This is revised version of a paper presented to the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association August 28, 1969, in San Diego. Mr. G. Feldman, Berkeley, commented upon the earlier paper, and the author wishes to express his gratitude for Mr. Feldman's critical remarks. The paper was accepted for publication in July 1970, and the author has not been able to take account of more recent literature. —Editor.

1. Ebert to Branting, Apr. 16, 1920. Printed in Blänsdorf, A., “Friedrich Ebert und die Internationale,” Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, IX (1969), 425–26.Google Scholar

2. Especially Schieck, H., “Der Kampf um die deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik nach dem Novemberumsturz” (unpub. diss., Heidelberg, 1958);Google ScholarKolb, E., Die Arbeiterräte in der deutschen Innenpolitik 1918–1919 (Düsseldorf, 1962);Google ScholarRürup, R., “Problems of the German Revolution 1918–1919,” Journal of Contemporary History, III, No. 4 (12 1968), 109–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3. See Feldman, G. D., Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany, 1914–1918 (Princeton, 1966), p. 443Google Scholar, who concludes that “Germany was now living in a state of permanent crisis.” Feldman emphasizes the food situation and the increase of radical sentiment resulting from the Russian Revolution.

4. Matthias, E. and Miller, S., eds., Das Kriegstagebuch des Reichstagsabgeordneten Eduard David (Düsseldorf, 1966), p. 239.Google Scholar See also Stern, F., “Bethmann Hollweg and the War: The Limits of Responsibility,” Stern, F. and Krieger, L., eds., The Responsibility of Power (Anchor Books edition, Garden City, N. Y., 1969), pp. 271–307.Google Scholar

5. Ebert, F. Jr., ed., Friedrich Ebert, Schriften, Aufzeichnungen, Reden (Dresden, 1926), I, 129,Google Scholar and Reichstag Budget Debates, July 3, 1917, Hauptstaatsarchiv, Stuttgart. Mommsen, W. J., “L'Opinion Allemande de la Chute du Gouvernment Bethmann-Hollweg en Juillet 1917,” Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, XV (01–03 1968), 39–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar, finds a serious crisis of confidence of the German people in a vacillating chancellor to be the major cause of the coming of the July Crisis. He does not, however, pinpoint the specific reasons why the moderate socialists should have already on June 30 informed Bethmann “of the need for greater steps in internal affairs and in the peace policy, otherwise collapse.” Cited in Matthias and Miller, Kriegstagebuch David, p. 238. These socialists had just returned from the Stockholm peace conference and found that foreign sympathies lay very much with the position of the Independent Socialists who had just bolted from their own party. In order to outflank the Independents for membership within the socialist camp, it was necessary to illustrate to the workers that the old party was acting on their behalf and trying to obtain peace.

6. For just this reason Epstein, K., Matthias Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy (Princeton, 1959), pp. 186ff.,Google Scholar emphasized the role of Erzberger in bringing the Center Party to an antiannexationist policy; he reinforced his view in “Der Interfraktionelle Ausschuss,” Historische Zeitschrift, CXCI (1960), 570–71.Google Scholar

7. Feldman, Army, Industry, and Labor, pp. 407ff., pointed out that incompetence and vacillation were the hallmarks of Ludendorff's rule. An older but still instructive analysis is Rosenberg, A., Imperial Germany (Beacon paperback edition of The Birth of the German Republic 1871–1918, Boston, 1964).Google Scholar Worth many readings is Otto Kirchheimer's essay of 1930, “Weimar—und was dann? Analyse einer Verfassung,” reprinted in Otto Kirchheimer: Polltik und Verfassung (Suhrkamp paperback edition, Frankfurt, 1964), esp. pp. 10–11Google Scholar: “The monarchy in its old form was not overthrown by an uprising, it was terminated by the Machtergreifung of General Ludendorff. Even with a lucky conclusion to the Ludendorff adventure, the way to the restoration of the monarchy in its pre-1916 form would have been blocked by heavy industry's influence which gave Ludendorff's rule its political shape.”

8. For details see Feldman, Army, Industry, and Labor, p. 379 and passim; the documentary evidence collected in Michaelis, H. and Schraepler, E., eds., Ursachen und Folgen vom deutschen Zusammenbruch (Berlin, 1958), I, 177ff.Google Scholar; and Dokumente und Materialien zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung (Berlin, 1958), Series 2, 1, 558ff.Google Scholar

9. Diary of Oskar Trautmann, Legionsrat in the foreign office (private possession), and Preussisches Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin, Nachlass Schiffer, 4: 536, and 5: 1374–76.

