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The End of the “Final Solution”?: Nazi Plans to Ransom Jews in 1944

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 December 2008

Extract

It first seemed to be a simple, if fantastic, deal: Blut gegen Waren, Jewish blood in exchange for goods. On 18 May 1944 two emissaries flew into Intanbul on special missions for high Nazi authorities. The first, Joel Brand of the Jewish Rescue Committee in Budapest, explained that he came with a proposal from Adolf Eichmann. If the Allies provided Nazi Germany with ten thousand trucks for use exclusively on the eastern front, as well as large quantities of tea, coffee, cocoa, soap, and assorted war materiel, Eichmann and Germany would spare the lives of approximately eight hundred thousand Jews then in German-occupied Hungary. But Brand's travel companion, Andrea Gyorgy (alias Bandi Grosz), a Jewish convert to Catholicism and a smuggler as well as agent for several intelligence services, claimed that he had a separate and more complicated mission: to contact Allied authorities and initiate peace negotiations between Nazi Germany and the West at the expense of the Soviet Union. After brief discussions with Jewish officials in Istanbul, Brand and Gyorgy separately crossed the border into British-held Syria, trying to reach Palestine. Suspicious of both men and both offers, British officials arrested them and sent them to intelligence headquarters in Cairo for extensive interrogation, which kept them out of action.

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Copyright © Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical Association 1992

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References

1. Brand, Joel, A Mission on Behalf of the Sentenced to Death (Tel Aviv, 1957);Google ScholarJoel, and Brand, Hansi, The Devil and the Soul (Tel Aviv, 1960), both in Hebrrew.Google Scholar For Brand's story in English, if not with scrutiny, see Weissberg, Alex, Desperate Mission: Joel Bran's Story (New York, 1958).Google Scholar

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5. Hadari, Zeev Veni., Against All Odds: Istanbul 1942–1945 (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv, 1992), esp. 134–35. A representative of the Histadrut (the Jewish Federation of Labor in British Palestine) and of the Zionist Youth Movements connected to it, Hadari went to Istanbul to serve on the Zionist Rescue Committe. Hadari's version probably overstates the Nazi initiative and understates the Jewish role in the case of Hungary. (See note 29 below.) It seems that he Jewish Rescue Committee of Budapest was prompted by an unduly optimistic account of previous Jewish negotiations with Eichmann's deputy Wisliceny in Slovakia for a cessation of the deportations there in return for outside money, and then by the appearance of Wisliceny in Budapest.Google Scholar According to Friling, Tuvia, “David Ben Gurion and the Catastrophe of European Jewry 1939–1945,” (Ph.D. diss. (Hebrew), Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1990), 118–23, Jewish response in Palestine to the so-called Europa Plan worked out by the Slovakian Jewish Working Group in conjunction with Wisliceny was basically positive, but nonetheless seemed too little and too late to the Slovakian group,Google Scholar whose views appear in Weissmandel, Michael Dov-Ber, From the Distress (Hebrew) (Jerusalem, 1960),Google Scholar According to Porat, Dina, An Entangled Leadership: The Yishuv and the Holocaust, 1942–1945 (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv, 1986), 336–38, Hadari was at first skeptical whether even large sums would help save Jews, but later he and others in Istanbul gave the possibility some weight. In any case they did not want Jews to seem responsible for failure.Google Scholar What is of most relevance here is not the (in)feasibility of the Europa Plan, but the impression received in Budapest and Istanbul regarding the possibility of such negotiations.

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8. Bauer, Yehuda, American Jewry and the Holocaust: A History of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, 1939–1945 (Detroit, 1981), 390–93.Google Scholar Several of Bauer's relevant articles have been collected in Marrus, , The Nazi Holocaust, vol. 9;Google Scholar see esp. “The Mission of Joel Brand,” 65–126, above all, 118–20. Vago, Bela, “The Intelligence Aspects of the Joel Brand Mission,” Yad Vashem Studies on the Eruopean Jewish Catastrophe and Resistance 10 (1974): 111–28, does not directly address the issues raised here, but does help to clarify the intelligence web in which Brand and Gyorgy were entangled.Google Scholar

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12. Bormann's note for Pg. Friedrichs und Pg. Dr. Klopfer, 14 October 1942, Akten der Parteikanzlei, Institut für Zeitgeschichte microfiche 103/22534.

