The research for this article was made possible by a grant of the Klaus Epstein Memorial Fellowship in German History, administered by the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung.

1. Ernst Fraenkel forcefully argues that the middle years of the Weimar Republic were in fact only superficially stable, and that it only took a worsening of economic conditions for German society to return to conflict and crisis. Cf. Fraenkel, Ernst, “Der Ruhreisenstreit 1928–29 in historischpolitischer Sicht,” in Hermens, Ferdinand A. and Schieder, Theodor, eds., Staat, Wirtschaft und Politik in der Weimarer Republik: Festschrift für Heinrich Brüning (Berlin, 1967), p. 97.Google Scholar

2. Cf. Fraenkel, ; Schneider, Michael, Auf dem Weg in der Krise: Thesen und Materialien zum Ruhreisenstreit 1928/29, Die Arbeiterbewegung in den Rheinlanden, no. 2 (Wentorf bei Hamburg, 1974)Google Scholar; Hüllbüsch, Ursula, “Der Ruhreisenstreit in gewerkschaftlicher Sicht,” in Mommsen, Hans, Petzina, Dietmar, and Weisbrod, Bernd, eds., Industrielles System und politische Entwicklung in der Weimarer Republik: Verhandlungen des Internationalen Symposiums in Bochum vom 12.–17. Juni 1973 (Düsseldorf, 1974), pp. 271–89Google Scholar; Bracher, Karl Dietrich, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik: Eine Studie zum Problem des Machtverfalls in der Demokratie, Schriften des Instituts für Politische Wissenschaft an der Freien Universität Berlin, vol. 4, 4th ed. (Villingen/Schwarzwald, 1964): 292ff.Google Scholar

3. The work that deals most directly with the KPD during the lockout is Volker vom Berg, “Vorgeschichte und politische Auswirkungen der Aussperrung von Arbeitnordwest im November 1928” (Wissenschaftliche Arbeit für die Erste Staatsprüfung, Bochum, 1972)Google Scholar. Berg's state examination paper is a solid piece of research that deals with the role of parliament and the press; he concentrates therefore on the KPD's proposals for aid to locked-out workers. Schneider's excellent introduction to and documentation of the lockout is good on all aspects of the conflict except the role of the KPD. Also see Lehndorff, Steffen, Wie kam es zur RGO? Probleme der Gewerkschaftsentwicklung in der Weimarer Republik von 1927 bis 1929 (Frankfurt a.M., 1975), pp. 64–67, 72–89, 95–105Google Scholar; and Bahne, Siegfried, “Die KPD im Ruhrgebiet in der Weimarer Republik,” in Reulecke, Jürgen, ed., Arbeiterbewegung an Rhein und Ruhr: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung in Rheinland-Westfalen (Wuppertal, 1974), pp. 330–37Google Scholar. Both provide important background material on the context of the KPD's actions.

4. The Nov. 1928 lockout was the first full-scale test of the KPD's new tactic, although in Oct. 1928 the Communists put aspects of the tactic into operation during two minor strike movements, one a wage movement of dockworkers at North Sea ports and the other a strike of textile workers in Mönchen-Gladbach. In both the KPD hurriedly improvised its new tactic in movements that had already begun before it was adopted. Only in Nov. 1928 did the KPD implement the new tactic in its entirety.

5. For the social and industrial structure of Rhineland-Westphalia, see Helmrich, Wilhelm, Das Ruhrgebiet: Wirtschaft und Verflechtung, 2nd ed. (Münster, 1949)Google Scholar; Pounds, Norman J. G., The Ruhr: A Study in Historical and Economic Geography (Bloomington, 1952)Google Scholar; and Neumann, Walter, Die Gewerkschaften im Ruhrgebiet: Voraussetzungen, Entwicklung und Wirksamkeit (Cologne, 1951)Google Scholar. On employers, see Feldman, Gerald D., Iron and Steel in the German Inflation 1916–1923 (Princeton, 1977)Google Scholar. On two Ruhr cities cf. Mogs, Fritz, Die sozialgeschichtliche Entwicklung der Stadt Oberhausen (Rhld.) zwischen 1850 und 1933 (Ph.D. diss., Cologne, 1956)Google Scholar; and Crew, David F., Town in the Ruhr: A Social History of Bochum 1860–1914 (New York, 1979)Google Scholar. On Hamborn, see Lucas, Erhard, Zwei Formen von Radikalismus in der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung (Frankfurt a.M., 1976)Google Scholar, and “Ursachen und Verlauf der Bergarbeiterbewegung in Hamborn und im westlichen Ruhrgebiet 1918/19: Zum Syndikalismus in der Novemberrevolution,” Duisburger Forschungen 15 (Duisburg, 1971): 1–119Google Scholar. For statistics on the Ruhr, see 50 Jahr Wahlen in Nordrhein-Westfalen 1919–1968, ed. Nordrhein-Westfalen, Statistischen Landesamt, in Beiträge zur Statistik des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen 244 (Düsseldorf, 1969).Google Scholar