10. Drabkin, J. S., Die Novemberrevolution 1918 in Deutschland (Berlin, 1968), p. 49.Google Scholar

11. See the letter by Ebert to his son printed in Ebert, , Schriften, I, 364Google Scholar; Dokumente und Materialien, Series 2, 1, 423–24, 656–59; Preussisches Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin, Nachlass Schiffer, 4: 550; Stern, L., ed., Archivalische Forschungen zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, Series 4, III, 1159ff.Google Scholar; the article by Ebert, in Neue Zeit, XXXVI (1917–1918), 459ff.;Google ScholarMatthias, E. and Pikart, E., eds., Die Reichstagsfraktion der deutschen Sozialdemokratie (Düsseldorf, 1966), II, 361ff.;Google ScholarMatthias, E. and Morsey, R., eds., Der Interfraktionelle Ausschuss (Düsseldorf, 1959), II, 192ff.;Google ScholarEbert, , Schriften, II, 348–52.Google Scholar

12. Payer became the “representative” of the Social Democrats in the cabinet after very protracted negotiations which are detailed in Matthias, and Morsey, , Interfraktionelle Ausschuss, I, 213ff.Google Scholar, and II, passim.

13. Scheidemann, P., Memoirs of a Social Democrat (London, 1930), II, 157.Google Scholar

14. Matthias, and Morsey, , Interfraktionelle Ausschuss, II, 341 and 503.Google Scholar Ebert also stated: “It is impossible for us to enter the Hertling government because of its position on the eastern question” (ibid., p. 645). When the supplementary treaties came up for consideration late in August 1918, Ebert denounced them in the Reichstag budget committee as the “continuation of a false policy.” Cited in Fischer, F., Germany's Aims in the First World War (Norton paperback edition, New York, 1967), p. 578Google Scholar. Such evidence would seem to question the assertion made by Feldman, Army, Industry, and Labor, p. 485: “The Social Democrats revealed their moral bankruptcy when they abstained.”

15. Matthias, and Morsey, , Interfraktionelle Ausschuss, II, 524.Google Scholar

16. For the situation in 1914 see Buse, D. K., “Ebert and the Coming of World War One: A Month from his Diary,” International Review of Social History, XIII, Pt. 3 (1968), 430–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar On integration see Roth, G., The Social Democrats in Imperial Germany (Totowa, N.J., 1963),Google Scholar and D. Groh's Habilitationsschrift, “Negative Integration und Revolutionärer Attentismus,” to be published by Klett Verlag, Stuttgart, in 1972. The wartime changes of position and values are most traceable in Matthias and Miller, Kriegstagebuch David; Matthias and Morsey, Interfraktionelle Ausschuss; Matthias, and Pikart, , Reichstagsfraktion der Sozialdemokratie, II.Google Scholar

17. The debate is printed in Matthias, and Pikart, , Reichstagsfraktion der Sozialdemokratie, II, 419–60.Google Scholar

18. The frequency of the visits can be traced in the reports of the leaders to the Reichstag caucus. Cf. Matthias, and Pikart, , Reichstagsfraktion der Sozialdemokratie, II.Google Scholar The acceptability of Social Democracy can be seen in that during 1914–15 the Social Democratic leaders were consulted solely on Reichstag matters, while after 1916 the government increasingly checked and discussed policies with them. Another index of the integration of Social Democracy is the decreasing file of information collected by the government as the war proceeded; the files of the foreign office dealing with “internal enemies” relate increasingly only to the Independents or Spartacists. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amt, Bonn, Europa Generalia Nr. 82.

19. Matthias, and Morsey, , Interfraktionelle Ausschuss, II, 744.Google Scholar

20. Ibid., p. 469.

21. Ibid., pp. 521–25.

22. von Thaer, Albrecht, Generalstabsdienst an der Front und in der OHL (Göttingen, 1958), p. 230.Google Scholar See also Feldman, Army, Industry, and Labor, pp. 459ff.

23. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amt, Bonn, Europa Generalia Nr. 82, Nr. 1. Report dated Oct. 1, 1918.

