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Paradoxes of Ostpolitik: Revisiting the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties, 1970

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 January 2017

William Glenn Gray
William Glenn Gray*
Affiliation:
Purdue University
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Abstract

This article reexamines the diplomacy of Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, focusing on two landmark achievements in 1970: the Moscow Treaty in August, and the Warsaw Treaty in December. On the basis of declassified US and German documentation, it argues that envoy Egon Bahr’s unconventional approach resulted in a poorly negotiated treaty with the Soviet Union that failed to address vital problems such as the status of Berlin. The outcome deepened political polarization at home and proved disconcerting to many West German allies; it also forced the four World War II victors—Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union—to save Brandt’s Ostpolitik by grinding out an agreement on access to Berlin. By contrast, West German negotiations in Warsaw yielded a treaty more in line with West German expectations, though the results proved sorely disappointing to the Polish leadership. Disagreements over restitution payments (repacked as government credits) and the emigration of ethnic Germans would bedevil German-Polish relations for years to come. Bonn’s Ostpolitik thus had a harder edge than the famous image of Brandt kneeling in Warsaw would suggest.

In diesem Aufsatz wird die Diplomatie der Ostpolitik Willy Brandts neu betrachtet und zwar mit einem Fokus auf deren zwei Meilensteine des Jahres 1970, den Moskauer Vertrag vom August und den Warschauer Vertrag vom Dezember. Auf der Basis freigegebener US-amerikanischer und deutscher Akten wird argumentiert, dass Botschafter Egon Bahrs unkonventionelle Herangehensweise zu einem schlecht verhandelten Vertrag mit der Sowjetunion führte, in dem es versäumt wurde, essentielle Fragen, wie etwa den Status Berlins, anzusprechen. Das Ergebnis vertiefte die politische Polarisierung in der Bundesrepublik und gab den westlichen Alliierten Anlass zur Sorge; darüber hinaus wurden die vier Siegermächte des Zweiten Weltkrieges – Großbritannien, Frankreich, die Vereinigten Staaten und die Sowjetunion – gezwungen, Brandts Ostpolitik durch eine mühsam zustande gekommene Einigung über den Zugang zu Berlin zu retten. Im Gegensatz dazu führten die westdeutschen Verhandlungen in Warschau zu einem Vertrag, der eher den westdeutschen Erwartungen entsprach, wobei die Ergebnisse aus Sicht der polnischen Führung freilich überaus enttäuschend waren. Unstimmigkeiten bezüglich Wiedergutmachungszahlungen (neu verpackt als Regierungskredite) und die Emigration ethnischer Deutscher würden die deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen auf Jahre hinaus erschweren. Die Bonner Ostpolitik hatte in der Tat schärfere Kanten als das berühmte Bild eines knienden Brandts in Warschau suggeriert.

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Articles
Information
Central European History , Volume 49 , Issue 3-4 , December 2016 , pp. 409 - 440
Copyright
Copyright © Central European History Society of the American Historical Association 2016 

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References

1 These Politikergedenkstiftungen are separate entities from the major political foundations that share similar names, notably the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and the Friederich-Ebert-Stiftung.

2 The classic account of the 1972 clash remains Baring, Arnulf, Machtwechsel: Die Ära Brandt-Scheel (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 1982)Google Scholar. See also Grau, Andreas, Gegen den Strom: Die Reaktion der CDU/CSU-Opposition auf die Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik der sozial-liberalen Koalition 1969–1973 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2005)Google Scholar; Clemens, Clay, Reluctant Realists: The CDU/CSU and West German Ostpolitik (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989)Google Scholar.

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11 For roughly the past decade, scholars have been documenting Nixon's extreme suspicions of Brandt. See Holger Klitzing, “To Grin and Bear It: The Nixon Administration and Ostpolitik,” in Fink and Schaefer, Ostpolitik, 80–110; Schaefer, Bernd, “The Nixon Administration and West German Ostpolitik, 1969–1973,” in The Strained Alliance: U.S.-European Relations from Nixon to Carter, ed. Schulz, Matthias and Schwartz, Thomas A. (New York: Cambridge, 2010), 45–64 Google Scholar. Academic studies that wield US records to document and interpret Brandt’s policies are less common.

12 National Archives and Records Administration—College Park, MD (hereafter NARA), Record Group (hereafter RG) 59, Subject-Numeric Files (hereafter SNF) 70–73, Box 2311 (POL 15–1 Ger W), US Embassy, Bonn (hereafter US Bonn), Kenneth Rush, telegram 1539, Feb. 11, 1970. Brandt made similar remarks to other visitors; see Archiv der sozialen Demokratie (hereafter AdsD), Willy-Brandt-Archiv, Bundeskanzler, Bd. 165, Otto Friedrich, note, Jan. 22, 1970.

