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Rethinking the Role of Artisans in Modern German Development

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 March 2009

Hal Hansen
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Since so much of what distinguishes Germany's social-economic development from that of other advanced capitalist societies derives from the prominence of the handicrafts (Handwerk) and their institutional legacy, it is regrettable that artisan sightings have become so rare in recent central European scholarship.1 It is especially so because disparaging postwar historiographic portrayals of “backward” late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century artisans leave us without a way to understand the emergence of a prosperous Mittelstand of small and medium-sized craft producers in the postwar years. Moreover, inasmuch as the existence of a vibrant, legally distinct class of handicraft firms constitutes one of the most striking features of the modern German political economy, we need an account of how it evolved and why.2 Furthermore, without this, we have no way to explain several other distinctive “peculiarities” of German institutional arrangements: an educational system that directs a majority of young Germans to practically oriented, work-based apprenticeships supplemented by part-time schooling instead of academically oriented, full-time secondary schools; a labor market that effectively professionalized all occupations and limited the creation of mere “jobs”; and a training system that, as it diffused from the craft to the industrial and service sectors, reinforced Germany's historic manufacturing preference for producing diversified, high-quality goods and services.3 In short, no history of modern German economic, social, or political development can afford to dispense with artisans or their institutions.

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Research Article
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Central European History , Volume 42 , Issue 1 , March 2009 , pp. 33 - 64
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Copyright © Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical Association 2009

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References

1 The same applies to Austrian and Swiss institutions, though these lay beyond the purview of this essay. Economic historians have, however, been active in the study of guilds in the medieval and early modern periods. See Ogilvie, Sheilagh, “‘Whatever is, is right?’ Economic institutions in pre-industrial Europe,” Economic History Review 60, no. 4 (2007): especially 653–656CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Remarkably, the sustained historiographic neglect of the crafts and their influence on modern German development sometimes extends even to treatments of the German economy and its history, despite its prominence. See, for instance, Dunlavy, Colleen and Welskopp, Thomas, who do not mention it in their juxtaposition of the two economies in their “Myths and Peculiarities: Comparing U.S. and German Capitalism,” GHI Bulletin 41 (Fall 2007): 33–64Google Scholar.

3 This is in contrast to the American historic preference for producing mass standardized goods. See Streeck, Wolfgang, “On the Institutional Conditions of Diversified Quality Production,” in Beyond Keynesianism: The Socio-Economics of Production and Unemployment, ed. Matzner, Edward and Streeck, Wolfgang (Aldershot: Elgar, 1991), 21–61Google Scholar. On how Handwerk-controlled training shaped the German labor movement, see Thelen, Kathy, How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 See Crossick, Geoffrey and Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard, The Petite Bourgeoisie in Europe, 1780–1914 (London: Routledge, 1995), 2–5Google Scholar. Marx and Engels were especially influential here; however, due to the effective disappearance of the handicrafts in the U.S., Britain, and France, countries from which most postwar social scientific theory derived, it seemed only natural to regard the handicrafts in Germany as a politically protected “residue” of Germany's premodern past.

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8 My critique of Blackbourn is a friendly one because it strengthens his and Eley's, Geoffrey contention in The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984)Google Scholar that German institutions were not as “backward” as Sonderweg proponents have claimed.

9 On the contributions of knowledge to industrialization, see Mokyr, Joel, “Useful Knowledge as an Evolving System: The View from Economic History,” in The Economy as an Evolving Complex System, Vol. III: Current Perspectives and Future Directions, ed. Blume, Lawrence E. and Durlauf, Steven N. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 307–337Google Scholar; Mokyr, Joel, The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002)Google Scholar; Mokyr, Joel, The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990)Google Scholar.

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11 Compare this with Thelen, How Institutions Evolve, 33–58, who embraces the Sonderweg interpretation of the Handicraft (“Protection”) Law, though she stresses the importance of the crafts for understanding modern German development and follows most other components of the larger story developed in my dissertation, “Caps and Gowns: Historical Reflections on the Institutions that Shaped Learning for and at Work in Germany and the United States, 1800–1945,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1997).