24. For the exact conditions and the struggle which the leadership went through to obtain approval for the decisive step of entering a bourgeois government, see the meeting of September 23, 1918, printed in Matthias, and Pikart, , Reichstagsfraktion der Sozialdemokratie, II, 419–60.Google Scholar Though Ebert thought it would be “nice” to take the power of command away from the Kaiser, he did not think that it would be possible because of the bourgeois partners. However, he did insist that “the military be put outside politics. The control of politics must under all circumstances be placed in the hands of the civil government. That is a standard which can be presented and which we must under all circumstances push through, and if that does not work, then we cannot go along” (p. 439).

25. For a revision of the view of an “improvised revolution” which was argued by Eschenburg, T., Die improvisierte Demokratie (Munich, 1963;Google Scholar the essay was first published in 1951), consult Bermbach, U., Vorformen parlamentarischer Kabinettsbildung in Deutschland (Cologne, 1967),CrossRefGoogle Scholar and the introduction to Matthias, E. and Morsey, R., eds., Die Regierung des Prinzen Max von Baden (Düsseldorf, 1962)Google Scholar. The significant fact is that the demand for constitutional alterations was being pressed with deadly intensity even before the military leaders agreed to the “revolution from above.” Ludendorff was trying to, and did, make the best out of a capitulation to reality which he had to make and had for too long avoided.

26. See the very perceptive analysis of Epstein, K., “Wrong Man in a Maelstrom: the Government of Prince Max von Baden,” Review of Politics, XXVI, No. 2 (04 1964), 215–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

27. See Matthias and Morsey, Regierung des Prinzen Max, pp. 333ff.; Snell, J. L., “Die Republik aus Versäumnissen,” Die Welt als Geschichte, XV (1955), 196–219Google Scholar; and Mayer, A. J., Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking (New York, 1967), pp. 53ff.Google Scholar

28. Quoted in Feldman, G., “Social and Economic Policies of German Big Business 1918–1929,” American Historical Review, LXXI, No. 1 (10 1969), 48.Google Scholar Consult also the trade unions' central discussion of October 4, 1918, in Protokoll der Vertreter der Verbandesvorstände (manuscript copy in Bebel Archiv, Berlin) and Miller, S. and Ritter, G., eds., Die deutsche Revolution 1918–1919 (Frankfurt, 1968), pp. 205–13.Google Scholar The recurrence of the phrase “to save what could be saved” is indicative of the identification of individuals with particular interests or what they thought those interests were. For example, Prince Max applied the phrase to the hopeless situation of October 16, 1918, and hoped to save “economically and politically” the institutions otherwise destroyed by a military collapse. Matthias and Morsey, Regierung des Prinzen Max, p. 216. Scheidemann applied it to the question of saving the unity of Germany. Vorwärts, Oct. 24, 1918. From this the conclusion might be drawn that the liberal regime of Prince Max and the later provisional socialist government identified themselves with the interests of the German state and all its old institutional forms as long as they could thereby save monarchy or party. Yet, as an informer for the government shrewdly reported, the dilemma for the socialists was much more complicated and their aims more comprehensive: “Above all, however: even during the war Social Democracy received the impression that its influence was much less than its power in the country would have indicated…. In decisive situations the government acted against the expressed will of the party, above all at the introduction of unlimited U-Boat warfare, at the dismissal of Kühlmann and in the dynastic affairs of the border states. And as the press of the Right long ago took up the prewar tone identifying Social Democracy as a destructive force to be shunned, it has become increasingly difficult for the leaders to hold the masses to a constructive policy and to the conviction that they should hold out. Especially the year of the Hertling government brought the Social Democrats, on the one hand, the burden of an identifiable, partial responsibility in the eyes of the masses, and, on the other, complete clarity that they would receive a decisive influence on affairs only through a very thorough reform. The SPD leaders had to try to protect themselves from the situation in which other power factors created conditions for which socialist ministers or secretaries of state would de facto also be responsible or in which their hands were tied by policies from individuals whose governments had class electoral systems. In some cases the Social Democratic leaders risked losing not only the trust of the masses for themselves but also losing that trust for any new government and thereby placing the Reich itself in a situation which would be extremely dangerous; any attempt to build a popular government encompassing the masses would be doomed and the radicalism of the Independents become the dominant voice of the working classes in a time of great national crisis.” Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amt, Bonn, Europa Generalia Nr. 82, Nr. 1.