13 AdsD, Nachlass Bahr, 1/EBAA001108, Paul Frank, remarks to a senior-level meeting at the foreign ministry, Sept. 18, 1970. As of June 1, Frank held the rank of state secretary, which was just below that of the minister.

14 Egon Bahr, memorandum, “Moskau,” Jan. 14, 1970, in Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (hereafter AAPD), 1970, ed. Ilse Dorothee Pautsch et al. (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2001), 20–23.

15 Egon Bahr, memorandum, “Gespräch mit Lednjew,” Dec. 24, 1969, in AAPD, 1969, ed. Franz Eibl and Hubert Zimmermann (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000), 1465–66. See also Keworkow, Wjatscheslaw, Der geheime Kanal: Moskau, der KGB und die Bonner Ostpolitik (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1995), 48–56 Google Scholar.

16 Walter Scheel to West German Embassy (Diplogerma), Moscow (hereafter DG Moscow), telegram 54, Jan. 23, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 73–74. See also Vogtmeier, Andreas, Egon Bahr und die deutsche Frage (Bonn: Dietz, 1996), 123–27Google Scholar.

17 That number of hours alone caused serious concern on the French side. See the comments by French ambassador François Seydoux cited in DG Moscow, Helmut Allardt, telegram 411, March 18, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 486; and, more generally, Marie-Pierre Rey, “Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik, France, and the Soviet Union,” in Fink and Schaefer, Ostpolitik, 111–25.

18 The press frequently remarked on the apparent warmth between Bahr and Gromyko. See, e.g., the cover story “Moskauer Geheimprotokolle: Verrat in Bonn,” Der Spiegel, April 24, 1972.

19 For an elaboration of this point using the example of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, see William Glenn Gray, “Abstinence and Ostpolitik: Brandt's Government and the Nuclear Question,” in Fink and Schaefer, Ostpolitik, 244–68.

20 Protocol of conversation between Egon Bahr and Andrei Gromyko (hereafter conversation Bahr/Gromyko), Jan. 30, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 105–18, here 106.  Throughout these notes, citations of German-language protocols of such conversations will designate the German participant first; citations of English-language records will designate the American participant first.

21 DG Moscow, Egon Bahr, telegram 318, March 4, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 371–74. Bahr broke with precedent here by using the term border rather than demarcation line to characterize the separation between East and West Germany.

22 Conversation Bahr/Gromyko, March 3, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 359–68.

23 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts—Berlin (hereafter PA AA), B 150, Bd. 198, “Deutsches Non-Paper vom 5. 3. 1970.”

24 Gromyko's paper is attached to Egon Bahr, memorandum, “Sowjetisches Non-Paper über Grundsätze des Gewaltverzichts,” March 7, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 393–400.

25 Report on Bahr's remarks in a conversation with National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, April 8, 1970, in Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1969–1976, vol. 40, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, ed. David C. Geyer (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 204–7.

26 Egon Bahr, memorandum, “Sowjetisches Non-Paper,” March 7, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 394.

27 PA AA, B 150, Bd. 198, Hans Hellmuth Ruete to DG Moscow, telegram 202, March 9, 1970. Ruete held the rank of Ministerialdirektor and ran Abteilung (division) II at the Foreign Office.

28 “Arbeitstext des Redaktionsausschusses,” March 11, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 450–52; DG Moscow, Egon Bahr, telegram 365, March 11, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 455–57. Bahr insisted that there was not yet a “common paper,” yet the Soviet framework continued to be the sole basis for discussion. See PA AA, B 150, Bd. 199, DG Moscow, Bahr, telegram 430, March 21, 1970.

29 Conversation Bahr/Gromyko, Feb. 10, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 189–97, here 196.

30 PA AA, B 150, Bd. 199, Günther van Well, memorandum, “Einbeziehung Berlins in den deutsch-sowjetischen Gewaltverzicht; hier: Französische Haltung,” March 12, 1970. Van Well held the rank of Ministerialdirigent and headed Unterabteilung II A.

31 PA AA, B 150, Bd. 198, Hans Hellmuth Ruete to DG Moscow, telegram 202, March 9, 1970.

32 Conversation Bahr/Gromyko, March 10, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 417–30, here 423.

33 Conversation Bahr/Gromyko, March 6, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 381–86.

34 NARA, RG 59, SNF 70–73, Box 2303 (POL 2 Ger W), US Bonn to US State Department, report on Bahr's comments to Martin J. Hillenbrand on May 9, 1970, airgram A-600, May 15, 1970.

35 Sarotte, Mary E., Dealing with the Devil: East Germany, Détente, and Ostpolitik, 1969–1973 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 46–54 Google Scholar. See also Schönfelder, Jan and Erices, Rainer, Willy Brandt in Erfurt: Das erste deutsch-deutsche Gipfeltreffen 1970 (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2010), 202–13Google Scholar.