13. “Loslösung gegen Devisen[,] bin nicht dafü,[,] bedeutend[r] als Geiseln,” Himmler's notes for meeting with Hitler, 10 December 1942, NA RG 242, T–175/R 94/2615065.

14. Hitler's remarks partially recorded in Himmler's notes at the meeting, see note 13 above, and clarified in Himmler's memorandum after the meeting, NA RG 242, T–580/R 39/no frame no.

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16. ibid., 1: 517. Some sources stress Winkelmann's role at first, more than Becher's: e.g., interrogation of Carl Berthold Franz Rekowski, 17 and 19 September 1945, NA RG 226, XL 25105; Thadden to Wagner, 22 May 1944, NA RG 238, NG–2980 and NG–4089, reprinted in Braham, Randolph L., ed., The Destruction of Hungarian Jewry: A Documentary Account [hereafter Braham, Destruction: Documents] (New York, 1963), 383.Google Scholar

17. See Himmler's dictated memo for the files, NA RG 242, T–175/R 138/2665819–20. Becher remembered a meeting with Himmler roughly two weeks before Brand left Budapest, which would have made it in early May. See interrogation of Kurt Becher, 7 July 1947, reprinted in Mendelsohn, John, ed., The Holocaust (New York, 1982), vol. 15;Google ScholarRelief in Hungary and the Failure of the Joel Brand Mission, 64–67. Himmler's schedule is partly illegible for this time period, but there is a record Becher visiting Himmler at his headquarters near the Obersalzberg (as Becher rememberred in the interrogation) on 13 May. See NA RG 242, T–84/R 25/ no frames. On the secrecy of the payments in foreign exchange, Becher affidavit of 6 February 1946, NA RG 238 T–1139/R 32/816, NG–2972; Braham, , Politics of Genocide, 1:518.Google Scholar

18. Interrogation of Carl Berthold Franz Rekowski, 17 and 19 September 1945, NA RG 226, XL 25105; Veesenmayer to Ribbentrop, 26 May 1944, NA RG 238, NG–2770, reprinted in Braham, Desctruction: Documents, 835.

19. On the three-hour meeting with Hitler, Himmler's schedule, NA RG 242, T–84/R 25/no frames, 28 March 1944. On Vessenmayer, interrogation of Kurt Becher, 28 July 1947, NA RG 238, M–1019/R 5/538–39. Rekowski (interrogation of 17 and 19 September 1945, NA RG 226, XL 25105) claimed that both Himmler and Ribbentrop had opposed Veesenmayer's appointment, but that Hitler had chosen him. Becher specified that Veesenmayer lined up with the Foreign Ministry, but simultaneously boasted frequently of his Führerweisung. On Ribbentrop's instructions to Veesenmayer, see Ritter to Veesenmayer, 31 March 1944, NA RG 238, NG–5564, reprinted in Braham, Destruction: Documents, 308.

20. Interrogation of Rekowski, 17 and 19 Sept. 1945, NA RG 226, XL 25105. Veesenmayer to Ribbentrop, 26 May 1944, NA RG 238, NG–2770, reprinted in Braham, Destruction: Documentes, 835, and discussed in Hilberg, , Destruction, 2:829.Google Scholar On Göring's efforts, Braham, , Politics of Genocide, 1:516–17. For Himmler's memo, NA RG 242, T–175/R 138/2665819–20.Google Scholar

21. Biss, , Stopp der Endlösung, 99. For Himmler's original terms, NA RG 242, T–175/R 138/2665819–20. On good behavior, Altenburg to Wagner, 20 June 1944, with Stojay's memo of conversation with Himmler, 6 June 1944, reprinted in Braham, Destruction Documents, 407.Google Scholar

22. For general treatment, Braham, , Politics of Genocide, 1: 519–20;Google ScholarHilberg, , Destruction, 2: 829. For Hitler's and Himmler's views, telegram of German Embassy, Budapest, 30 June 1944; Wagner to Rudolf Brandt, 1 July 1944; Himmler to Winkelmann, 8 July 1944, all in NA RG 242, T–175/R 125/2650721–24, 2650739.Google Scholar

23. Veesenmayer to Ribbentrop, 3 April 1944, NA RG 242, T–1139/R 26/173, NG–2234.

24. On Ribbentrop's goals, see interrogation of Bruno [Peter\ Kleist, 27 October 1945, NA RG 226, entry 125, box 29, folder 407, which must be used with some caution.

