1. See for example Hamerow, Theodore S., Restoration, Revolution, Reaction (Princeton, 1958), pp. 130–31;CrossRefGoogle ScholarFasel, Georg, Europe in Upheaval: The Revolutions of 1848 (Chicago, 1970), p. 162.Google Scholar The most complete account of franchise questions in Germany during the revolutions of 1848–49 is Schilfert, Gerhard's Sieg und Niederlage des demokratischen Wahlrechts in der deutschen Revolution 1848/49 (Berlin, 1952).Google Scholar For an older account of the franchise question at the Frankfurt National Assembly, see Frensdorff, F., “Die Aufnahme des allgemeinen Wahlrechts in das öffentliche Recht Deutschlands,” Festgabe für Rudolf von Jhering (Leipzig, 1892), pp. 135–210;Google Scholar Frensdorff also discusses the electoral law of the North German Confederation. For a more recent short account, see Walter, Gagel's excellent discussion in Die Wahlrechtsfragen in der Geschichte der deutschen liberalen Parteien 1848–1918 (Düsseldorf, 1958), pp. 9–16.Google Scholar

2. Philippson, Johanna, Über den Ursprung und die Einführung des allgemeinen gleichen Wahlrechts in Deutschland (Basel, 1913), pp. 5–26.Google Scholar Schilfert, pp. 12–18, stresses the more radical thinkers. For some of the early proponents of universal suffrage, see also Boberach, Heinz, Wahlrechtsfragen im Vormärz (Düsseldorf, 1958), pp. 11–18; but see also pp. 18–35 for more conservative thought; also pp. 62–77 for the franchise views of the Rhineland liberals during the 1840's.Google Scholar

3. For a detailed study of pre-1850 electoral rules in the European states, see Meyer, Georg, Das parlamentarische Wahlrecht (Berlin, 1901), pp. 3–231. See also Fasel, p. 43; Schilfert, pp. 19–21;Google ScholarHeffter, Heinrich, Die deutsche Selbstverwaltung im 19. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1950), pp. 138, 143, 150;Google ScholarBraunias, Karl, Das parlamentarische Wahlrecht (Berlin, 1932), 1, 7–8, 206–207, and passim;Google ScholarBülau, Friedrich, Wahlrecht und Wahlverfahren (Leipzig, 1849), pp. 79–95.Google Scholar In Germany, Baden had the most liberal electoral law before 1848, but even here the elections were indirect, and excluded “Hintersassen, Gewerbs-gehülfen, Gesinde, Bediente u.s.w.”: Wahlordnung of Dec. 23, 1818, in Pölitz, K. H. L., Die Europäischen Verfassungen seit dem Jahre 1789 (Leipzig, 1832), 1, 474. The other German assemblies were much more restrictive in their franchise rules before 1848, ranging from highly exclusive “estatist” assemblies in Bavaria and Prussia, to such complicated systems of indirect elections as Württemberg's, where voting procedures favored the wealthy.Google Scholar

4. Braunias, p. 8 and passim.

5. See n. 3, above. Also Schilfert, pp. 132–50; Valentin, Veit, Geschichte der deutschen Revolution 1848–1849 (Berlin, 1931), II, 387ff.Google Scholar

6. “Das deutsche Vorparlament,” Die Gegenwart, II (Leipzig, 1849), 692–96;Google ScholarDroz, Jacques, Les révolutions allemandes de 1848 (Paris, 1957), pp. 231–32;Google ScholarEyck, Frank, The Frankfurt Parliament 1848–1849 (London and New York, 1968), pp. 43–45;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Schilfert, pp. 86–107; Philippson, pp. 33–46; and especially Hamerow, Theodore S., “The Elections to the Frankfurt Parliament,” Journal of Modern History, XXXIII (1961), 19–22. Hamerow is most complete on the matter of “independence” and the way this word came into the Pre-Parliament's final resolutions.Google Scholar