29. Matthias and Morsey, Regierung des Prinzen Max, p. 18.

30. Quoted in The Memoirs of Prince Max von Baden (London, 1928), II, 312.Google Scholar Fehrenbach worked closely with Ebert during the first week of November 1918 in what he termed “anti-revolutionary activities” but left unspecified the actual undertakings. Stadtarchiv Köln, Nachlass Bachem 833, Manuscript ”Meine Erinnerungen aus der deutschen Revolution,” dated Jan. 21, 1919.

31. Meissner, O., Staatssekretär unter Ebert-Hindenburg-Hitler (Hamburg, 1950), p. 25.Google Scholar

32. Full details in Matthias, E. and Miller, S., eds., Die Regierung der Volksbeauftragten 1918/19 (Düsseldorf, 1969), pp. 3–34;Google Scholar Kolb, Arbeiterräte, pp. 114–22; Elben, W., Das Problem der Kontinuität in der deutschen Revolution (Düsseldorf, 1965), pp. 11–18Google Scholar. According to Fehrenbach both Landsberg and Scheidemann thought that the approval of the councils would not be forthcoming. Stadtarchiv Köln, Nachlass Bachem 833.

33. Hunt, R. N., “Friedrich Ebert and the German Revolution of 1918,” in Krieger, and Stern, , eds., The Responsibility of Power, p. 347.Google Scholar

34. Much evidence exists for this view of Ebert's intentions. See Dittmann's “Erinnerungen,” pp. 865ff. (typewritten manuscript in International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam) and the statement by Bauer to Koch-Weser: “In addition Bauer wanted to add, in confidence, that Ebert, Müller, and he, as well as other decisive people, had already seen clearly in November 1918 that everything depended upon creating a government which included the Democrats.” Quoted in Kastning, A., Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie zwischen Koalition und Opposition (Paderborn, 1970), p. 39.Google Scholar

35. Vorwärts, Nov. 11, 1918.

36. This aim was outlined on more than one occasion; for examples see the speeches printed in Ebert, , Schriften, II, 120–26.Google Scholar The quotation is from a speech at the Reichkonferenz, Nov. 25, 1918, partly reprinted ibid., p. 113; full text in Matthias, and Miller, , Regierung der Volksbeauftragten, I, 152.Google Scholar

37. See the appeal to neutral socialists by members of both socialist parties as they found Germany's existence threatened by some of the blockade conditions. Schulthess' Europäischer Geschichtskalender, 1918, I, 469ff.Google Scholar The Independent Socialist Wurm, who headed the Reichsernährungsamt, emphasized “that only organizations with dictatorial powers could operate, otherwise the food system would break down.” Matthias, and Miller, , Regierung der Volksbeauftragten, I, 43–44.Google Scholar The cabinet discussed economic and social conditions on numerous occasions. Ibid., pp. 48ff., pp. 66ff. The figure of ninety-five per cent was given by Koeth, the Fachminister responsible for demobilization (ibid., p. 115); Ebert's diary notation in Ebert, , Schriften, II, 107.Google Scholar

38. Ebert, F. Jr., ed., Friedrich Ebert: Kämpfe und Ziele (Dresden, 1927), p. 25.Google Scholar

39. Keil, W., Erlebnisse eines Sozialdemokraten (Stuttgart, 1948), II, 102.Google Scholar

40. Reichsgesetzblatt 1918 (Berlin, 1918), p. 1303.Google Scholar For the councils the most extensive study is Kolb, Arbeiterräte, especially pp. 287ff.; however, his evidence sometimes counters his own conclusions, and it appears that “most of the councils turned out to be more revolutionary in form than in content.” Ryder, A. J., The German Revolution of 1918 (Cambridge, 1967), p. 148.Google Scholar

41. The manifesto was often reprinted, for example in Ebert, , Schriften, II, 96–97Google Scholar. Dittmann even termed it “the Magna Carta of the Revolution.”