6. Staatsarchiv Koblenz (StAK) 16 770, Der Kampf der Metallarbeiter der Nordwestgruppe im November 1928. Tatsachenmaterial zusammengestellt vom Sekretariat der Bezirksleitung Ruhrgebiet. Bericht der Bezirksleitung Ruhrgebiet über den Nordwestkampf vom 1. November bis 3. Dezember 1928 (hereafter cited as Bericht der Bezirksleitung Ruhrgebiet). Both Schneider, p. 4, and Hüllbüsch, p. 282, estimate union membership figures to be closer to 50% of Ruhr metalworkers. I consider this figure much too high. According to DMV figures, there were 47,406 members in the union's Essen district (essentially the Ruhr) on Dec. 31, 1928. Metallarbeiter-Verband, Deutscher, Jahrund Handbuch für Verbandsmitglieder über das Jahr 1929, ed. Metallarbeiter-Verbandes, Vorstand des Deutschen (Stuttgart, 1930), p. 127Google Scholar. This figure is somewhat inflated as compared to actual membership at the beginning of the lockout, since it includes an increase in membership resulting from the lockout itself. Moreover, not all union members worked in the Northwest Group, for the DMV organized metalworkers in mining, transport, and shipbuilding, as well as plumbers and other craftsmen. According to my own studies, the DMV (and labor unionism in general) was traditionally underrepresented in the Ruhr's heavy industry, and the unions lost a disproportionately high number of members in the crisis of 1923–24. Cf. Peterson, Larry, “The Policies and Work of the KPD in the Free Labor Unions of Rhineland-Westphalia 1920–1924” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia Univ., New York, 1978), chap. 8Google Scholar. These members were never recovered, and the DMV was still very weak in membership in Nov. 1928. While the Communists may have underestimated union size, they came closer to the truth by emphasizing that the bulk of workers in the Ruhr were unorganized. Even if all DMV members in the Essen district are included, less than 22% of the metalworkers would have belonged to the DMV, and only 30% to the three major unions which represented the locked-out workers.

7. Cf. Neumann; Reulecke, Arbeiterbewegung an Rhein und Ruhr; and Peterson. The impact of rationalization on workers in the factories is an area that is still virtually unexplored by historians. One of the few studies that broaches the subject is Reulecke, Jürgen, Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung der Stadt Barmen von 1910 bis 1925 (Ph.D. diss., Bochum, 1972)Google Scholar. This is a study of the textile and metal industries of Barmen, another center of Rhenish-Westphalian industry but one located outside the Ruhr. For an older study of the rationalization movement see Brady, Robert A., The Rationalization Movement in German Industry: A Study in the Evolution of Economic Planning (Berkeley, 1933)Google Scholar. Brady, however, deals only with the overall economic aspects of rationalization and does not touch upon its social impact upon workers in the factories. In the Ruhr steel industry, the crisis of the labor movement in 1924–25 gravely weakened the factory councils, and in several large steel mills the expulsion of Communist militants and the loss of union membership so weakened the organized workers' movement that no factory councils at all could be elected between 1924 and 1926. (Election of factory councils was voluntary and depended generally upon union initiatives to implement the Factory Council Law of 1920. In some factories the union organization was so weakened that the unions were unable to organize council elections.) This was all the more serious for the labor unions because union organization was based on geography rather than factory units and the unions relied on control of the factory councils as their base of power and influence inside the factories. By 1926 the unions had revived the councils in all the more important factories, but the councils lacked the militancy and influence of the immediate postwar years. (How general the decline of the councils was in 1924–26 is impossible to say at this point of research. My conclusions are based on unpublished research into labor union and archival sources.)