36 Conversation Brandt/Stoph, March 19, 1970, in Bonn und Ost-Berlin 1969–1982, ed. Potthoff, Heinrich (Bonn: Dietz, 1997), 135–59Google Scholar.

37 Dannenberg, Foundations of Ostpolitik, 160–61.

38 This was the line Bahr took during consultations in Washington. See NARA, RG 59, SNF 70–73, Box 2320 (POL Ger W-USSR), conversation Hillenbrand/Bahr, April 9, 1970.

39 The German-language version of the working group's agreed text is published as “Leitsätze für einen Vertrag mit der UdSSR,” May 20, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 822–24.

40 PA AA, B 150, Bd. 203, DG Moscow, Bahr, telegram 749, May 20, 1970. Bahr argued that, under the circumstances, it might be best to adopt new compromise language proposed by Gromyko that used the word anerkennen.

41 For the text of Bahr's letter, see DG Moscow, telegram 770, May 21, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 846–48.

42 Bahr, Egon, Zu meiner Zeit (Munich: Blessing Verlag, 1996), 318–21Google Scholar.

43 NARA, RG 59, SNF 70–73, Box 2311 (POL 15–1 Ger W), US Bonn, Rush, airgram A-634, May 22, 1970.

44 Conversation Rush/Strauss, Apr. 16, 1970, in FRUS, 1969–1976, 40:226–29. Strauss had been making similar remarks since the formation of the Brandt government; see, e.g., Buchstab, Günter and Lindsay, Denise, eds., Barzel: “Unsere Alternativen für die Zeit der Opposition”; Die Protokolle des CDU-Bundesvorstands 1969–1973 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2009), 20–21 Google Scholar.

45 “Rightists Assail Brandt at Rally: He Is Branded ‘Traitor’ for Talks With East Bloc,” New York Times, May 31, 1970. The quotation on the banner was used with heavy irony: it was a statement issued by SPD leader Herbert Wehner in 1950, on the occasion when the GDR first recognized the Oder-Neisse Line.  For a photograph of the protest rally, see “Protest Demonstration in Bonn against Brandt's Ostpolitik (May 30, 1970),” German History in Documents and Images (Washington, DC: German Historical Institute),  http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_image.cfm?image_id=2411&language=english.

46 On the politics of the expellee groups, see Ahonen, Pertti, After the Expulsion: West Germany and Eastern Europe 1945–1990 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)Google Scholar; Müller, Matthias, Die SPD und die Vertriebenenverbände 1949–1977: Eintracht, Entfremdung, Zwietracht (Berlin: Lit, 2012)Google Scholar. As Andrew Demshuk observes, expellees were probably less hostile to Ostpolitik than the leaders of the expellee lobbies were; see The Lost German East: Forced Migration and the Politics of Memory, 1945–1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 232–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

47 Brandt had sent a letter to Polish party chief Władisław Gomułka on April 20 without Scheel's knowledge; this caused a minor scandal when Scheel denied the letter's existence—and turned out to be wrong. See Scheel's comment in the Bundestag's Foreign Affairs Committee, 15. Sitzung, Apr. 24, 1970, in Der Auswärtige Ausschuss des Deutschen Bundestages: Sitzungsprotokolle 1969–1972, ed. Wolfgang Hölscher and Joachim Wintzer, CD-ROM ed. (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2008), 218. On the resulting political fallout, see NARA, RG 59, SNF 70–73, Box 2307 (POL 12 Ger W), US Bonn, Rush, airgram A-589, May 13, 1970.

48 NARA, RG 59, SNF 70–73, Box 2307 (POL 12 Ger W), US Bonn, Frank Cash, telegram 6403, June 5, 1970. This outcome included the votes of West Berlin delegates (twelve for the government, eight for the opposition), who were not allowed to vote on legally binding measures such as electing the chancellor. Theoretically, then, the opposition already had a majority of two.

49 Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 322–23; NARA, RG 59, SNF 70–73, Box 2320 (POL Ger W-USSR), US Bonn, Rush, telegram 6066, May 28, 1970.

50 Bundeskabinett, 28. Sitzung, May 27, 1970, in Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung, vol. 23, 1970, ed. Christine Fabian and Uta Rössel (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2015), 244–45.

51 NARA, RG 59, SNF 70–73, Box 2265 (POL 1 Eur E-Ger W), US Bonn, Rush, telegram 6077, May 30, 1970. Genscher and Ertl were the interior and agriculture ministers, respectively; Dahrendorf was not a minister, but he took part in the meeting in his capacity as parliamentary state secretary at the foreign ministry (representing Scheel).

52 Schmidt, Leber, and Franke were ministers of defense, transportation, and intra-German relations, respectively. See Werner Link's account in Bracher, Karl-Dietrich, Jäger, Wolfgang, and Link, Werner, Republik im Wandel: Die Ära Brandt 1969–1974 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1986), 186–88Google Scholar.