25. Many relevant documents on these offers are reprinted in Mendelsohn, ed., The Holocaust, vol, 7, Jewish Emigration: The St. Louis Affair and Other Cases, 151–270.

26. Hilberg, , Destruction of the European Jews, 2:850–53.Google ScholarBraham, , Politics of Genocide, 2:762–74.Google Scholar

27. Ribbentrop to Veesenmayer, 10 July 1944, reprinted in Braham, Destruction: Documents, 700.

28. On the initiative from the Jewish Rescue Committee in Budapest, see interrogation of Becher by Kasztner in the presence of American authorities, 7 July 1947, in Mendelsohn, ed., The Holocaust, vol. 15, Relief in Hungary and the Failure of the Joel Brand Mission, 64–67. Kasztner said quite directly: “Vielleicht werden Sie sich erinnern, die Initiative ist von uns ausgegangen.” On these negotiations, see in particular, Yehud Bauer, “The Mission of Joel Brand,” in Marrus, ed., Nazi Holocaust, vol. 9, The End of the Holocaust, 65–126; Braham, , Politics of Genocide, 2:932–57. All sources in notes 1 and 3 discuss these events in considerable detail.Google Scholar

29. On Eichmann, and Brand, , Braham, , Politics of Genocide, 2:936;Google ScholarBiss, , Stopp der Endlösung, 53–54.Google Scholar

30. Interrogation of Becher by Kasztner, 7 July 1947, in Mendelsohn, , ed., The Holocaust, 15:6467, 70–71. On Himmler's schedule, NA RG 242, T–84/R 25/no frames.Google Scholar

31. Interrogation of Becher, 1 November 1947, NA RG 238, M–1019/R 5/534.

32. Veesenmayer to Foreign Office, 30 June 1944, NA RG 238, T–1139/R 26/400, NG–2263. See also McClelland to War Refugee Board, enclosed in State Department and War Refugee Board to Harriman, 6 July 1944, in Mendelsohn, , ed., The Holocaust, 15:190.Google Scholar Foreign Office official Wagner related that this idea of using some Hungarian Jews as laborers under German control first came up at the time when Himmler consulted the Führer about the Manfréd Weiss bargain, which is to say in June. This comment suggests that Himmler consulted Hitler on the “labor” too. Yet the fact that intellectuals and families were sent indicates that Himmler was not thinking of productivity alone. Wagner to Ribbentrop, 11 November 1944, in Braham, Destruction: Documents, 811.

33. Biss, , Stopp der Endlösung, 87–97. Although Himmler's schedule for June 1944 does not survive, his records for April and May show a number of meetings with Kaltenbrunner. NA RG 242, T–83/R 25/no frames.Google Scholar

34. Kasztner, to ? [Nathan Schwalb], 18 June 1944, Hagana Archive. Tel Aviv, Brand/Kasztner files.Google Scholar

35. Biss, , Stopp der Endlösung, 96–96, 105–09.Google Scholar In a 1946 affidavit Kasztner claimed that Hungarian Jewish valuables which Jewish sources estimated at eleven million Swiss francs were deliverred to Becher. Kasztner/Boukstein affidavit of 18 February 1946, Hagana Archive, Tel Aviv, Brand/Kasztner files. Biss, however, claimed that he persuaded Becher's officials to accept an inflated value of various goods in order to promote the train and the negotiations with Jewish representatives outside. In a postwar interrogation Becher gave the much more modest figure of six million Pengö for the goods. Interrogation of 1 November 1947, NA RG 238, M–1019/R 5/564. Each sources had an interest in establishing his own version, and it now seems impossible to sort our the conflicts. For a balanced account of how the candidates for the first train were selected, see Braham, , Politics of Genocide, 2:953–55.Google Scholar