42. The best-known example is the declaration of Eisner's government. See Mitchell, A., Revolution in Bavaria, 1918–1919 (Princeton, 1965), p. 120CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Ebert's government declared it would not sanction a policy of “experiments.” Perhaps the fullest analysis of what was possible on the issue of socialization and a statement reflecting the outlook of many of these “Marxists” is Hilferding's report to the congress of councils in December 1918. Allgemeiner Kongress der Arbeiter- und Soldatenräte Deutschlands (Berlin, 1919), pp. 154ff.Google Scholar He argued that the first task was to get “the economy going again.” H.-J. Steinberg has traced the sources of these socialists' fatalistic convictions about economics and change to the influence of Social Darwinism, in Sozialismus und deutsche Sozialdemokratie (Hanover, 1967).Google Scholar Astute comments on the German socialists' difficulties in finding the right men and the right policies are presented with irony and post facto insight by Toller, Ernst, Eine Jugend in Deutschland (Rowohlt paperback edition, Hamburg, 1962), pp. 85Google Scholar and 90, as he notes that the famed free-market economist Brentano was placed at the head of the Bavarian socialization commission and that a Physiocrat became finance minister during the time of the Räterepublik.

43. Matthias, and Miller, , Regierung der Volksbeauftragten, I, 25.Google Scholar

44. Archiv der SPD, Bonn, Nachlass Barth 22.

45. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking, p. 102, summarizes: “Allied antagonism to revolutionary chaos and change helped to settle three major issues of the German Revolution in favor of the forces of order: the emasculation of the Workers' and Soldiers' Councils; the early election of the Constituent Assembly; and the decision not to resume relations with the Soviet Union.” However, he overestimates the use to which Ebert could put external affairs for internal purposes.

46. Matthias, and Miller, , Regierung der Volksbeauftragten, I, 304.Google Scholar Compare Elben, Problem der Kontinuität, pp. 101ff.

47. Diary entry of Nov. 18, 1918, printed in Ebert, , Schriften, II, 104.Google Scholar

48. Ebert, Kämpfe und Ziele, pp. 66–67.

49. A long and exact exegesis of Ebert's writings, speeches, and discussions with contemporaries cannot be undertaken here, but it must be noted that he repeatedly quoted the Erfurt program of the party to summarize his views, as for example in the public speech of December 1, 1918, reprinted in Ebert, , Schriften, II, 121.Google Scholar Ebert, who had fought for representative institutions in Bremen and for responsible government in Berlin, wrote in Vorwärts, January 19, 1919: “As I, a young saddler's apprentice, joined the German labor movement, I heard the words ‘The people's will shall be the supreme law.’ ” In his personal copy of Ebert, , Schriften, II, 18Google Scholar, where this was reprinted, Rudolf Wissell commented: “1. Rhetoric: How is the people's will found? It is never there, but split in opposites. A group has control! 2. Mussolini: Those who cannot even read the compass should guide the ship!! 3. Every finance minister is appointed, not elected, because the people's will cannot deal in specialization!” It is not certain whether Ebert was clear about the first or last point Wissell made. It is clear that Ebert wished a transition period so that Germans could learn to read the compass. During Prince Max's regime Ebert informed Schiffer that “The German people is not yet ready for a republic and must first be educated up to that level. That could best happen under a democratic monarchy.” Preussisches Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin, Nachlass Schiffer 1:50.

50. Scheidemann, , Memoiren, II, 313Google Scholar. Hunt, “Friedrich Ebert and the German Revolution,” p. 347, avoids the major question when he quotes Ebert proclaiming to Scheidemann that he had no right to declare the republic, because at issue is not whether Ebert was correct or incorrect in this assertion, rather why he reasoned Scheidemann had no right to do so. Similarly on the question of Ebert's “conspiring” (Hunt, p. 346) with Prince Max, the issue is why Ebert worked with him (to which the idea of a transition period referred to in n. 49 gives at least a partial answer).

51. For that reason he had tried to include both bourgeois parties and the Independent Socialists including Liebknecht in the government on November 9, 1918. See Matthias, and Miller, , Regierung der Volksbeauftragten, I, 3–34Google Scholar. For the same reason he refused to rely solely on the representatives of the old regime or its institutions, as can be seen in his refusal to call together the old Reichstag, for which Fehrenbach pressured from the first day of the revolution. Later Ebert opposed Groener and Hindenburg on this question. Ibid., pp. 28 and 381ff.