53 Bundeskabinett, 29. Sitzung, June 4, 1970, in Kabinettsprotokolle 23:257–58.

54 Frank, Paul, memorandum, “Kabinettsberatung am 7. 6. 1970 über ein Gewaltverzichtsabkommen mit der Sowjetunion,” June 8, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 940–42Google Scholar.

55 On Bild publisher Axel Springer's hostility toward Brandt's Ostpolitik, see Münkel, Daniela, Willy Brandt und die Vierte Gewalt: Politik und Massenmedien in den 50er bis 70er Jahren (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 2005), 71–77 Google Scholar.

56 Walter Scheel, conversation with members of the CDU/CSU faction, June 7, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 917–20.

57 US Bonn, Rush, telegram 7412, June 29, 1970, in FRUS, 1969–1976, 40:955–57. Paul Frank later mentioned Ahlers as a possible source; see NARA, RG 59, SNF 70–73, Box 2320 (POL 4 Ger W-USSR), US Bonn, Russell Fessenden, airgram A-986, Sept. 8, 1970. For further discussion on the nature of the leak, see Dedo von Schenck, memorandum, “Deutsch-sowjetischer Gewaltverzicht,” July 3, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1119–20; Grau, Gegen den Strom, 90–91; Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 324–25. According to Bahr, Rainer Barzel claimed that the leak had originated with Immo Stabreit, a mid-ranking German diplomat in the Moscow embassy.

58 AdsD, Nachlass Bahr, 1/EBAA000788, Egon Bahr to Willy Brandt, June 12, 1970.

59 NARA, RG 59, SNF 70–73, Box 2265 (POL 1 Eur E-Ger W), US Bonn, Rush, telegram 7413, June 29, 1970.

60 On Ahlers's feud with the Springer press, see Schwarz, Hans-Peter, Axel Springer: Die Biographie (Berlin: Ullstein, 2009), 508–10Google Scholar.

61 Baring, Machtwechsel, 353–55. Also of interest is the analysis that Kissinger conveyed to Nixon, June 18, 1970, in FRUS, 1969–1976, 40:251–53.

62 NARA, RG 59, SNF 70–73, Box 2307 (POL 12 Ger W), US Bonn, Rush, telegram 6931, June 16, 1970. Dahrendorf, Ralf, famous as the author of Society and Democracy in Germany (New York: Doubleday, 1967)Google Scholar, had already decided to resign in protest against Bahr's Ostpolitik. See Baring, Machtwechsel, 342–44; Hacke, Jens, “Das politische Scheitern eines liberalen Hoffnungsträgers: Ralf Dahrendorf und die FDP,” in Intellektuelle in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Verschiebungen im politischen Feld der 1960er und 1970er Jahre, ed. Kroll, Thomas and Reitz, Tilman (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), 123–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

63 Genscher told American officials that he would resign if the “Bahr Paper” were signed in its current form. See US Bonn, Rush, telegram 7412, June 29, 1970, in FRUS, 1969–1976, 40:955–57.

64 AdsD, Nachlass Bahr, 1/EBAA000920, Bahr to Brandt, July 1, 1970.

65 DG Moscow, Allardt, telegram 870, June 4, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 903–5. Allardt later published a starkly critical account of Brandt's Ostpolitik; see Allardt, Helmut, Moskauer Tagebuch: Beobachtungen, Notizen, Erlebnisse (Düsseldorf: Econ, 1973)Google Scholar.

66 Text in Günther van Well, memorandum, July 13, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1150–56.

67 NARA, RG 59, SNF 70–73, Box 2320 (POL Ger W-USSR), US Bonn, Rush, telegram 8001, July 13, 1970.

68 Conversation Scheel/Schumann, July 3, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1081–88; West German Embassy, London, Karl-Günther von Hase, telegram 1312, July 17, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1191–94.

69 NARA, RG 59, SNF 70–73, Box 2320 (Pol Ger W-USSR), US State Department to US Bonn, telegram 115580, July 18, 1970.

70 Ibid. By contrast, Bahr told Kissinger that everything would be wrapped up in a week or two; see Bahr to Kissinger, July 24, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1231–32.

71 Conversation Scheel/Gromyko, July 28, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1257–64.

72 Conversation Scheel/Gromyko, July 31, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1307–13.

73 Bahr to Brandt, Aug. 1, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1335–37. For a more favorable assessment of Scheel's performance, see Dannenberg, Foundations of Ostpolitik, 175–77.

74 Bahr to Brandt, Aug. 1, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1335–37.

75 Bahr to Scheel and Frank, July 31, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1314–15.

76 Brandt to Bahr, Aug. 3, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1362–65.

77 Brandt to DG Moscow, telegram 851, Aug. 3, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1341–44. On Brandt's desire to have something “citable” [zitierfähig], see Braun to DG Moscow, telegram 898, Aug. 6, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1407.