8. Cf. Peterson, esp. chap. 8. For an example of the attitude of free union leaders toward the unorganized in the mid-1920s, cf. Metallarbeiter-Zeitung (official organ of the DMV), Nov. 5, 1927. For a general exploration of this problem see Schöck, Eva Cornelia, Arbeitslosigkeit und Rationalisierung: Die Lage der Arbeiter und die kommunistische Gewerkschaftspolitik 1920–28 (Frankfurt a.M., 1977).Google Scholar

9. Throughout the Weimar Republic, the minister of labor, who oversaw the arbitration system, was drawn from the labor movement. When the SPD led the government the minister of labor usually came from the free unions; in center-right coalitions he was drawn from the Christian unions (and since the Christian unions were strongest in Rhineland-Westphalia, the two key Center Party labor ministers, Heinrich Brauns and Adam Stegerwald, both came from the Ruhr). Thus, even when there was a center-right coalition in Berlin, the labor unions exercised a direct influence over the arbitration system, and when the SPD led the government the free unions could be particularly aggressive in exploiting the arbitration courts.

10. StAK 16 770, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Ruhrgebiet. Bahne, p. 335. Also Weber, Hermann, Die Wandlung des deutschen Kommunismus: Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer Republik 1 (Frankfurt a.M., 1969): 361–68, 372–75.Google Scholar

11. On the internal crisis of the KPD in 1923–24, cf. Peterson. On union tactics in the mid-1920s, see Lehndorff. For the role of unskilled and unemployed workers in Communist thinking, see Schöck.

12. Hüllbüsch, pp. 273–77, and Neumann, pp. 207ff. The unions won a small wage increase but, more important, the promise that the eight-hour day would be introduced by stages in heavy industry.

13. In Rhineland-Westphalia this strategy was elaborated in a series of wage movements from late 1926 to early 1928. In fall 1926 the KPD agitated for a solidarity strike of Ruhr miners in support of British miners; in early 1927 it began to agitate for wage strikes, using a wage movement of Solingen cutlery workers; in fall 1927 it used the local of the Solingen DMV, in Communist hands, to endorse a local strike over wages against the wishes of national union leaders; finally in Dec. 1927 the KPD presented its strategy in full in its agitation among metalworkers in the Northwest Group. With each change in the economic cycle the KPD advanced its union strategy one step further.

14. Hauptstaatsarchiv Düsseldorf (HStAD) 16 928, Disposition zur wirtschaftlichen und politischen Lage und Hauptaufgaben der Partei, District Leadership, KPD Lower Rhineland, Jan. 1928; Aktionsprogramm der KPD-Entwurf, Plenary session, KPD Central Committee, Dec. 8–9, 1927; Essen, Apr. 6, 1928, police report of a meeting of KPD functionaries, Ruhr, in Essen. For a government assessment of the KPD's tactics cf. Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BAK) R 43 I/2674, Berlin, Feb. 16, 1928, Reichskommissar für Überwachung der öffentlichen Ordnung (copy in HStAD 16 928).

15. Cf. Ruhr-Echo (official KPD newspaper in the Ruhr, printed in Essen), esp. Jan. 5, 11, 19, 20, and June 5, 1928; also, Bahne, p. 334.

16. HStAD 16 869, Düsseldorf, Jan. 25, 1928, report of Landrat.

17. The insecurity of workers, even at the highpoint of prosperity, confirms Fraenkel's argument that the “stabilization” of the mid-Weimar years was illusory, or was a “relative stabilization” only, as the Communists described the situation.

18. HStAD 16 869, police reports from Lower Rhineland. HStAD 16 928, police reports on unemployment at the end of 1927 and on the revival of the Communist movement of unemployed workers. For demands of Catholic miners for higher wages, see BAK R43 I/2176, Bochum, Oct. 2, 1927, Gewerkverein christlicher Bergarbeiter to Reichskanzler Marx. For government assessments see BAK R43 I/2696, Berlin, Oct. 15, 1927, Lagebericht; and R43 I/2697, Berlin, Dec. 24, 1927, Lagebericht.

19. Hüllbüsch, pp. 273–77; Schneider, pp. 1–2, 11–12. The DMV specifically promised employers that their revenge for lockout threats would be in the 1928 Reichstag elections. Cf. Metallarbeiter-Zeitung, Dec. 17, 1927.

