Groener” (unpub. diss., Free University of Berlin, 1957), p. 119Google Scholar, cited in Schmädeke, Jürgen, Militärische Kommandogewalt und parlamentarische Demokratie: Zum Problem der Verantwortlichkeit des Reichswehrministers in der Veimarer Republik (Lübeck, 1966), p. 26.Google Scholar

41. Carsten, , Reichswehr und Politik, p. 459Google Scholar. After the events of December 24, Reinhardt, who up to then had been in charge of demobilization of the troops, was appointed Prussian Minister of War. He went on to become the first Chief of Army Command (Chef der Heeresleitung) in the Weimar Republic.

42. Cited in Haase, , Hugo Haase, pp. 173–74.Google Scholar