7. See again especially Hamerow, “Elections,” pp. 22–28, 32. Also Hamerow, Restoration, pp. 120–24; Eyck, pp. 43–45, 57–60; Droz, pp. 265–66; Ibler, Hermann, “Die Wahlen zur Frankfurter Nationalversammlung in Österreich 1848,” Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung, XLVIII (1934), 105–107. Other devices for limiting the suffrage included indirect balloting (this against the Pre-Parliament's advice), and residency requirements that particularly disfranchised the journeymen.Google Scholar

8. Aktenstücke und Aufzeichnungen zur Geschichte der Frankfurter Nationalversammlung. Aus dem Nachlass von J. G. Droysen, ed. Hübner, R. (Leipzig, 1924), p. 174. See also Waitz's comments at this time, pp. 172–73.Google Scholar

9. “Das Königreich Sachsen,” Die Gegenwart, v (1850), 611–12, 616–20; Schilfert, pp. 145–50; Valentin, II, 413–14. For Hansemann's letter to the Prince of Prussia, Dec. 13, 1848, see von Manteuffel, Otto, Unter Friedrich Wilhelm IV (Berlin, 1901), I, 67.Google Scholar

10. Schilfert, p. 199; Frensdorff, p. 158. The official election figures are listed (among other places) in the Annual Review for 1848, pp. 303–304.

11. Wernher, discussing Rhineland peasants in speech of Jan. 19, 1849, Stenographischer Bericht der Verhandlungen der deutschen constituierenden Nationalversammlung zu Frankfurt, ed. Wigard, F. (Frankfurt, 1848–1949), p.4773. Subsequent references to the Stenographischer Bericht will be cited as SB plus page numbers.Google Scholar

12. Valentin, II, 293, 345–46; Droz, Jacques, Réaction et suffrage universel en France et en Allemagne (1848–1850) (Paris, 1963), pp. 5–8;Google Scholar Droz, Révolutions, pp.471–73.One of the Prussian delegates at Frankfurt, J. A. Ambrosch, dubbed as “unbrauchbar” the second house emerging from the Prussian elections, and then went into something of a tirade about the moral lapses of the voters, the danger of danger of Prussia's situation due to such men, etc.: letter of Feb. 6, 1849, in Bergsträsser, Ludwig, ed., Das Frankfurter Parlament in Briefen und Tagebüchern (Frankfurt, 1929), p. 78.Google Scholar Friedrich von Raumer made similar remarks; see his letter of Jan. 26, 1849, Briefe aus Frankfurt und Paris, 1848–49 (Leipzig, 1849), II, 186. On the other hand, however, the Württemberger Gustav Rümelin thought the Prussian elections had come out less radically than anyone had expected: letter of Feb. 9, 1849, in Bergsträsser, p. 111.Google Scholar

13. For the entire debate, Aktenstücke, pp. 370–405, 429–35.

14. See for example Waitz's comments, Aktenstücke, p. 372.

15. Aktenstücke, pp. 371–72 (Wigard, Gülich); see also Mittermaier's comments, p. 370.

16. Aktenstücke, pp. 370, 380–81 (Waitz, Hergenhahn), 372 (Scheller).

17. Aktenstücke, pp. 372 (Welcker), 377 (Scheller), 379–80 (Soiron), 381 (Waitz, Tellkampf), 384 (Soiron). Tellkampf spoke specifically of “indirect communism.”

18. Aktenstücke, p. 376 (Rotenhan).

19. Dahlmann especially spoke this way.See Aktenstücke, p. 374.

20. Aktenstücke, p. 378. Tellkampf was also nervous about the “fourth estate,” p. 382.

21. Aktenstücke, pp.370, 378 (Mittermaier), 380–81 (Hergenhahn).

22. Aktenstücke, pp. 374–76, 382–83; see also below.

23. Aktenstücke, p. 379.

24. ibid.