20. Lehndorff, pp. 72–76.

21. Paul Merker, in a widely publicized article in the party press, specifically interpreted the decisions of the Fourth Congress of the Red International of Labor Unions (RGI) to accord with the existing union tactics in Germany. Freiheit (official organ of the KPD in the Lower Rhineland, published in Düsseldorf), Apr. 18, 1928. Merker personally supported a left-wing union tactic but spoke officially throughout spring and summer 1928 in favor of the old tactic of work inside the free unions.

22. Lehndorff, pp. 76–89. Cf. HStAD 30 657a, circulars from district leadership of KPD Ruhr from May to fall 1928, which confirm that no change had taken place in the KPD's practical work. Also BAK R43 I/2718, Berlin, Feb. 2 and July 20, 1928, Lageberichte, for the government's assessment that the KPD had as yet made no changes in tactics by midsummer 1928, despite the RGI and Comintern congresses. It might be noted that throughout this period the Prussian prime minister and interior minister and after May 1928 the Reich chancellor, labor minister, and especially interior minister were all Social Democrats and thus were aware of the KPD's moderation during most of 1928.

23. HStAD 30 657a, Essen, June 8, 1928, Circular of District Leadership, KPD Ruhr. StAK 16 767, Plan für die Parteiarbeit im Bezirk Ruhrgebiet bis zum 31. Dezember 1928. Fractions were organized caucuses of all Communist Party members in a local union, whereas cells were the basic units of party organization in factories and residential neighborhoods.

24. StAK 16 770, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Ruhrgebiet. In addition to conferences of party functionaries to coordinate the agitation and train speakers, the Ruhr KPD sponsored seventy-one public meetings, thirty-one cell meetings in the most important factories, and twenty-nine factory or mine assemblies. These were in addition to the regular meetings and agitation of Communist fractions, cells, and local party groups, all of which also devoted much of their energy to the movement in the Northwest Group. The KPD won 700 new members and 1,200 new subscribers to the party press from July to Oct. 1928, but, though it succeeded in holding a number of factory assemblies to address workers, it was unable to sponsor any demonstrations before the lockout actually began.

25. Freiheit, Sept. 21, 1928.

26. Until Oct. 1928, the KPD initiated strike action only where a local union already had a Communist majority in favor of a strike (as in Solingen) or where the Communist opposition could win a majority in a strike vote. In summer 1928, for example, the free unions led a strike of domestic seamen at the Ruhrort harbor. In a vote for a compromise settlement, the KPD succeeded for the first time since 1924 in winning a majority of workers in some locals to reject the contract and vote to continue the strike. However, the KPD acted strictly within the free unions and then only with the backing of a majority of union members. HStAD 30 657a, Essen, June 8, 1928, Circular of District Leadership, KPD Ruhr.

27. After Jan. 1928 the free unions expelled such Communists as Gustav Sobottka, leader of the Ruhr miners' opposition, Hermann Schubert, leader of the metalworkers' opposition and candidate for union office in Essen, and the chairman of the DMV in Solingen, in addition to numerous lesser union members. Among the local union elections that were overturned was that in the DMV Remscheid, where the KPD won back control of the local for the first time since 1924. Cf. circulars in HStAD 30 657a. StAK 16 767, Düsseldorf, July 2, 1928, Report of the Regierungspräsident; Essen, June 7, 1928, Circular of District Leadership, KPD Ruhr. Ruhr-Echo, Jan. 23, June 7, 14, 1928. Freiheit, Apr. 21, June 22, 29, July 10, Sept. 4, 22, 1928. Lehndorff. pp. 56–61.

28. The free unions went so far as to expel August Enderle, the leading spokesman of the KPD's right wing in the party's labor union section, precisely in summer 1928 when the Communists were considering a revision of tactics.

29. For disagreements in the KPD in Rhineland-Westphalia over changes in union tactics, cf. StAK 16 767, Essen, July 8, 1928, Circular from KPD District Leadership, Ruhr, Organizational Bureau; Essen, Aug. 30, 1928, Report of Polizeipräsident.

30. One of Thälmann's close associates in the Hamburg party had embezzled party funds, and Thälmann protected him from expulsion from the party.

