1. Throughout the essay this convenient designation for the Habsburg state will be used.Google Scholar

2. Braubach, Max, Versailles und Wien von Ludwig XIV. bis Kaunitz (Bonn, 1952), p. 415.Google Scholar

3. Beer, Adolf, ed., Aufzeichnungen des Grafen William Bentinck über Maria Theresia (Vienna, 1871), pp. vi–xiv;Google ScholarStrieder, Jakob, “Maria Theresia, Kaunitz und die österreichische Politik von 1748–1755,” Historische Vierteljahrsschrift, XIII (1910), 494–504;Google ScholarBroicher, Elisabeth Charlotte, Der Aufstieg der preussischen Macht von 1713 bis 1756 in seiner Auswirkung auf das europäische Staatensystem (Cologne, 1955), pp. 201–205.Google Scholar

4. See Correspondance secrète entre le Comte A. W. Kaunitz-Rietberg, ambassadeur impérial à Paris, et le Baron Ignaz de Koch, secrétaire de l'impératrice Marie-Thérèse, 1750–1752, ed. Schlitter, Hanns (Paris, 1899).Google Scholar

5. This truer interpretation, while not found in most English language works, had an able spokesman in the greatest Austrian historian to treat the Theresian era. See Alfred, von Arneth, Ritter, Geschichte Maria Theresia's, rv: Maria Theresia nach dent Erbfolgekrieg, 1748–1756 (Vienna, 1870), 367.Google Scholar

6. See Horn, D. B., “The Origins of a Proposed Election of a King of the Romans, 1748–50,” English Historical Review, XLII (1927), 361–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Browning, Reed, “The Duke of Newcastle and the Imperial Election Plan, 1749–1754,” Journal of British Studies, VII (1967), 28–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Droysen, Johann Gustav, Geschichte der preussischen Politik, Part v: Friedrich der Grosse, II (Leipzig, 1886), 175–330Google Scholar; Ebbecke, Otto Karl, Frankreichs Politik gegeniiber dem deutschen Reiche in denjahren 1748–1756 (Karlsruhe, 1931)Google Scholar, passim, for important discussions of the election plan. This plan eclipsed all other issues influencing Anglo-Austrian relations. The quarrel over the Barrier, for example, embittered the ties between Austria and the United Provinces, and to the extent that Britain lent its ostensibly disinterested support to the Dutch it incurred Austrian wrath. But Britain was not the target of ultimate Austrian anger on this point, for Dutch and Austrian negotiators were able to reach an agreement in January 1752—only to have the Princess-Royal reject the hard-won compromise. Another potential issue of contention involved Vienna's efforts to negotiate secretly with Spain in the summer and autumn of 1751. Austria hoped for a mutual guarantee of Austrian and Spanish territories in Italy. Upon learning of the negotiations, Britain tried to bring itself and Sardinia into the plans. The Austrians resented the British intrusion, but any rankled feelings—felt in Vienna when Britain broached the subject and in London when Britain's (but not Sardinia's) bid was rejected—did not persist.

7. For a discussion of the meaning of “Whig foreign policy,” see SirLodge, Richard, “The Continental Policy of Great Britain, 1740–1760,” History, n.s., XVI (1932), 298–304.Google Scholar

8. Albert, , Broglie, Duc de, L'alliance autrichienne (Paris, 1895), p. 31.Google Scholar

9. For a detailed account of the history of the capitulation, see Hartung, Fritz, “Die Wahlkapitulationen der deutschen Kaiser und Könige,” Historische Zeitschrift, CVII (1911), 306–44.Google Scholar

10. Actually, he was Secretary of State for the Northern Department.

11. For a variety of technical reasons Anglo-Austrian diplomatic relations were usually maintained at a ministerial rather than an ambassadorial level (Horn, D. B., The British Diplomatic Service, 1689–1789 [Oxford, 1961], p. 22Google Scholar).

12. Despatches from Richecourt, Mar. 2/13, Mar. 14/25, and Mar. 16/27, 1750, Haus-, Hof–und Staatsarchiv, Vienna (hereafter cited “HHStA”), England, Berichte, fasc. 137. All dates are in New Style unless otherwise noted.

13. The Treaty of Neuhaus, by terms of which Cologne was to receive an annual subsidy of £40,000 from Hanover and the United Provinces, contained a promise by the archbishop to direct his representatives on imperial bodies to vote with the representatives of the Elector of Hanover. For the history of the negotiations, see Braubach, Max, “Die österreichische Diplomatie am Hofe des Kurfürsten Clemens August von Köln, 1740–1756,” Annalen des historischen Vereins für den Niederrhein, insbesondere die alte Erzdiözese Köln, CXIV (1929).Google Scholar

14. Despatch from Richecourt, Mar. 29/Apr.9, 1750, HHStA, England, Berichte, fasc. 137.

15. “Mémoire instructif” for Richecourt, May 17, 1750, HHStA, England, Weisungen, fasc. 138. Joseph's election had been mooted by various nations on occasions ever since 1743. Britain, however, was the first state to adopt the plan as policy.