25. Aktenstücke, pp. 379 (Wigard), 381 (Schüler).

26. Aktenstücke, p. 379 (Wigard).

27. Aktenstücke, pp. 376–77 (Reh), 378–79 (Zell).

28. For the major documents in the jockeying over the Constitution in late 1848 and in January 1849, see Huber, E. R., Dokumente zur deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte (Stuttgart, 1961), 1, 290–300.Google Scholar For a narrative of the situation after late January 1849, see Valentin, II, 360ff.; and Bergsträsser, Ludwig, “Die Parteien von 1848,” Preussische Jahrbücher, CLXXVII (1919), 206ff., especially 209–10. By February 1849 Gagern's following called themselves the “Imperialists” (Erbkaiserlichen) or “Weidenbusch” (from the name of the hotel where they met from mid-February on); “Little German” was a sobriquet that came from the Great Germans. I shall use the terms “Great German” and “Little German”—not in any pejorative sense, but only for the sake of clear distinction.Google Scholar

29. Bergsträsser, “Parteien,” pp. 209–10; August von Rochau, Ludwig, “Die verfassungsgebende deutsche Reichsversammlung,” Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift, XLVII (1849), 252–54;Google ScholarBiedermann, Karl, Erinnerungen aus der Paulskirche (Leipzig, 1849), pp. 83ff. Biedermann must be used with care, as his slant is consistently “Little German.”Google Scholar

30. Karl Vogt, one of the Left's leading figures, remarked to the Great German meeting on Feb.14 that the Left would go along with whatever group promised the most “Volksrechte” in exchange; the Electoral Law debate was to act as a test: Rochau, p. 255; Biedermann, Erinnerungen, pp. 85ff. Biedermann reported that Vogt specifically said, “man sichere uns ein freies Wahlgesetz, und ich willige ein in den Kauf.” In addition to Biedermann, see also Ambrosch's letter of Feb. 19, 1849, in Bergsträsser, Briefe, p. 80; and Hallbauer's diary entry of Feb. 14, also in Bergsträsser, Briefe, p. 257. Vogt evidently made the same sort of offer to the Little Germans; see Schneider, Eugen F., Grossdeutsch oder Kleindeutsch? (Berlin, 1939), p. 163.Google Scholar

31. Rudolf Haym, letter of Feb. 14, 1849, to Hansemann, in Haym, 's Ausgewählter Briefwechsel, ed. Rosenberg, H. (Berlin and Leipzig, 1930), pp. 67–68.Google Scholar See also Hansemann's reply, Feb. 19, 1849, pp. 68–69. Haym, whose own sentiments were very much with the Little Germans and suffrage restrictionists, wrote later that many delegates felt some moral compulsion to leave intact the “allgemeine Wahlen” by which they had been elected: Haym, , Die deutsche Nationalversammlung (Berlin, 1850), II, 290–91.Google Scholar For the same view, see Bassermann, Friedrich, Denkwürdigkeiten (Frankfurt, 1926), p. 105;Google Scholar also Biedermann, Karl, Das erste deutsche Parlament (Breslau, 1898), pp. 66–67. At the time the Electoral Law came up for debate, however, Waitz was careful to point out in the Constitutional Committee's report that the voting regulations in the spring of 1848 had been extremely variable: SB, 5220–21.Google Scholar

32. In Bergsträsser, Briefe, p. 77; see also Ambrosch's remarks in his letter of Feb. 19, pp. 80–81. Although Little German spokesmen often referred to the Left-Great German cooperation as a coalition or alliance, the Great Germans themselves denied any formal agreement. See Jürgens, Karl, Zur Geschichte des deutschen Verfassungswerkes 1848–49 (Hanover, 1850–1857), III, 59–60, also 89–90, 131–38. Eugen Schneider has also argued convincingly that this “alliance” was not based on any formal understanding but was rather a matter of informal, pragmatic mutual assistance: pp. 162–66. The more sophisticated Little German spokesmen realized this, however; see for example Haym's letter of Mar. 6 to Hansemann, describing the Left and Austrian cooperation as “changing, temporary” mutual backscratching: Ausgewählter Briefwechsel, p. 73. And see also Biedermann (the special object of Schneider's attack), who admitted the informal—and mutually suspicious—character of the Left-Great German alliance: Erinnerungen, pp. 86–87.Google Scholar