78 Conversation Frank/Falin, July 31, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1296–1306.

79 DG Moscow, telegram 1289, Aug. 4, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1366–68.

80 DG Moscow, telegram 1310, Aug. 5, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1402–5; State Secretary Baron Sigismund von Braun to DG Moscow, telegram 898, Aug. 6, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1407.

81 Cabinet instructions for Scheel, July 23, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1222–24.

82 Conversation Scheel/Gromyko, Aug. 6, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1410–14.

83 Ibid. Schiller was the minister for economic affairs, Leussink the minister for education and science.

84 On Wienand's work for the Stasi, see Andrew, Christopher and Mitrokin, Vasili, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 452 Google Scholar.

85 West German Embassy, Washington, DC (hereafter DG Washington), Rolf Pauls, telegram 1594, Aug. 6, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1419–20. For French complaints about “the haste with which the Germans had conducted their negotiations,” see NARA, RG 59, SNF 70–73, Box 2320 (POL Ger W-USSR), Martin Hillenbrand's conversation with a French embassy official in Washington, Aug. 13, 1970.

86 Barzel to Brandt, Aug. 7, 1970, in PA AA, B 1, Bd. 350.

87 CDU whip Will Rasner to Scheel, July 20, 1970, in Moskau—Bonn: Die Beziehungen zwischen der Sowjetunion und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1955–1973; Dokumentation, ed. Meissner, Boris (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1975), 1248–49Google Scholar.

88 US Bonn, Fessenden, telegram 9011, Aug. 5, 1970, in FRUS, 1969–1976, 40:286–89.

89 Bundeskabinett, Sondersitzung, Aug. 8, 1970, in Kabinettsprotokolle 23:330–33.

90 Brandt to Heath (and to Nixon and Pompidou), Aug. 14, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1473–75; English translation in FRUS, 1969–1976, 40:291–93. On the legacy of Rapallo, see Buffet, Cyril, “Rapallo: Sirens and Phantoms,” in Haunted By History: Myths in International Relations, ed. Buffet, Cyril and Heuser, Beatrice (New York: Berghahn, 1998), 235–58Google Scholar.

91 Pompidou's pique may have been heightened by the memory of French president Charles de Gaulle's 1958 effort to create a directory of the “Big Three” (France, Britain, the United States), which was rebuffed by the US. See Giauque, Jeffrey Glen, Grand Designs and Visions of Unity: The Atlantic Powers and the Reorganization of Western Europe, 1955–1963 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 87 Google Scholar.

92 NARA, RG 59, SNF 70–73, Box 2320 (POL Ger W-USSR), conversation Hillenbrand/Pauls, Aug. 11, 1970.

93 DG Washington, Pauls, telegram 1636, Aug. 11, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1436–37.

94 On this count, Bahr's “back-channel” conversation partners provided excellent background information. See, e.g., Bahr's notes on a conversation with Lednjew [Lednev], April 27, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 684–86.

95 Conversation Brandt/Brezhnev, Aug. 12, 1970, AAPD, 1970, 1449–64, here esp. 1454–55. This record shows that the entire first half of the conversation consisted of a long monologue by Brezhnev.

96 Conversation Brandt/Kosygin, Aug. 12, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1438–49, here 1445.

97 Conversation Scheel/Gromyko, Aug. 5, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1393–97. On the “relaunch” of Europe in 1969, which gave rise to optimistic views about the creation of a “European Union” by 1980, see Knipping, Franz and Schönwald, Matthias, eds., Aufbruch zum Europa der zweiten Generation: Die europäische Einigung 1969–1984 (Trier: WTV, 2004)Google Scholar.

98 Berghahn, Volker, “Lowering Soviet Expectations: West German Industry and Osthandel during the Brandt Era,” in Quest for Economic Empire: European Strategies of German Big Business in the Twentieth Century, ed. Berghahn, Volker (Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1996), 145–58Google Scholar.

99 Conversation Brandt/Kosygin, Aug. 12, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1438–49, here 1439.

100 On the European security conference, see Hakkarainen, Petri, A State of Peace in Europe: West Germany and the CSCE, 1966–1975 (New York: Berghahn, 2011)Google Scholar.

101 Conversation Brandt/Brezhnev, Aug. 12, 1970, AAPD, 1970, 1449–64.

102 Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 330–31.

103 NARA, RG 59, SNF 70–73, Box 2320 (POL Ger W-USSR), US Embassy, Luxembourg, telegram 426, Aug. 19, 1970. For milder remarks by Dutch foreign minister Joseph Luns, see NARA, RG 59, SNF 70–73, Box 2320 (POL Ger W-USSR), US Embassy, The Hague, J. William Middendorf, telegram 3224, Sept. 1, 1970.