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13 While I know of no good data for Germany, Diane Lindstrom estimated that the average rural migrant increased his/her market consumption by a factor of three upon settlement in metropolitan Philadelphia between 1810 and 1850. Lindstrom, , Economic Development in the Philadelphia Region, 1810–1850 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), especially 1–54Google Scholar, 153–185.

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16 On the importance of knowledge and its diffusion for industrialization, see Mokyr, The Gifts of Athena. On the privileged place of metropolitan areas in technological development and diffusion, see Streb et al., “Technological Knowledge Spillover,” 347–373.

17 Cronon's, WilliamNature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1992)Google Scholar offers the best detailed description of this type of big-city, urban-hinterland development, a process common to all metropolitan growth in these years. Also see Tipton's, Frank “Regional and Economic Geography,” in Germany: A New Social and Economic History, Volume III, Since 1800, ed. Ogilvie, Sheilagh and Overy, Richard (London: Arnold, 2003), 1–15Google Scholar.

18 Hohenberg, Paul M. and Lees, Lynn Hollen, The Making of Urban Europe 1000–1950 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985)Google Scholar, 226 and 227, Table 7.2. For other reasons, some of Germany's mid-sized cities grew, in relation to their initial size, very quickly as well.

19 Reulecke, Jürgen, Geschichte der Urbanisierung in Deutschland (Frankfort: Suhrkamp, 1985)Google Scholar, Table 3.

20 Ritter, Gerhard and Tenfelde, Klaus, Arbeiter im Deutschen Kaiserreich, 1871–1914, vol. 3 of Geschichte der Arbeiter und der Arbeiterbewegung in Deutschland seit dem Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts, ed. Ritter, Gerhard (Bonn: Verlag J. H. W. Dietz Nachf., 1992), 68–77Google Scholar. Also see Herrigel, Gary, Industrial Constructions: The Sources of German Industrial Power (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 72–110Google Scholar.

21 This is a central part of Herrigel's account of what he calls “autarkic industrialization.” See Herrigel, Industrial Constructions, 72–110. Although Herrigel stresses the role of coal and water transport in his description of the rise of the Ruhr, he gives them little place in his broader theoretical account of the emergence of “autarkic industrialization.” He does so in part, no doubt, because it would weaken his contention that social institutional practices—especially landholding patterns—largely determined a region's industrial order. But the physical attributes of place were essential to industrial urbanization. Also see Kocka, Jürgen and Siegrist, Hannes, “Die hundert größten deutschen Industrieunternehmen im späten 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert. Expansion, Diversifikation und Integration im internationalen Vergleich,” in Recht und Entwicklung der Großunternehmen im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Horn, Norbert und Kocka, Jürgen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979), 55–122Google Scholar.

22 Mokyr, The Lever of Riches, 81–150, 239–271.

23 Landes, David, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 148–192Google Scholar. Americans relied on the same process. Rosenberg, Nathan, Technology and American Growth (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharp, 1972), 59–86Google Scholar.

24 Keck, Otto, “The National System for Technical Innovation in Germany,” in National Innovation Systems, ed. Nelson, Richard R. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 115–157Google Scholar.

25 For more on metropolitan and industrial development, see Hansen, “Caps and Gowns,” 134–168.

26 These forms of industry, often misleadingly referred to as “protoindustrial,” proliferated throughout Europe from about 1650. See Vries, Jan de, “The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolution,” Journal of Economic History 58 (1994): 1, 249–270Google Scholar. On Germany, see Ogilvie, Sheilagh, “The Beginnings of Industrialization,” in Germany: A New Social and  Economic History, Vol. II, 1630–1800, ed. Ogilvie, Sheilagh (London: Hodder Arnold, 1996), 263–308Google Scholar.