33. For the tactics of this maneuver, see the exchange between Vogt and Bassermann on Feb. 14, SB, 5199–200. See also Rochau, pp. 255–56; Ambrosch's letter of Feb. 19, in Bergsträsser, Briefe, p. 81. Gustav von Mevissen attributed the timing of the Electoral Law debate to “österreichische Perfidie,” and remarked that “Österreich, Bayern, Ultramontane und Republikaner” were doing all they could to ruin the constitutional work. Letter of Feb. 13, 1849, in Hansen, Joseph, Gustav von Mevissen. Ein rheinisches Lebensbild 1815–1899 (Berlin, 1906), II, 463. For a similar view, Biedermann, Erinnerungen, pp.83ff.; also Haym, Ausgewählter Briefwechsel, pp. 67–68.Google Scholar

34. Letter of Feb. 14, in Bergsträsser, Briefe, pp. 111–12.

35. The Hanoverian Great German Jürgens, III, 79, described the debate as a kind of mad scene, a whirl of furious but empty posturings; the Little German liberal Georg Beseler some years later remembered the debate as “long and lively”: Beseler, 's Erlebtes und Erstrebtes 1809–1859 (Berlin, 1884), p. 82. For accusations of bad faith during the debate, see especially Bassermann on the liberal side, SB, 5254; on the Left, Ludwig Simon, SB, 5314–15. The Left especially accused the liberals of betraying their constituents, who had allegedly elected their delegates through universal suffrage. For some variations on this argument see SB, 5257 (Vogt), 5280 (Jahn), 5308, 5310 (Eisenstuck), 5316 (Ludwig Simon). The Left was also exceedingly adroit in sneering at the liberals' pretensions to learning; scarcely a one of their speakers failed to snipe at the bureaucrats or professors, designating them as members of servile or “not independent” professions. The “professor”-baiting reached a peak just after a speech of Georg Beseler's during the discussion of oral versus secret balloting: SB, 549ff. See also below.Google Scholar

36. SB, 5312.

37. SB, 5233–35.

38. SB, 5246 (Beckerath), 5251–53 (Bassermann), 5297–99 (Mathy), 5303–306 (Tellkampf), 5506–508 (Fuchs).

39. For Beseler, SB, 5497. Variations on this argument appeared repeatedly: SB, 5222 (Waitz's report), 5232 (Scheller), 5252 (Bassermann), 5291 (Matthies), 5297–98 (Mathy), 5301 (Gagern), 5273–74 (Wernher).

40. SB, 5222.

41. Letter of Feb. 16, 1849, Briefe, II, 247. For an interesting contrast with Raumer's earlier views, see his 1846 defense of universal suffrage in America in his Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika (Philadelphia, 1846), pp. 171–72. The contrast may have embarrassed Raumer, because in the assembly he took some pains to point out that the American voters were property owners: SB, 5284.Google Scholar

42. See especially SB, 5273–74 (Wernher).

43. SB, 5250–51.

44. SB, 5303.

45. Haym later called the committee's proposal “the most ill-starred and unpopular thing ever to come out of the committee.” Deutsche Nationalversammlung, II, 293.Google Scholar

46. See especially SB, 5246 (Beckerath), 5284 (Raumer), 5291–92. (Matthies), 5302–303 (Gagern), 5304 (Tellkampf).

47. Frensdorff, pp. 152–53, noted that the committee's proposal embarrassed and confused the restrictionists; nor was this point lost on contemporaries: see Rochau, p. 256; Haym, Deutsche Nationalversammlung, II, 293.