36. NA RG 242, T–175/R 94/2615074.

37. Memorandum by Altenburg, 21 July 1944, quoted in Hilberg, , Destruction of the European Jews, 2: 854.Google Scholar

38. Text in Hillgruber, Andreas, ed., Staatsmänner und Diplomaten bei Hitler: Vertrauliche Aufzeichnungen über Unterredungen mit Vertretern des Auslandes 1942–1944 (Frankfurt am Main, 1970), 476–77.Google Scholar

39. Himmler to Mutschmann, 31 July 1944, Berlin Document Center, Non-Biographic Ordner, RFSS 5, SS 704.

40. See note 81 below regarding claims of Himmler's plotting against Hitler.

41. S. I. M. E. [Security Intelligence Middle East] Report no. 3, 22 June 1944, Top Secret, Public Record Office ‘hereafter PRO], FO 371 42811 01239, 37. Bauer, Yehuda, “The Mission of Joel Brand,’ The Nazi Holocaust, 9: 115–17, (see note 4).Google Scholar For a reading of Gyorgy's various activities and alliances, Rubin, Barry, Instanbul Intrigues (New York, 1989), 190–92, 260–62, 279.Google Scholar

42. S. I. M. E., no. 3, 22 June 1944, PRO FO 371 42811 02139, 38–41.

43. Biss, , Stopp der Endlösung, 67, 76, 84, Biss's comment that Himmler was worried that the Hungarian government would tell Hitler of Himmler's plotting against him, however, seems most far-fetched.Google Scholar

44. On Himmler's normal methods, see Breitman, Richard, The Architect of Genocide (New York, 1991), 73.Google Scholar Veesenmayer to Ribbentrop, 22 July 1944, NA RG 238, NG–2994, reprinted in Braham, Destruction: Documents, 630.

45. Gyorgy's mention of Foreign Office in S. I. M. E. report no. 3. PRO FO 371 82811 02139. Interrogation of Bruno [Peter\ Kleist, 27 October 1945, NA RG 226, entry 125, box 29, folder 407. The most detailed study in Nazi-Soviet peace efforts, containing a good deal of new material, is Ingeborg Fleischauer, , Die Chance des Sonderfriedens: Deutsch-sowjetische Geheimgespräche 1941–1945 (Berlin, 1986). Unfortunately, Fleischauer fails to differentiate adequately between reliable and unreliable information.Google Scholar

46. The substance of Olsen's cable appears in State Department and War Refugee Board to Ambassador Harriman, 6 July 1944, reprinted in Mendelsohn, ed., The Holocaust, 15:188–89. (see note 28). Also memorandum from Gösta Engzell, 7 July 1944, reprinted Koblik, Steven, The Stones Cry Out: Sweden's Response to the Persecution of the Jews, 1933–1945 (New York, 1988), 249–51. Bauer, “The Mission of Joel Brand,” 117, makes the same general point as we do: Kleist's mission in a sense confirms the legitimacy of Gyorgy's.Google Scholar

47. Schellenberg's entry of 4 August 1944, NA RG 242, T–175/R 579/124; Kaltenbrunner to Himmler, 9 October 1944, NA RG 242, T–175/R 579/133. Koblik, Stones Cry Out, 249–51.

48. Hiummler's preference for a peace with the West was mentioned by Felix Kersten in talks with an American businessman in Stokholm named Abram Hewitt. Hewitt's “Contract with Himmler,” written at the request of General William J. Donovan, NA RG 226, entry 180, roll 28; see also the analysis of the well-informed Eduard Waetjen, code-named Gorter. in Bern to OSS, Washington, 5 March 1944, NA RG 226, entry 134, box 228.