27 Hohenberg and Lees, The Making of Urban Europe, 181. Herrigel, Gary, “Industrial Organization and the Politics of Industry: Centralized and Decentralized Production in Germany,” (Ph.D. diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1990), 71–92Google Scholar. Herrigel followed the lead of Gustav Schmoller, and others, in exploiting the observation that craft production was densest in areas of partible inheritance. Schmoller, Gustav, Zur Geschichte der deutschen Kleingewerbe im 19. Jahrhundert (Halle: Verlag der Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1870)Google Scholar. Further, Herrigel has identified these within Germany as Baden, Württemberg, the Kingdom of Saxony, the Thüringen States, portions of the Grand Duchy of Hesse and the Rhineland, the lower Main, and the upper Franconian regions of northern Bavaria. Herrigel, Industrial Constructions, 33–71.

28 Griesmeier, Josef, “Die Entwicklung der Wirtschaft und der Bevölkerung von Baden und Württemberg im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Ein statistischer Rückblick auf die Zeit des Bestehens der Länder Baden und Württemberg,” in Jahrbücher für Statistik und Landeskunde von Baden-Württemberg, vol. II (1954): 12–123, 128–129Google Scholar; Schmoller, Zur Geschichte der deutschen Kleingewerbe, 316–317, 322–325.

29 Stuttgart, for instance, doubled in size over these two decades. Hohorst, Gerd, Kocka, Jürgen, and Ritter, Gerhard, eds., Sozialgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch II (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1978), 45Google Scholar, Table 12.

30 Schäfer, Hermann, Regionale Wirtschaftspolitik in der Kriegswirtschaft. Staat, Industrie, und Verbände während des Ersten Weltkriegs in Baden (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1983), 7Google Scholar.

31 Ibid., 8–9.

32 For a description of this type of manufacturing, see Boch, Rudolf, “The Rise and Decline of ‘Flexible Production’: The Cutlery Industry of Solingen since the Eighteenth Century,” in Worlds of Possibility: Flexibility and Mass Production in Western Industrialization, ed. Sabel, Charles and Zeitlin, Jonathan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997)Google Scholar.

33 Marshall, Alfred, Principles of Economics (London: Macmillan and Co., 1890)Google Scholar, chapter 10.

34 Hansen, “Caps and Gowns,” 180–195, 287–312; Haverkamp, Frank, Staatliche Gewerbeförderung im Großherzogtum Baden. Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Entwicklung des gewerblichen Bildungswesens im 19. Jahrhundert (Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 1979)Google Scholar; Snowden, Albert A., The Industrial Improvement Schools of Württemberg (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1908)Google Scholar; and Fischer, Wolfram, Der Staat und die Anfänge der Industrialisierung in Baden, 1800–1850. Die staatliche Gewerbepolitik (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1962)Google Scholar. Note how these strategies contravene Alexander Gerschenkron's contention that successful late developers necessarily turned to autarkic forms of large-scale production to compensate for their backwardness. Gerschenkron, , Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966)Google Scholar.

35 See Rinneberg's, Karl-Jürgen analysis of the survey in Das betriebliche Ausbildungswesen in der Zeit der industriellen Umgestaltung Deutschlands (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1985), 120–127Google Scholar.

36 Sedatis, Helmut, Liberalismus und Handwerk in Südwestdeutschland. Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftskonzeptionen des Liberalismus und die Krise des Handwerks im 19. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1979), 59, 69Google Scholar. Moreover, lenders typically tried to guide the business practices of the people to whom they lent money as a means of enhancing the probability of repayment. Familiarity with language and logic of standard business practices thus enhanced the attractiveness of a borrower to a lender.

37 For references to developments in France and Italy, see Sabel, Charles and Zeitlin, Jonathan, “Historical Alternatives to Mass Production,” in Past and Present 108 (August 1985): 133–176CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For Austria-Hungary, see Komlos, John, Nutrition and Economic Development in the Eighteenth-Century Habsburg Monarchy: An Anthropometric History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 119–165Google Scholar.

38 Hansen, “Caps and Gowns,” 332–340. On the logic of collective action, see Olsen, Mancur, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), especially 53–65Google Scholar.