104 See, e.g., Barzel's conversation with Secretary of State William Rogers, summarized in Richard Nixon Presidential Library, Yorba Linda, CA, National Security Files, Box 683 (Germany Vol. V), US State Department, Rogers, to US Bonn, telegram 146772, Sept. 8, 1970.

105 NARA, RG 59, SNF 70–73, Box 2320 (POL Ger W-USSR), US Embassy, Rome, Graham Martin, telegram 4343, Aug. 11, 1970; NARA, RG 59, SNF 70–73, Box 2320 (POL Ger W-USSR), US Embassy, Paris (hereafter US Paris), Robert O. Blake, telegram 10920, Aug. 15, 1970. On the 1968 currency crisis, see Gray, William Glenn, “‘Number One in Europe’: The Startling Emergence of the Deutsche Mark, 1968–1969,” Central European History 39 (2006): 56–78 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

106 Kissinger to Nixon, Aug. 17, 1970, in FRUS, 1969–1976, 40: 293–94.  The declassified version of this document obscures the specific venue where Scheel spoke, but this document was likely a report on a briefing Scheel gave to the leaders of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group after initialing the Moscow Treaty on August 7. The italics reflect Kissinger's underlining.

107 For earlier Scheel remarks about how West Germany should aspire to “achieve a certain participation in decisions around the world,” see his remarks to the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee on Jan. 19, 1966, in Der Auswärtige Ausschuß des Deutschen Bundestages: Sitzungsprotokolle 1965–1969, CD-ROM ed., ed. Wintzer, Joachim (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2006), 38–40 Google Scholar.

108 NARA, RG 59, SNF 70–73, Box 2320 (POL Ger W-USSR), conversation Kissinger/Bahr, Aug. 17, 1970. The German record of the conversation shows an even shorter timetable–a Berlin settlement before the end of 1970 and ratification by winter's end; see AAPD, 1970, 1487–91.

109 According to Jean-Daniel Jurgensen at the Quai d'Orsay, the Moscow Treaty left Pompidou “furious” and the French government “sulking.” See NARA, RG 59, SNF 70–73, Box 2316 (POL Ger W-Pol), US Paris, telegram 12295, Sept. 12, 1970. On Pompidou's overall caution regarding Berlin, see Soutou, Georges-Henri, “Willy Brandt, Georges Pompidou et l'Ostpolitik,” in Willy Brandt und Frankreich, ed. Möller, Horst and Vaïsse, Maurice (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005), 121–54; here 133–36Google Scholar.

110 NARA, RG 59, SNF 70–73, Box 2320 (POL Ger W-USSR), US State Department to US Paris and US Bonn, telegram 152856, Sept. 17, 1970.

111 Remarks by Deputy Foreign Minister Józef Winiewicz, reported in German Trade Mission (Deutsche Handelsvertretung), Warsaw (hereafter DHV Warsaw), Heinrich Böx, telegram 167, April 20, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 634–36. On Gomułka's offer, see Niedhart, Gottfried, “‘Phase widerspruchsvollen Wandels’: Willy Brandts Entspannungspolitik und die deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen 1966–1974,” in Nie mehr eine Politik über Polen hinweg, ed. Boll, Friedhelm and Ruchniewicz, Krzysztof (Bonn: Dietz, 2010), 44–69, here 48–49Google Scholar.

112 The Görlitzer Abkommen of June 1950 contained extremely detailed provisions about the course of the border between the GDR and Poland. See Stokłosa, Katarzyna, Polen und die deutsche Ostpolitik 1945–1990 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 76–79, 194–99Google Scholar.

113 During the third round of German-Polish talks, for example, Winiewicz made clear that diplomatic relations should be considered a culmination of the normalization process set in motion by the border treaty. See DHV Warsaw, Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz, telegram 171, April 22, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 646–48.

114 Bahr to Duckwitz, Jan. 22, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 63–5.

115 Lothar Lahn, memorandum, “Deutsch-polnische Gespräche; hier: Richtlinien für die dritte Gesprächsrunde,” April 2, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 548–58. At the time, Lahn was Ruete's deputy in Abteilung II. See also Bingen, Dieter, Die Polenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von Adenauer bis Kohl 1949–1991 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998), 141–42Google Scholar, which underscores the basic point (using a slightly later date) that the “humanitarian” demands were not an original feature of the German negotiating agenda.