49. Interrogation of Bruno [Peter] Kleist, 27 oct. 1945, NA RG 226, entry 125, box 29, folder 407.

50. Biss, , Stopp der Endlösung, 113. Becher Affidavit of 6 February 1946, NA RG 238, T–1139/R 32/812. For Eichmann's negative recommendation to Himmler on a proposed small shipment of Jews to Palestine, see Veesenmayer to Foreign Office, 3 August 1944, and Hezinger Memorandum, 4 August 1944, reprinted in Braham, Destruction: Documents, 774, 706–7.Google Scholar

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52. Braham, , Politics of Genocide, 2:957.Google Scholar

53. Palestine censorship, 18 August 1944, with extract of meeting of Middle East Advisory Committee of the JDC with Dr. Schwarz, 23 July 1944, NA RG 226, enter 191, box entry 191, box 4, Censorship—Beligian Jewry. Many other relevant documents are in Mendelsohn, , ed., The Holocaust, 15:211–45. See also Bauer, American Jewry, 411.Google Scholar

54. Braham, , Politics of Genocide, 2: 957–59. Biss, Stopp der Endlösung, 132–48. Biss claims that Becher was ordered to Berlin to see Himmler on this matter at the end of July and returned to Budapset on 2 Aug. Himmler's schedule does not survive for this period.Google Scholar

55. Bauer, , American Jewry, 413–14.Google Scholar

56. Braham, , Politics of Genocide, 960. Biss, Stopp der Endlösung, 150–51. Bauer, American Jewry, 414–15.Google Scholar

57. Harrison to Department (McClelland to War Refugee Board), 26 August 1944, War Refugee Board Records, box 56, Jews in Hungary Folder, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. Braham, Politics of Genocide, 960.

58. Harrison to Department (McClelland to War Refugee Board), 26 August 1944, War Refugee Board Records, box 56, Jews in Hungary folder. The impression that Himmler wished to give was that of the pragmatist who was simply trying to acquire useful goods.

59. Becher's, telegram to Himmler, 25 August 1944, and Himmler's response, 26 August 1944, in NA RG 242, T–175/R 59/2574473 and 2574471. Biss, Stopp der Endlösung, 153, claims that Kasztner and Billitz persuaded Becher not to send a fully negative report to Himmler.Google Scholar

60. Wagner Memorandum, 10 November 1944, reprinted in Braham, Destruction: Documents, 808.

61. Bauer, , American Jewry, 415.Google Scholar

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63. Veesenmayer to Foreign Office, 24 August 1944, and Veesenmayer to Ribbentrop 25 August 1944, in Braham, Destruction: Documents, 480–81.

64. See Braham, , Politics of Genocide, 2:752–74.Google Scholar

65. See Ziemke, Earl F., Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East (Washington, D. C., 1984), 351–52.Google ScholarKeegan, John, ed., The Times Atlas of the Second World War (New York, 1989), 176.Google Scholar

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74. Berger to Himmler, read by Himmler 27 September 1944, NA RG 242, T–175/R 138/2665822–29.

75. Interrogation of Kleist, Bruno [Peter], 27 October 1945, NA RG 226, entry 125, box 29, folder 407. Fleischauer, Chance des Sonderfriedens, 176, 194–95. Both sources reveal Hitler's previous outrage at peace feelers allegedly involving Jewish intermediaries.Google Scholar

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77. Himmler met with Hitler on both 26 and 27 Sept. They did discuss the situation in Hungary, where Germany was about to use force and the kidnapping of Horthy's son to impose a new government headed by Arrow Cross leader Szalasi. The Szalasi government resumed cooperation with the Nazis on the Jewish question. But it is hard to prove that Hitler and Himmler discussed that aspect of the Hungarian problem in late Sept. See Himmler's agenda notes, NA RG 242, T–175/R 94/2615056–58.

78. See Johnson's, Hershel V. cable, 14 October 1944, NA RG 200, box 29, folder 364, citing Hillel Storch's contact with Kleist and Kleist's information on what had transpired in Berlin.Google Scholar

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82. See Bauer, American Jewry, 422–34, which emphasizes negotiations in Switzerland. Koblik, The Stones Cry Out, 121–40, 271–93, provides new material on Swedish contacts. Recently declassified interrogations of Walter Schellenberg represent a much better source than Schellenberg's later memoirs. Hitler's Secret Service (New York, 1971) See esp. NA RG 226, entry 125, box 2, folder 21. Both Koblik and Schellenberg here support the view that Himmler broke with Hitler only in 1945.Google Scholar

83. Bullock, , Hitler and Stalin, 766, 889.Google Scholar