39 Fischer, Der Staat und die Anfänge der Industrialisierung, 139–157.

40 See Walker, Mack, Germany and the Emigration, 1816–1885 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), 47–77Google Scholar. Some 7.2 percent of Baden's population left the Grand Duchy in the years 1845 to 1849, a rate that accelerated to 12.7 percent between 1850 and 1854.

41 Haverkamp, Staatliche Gewerbeförderung, 146–148; Sedatis, Liberalismus und Handwerk, 78–117; Borscheid, Peter, Naturwissenschaft, Staat und Industrie in Baden, 1848–1914 (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1976), 17–30Google Scholar; Fischer, Der Staat und die Anfänge der Industrialisierung, 380–401. For similar developments in Württemberg, see Hettling, Manfred, Reform ohne Revolution. Bürgertum, Bürokratie und kommunale Selbstverwaltung in Württemberg von 1800 bis 1850 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

42 See Sedatis on southwestern liberalism and the state in Liberalismus und Handwerk, 1–50.

43 Griesmeier, “Die Entwicklung der Wirtschaft,” 134; Haverkamp, Staatliche Gewerbeförderung, 162.

44 Fischer, Der Staat und die Anfänge der Industrialisierung, 139 ff.

45 Sedatis, Liberalismus und Handwerk, 42–59.

46 Ibid., 107, 187–190.

47 For this and the following paragraph, see Haverkamp, Staatliche Gewerbeförderung, 51–58, 65–70; Fischer, Der Staat und die Anfänge der Industrialisierung, 166–168; Schäfer, Regionale Wirtschaftspolitik, 8–9.

48 Due in part to the fact that Prussia's large-scale agricultural estates suffered less from soil depletion than the intensively farmed plots of the southwest, it made little early investment in chemical research.

49 See Borscheid, Naturwissenschaft, Staat und Industrie, 28–119; Homburg, Ernst, “The Emergence of Research Laboratories in the Dyestuffs Industry, 1870–1900,” British Journal for the History of Science 25 (1992): 91–111Google Scholar.

50 Schöfer, Rolf, Berufsausbildung und Gewerbepolitik. Geschichte der Ausbildung in Deutschland (Frankfort: Campus Verlag, 1981), 50Google Scholar; Nebenius, Carl Friedrich, Über technische Lehranstalten in ihrem Zusammenhang mit dem gesamten Unterrichtswesen (Karlsruhe: C. F. Muller, 1833), 96–100Google Scholar.

51 Nebenius, Über technische Lehranstalten, 78 ff.

52 Haverkamp, Staatliche Gewerbeförderung, 79–80.

53 Harvey, Klaus, Die preußische Fortbildungsschule. Eine Studie zum Problem der Hierarchisierung beruflicher Schultypen im 19. Jahrhundert (Weinheim: Beltz, 1980)Google Scholar.

54 See ibid., 13–60; Simon, Oscar, Die Fachbildung des Preußischen Gewerbe- und Handelsstandes im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert (Berlin: Mittler, 1902)Google Scholar, 726 ff.; Schmoller, Gustav, “Das untere und mittlere gewerbliche Schulwesen in Preußen,” in Schmoller, Zur Social- und Gewerbepolitik der Gegenwart. Reden und Aufsätze (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1890)Google Scholar, 1262 ff. Interestingly, American schools followed a similar trajectory once academics monopolized their governance. See Hansen, “Caps and Gowns,” chapters 6–8.

55 This story is developed at length in Haverkamp, Staatliche Gewerbeförderung, 188–245.

56 Fischer, Der Staat und die Anfänge der Industrialisierung, 169–172; Haverkamp, Staatliche Gewerbeförderung, 215–237.

57 Haverkamp, Staatliche Gewerbeförderung, 216–236.

58 Ibid., 245.

59 Note that the Wisconsin state commission on industrial education made a similar point in 1911. Report of the Commission, 18. See the conclusion below.