31. Weber, pp. 199–210.

32. StAK 16 768, Essen, Sept. 29, 1928, Circular of KPD, District Fraction Leadership in DMV Ruhr.

33. Cf. Schneider, pp. 2–3; Neumann, pp. 207–18.

34. For the party's tactics in October, see StAK 16 768, Essen, Oct. 12, 1928, Circular of KPD, District Fraction Leadership in DMV Ruhr. Freiheit, Oct. 10, 12, 15, 24, 27, 29, 30, 31, 1928.

35. Cf. Fraenkel, passim; Hüllbüsch, pp. 277–82.

36. HStAD 30 657a, Essen, Nov. 2, 1928, Circular of District Leadership, KPD Ruhr, Organizational Bureau. StAK 16 768, Essen, Nov. 2, 1928, Circular of District Leadership, KPD Ruhr, Labor Union Section; 16 770, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Ruhrgebiet. Staatsarchiv Münster (StAM) I Pa 314, Bochum, Nov. 1, 3, 1928, Reports of Polizeipräsident.

37. See Mogs.

38. Indeed, police carefully recorded the statements of Communist agitators that might reawaken the latent discontent, as when one Communist used the slogan “Ausdehnung des Kampfes auf die Forderung des Proletariats vom 1923” (“Extend the struggle to the proletariat's demand of 1923”) and declared, “Lieber im offenen Kampf verenden, als in den Betrieben langsam verrecken” (“Better to die in open battle than to rot away slowly in the factories”). StAM I Pa 314, Bochum, Nov. 9, 1928, Report of Polizeipräsident, and other police reports in this volume.

39. StAM I Pa 314, Dortmund, Nov. 9, 1928, Report of Polizeipräsident.

40. Cf. Hüllbüsch, pp. 280–83; Fraenkel, pp. 109–10.

41. Freiheit, Nov. 2, 3, 1928. Berg, Volker vom, pp. 73–76, 84–85.Google Scholar

42. Demonstrations of the RFB and/or unemployed workers are known to have taken place in Essen on Nov. 5, 10, and 16; in Bochum and Dortmund in early November; and in Düsseldorf on Nov. 7. Berg, Volker vom, p. 76Google Scholar. StAK 16 768, Essen, Nov. 12, 1928, Report of Polizeipräsident; Düsseldorf, Nov. 26, 1928, Report of Regierungspräsident; Essen, Nov. 18, 1928, Report of Polizeipräsident. StAK 16 770, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Ruhrgebiet. StAM I Pa 314, police reports from Bochum and Dortmund. Freiheit, Nov. 8, 1928.

43. StAM I Pa 314, Bochum, Nov. 9, 1928, Report of Polizeipräsident.

44. Neumann, pp. 207–18; Berg, Volker vom, pp. 84–85.Google Scholar

45. The KPD strongly criticized the final law (Freiheit, Nov. 19, 1928), although one suspects this was merely a propagandistic stance, for the law incorporated the main features of the KPD's proposals. According to the convincing evidence of Schneider, pp. 41–48, the unemployment compensation substantially alleviated the financial problems of metalworkers in the Ruhr; the unorganized could subsist without immediate worry, if still with hardship, and some categories of unionized workers received as much from unemployment compensation and union strike support combined as from their regular wages.

46. In the last three weeks of the lockout, 750, 000 food portions were given out; 15,000 packages of food were distributed in areas without IAH kitchens; and 2, 500 packages were received from other German and foreign workers. StAK 16 770, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Ruhrgebiet. The IAH kitchens are well documented. In addition to this report, see StAK 16 768, Essen, Dec. 21, 1928, Report of Polizeipräsident. StAM I Pa 314, Hamm, Nov. 28, 1928, Report of Polizei-Direktor; Bochum, Nov. 14, 1928, Report of Polizeipräsident; Dortmund, Nov. 9, 1928, Report of Polizeipräsident. Freiheit, Nov. 10, 14, Dec. 11, 1928.

47. StAK 16 770, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Ruhrgebiet.

48. StAK 16 770, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Ruhrgebiet. On Hamborn, see Lucas and Peterson.

49. The KPD registered 4, 000 workers a day at three registration points (Kontrolllokale) for unorganized workers. StAM I Pa 314, Bochum, Nov. 14, 1928, Report of Polizeipräsident.

