1. The reasons derive from research for a book on Walther Rathenau and the Weimar Republic: The Politics of Reparations (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971)Google Scholar, but this article must stand on the facts and arguments as presented here. The most important archival sources included the files Reichskanzlei: Ausführung des Friedensvertrags, Bundesarchiv, Coblenz, West Germany, Series R43I, vols. 12–34 (June 1919–January 1923); and Büro des Reichspräsidenten, Politische Abteilung: Ausführung des Friedensvertrags, Deutsches Zentralarchiv, Potsdam, East Germany, vols. 671–82 (April 1919–March 1927). On the basis of this research I doubt that any important secrets are to be found in the files of any government concerned, as Miss Marks hopes. The best truths lie not in the political secrets, but in the mediocre economic data. The literature on reparations is enormous. Since I also disagree with Miss Marks about the value of some of the works she cites, let me mention the published sources I found most useful (among sources not yet published but available in the United States are Germany's Kabinettsprotokolle): Bergmann, Carl, Der Weg der Reparationen (Frankfurt, 1926);Google ScholarBurnett, Philip M., Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference (2 vols., New York, 1940);Google ScholarCastillon, Richard, Les réparations allemandes: Deux expériences 1919–1932, 1945–1952 (Paris, 1953);Google Scholard'Abernon, Edgar Vincent, The Diary of an Ambassador: Versailles to Rapallo 1920–1922 (New York, 1929);Google ScholarDocuments on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, First Series, VIII, XV, XVI (London, 1958–1968);Google ScholarGradl, Baptist, Die Reparations-Sachleistungen von Versailles bis zur Bank Internationaler Zahlungen (Berlin, 1933);Google ScholarHelbich, Wolfgang J., Die Reparationen in der Ära Brüning (Berlin, 1962);Google ScholarKessler, Harry, Walther Rathenau: Sein Leben und sein Werk (Wiesbaden, 1963);Google ScholarKeynes, John Maynard, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (New York, 1920);Google Scholar “The The Experts' Reports, 1: The Dawes Report,” and “The Experts' Reports, 2: The McKenna Report,” The Nation and The Athenaeum, XXXV (1924), 40–41 and 76–77,Google Scholar and A Revision of the Treaty (New York, 1922);Google ScholarLaubach, Ernst, Die Politik der Kabinette Wirth 1921–1922 (“Historische Studien,” CCCCII, Lübeck and Hamburg, 1968);Google ScholarLeyrette, Jean, “The Foreign Policy of Poincaré” (unpub. diss.,Oxford, 1955);Google ScholarLüke, Rolf E., Von der Stabilisierung zur Krise (Basel and Zurich, 1958);Google ScholarMantoux, Étienne, The Carthaginian Peace or the Economic Consequences of Mr. Keynes (London, 1946);Google ScholarMendershausen, Horst, Two Postwar Recoveries of the German Economy (Amsterdam, 1954);Google ScholarMoulton, Harold G. and Pasvolsky, Leo, War Debts and World Prosperity (Washington, 1932);Google ScholarRonde, Hans, Von Versaille bis Lausanne (Stuttgart and Cologne, 1950);Google ScholarSuarez, Georges, Briand: Sa vie—son oeuvre, v: L'artisan de la paix 1918–1923 (Paris, 1941);Google ScholarWeill-Raynal, Étienne, Les réparations allemandes et la France (3 vols., Paris, 1938–1947);Google ScholarWheeler-Bennett, John W., The Wreck of Reparations (New York, 1933),Google Scholar and Wüest, Erich, Der Vertrag von Versailles im Licht und Schatten der Kritik (Zurich, 1962).Google Scholar

2. This is suggested by a reading of the German press, cabinet minutes, and other government documents, especially the Ausführung files; also documented in Zwoch, Gerhard, “Die Erfüllungs- und Verständigungspolitik der Weimarer Republik und die deutsche öffentliche Meinung” (unpub. diss., Kiel, 1950).Google Scholar