60 This paragraph and the next derive from Haverkamp, Staatliche Gewerbeförderung, 287–306.

61 Lexis, W., ed., Der mittlere und niedere Fachunterricht im Deutschen Reich, vol. 4, part 3 of Lexis, Das Unterrichtswesen im Deutschen Reich (Berlin: Verlag von A. Asher & Co., 1904), 183–184Google Scholar; Haverkamp, Staatliche Gewerbeförderung, 307–316.

62 Haverkamp, Staatliche Gewerbeförderung, 325–393.

63 Ibid., 323–327; Snowden, The Industrial Improvement Schools of Württemberg, 41–43. On the quality of the teacher's training in Karlsruhe, see 43–44.

64 Lexis, Der mittlere und niedere Fachunterricht, 175–178, 184–187; Haverkamp, Staatliche Gewerbeförderung, 336–346.

65 Haverkamp, Staatliche Gewerbeförderung, 470, Illustration 9.

66 A similar process took place in Württemberg in the same years. See Snowden, The Industrial Improvement Schools of Württemberg, 47–48.

67 Haverkamp, Staatliche Gewerbeförderung, 347, 470 (Illustration 9).

68 Ibid., 347–358. On Württemberg's trade continuation schools and some of their early problems, see Snowden, The Industrial Improvement Schools of Württemberg, 42–44.

69 Haverkamp, Staatliche Gewerbeförderung, 358–361.

70 Rinneberg, Das betriebliche Ausbildungswesen, 159, 167–169. The single most frequent suggestion for improvement of training in Adelsheim, which lacked a trade school, was trade schooling.

71 Haverkamp, Staatliche Gewerbeförderung, 265–275, 429–430; Gutmann, Emile, Die Gewerbeschule Badens 1834/1930. Ihre Entwicklung und ihr gegenwärtiger Stand, im Zusammenhang mit der Geschichte ihres Lehrerstandes und des Verbandes badischer Gewerbeschulmänner dargestellt (Bühl and Baden: Konkordia, 1930), 328–450Google Scholar. Interestingly, Baten, Jörg, Spadavecchia, Anna, Streb, Jochen, and Yin, Shuxi concluded in “What made southwest German firms innovative around 1900? Assessing the Importance of Intra- and Inter-Industry Externalities,” Oxford Economic Papers 59 (2007): i105–i126CrossRefGoogle Scholar, that “the excellent state of technical and commercial schools of 19th-century Baden significantly increased firms' successful patenting activities”—along with the diffusion of innovations across industries that were not spatially concentrated, supporting the “view that state intervention in the educational sphere was the single most important contribution to the development of an industrial system,” i123.

72 Sedatis, Liberalismus und Handwerk, 59, 69.

73 While some 1,119 apprentices did so in Württemberg in 1892, fewer than 100 signed up in Baden in the same year. Haverkamp, Staatliche Gewerbeförderung, 391.

74 See Rinneberg's analysis of the survey, Das betriebliche Ausbildungswesen, 156–157.

75 For more on this, see Hansen, “Caps and Gowns,” chapter 5.

76 See ibid., 316–340.

77 Gimmler, Wolfgang, Die Entstehung neuzeitlicher Handwerkerverbände im 19. Jahrhundert, ihre Ziele, Struktur und Auseinandersetzungen um eine grundsätzliche, gesetzlich verankerte Reglung des Organisationswesens (Ph.D. diss., University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, 1972), 81–99Google Scholar.

78 Körting, Johannes, Geschichte der Gewerbeförderung in Baden, 1865–1965 (Karlsruhe: Verlag C. F. Müller, 1965), 77Google Scholar.

79 Gimmler, Die Entstehung neuzeitlicher Handwerkerverbände, 144, table.

80 Haverkamp, Staatliche Gewerbeförderung, especially 1–64, 362–469.

81 Körting, Geschichte der Gewerbeförderung in Baden, 89–95.

82 For this paragraph and the next, see Hansen, “Caps and Gowns,” 347–354. On the limits of the voluntary guilds as agents of self-help, see 332–341.