50. There are nine reports from the Polizeipräsident of Bochum, completely documenting the role of the KPD and the reaction of workers and union leaders during the lockout from Nov. 1 to Dec. 4, 1928, in StAM I Pa 314. Also see StAK 16 770, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Ruhrgebiet.

51. StAK 16 770, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Ruhrgebiet.

52. In Oberhausen there was not even a single KPD member in the Gutehofnungshütte, a sign of the effectiveness with which the GHH fired and blacklisted radical workers. In Hamm free union leaders were so influential that they were able to prevent the KPD from renting a hall for its meetings. Consequently, in Oberhausen the KPD relied on sympathizers (not party members) in the GHH to start the agitation, and in Hamm the KPD had to resort to open-air meetings and especially the IAH to counteract the free unions. In Hörde the KPD had to forego independent agitation because so many workers belonged to the free unions and agitated instead strictly inside the unions. StAK 16 770, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Ruhrgebiet. StAM I Pa 314, Hamm, Nov. 7, 8, 1928, Reports of Polizei-Direktor. Freiheit, Dec. 19, 1928.

53. Gelsenkirchen, Dortmund, Duisburg, Rheinhausen, and the smaller factories in Oberhausen fell into this group. StAK 16 770, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Ruhrgebiet. StAM I Pa 314, Dortmund, Nov. 9, 23, 1928, Reports of Polizeipräsident.

54. StAK 16 770, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Ruhrgebiet.

55. StAK 16 770, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Ruhrgebiet. Freiheit, Nov. 5, 6, 1928.

56. The five members of the KPD's central strike leadership were Hermann Schubert, leader of the Communist opposition in the DMV in the Ruhr and head of the party's labor union section; August Kreutzberg, a leading party functionary active in Rhineland-Westphalia in 1928; Paul Wojtkowski, KPD member of the Prussian Landtag for the Ruhr; Wilhelm Florin, Polleiter of the KPD district organization in the Ruhr and member of the KPD's Central Committee; and Karl Schmitz, a Communist functionary active in the unions. StAK 16 768, Dec. 7, 1928, Report of Regierungspräsident. StAK 16 770, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Ruhrgebiet. Freiheit, Nov. 10, 30, 1928.

57. StAK 16 770, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Ruhrgebiet. StAM I Pa 314, Hamm, Nov. 7, 8, 1928, Reports of Polizei-Direktor; Dortmund, Nov. 9, 23, 1928, Reports of Polizeipräsident.

58. Freiheit, Jan. 10, 17, 22, and 28, 1929.

59. Factionalism in fact began to break out into the open in Oct. 1928 when an editor of the Ruhr-Echo in Essen resisted the change in the party's tactics in the Northwest movement and when the leading Communists in the DMV in Solingen openly opposed the reinstatement of Thälmann as party leader. StAK 16 770, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Ruhrgebiet. StAK 16 769, Essen, Jan. 3, 1929, Circular of District Leadership, KPD Ruhr, Secretariat. StAM I Pa 314, Dortmund, Nov. 9, 23, 1928, Reports of Polizeipräsident. Freiheit, Nov. 28, Dec. 19, 1928.

60. The Social Democrats in the DMV at times tried to exploit the reluctance of Communist factory councilors, shop stewards, and union officials to implement the new KPD tactics by reminding them of union regulations and by keeping them occupied with union work. Cf. StAK 16 770, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Ruhrgebiet (for Essen and Gelsenkirchen) and StAM I Pa 314, Dortmund, Nov. 9, 1928, Report of Polizeipräsident (for Dortmund). When forced to choose between the KPD and the free unions, a great many Communist union functionaries chose the latter. They wanted to fight for the KPD inside the union movement and opposed the new Communist tactics once it became apparent in Nov. 1928 that they would force the Communists to fight outside and against the unions.

61. Cf. Tjaden, Karl Hermann, Struktur und Funktion der “KPD-Opposition” (KPO): Eine organisationssoziologische Untersuchung zur “Rechts”-Opposition im deutschen Kommunismus zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik (Meisenheim am Glan, 1964).Google Scholar

62. In the midst of the lockout, in the Freiheit of Nov. 26, 1928, the KPD still agitated for the recruitment of unorganized workers into the DMV. Cf. also StAK 16 770, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Ruhrgebiet.