16. Bavarian claims to Mirandola and Concordia were based on the Treaty of Vienna of 1638 between Emperor Ferdinand III and Elector Maximilian of Bavaria; but this treaty had given rise to many problems, and the two states had held frequent negotiations during the following century. In the Treaty of Baden (1726) Austria had recognized Bavaria's claim to Mirandola (although not to Concordia); but since Bavaria had not fulfilled its obligations under the terms of the treaty, Austria regarded this recognition as void. (“Instructions und Anmerckung” [for Richecourt], July 14, 1750, HHStA, England, Weisungen, fasc. 138; Keith to Newcastle, Aug. 5, 1750, British Museum, London, Additional MSS [hereafter cited “Add. MSS”] 35488, fols. 128–30).

17. Protocol of the Conference, June 30, 1750, HHStA, Wahl-und Krönungsakten, Josef II, fasc. 68.

18. Protocol of the Conference, July 3, 1750, HHStA, Wahl-und Krönungsakten, Josef II, fasc. 68.

19. Most observers recognized Richecourt's inadequacies. Newcastle and George's chief Hanoverian minister, Gerlach Adolf von Münchhausen, wanted him replaced (Newcastle to Pelham, May 22/June 2, 1750, Add. MSS 32720, fols. 375–78, printed in Coxe, William, Memoirs of the Administration of the Right Honourable Henry Pelham [London, 1829], II, 339–42)Google Scholar. Quite independently of them, the Austrian government had reached much the same judgment (Pribram, Alfred Francis, Oesterreichische Staatsverträge: England, II [Vienna, 1913], 29n.).Google Scholar Vorster's instructions, dated July 14, 1750, are in HHStA, England, Weisungen, fasc. 138.

20. George II and Newcastle could not understand Austrian concern on this point. Münchhausen, however, wiser in the ways of German politics, showed greater sympathy for Vienna's fears.

21. The General Plan is printed in Pribram, II, 35–37n. See also a paper of eighteen points prepared by Bartenstein, n.d., HHStA, Wahl–und Krönungsakten, Josef II, fasc. 68; “Points selon lesquels on pourroit dresser un plan general,” n.d., HHStA, Wahl–und Krönungsakten, Josef II, fasc. 87c; despatches from Vorster, Aug. I and Aug. 8, 1750, HHStA, R K Braunschweig-Hannover, Berichte, fasc. 4a; a set of four points raised by Vorster and answered by Münchhausen, n.d., Add. MSS 32822, fols. 265–67. Arneth's account of the plan is sketchy and misleading (IV, 293–94).

22. The Dutch, who together with the British were often at this time called the “Maritime Powers,” were involved in this episode of imperial politicking because their ruling faction agreed with Newcastle's plan, and because they shared a sensitive frontier with various imperial principalities and hence had a strong desire to maintain peace in Germany.

23. Bavaria would accept no less than £40,000 a year since this was the price paid by Hanover and the Dutch for Cologne's vote earlier in 1750, and to accept less would have been dishonorable. Newcastle, feeling pressure from his brother Henry Pelham, First Lord of the Treasury, dared not oblige Britain to pay more than half. And by the terms of an Anglo-Dutch understanding, according to which the United Provinces would pay no more than half of what Britain paid, the Dutch quota came to one-quarter of the entire sum.

24. Actually, he was forbidden to accept any Austrian commitment to pay more than £40,000. But he was also authorized to remit, if necessary, £12,000 owed to Vienna by Munich.

25. The need to preserve the fiction that Austria was not buying Munich's vote (a practice enjoined by the Golden Bull) accounted for the multiplicity of documents. The Trety of Hanover (involving London, The Hague, and Munich, but not Vienna) and a separate declaration (involving Munich and Vienna) appear in Wenck, F. A. G., Codex juris gentium recentissimi, II (Leipzig, 1788), 457–63Google Scholar. Still other documents appear in Pribram, II, 33–39. Copies of all may be found in Holland, (Province) Staaten, Secreete resoultion van de Edele Groot Mog. Heeren Staaten van Holland en Westvriesland, beginnende metden jaare 1747 en eindigende met den jaare 1751 incluis (The Hague, 17—?), pp. 518–20, 524–27.Google Scholar

26. Keith to Newcastle, Oct. 10, 1750, Add. MSS 35486, fol.76.

27. Newcastle expressed this view to Keith at the time, and Maria Theresa later acknowledged that she too had believed an election imminent (Newcastle to Keith, Sept. 11 / 22, 1750, Add. MSS 32823, fol.269; instructions to Vorster, Nov.30, 1750, HHStA, St K Hannover, fasc.6).