48. SB, 5285–86.

49. See Waitz's report, SB, 5223; and Scheller's oral report, SB, 5233.

50. Laube, Heinrich, Das erste deutsche Parlament, vols. XXXVI-XXXVIII of Laube's Gesammelte Werke, ed. Hänel, A. (Leipzig, 1909), Pt. III, p. 229.Google Scholar

51. Hofmann's proposal, SB, 5272. This proposal would also have permitted landowners, houseowners, and community and church officials to vote.

52. SB, 5259 (Lette's proposal), 5297–99 (Mathy's speech), 5310–12 (Plathner's speech), 5270–71 (Grävell's proposal).

53. SB, 5237 (Edlauer), 5247 (Beckerath), 5273–74 (Wernher), 5284–85 (Raumer), 5304–305 (Tellkampf). These and other restrictionist speakers spoke in favor of “independence” even when they expressed disagreement with the committee's definitions of “non-independence.”

54. Some of the liberal speakers themselves came close to this conclusion when they spoke of the purpose of representation as the reflection of all interests in the state. See for example Mathy's speech, SB, 5298–99; Mathy did, however, explicitly state his opposition to a straight head-count as the basis of representation, for in his view such a headcount would neglect some of the interests that ought to receive expression in the representative body.

55. A most interesting example of the restrictionists' ambivalence appeared in Rudolf Haym's discussion of the Electoral Law debate in his Deutsche Nationalversammlung, II, 294ff. Haym fulminated against the ideas of natural liberty and equality as “foreign” importations (from France, of course); and he berated the “theological categories” of absolute individual rights. But in the same pages he recoiled from a “division of society into privileged and unprivileged castes,” and from an “aristocracy of money.” He concluded by supporting a property qualification for suffrage, which qualification would provide equal opportunity to the thrifty laborer; his whole discussion curiously mixed “organic” political thought with a paean to hard work and a celebration of individual initiative—all under the guise of tough-minded realism.

56. SB, 5251–52. Others argued very much as Bassermann did; see for example Beckerath, SB, 5246–48; also n. 55, above.

57. Mittermaier had supported a mild suffrage restriction in the Constitutional Committee's discussions, but changed his mind by the time of the plenary debate, largely on the ground that all the proposed restrictions would be arbitrary in practice, and would end by “splitting the nation in two halves.” See his very effective speech to the assembly, SB, 5324–28. Haym also mentions the delegates’ nervousness about alienating the lower classes through suffrage restrictions: Deutsche Nationalversammlung, II, 290–91.

58. Some of the liberal restrictionists' letters and diaries showed a distinct depression at the outcome of the franchise paragraphs; there were several who made acid comments about the way some highly conservative Austrians had voted with the Left. See J. G. Droysen's letter of Feb. 21 to Arndt, , in Droysen's Briefwechsel, ed. Hübner, R. (Berlin and Leipzig, 1929), I, 524; also Hallbauer's diary entry of Feb. 20, in Bergsträsser, Briefe, p. 260; and Ambrosch's letter of Feb. 28 to Olfers, also in Bergsträsser, Briefe, p. 83.Google Scholar

59. The liberals argued that only “independent” men would have the moral fibre to vote publicly, whereas the Left argued that no one should have to prove his “independence” by voting aloud. SB, 5491ff.

60. SB, 5522–27.

61. See his article in the Schwäbischer Merkur of 02. 21, 1849Google Scholar, reprinted in his Aus der Paulskirche, ed. Schäfer, H. R. (Leipzig, n.d.), pp. 174–75.Google Scholar

62. SB, 5489, 5490–91. On Grävell, see Valentin, Veit, Die erste Deutsche Nationalversammlung (Munich and Berlin, 1919), pp. 26–27.Google Scholar

63. SB, 5497ff.

64. SB, 5372–73, 5384–85.

65. The Constitutional Committee's proposal had called for direct elections, but some restrictionist liberals began to support indirect elections, thinking that indirect elections might act as a substitute for the defeated franchise limitations. See for example the speeches of Fuchs, SB, 5506–508, and more particularly Schubert, SB, 5508–509. See also Raumer's comments in his letter of Feb. 25, 1849, Briefe, II, 278–79. However, the proposal for direct elections won by a vote of 264 to 202. The issue of public voting was a clearer confrontation between the liberal restrictionists and the Left speakers, but the oral voting proposal lost by a vote of 239 to 230, and the secret ballot was then accepted by a vote of 249 to 218: SB, 5529–37.