52. For the conflict of authority between the cabinet led by Ebert and the Berlin Council (Vollzugsrat) see ibid., I, 72ff.; Friedlander, H. E., “Conflict of Revolutionary Authority,” International Review of Social History, VII, No. 2 (1962), 163–76;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Kolb, Arbeiterräte, pp. 114ff. Kolb provides the most comprehensive account of Ebert's efforts to achieve the calling of the constituent assembly against the opposition of some of the council leaders. However, he is not very clear why Ebert declared, “The government stands and falls with the constituent assembly” (Kolb, p. 130). Ebert's purpose—the German people must be consulted for legal approval—is probably most clearly revealed during the cabinet discussions in preparing the new constitution. See Matthias, and Miller, , Regierung der Volksbeauftragten, II, 153ff., esp. 165.Google Scholar

53. Bayerisches Hauptarchiv, Munich, Abteilung II, MA 1980.

54. Especially penetrating on the influence of Social Democracy's past is the introduction to Matthias, and Miller, , Regierung der Volksbeauftragten, I, cxxviff.,Google Scholar the remarks by Groh, D., “Remarques sur la revolution de novembre en Allemagne,” Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, XVI (01–03 1969), 53–55,Google Scholar and Nettl, P., “The German Social Democratic Party 1890–1914 as a Political Model,” Past and Present, No. 42 (04 1965), 65–95.Google Scholar

55. Dokumente und Materialien, Series 2, II, 341ff.; Luxemburg, Rosa, “Der Anfang,” Rote Fahne, 11 18, 1918;Google Scholar Kolb, Arbeiterräte, pp. 138–57; Drabkin, Novemberrevolution, p. 201.

56. “Friedrich Ebert,” by Konrad Haenisch, reprinted in Ebert, Kämpfe und Ziele, p. 41.

57. Österreichisches Hauptarchiv, Vienna, NPA 140. Hartmann to Bauer, December 7, 1918. Hartmann was very close to Ebert.

58. Quoted in Drabkin, Novemberrevolution, p. 351.

59. Hunt, “Friedrich Ebert and the German Revolution,” pp. 340, 348–49.

60. Ibid., pp. 360 and 340.

61. Ibid., p. 341.

62. Ibid., p. 361.

63. Groener, W., Lebenserinnerungen (Göttingen, 1957), pp. 466ff.;Google ScholarSauer, W., “Das Bündnis Ebert-Groener” (unpub.diss., Free University of Berlin, 1958);Google ScholarBerthold, L. and Neef, H., eds., Opportunismus gegen die Novemberrevolution (Berlin, 1958);Google Scholar Elben, Problem der Kontinuität, pp. 126–31; Carsten, F. L., The Reichswehr and Politics (Oxford, 1966), pp. 3–37;Google ScholarPhelps, R., “Aus den Groener-Akten,” Deutsche Rundschau, LXXVI (07 1950), 530–41.Google Scholar Hunt, “Friedrich Ebert and the German Revolution,” raises important questions about the Ebert-Groener “Pact,” but again his essay is marred by inaccuracies and a lack of evidence. So he argues that there is “no evidence” to indicate that Ebert preferred to see the old army disappear and to have a Volkswehr (Hunt, p. 359). Here Hunt misread the cabinet minutes and credited the Independents with what Ebert did, that is, initiate a plan for such a Volkswehr. Compare Hunt, p. 356, n. 18, with Mathias, and Miller, , Regierung der Volksbeauftragten, I, 347,Google Scholar and Ebert, , Schriften, II, 110ff.Google Scholar Indeed a recent analysis of military reform has found that “it has been too readily and frequently accepted that the conservative, bureaucratic character of the SPD's party and trade union officials exclusively determined Friedrich Ebert's policy.” Herwig, H. H., “The First German Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils and the Problem of Millitary Reforms,” Central European History, I, No. 2 (06 1968), p. 154.Google Scholar The necessity of the situation and Ebert's self-limiting methods forced working with the military and the bureaucracy. The question was what price these institutions could exact for their contributions.

64. Examples in Ritter and Miller, Deutsche Revolution, pp. 74–77. Barth too thought “order” was the prime issue of the day, though he held that it could be achieved by the workers’ and the soldiers' councils. Matthias, and Miller, , Regierung der Volksbeauftragten, I, 174.Google Scholar