116 DHV Warsaw, Duckwitz, telegram 120, March 11, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 452–54.

117 Berndt von Staden, memorandum, “Sechste deutsch-polnische Gesprächsrunde,” Oct. 9, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1707–14, here 1708. In mid-1970, Staden replaced Ruete as head of Abteilung II at the Foreign Office. Stark differences between Polish and German estimates reflected the tremendous difficulty that any state authority faced in trying to assign unitary national identities. For background on this problem, see Kulczycki, John J., Belonging to the Nation: Inclusion and Exclusion in the Polish-German Borderlands 1939–1951 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

118 Bundeskanzleramt, Carl-Werner Sanne, report on a conversation between Bahr and Winiewicz, June 8, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 931–33; PA AA, B 150, Bd. 213, Hans Julius Boldt, memorandum, “Deutsch-polnische Gespräche—Behandlung von humanitären Problemen,” Oct. 12, 1970. Boldt worked at the Foreign Office desk for labor and social law.

119 Lothar Lahn, memorandum, “Deutsch-polnische Gespräche (4. Gesprächsrunde), hier: Sitzung am 8. 6. 1970,” in AAPD, 1970, 923–36.

120 Among others, CDU deputies Hans Dichgans and Peter Petersen visited Poland in May 1970 and reported to the Bundestag on the need to do more for ethnic Germans in Poland. See Grau, Gegen den Strom, 78–80. Bishop Hermann Kunst also wrote to Scheel on the subject; see PA AA, B 1, Bd. 354, Kunst to Scheel, July 31, 1970.

121 Behrens, Alexander, ed., Durfte Brandt Knien?’ Der Kniefall in Warschau und der deutsch-polnische Vertrag; Eine Dokumentation der Meinungen (Bonn: Dietz, 2010), 23–24 Google Scholar. See also Grau, Gegen den Strom, 135–37.

122 Frank to Barzel, Oct. 23, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1828–31.

123 Barzel to Scheel, Oct. 26, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1833–34; PA AA, B 1, Bd. 354, Barzel to Scheel, Oct. 28, 1970.

124 Brandt to Cyrankiewicz, Oct. 27, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1846–48.

125 PA AA, B 150, Bd. 216, Paul Frank, memorandum, “Kabinettssitzung vom 29. Oktober 1970,” Nov. 2, 1970. The official cabinet minutes are not nearly so revealing; see Kabinettsprotokolle 23:412–13.

126 Scheel told Bonn's negotiators in early October to postpone final agreement on the key points of contention until his trip to Warsaw in November. See the minutes of a preparatory conversation at the Foreign Office, Oct. 2, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1676–78.

127 Conversation Scheel/Jędrychowski, Nov. 3, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1894–1900.

128 Report by Paul Frank, conveyed in DHV Warsaw, telegram 549, Nov. 3, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1902–5.

129 Conversation Scheel/Cyrankiewicz, Nov. 9, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1976–85, here 1977.

130 The radicalism of the SPD branch in South Hesse apparently redounded to the benefit of the FDP: mainstream Social Democrats could vote for the Free Democrats as a way of guaranteeing the continuity of Ostpolitik without augmenting the voice of the “reds” in Frankfurt. The CDU also made significant gains in 1970, winning back votes lost to the right-radical National Democratic Party during the last Hesse elections in 1966. See, e.g., David Binder, “Vote in Hesse Aids German Coalition,” New York Times, Nov. 9, 1970.

131 For the eleven points, see DHV Warsaw, Staden, telegram 586, Nov. 9, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1991–95. For the underlying focus on process, see Berndt von Staden, memorandum, “Deutsch-polnische Verhandlungen in Warschau; hier: Taktische und sachliche Behandlungsvorschläge für die humanitären Fragen,” Oct. 15, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1775–76.

132 Informal English translation in NARA, RG 59, SNF 70–73, Box 2316 (POL Ger W-Pol), US Bonn, Rush, airgram A-1258, Nov. 30, 1970.

133 PA AA, B 150, Bd. 219, “Vertrauliche Erläuterungen zur Information der Regierung der Volksrepublik Polen,” Dec. 7, 1970. This was a German translation of the confidential document passed along by the Poles.

134 Conversation Scheel/Jędrychowski, Nov. 13, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 2030–42; “Deutsch-polnisches Regierungsgespräch,” Nov. 13, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 2030–42.

135 “Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland Concerning the Basis for Normalizing Their Mutual Relations,” Dec. 7, 1970, in US Department of State, Documents on Germany, 1944–1985 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1985), 1125–27.

136 In a further indication of the chancellor's willingness to play hardball, Brandt threatened to stay home from Warsaw and not take part in the signing ceremony if the Poles did not at least promise to commence diplomatic relations at the time the treaty was ratified. See PA AA, B 150, Bd. 218, Berndt von Staden, memorandum, “Unterzeichnung des deutsch-polnischen Vertrages sowie Aufnahme diplomatischer Beziehungen,” Nov. 27, 1970.

137 Bahr to Brandt, Nov. 10, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 1998. Scheel told Bahr that he was “terribly missed” in Warsaw; in relaying this to Brandt, Bahr seems to have taken the remark at face value, without considering the possibility that Scheel was merely massaging his ego.