63. Cf. Freiheit and other Communist newspapers for Jan. 1929.

64. Cf. Freiheit, Dec. 19, 1928; StAK 16 770, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Ruhrgebiet.

65. Freiheit, Jan. 3, 4, 5, 8, 14, 29, Feb. 9, 11, 22, and Mar. 5, 1929. Another victim of the Nov. 1928 lockout was the party's labor union journal, Die Einheit. This journal had fostered collaboration between left-wing Social Democrats and the Communist opposition in the free unions from 1926 to 1928, and several left-wing Social Democrats contributed to the journal. The editors of the journal opposed the KPD's tactics in Nov. 1928. After they openly criticized the KPD's tactics in the Jan. 1929 issue, the KPD leadership deposed the editorial board and took over the journal. Die Einheit in fact no longer had any reason to exist and was renamed Betrieb und Gewerkschaft in summer 1929 to correspond to the party's new tactics. Cf. Die Einheit, Jan. 6, Feb. 3, June 10, 1929.

66. Rumors placed the growth of the KPD as high as 5,000–6,000 members in the Ruhr with 1,000 in Essen alone. The KPD itself set party growth at the more modest level of 1,000, with 3,000 new members of the IAH. However, the important point was not the absolute number but rather the renewed dynamism of the party. StAK 16 768, Düsseldorf, Jan. 10, 1929, Report of Regierungspräsident; Essen, Dec. 21, 1928, Report of Polizeipräsident. StAK 16 770, Bericht der Bezirksleitung Ruhrgebiet. Freiheit, Dec. 11, 1928.

67. Cf. Schneider, pp. 11–12.

68. More study is needed of the social factors that conditioned political behavior in the German workers' movement, but existing studies point to the pattern I have indicated. Cf. Wheeler, Robert, “Zur sozialen Struktur der Arbeiterbewegung am Anfang der Weimarer Republik: Einige methodologischen Bemerkungen,” in Industrielles System und politische Entwicklung in der Weimarer Republik, pp. 179–89Google Scholar; Wunderer, Hartmann, “Materialien zur Soziologie der Mitgliedschaft und Wählerschaft der KPD zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik,” in Gesellschaft: Beiträge zur Marxschen Theorie 5 (Frankfurt a.M., 1975): 257–77Google Scholar; Weber, pp. 281–87; Holzer, Jerzy, Parteien und Massen: Die politische Krise in Deutschland 1928–1930, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für europäische Geschichte Mainz, Abteilung Universalgeschichte, vol. 1 (Wiesbaden, 1975)Google Scholar; Comfort, Richard A., Revolutionary Hamburg: Labor Politics in the Early Weimar Republic (Stanford, 1966)Google Scholar; Hunt, Richard N., German Social Democracy 1918–1933 (Chicago, 1970)Google Scholar. For the continuity of divisions in the labor movement of Rhineland-Westphalia, see Walther, Henri and Engelmann, Dieter, “Zur Linksentwicklung der Arbeiterbewegung im Rhein-Ruhrgebiet unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Herausbildung der USPD und der Entwicklung ihres linken Flügels vom Ausbruch des 1. Weltkrieges bis zum Heidelberger Parteitag der KPD und dem Leipziger Parteitag der USPD (Juli/August 1914–Dezember 1919)” (Ph.D. diss., Leipzig, 1965)Google Scholar; Rürup, Reinhard, ed., Arbeiter- und Soldatenräte im rheinisch-westfälischen Industriegebiet: Studien zur Geschichte der Revolution 1918/19 (Wuppertal, 1975)Google Scholar; Reulecke, Jürgen, Arbeiterbewegung an Rhein und RuhrGoogle Scholar; Lucas, Erhard, Märzrevolution 1920, 3 vols. (Frankfurt a.M., 1970–1977)Google Scholar; and Peterson.

69. It is interesting to note that no national KPD or Comintern leaders were present in the Ruhr during the lockout. Thälmann made a brief speaking tour of the region but did not participate in the leadership of the movement. It was typical of the Communist organizational structure that the implementation of tactics, even at times of intense factionalism, was left to local and regional party leaders. Indeed, police remarked on this. StAK 16 768, Düsseldorf, Dec. 12, 1928, Report of Regierungspräsident.