65. Politische Herrschaft (Suhrkampf paperback edition, Frankfurt, 1967), p. 93.Google Scholar

66. Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Nachlass Haeften: “Der Versuch zu einer Gegenrevolution November/Dezember 1918” (Haeften's various versions of his memoirs must be employed with caution because they were revised from 1923 to 1935 with the later versions fitting the trends of the times); Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Nachlass Schleicher 9: “ Bericht des Major v. Harbou über die Tätigkeit des Generalkommandos Lequis”; Thaer, Generalstabsdienst, pp. 267, 272–73; Elben, Problem der Koninuität, pp. 126ff.; Die Wirren in der Reichshauptstadt und im nordlichen Deutschland (Berlin, 1940), VI, 28ff.Google Scholar All the foregoing present information about the Berlin action planned, as Groener, Lebenserinnerungen, p. 478, admitted, against the “urban masses of workers,” and developed in “secrecy with the consent of Ebert.” Herwig overlooks most of the above literature when he states he was “unable to find any other references to this alleged agreement aimed at combatting the urban workers.” “First German Congress of Councils,” p. 155, n. 14. A letter, dated December 1, 1918, in Nachlass Schleicher 9 addressed to “Dear Friend” can be identified (Nachlass Schleicher 13, p. 15) as being from Groener to Ebert. In it Groener argues for the use of troops to create “absolute authority and real power.” The question of how far Ebert agreed remains uncertain, though from Thaer's account it is clear that Ebert refused the application of force, and Groener had to issue the order to march into Berlin “even against the orders of the government or of military authorities, including our minister of war.…” From Groener's diary cited in Carsten, Reichswehr and Politics, p. 14, and in Wirren in der Reichshauptstadt, VI, 31.

67. See n. 63 above and Oeckel, H., Die Revolutionäre Volkswehr (Berlin, 1968), p. 60.Google Scholar The author has not yet seen the study cited in Feldman, Army, Industry, and Labor, p. 5, by W. Sauer.

68. Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Nachlass Schleicher 9. Groener to Ebert, Dec. 1, 1918.

69. Thaer, Generalstabsdienst, p. 281; Reinhard, W., Die Wehen der Republik (Berlin, 1933), pp. 43–45;Google Scholar Groener, Lebenserinnerungen, p. 476. Harbou reported: “Often when I asked for action, I was told by the people in the chancellery that the power of socialism is the word and not the weapon, and that a peoples' government must avoid bloodshed.” Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Nachlass Schleicher 9.

70. Nachlass Trautmann (private possession), diary entry Dec. 12, 1918.

71. Thaer, Generalstabsdienst, p. 283, suggests that once Ebert and Scheidemann had decided in favor of a forceful resolution they were prepared to employ any means to be rid of Liebknecht and Luxemburg. However, Ebert's manuevering is shown in that he also threatened Groener that they would join the radical left unless Groener and the military staff stayed on to oversee the demobilization despite the conditions imposed by the congress of councils. Ebert's reluctance to employ force is revealed not only in his negotiations with the troops that were about to clash in front of the chancellery on December 23, 1918, but also in his attempt to prevent troops’ coming to Berlin from Potsdam. Telegram quoted in Matthias, and Miller, , Regierung der Volksbeauftragten, II, 79Google Scholar, n. 20. Also: Archiv der SPD, Bonn, Nachlass Barth 44. Hunt, “Friedrich Ebert and the German Revolution,” p. 359, repeatedly states that ”no evidence” exists showing that Ebert underwent any inner struggle in reaffirming the military alliance against the so-called Hamburg Points on military matters or that Ebert suffered “moral qualms” when forced to choose between the generals and the Independents in late December 1918. Disregarding the fact that Hunt has overlooked much evidence which would suggest that Ebert did want a different kind of military, the issue must be joined whether Hunt has not assigned values to Ebert which he never had and hence has misjudged Ebert's endeavors. For instance, Hunt's term “reluctant revolutionary” cannot apply to Ebert because he was not at all revolutionary, but a man bent on constitutionally controlled reform. For Ebert the choice between Independents and military was not a moral issue but a matter of political tactics; for Ebert the mode in which power was employed was the moral issue, and he had very strong moral qualms about the use of force. In addition to the literature cited in notes 53, 57, and 69 above see Carsten, Reichswehr and Politics, p. 22.

72. Groener, Lebenserinnerungen, p. 477.

73. Philipp, K., “The Independent Socialists' Attempt to Govern Germany” (unpub. diss., Kansas State University, 1968), p. 261Google Scholar, concludes that the Independents were not really in contact with the reality of German politics: “To understand then the USPD's failure, one does not have to look for a conspiracy between Ebert and the military. In the final analysis the party failed largely because of its own weaknesses.”