66. Biedermann, Erinnerungen, p. 87. Even before the law had passed the first reading, Venedey moved to put the second reading on the agenda before the second reading of the constitution; his proposal was made in response to a Little German bid to hurry the second reading of the constitution by placing it on the agenda by March 5. For the debate on this and on Venedey's motion, SB, 5462–85. For the debate on similar motions later, SB, 5561–63, 5648–59. For comment, see Bammel, Ernst, “Der Pakt Simon-Gagern und der Abschluss der Paulskirchen-Verfassung,” Aus Geschichte und Politik. Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Ludwig Bergsträsser (Düsseldorf, 1954), p. 62.Google Scholar

67. Rümelin, p. 186. See also Hallbauer's diary entries of Mar. 9 and 10, in Bergsträsser, Briefe, pp. 272–73; Raumer's letter of Mar. 10, Briefe, II, 316–17; Haym, , Deutsche Nationalversammlung, II, 314–15Google Scholar; Rochau, p. 262; Droysen's letter of Mar. 10 to W. Arndt, Briefwechsel, I, 527.

68. Valentin, , Revolution, II, 370;Google ScholarHaym, , Deutsche Nationalversammlung, II, 315ff.;Google Scholar Laube, Pt. III, pp. 262–63. See also Huber, I, 300–302, for some of the more important documents.

69. SB, 5666. Welcker's action caused a tremendous uproar in the assembly.

70. The other major concession concerned the monarch's constitutional veto power: the liberals agreed to let the veto be suspensive rather than final.

71. For the Little German–dominated Constitutional Committee's deliberations, see Aktenstücke, pp. 629ff.; for the committee's proposal and for the maneuverings in the assembly, SB, 5739–41ff., 5792–96ff., especially 5867–68, 5912ff., 5931ff. For party meetings and private reactions, see Haym, , Deutsche Nationalversammlung, II, 322–30, 332ff.;Google Scholar Rochau, p. 268; Laube, Pt. III, pp. 267–69; Hallbauer diary entry of Mar. 12, in Bergsträsser, Briefe, pp. 274–75; Rümelin, pp. 187–89. For other details of the backstage maneuvering, see Bammel, especially pp. 62ff.; also Valentin, , Revolution, II, 371–72;Google Scholar Eyck, pp. 371–74. Some Little German liberals continued to oppose any deal with the Left, particularly on the matter of the Electoral Law. See Ambrosch's letter of Mar. 25, 1849, in Bergsträsser, Briefe, pp. 86–87; also Hallbauer's diary entry for Mar. 25, in Bergsträsser, Briefe, p. 284. Karl Biedermann in his Erinnerungen, pp. 108–10, insisted that the final passage of the Electoral Law resulted not from a “deal” between the Little Germans and the Left, but from the euphoria surrounding the final passage of the constitution.

72. SB, 6069–70.

73. Deutsche Nationalversammlung, II, 359.

74. Duncker, Max, Zur Geschichte der deutschen Reichsversammlung in Frankfurt (Berlin, 1849), p. 92.Google Scholar

75. Gagel's excellent discussion of the franchise question at Frankfurt points out the lack of firm ideological distinctions between the Left and the liberals: pp. 9–16, particularly pp. 15–16. Gagel explains the difference as one of social class rather than ideology—a theme curiously akin to that of the Marxist historian Schilfert, who comments in his Sieg und Niederlage des demokratischen Wahlrechts, p. 213, on the “petty bourgeois” character of the Left.