83 A “free rider” is someone who benefits from a public program or good without bearing any of the costs. Craft employers, for instance, could hire skilled journeymen whether they had contributed to the cost of training them or not. Consequently, many elected to make no voluntary contributions to education and training outlays.

84 Hampke, Thilo, “Das neue badische Gewerbekammergesetz,” Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung, und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich XVIII (1894): 1,166–167Google Scholar; Hampke, Thilo, Handwerker- oder Gewerbekammern? Ein Beitrag zur Lösung der gewerblichen Organisationsfrage (Jena: G. Fischer, 1893), 20–22Google Scholar.

85 Erhebungen über die Lage des Kleingewerbes in Amtsbezirk Mannheim 1885. Veranstaltet durch das Großherzogliche Ministerium des Innern, vol. I (Karlsruhe: Macklot'sche Druckerei, 1887); Erhebungen über die Lage des Kleingewerbes in Amtsbezirk Adelsheim 1885. Veranstaltet durch das Großherzogliche Ministerium des Innern, vol. II (Karlsruhe: Braunsche Hofbuchdruckerei, 1887); Erhebungen über die Lage des Kleingewerbes 1885. Veranstaltet durch das Großherzogliche Ministerium des Innern, vol. III (Karlsruhe: Gutsch, 1888).

86 An association's structure shaped its policy goals. There is no space here for a discussion of how organizational structure affected interest articulation, but it is a fascinating phenomenon that rendered Prussia's voluntary guilds unlikely instruments of effective craft bootstrapping policies. See Hansen, “Caps and Gowns,” 327–341.

87 Gimmler, Die Entstehung neuzeitlicher Handwerkerverbände, 138, 144–148.

88 See the “Erlaß des preußischen Ministers für Handel und Gewerbe: Zur Frage der Regelung des Handwerks. Vom 15. August 1893,” in Annalen des Deutschen Reichs, ed. Georg Hirth and Max von Seydel (Munich and Leipzig: Hirth, 1893), 801–815; reprinted as Document 29 in Stratmann, Karlwilhelm and Schlüter, Anne, eds., Quellen und Dokumente zur Berufsbildung (Cologne: Böhlau, 1982), 199–205Google Scholar.

89 See Hansen, “Caps and Gowns,” 514–534. To some degree, this was a turf battle, with the Ministry of Education wanting to retain its monopoly over all schooling, whereas southwestern-style trade schools required oversight by the Ministry of Trade in consultation with the communities of practice for which they trained. Moreover, the ministries of War and Education insisted on a culturally oriented curriculum because their primary objective was to form fatherland-loving military recruits and subjects. Trade Ministry officials argued that the only way to win over students and their mostly working-class parents was to provide economically useful instruction that gave the young a stake in their society. Besides, they argued, since the primary schools had been spectacularly unsuccessful at this kind of instruction, what made them think a few hours a week of patriotic literature, history, and civics—when students were older and less docile—would prove any more effective? Ultimately, the Ministry of Trade won this argument. Thus, contrary to what postwar academic critics of Germany's “business dominated” vocational education and training system have assumed, its Kaiserreich advocates stood against the forces of reaction.

90 See Hansen, “Caps and Gowns,” chapter 3.

91 Report of the Commission upon the Plans for the Extension of Industrial and Agricultural Training (Madison, WI: Democrat Printing Company, 1911), 18.

92 See Hansen, “Caps and Gowns,” chapter 6.

93 Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags, IX. Legislaturperiode, IV. Session 1895/97 (Berlin: Norddeutsche Buchdruckerei und Verlagsanstalt, 1892), VII, 5427. My translation.

94 In many respects, their rhetoric resembled that of American Jeffersonians; however, a century after Jefferson, they saw that the future belonged to industry, not agriculture.

95 Sheehan, James, German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 32Google Scholar.

96 See Hansen, “Caps and Gowns,” chapters 5 and 7.