3. Also called London Schedule of Payments, reprinted in Documents on British Foreign Policy, First Series, XV, 566–69.

4. France, , Assemblée nationale: Annales: Chambre des députés CIV, First Section, 3–10.Google Scholar

5. Germany, Statistisches Amt, Statistik des deutschen Reichs: Der auswärtige Handel in den Jehren 1920, 1921, und 1922 (1924), CCCX, Section 1, 2, table.Google Scholar

6. Germany, Statistiches Amt, Wirtschaft und Statistik (1924), IX (bound monthly bulletin), 276Google Scholar, table. The term general operating deficit is mine. The table simply shows the difference between government income and expenditures, as mentioned above. The government, through its budget, was making up for all the economy's deficits ves-à-vis the outside world, including such losses as were normally the responsibility of the private sector. The situation, however, was extraordinary, and Germany could not afford to let any important economic component go bankrupt.

7. John Maynard Keynes gave this estimate for 1922, when conditions were somewhat better—as far as actual production of values was concerned. He got it by taking the figure for 1913, 43 billion marks, and assuming a 15 per cent production loss. It is possible that the true figure for 1921 was closer to 30 billion, but I perfer to use the higher one to avoid any possible exaggeration of German hardship. Keynes may have failed to appreciate the extent of productivity increases resulting from the war. The term national income has been superseded in recent years by gross national product, both expressing the total value of nation's goods and services. The GNP is calculated according to slightly different criteria, but the differences are insignificant for the purposes of this article.

8. According to an economic study for the Dawes Plan, cited in Bresciani-Turroni, Constantino, The Economics of Inflation (London, 1937), p. 252.Google Scholar

9. Bergmann, , Der Weg der Reparationen, p. 186Google Scholar. The payments totaled 615 million gold marks by August 1922, when the operation was halted.

10. Weill-Raynal, , Les réparations allemands, I, 528Google Scholar. By May 1, 1921, a few days before the London Payments Plan went into effect, the occupation costs totaled 3.6 billion gold marks, according to Weill-Raynal' calculation. Occupation costs and clearing payments were eliminated officially with the Dawes Plan in 1924 (see below), when all such charges were consolidated into the reparation payments.

11. Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (London, 1952), p. 77.Google Scholar

12. In a Reichstag speech on Feb. 11, 1930, just before he took office, Brüning said that Germany must balance her budget and her foreign trade so that no one “could attribute to her a lack of good will” as she sought relief (quoted in Helbich, Die Reparationen in der Ära Brüning p. 30). Brüning achieved an extraordinary technical success. Besides three rigorous wage and price reductions, he brought imports down from 13·7 billion to 4·7 billion Reichsmarks from 1929 to 1932. Of course, the other nations retaliated, and German exports in the same period fell from 13·5 billion to 5·7 billion Reichsmarks. And then Keynes wrote his General Theory.

13. Weill-Raynal, , Les réparations allemandes III, 769–71Google Scholar. The term marks comprehends gold marks, Rentenmarks (the official currency introduced late in 1923 and used briefly), and Reichsmarks. All these varieties had about the same relation to the dollar. The figure also covers the value of deliveries in kind, chiefly coal.

14. Schwartz, Albert, Die Weimarer Republik (Constance, 1958), p. 103.Google Scholar

15. According to the Layton Report (Walter Layton was a British banker), submitted to the London Conference of 1931, quoted in Stolper, Gustav, Deutsche Wirtshaft seit 1870 (Tübingen, 1964), p. 116.Google Scholar

16. Woytinsky, W. J., Die Welt in Zahlen (Berlin, 1925), I, 198.Google Scholar

17. Cabinet: Conclusions of the Meetings of the Cabinet, Public Record Office, London, CAB 32/25.

18. A classic statement that has been taken into the Oxford Dictionary of Quotations.

19. The Economic Consequences of the Peace, p. 268.

20. Introduction to Bresciani-Turroni, The Economics of Inflation, p. 5.