138 NARA, RG 59, SNF 70–73, Box 2316 (POL Ger W-Pol), comments by Walter Becher (CSU) at a rally of the Sudeten Germans in Munich on Nov. 29, 1970, reported in US Bonn, Rush, airgram A-1282, Dec. 3, 1970.

139 See, e.g., the untitled editorial by CSU grandee Baron Karl Theodor von und zu Guttenberg in the Deutschland-Union-Dienst, Nov. 5, 1970, reprinted in Behrens, Durfte Brandt Knien?, 24–27.

140 As early as September, Barzel spoke of the Brandt cabinet as a “lying government” (lügenhafte Regierung). See his remarks to the CDU-Bundesvorstand on Sept. 8, 1970, in Buchstab and Lindsay, Barzel, 303.

141 PA AA, B 1, Bd. 517, Barzel to Brandt, Dec. 4, 1970.

142 Baring, Machtwechsel, 475–77.

143 Grau, Gegen den Strom, 153–55.

144 On the Catholic bishops’ decision to stay home, see NARA, RG 59, SNF 70–73, Box 2316 (POL Ger W-Pol), US Bonn, Rush, telegram 14085, Dec. 4, 1970.

145 NARA, RG 59, SNF 70–73, Box 2316 (POL Ger W-Pol), US Embassy, Warsaw, Stoessel, telegram 3408, Dec. 7, 1970. A follow-up luncheon did feature toasts; they, too, were measured in tone. For the texts, see Behrens, Durfte Brandt knien?, 35–41.

146 Conversation Brandt/Cyrankiewicz, Dec. 7, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 2195–2201, here 2195–96.

147 Conversation Brandt/Gomułka, Dec. 7, 1970, AAPD, 1970, 2210.

148 Ruchniewicz, Krzysztof, “Deutschland und das Problem der Nachkriegsentschädigungen für Polen,” in Grenzen der Wiedergutmachung: Die Entschädigung für NS-Verfolgte in West- und Osteuropa 1945–2000, ed. Hockerts, Hans Günter, Moisel, Claudia, and Winstel, Tobias (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2006), 718–20Google Scholar.

149 Krzeminski, Adam, “Der Kniefall,” in Deutsche Erinnerungsorte I, ed. François, Etienne and Schulze, Hagen (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2001), 638–53Google Scholar.

150 Kemp-Welch, Anthony, Poland under Communism: A Cold War History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 180–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

151 Bahr's own postmortem on the Prague events pointed to the depth of German influence in Czechoslovakia, though he stopped short of suggesting that German overeagerness had helped to provoke the Warsaw Pact intervention. See Egon Bahr, memorandum, “Ostpolitik nach der Besetzung der CSSR,” Oct. 1, 1968, in AAPD, 1968, ed. Mechthild Lindemann and Matthias Peter (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2009), 1978–81.

152 Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group, Dec. 18, 1970, in FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. 29, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972, ed. James E. Miller, Douglas E. Selvage, and Laurie Van Hook (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 337–47, here 341.

153 In October 1970, the Poles signed a completely separate trade agreement with West Germany. See Bingen, Polenpolitik, 133–34.

154 Jarzabek, Wanda, “Die Haltung der Volksrepublik Polen zur Normalisierung der Beziehungen mit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1970–1975,” Deutsch-Polnisches Jahrbuch 13 (2006): 85–130 Google Scholar.

155 Günther van Well, memorandum, “Fraktionssitzung der CDU/CSU in Berlin am 30. November und Störungen auf den Zugangswegen,” Dec. 1, 1970, in AAPD, 1970, 2156–59; Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, Dec. 19, 1970, in FRUS, 1969–1976, 40:439–40.

156 See Dean Acheson's memorandum on the group's conversation with Nixon, Dec. 7, 1970, in FRUS, 1969–1976, 40:403–6. See also NARA, RG 59, SNF 70–73, Box 2264 (POL Eur E-Ger W), conversation Hillenbrand/Pauls, Dec. 10, 1970.

157 Telephone conversation Kissinger/Rogers, Dec. 20, 1970, in FRUS, 1969–1976, 40:415–23, here 421.

158 David Binder, “Strain in U.S.-Bonn Relations Reported,” New York Times, Dec. 20, 1970. Bernd Schäfer argues that, on balance, the Nixon administration maintained a pragmatic line vis-à-vis Brandt; see Schaefer, “Nixon Administration and West German Ostpolitik.”

159 See Sonnenfeldt's account of his conversation with Berndt von Staden: Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, Oct. 16, 1970, in FRUS, 1969–1976, 40:369–75. See also, more generally, Klitzing, “To Grin and Bear It.”

160 On Brandt's exhaustion and depression following the November 1972 election, see Merseburger, Peter, Willy Brandt 1913–1992: Visionär und Realist (Stuttgart: DVA, 2002), 657–61Google Scholar.