74. Feldman, “German Big Business,” p. 48, and Richter, W., Gewerkschaften, Monopolkapital und Staat (Berlin, 1959).Google Scholar

75. This point was made on different occasions by Barth and Ebert and it is implicit in Haase's letter to his son, November 26, 1918, printed in Haase, E., ed., Hugo Haase (Berlin, 1929), p. 173.Google Scholar The unity of views among cabinet members is well indicated in the minutes of the meeting between the central government and the representatives of the provinces, November 25, 1918. Matthias, and Miller, , Regierung der Volksbeauftragten, I, 140–215.Google Scholar Further evidence is Dittmann's report on behalf of the whole cabinet to the congress of councils. Allgemeiner Kongress, pp. 16ff.

76. Badia, G., Les Spartakistes 1918 (Paris, 1966);Google ScholarWaldman, E., The Spartacist Uprising (Milwaukee, 1958);Google ScholarKolb, E. and Rürup, R., eds., Der Zentralrat (Leiden, 1968)Google Scholar. The annotations in the latter edition are especially informative.

77. For the lack of government control see the cabinet meeting of January 15, 1919. Matthias, and Miller, , Regierung der Volksbeauftragten, II, esp. 275.Google Scholar

78. Ursachen und Folgen, III, 126.

79. von Oertzen, P., Betriebsräte in der Novemberrevolution (Düsseldorf, 1966)Google Scholar, argues that the second phase of the revolution began at this time because of the rescnment over so few gains by the working classes during the first phase, November 1918 to February 1919.

80. Rürup, “Problems of the German Revolution,” p. 132; Ryder, German Revolution, pp. 218ff.; Drabkin, Novemberrevolution, p. 547, points out that the social basis of Social Democratic party membership became increasingly kleinbürgerlich. Müller was willing to recognize that SPD support came increasingly from opportunists and that this factor limited the party's efforts: “Without the ‘November-socialists’ we would not even be here.” Protokoll der Parteikonferenz in Weimar (Berlin, 1919), p. 7.Google Scholar

81. Österreichisches Hauptarchiv, Vienna, NPA 140, Hartmann to Bauer.

82. See the literature cited in n. 54 above for the reasons Social Democracy became so attached to an evolutionary concept of how to achieve socialism. Ebert had early accepted this “Marxism” as propounded by Kautsky; already in 1898 he had argued this fatalistic conception of history: Social Democracy did not have to overthrow the existing society since “the course of developments would bring that.” Bremer Bürgerzeitung, June 16, 1898.

83. Ebert pushed through the participation of the Center Party in the Scheidemann government. Landsberg, Otto, “Der Rat der Volksbeauftragten,” in Friedrich Ebert (Berlin, 1929), p. 208Google Scholar, and Parteiarchiv der SPD, Bonn, “Protokoll der Fraktionssitzung,” February 4, 1919. For the establishment of the president's office see Nadolny, R., Mein Beitrag (Wiesbaden, 1955), p. 69Google Scholar; Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amt, Bonn, Nachlass Nadolny; Bundesarchiv, koblenz, Nachlass Doehle, “Lebenserinnerungen” (typewritten manuscript).

84. Kastning, Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie, pp. 19–49; Erger, J., Der Kapp-Lüttwiz-Putsh (Düsseldorf, 1967), pp. 15–59.Google Scholar

85. The descriptive terms are from Troeltsch, E., Spektator-Briefe (Berlin, 1924), p. 87.Google Scholar

86. This very accurate summary of the goals of the Social Democrats is in the introduction to Ritter and Miller, Deutsche Revolution, p. 20.

87. In this regard Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War, is most significant. His contribution relates mainly to war aims, not war origins; to the war's significance, not its beginnings. As he states (p. 637): “But even after the defeat of 1918, many Germans, and especially those who had played leading parts in political and economic life up to 1918, preserved in the two following decades a political and historical image of themselves which was colored by illusions.”

88. See Ebert's polemic against the Vaterlandspartei in the Elberfelder Frcic Presse, November 19, 1917; his warning to the western powers is quoted in Ryder, German Revolution, p. 134; Ebert's speech to the returning soldiers on December 10, 1918, is printed in Ebert, , Schriften, II, 127Google Scholar. However, the context of the speech requires as much attention as the phrase about no military defeat, since Ebert often maintained: “We have lost the war. This fact is not a consequence of the revolution.” Ibid., p. 149.

89. Wels, Otto, in Protokoll des SPD-Parteitages (Berlin, 1919), p. 152.Google Scholar

90. Luxemburg, Rosa in Rote Fahne, November 18, 1918.Google Scholar