28. Most observers at the time believed that Prussia organized the opposition, prevailing upon France, after lengthy expostulation, to unite in resistance to the election plan (Holdernesse to Joseph Yorke, July 8, 1751, O. S., Add. MSS 32828, fols. 189–91, printed in British diplomatic instructions, 1689–1789, VII: France, 1745–1789, ed. Legg, L. G. Wickham [London, 1934], pp. 17–18; “Ohnmassgebigste Meynung,” 11. 22, 1750, HHStA, Wahl-und Krönungsakten, Josef II, fasc. 87b)Google Scholar. This view has been discredited by Ebbecke, who demonstrates not only that France was true promoter of opposition and Prussia the laggard, but also that France had outlined a plan for such opposition as early as the spring of 1750—i.e., as soon as France learned that Britain was meddling in imperial affairs (pp. 48–49). Both of the French foreign secretaries between 1750 and 1753, Puisieulx and St. Contest, were interested above all in German affairs; this concern gave French policy toward the election an unwonted air of determination and continuity.

29. France said its support would be forthcoming only if: (1)the election abided strictly by imperial law; (2) the man chosen represented the general desire of Germany; and (3) the election did not alter the situation in Europe. The studied vagueness of the conditions, and the absolute impossibility of objectively ascertaining if they had been fulfilled, correctly suggested to Vienna that they were merely designed to establish a pretext for any later French intervention (Puisieulx to Blondel, n.d., HHStA, Wahl- und Krönungsakten, Josef II, fasc. 68).

30. Keith to Newcastle, Oct. 9, 1750, Add. MSS 35488, fol. 149.

31. Instructions to Vorster, Oct. 10, 1750, HHStA, St K Hannover, fasc. 6. Ostensibly the decision to convoke rested with the Archbishop of Mainz by virtue of his position as Arch-Chancellor of the Empire. In practice, the archbishop would not act without Vienna's approval.

32. Although the six demands also involved territory and various marks of honor, Cologne's negotiator in Hanover assured Newcastle and Vorster that satisfaction on the pecuniary points alone would suffice (despatch from Vorster, Oct. 16, 1750, HHStA, R K Braunschweig-Hannover, Berichte, fasc. 4a).

33. Instructions to Vorster, Oct. 10, 1750, HHStA, St K Hannover, fasc.6.

34. Instructions to Vorster, Nov. 30, 1750, HHStA, St K Hannover, fasc.6.

35. Instructions to Vorster, Oct. 10, 1750, HHStA, St K Hannover, fasc. 6.

36. “Mémoire instructif” (for Puebla), Oct. 6, 1750, HHStA, Wahl-und Krönungsakten, Josef II, fasc. 68; Politische Correspondenz Friedrich's des Grossen, eds. Droysen, J. G. et al. , VIII (Berlin, 1882), 129–30Google Scholar. On October 3 Frederick II had declared: “Cette affaire [the election] m'est a présent la plus importante entre toutes les autres qui m'intéressent” (ibid., p. 91).

37. “Ohnmassgebigste Meynung,” Nov. 22, 1750, HHStA, Wahl-und Krönungsakten, Josef II, fasc.87b.

38. “Mémoire instructif” [for Richecourt], Jan. 1751, HHStA, England, Weisungen, fasc. 140; Ebbecke, pp. 61n., 69.

39. Braubach, , Annalen, CXIV, 96–97; see Wynnants to Tessin, Jan. 15, 1751 [intercepted Swedish correspondence], Add. MSS 32826, fols. 59–61.Google Scholar

40. “Mémoire instructif” [for Richecourt], Jan. 1751, HHStA, England, Weisungen, fasc. 140. Although it apparently had little effect on Vienna's decision, a similar shift in thinking among Hanoverian ministers at this time reveals that Austria was not alone in fearing France and mistrusting British diplomacy. With the sanguine Newcastle and the resolute George II back in Britain, men such as Münchhausen could more freely survey the spectacle of European power politics. These men had concluded by late December that French neutrality “mehr zu wünschen, als zu hoffen seÿe” (despatch from Vorster, Dec. 29, 1750, HHStA, St K Hannover, fasc. 6).

41. Instructions to Vorster, Nov. 13, 1750, HHStA, St K Hannover, fasc. 6.

42. As Koch explained to Kaunitz about the Empress Queen: “elle s'est expliquée très clairement qu'elle aimeroit mieux voir passer la couronne impériale dans une autre maison s'il le falloit, que de s'exposer au risque de se voir entrainée pour cela dans une guerre” (Correspondance secrète, p. 193).

43. Indeed, by the end of 1751 the Austrians believed that Britain had abandoned the scheme (“Nota, in was Umständen die Sicherheit, dass die Wahl-Capitulationen des Römischen Königs nicht abgeändert worden solle, bestehet,” n.d., HHStA, Wahl-und Krönungsakten, Josef II, fasc. 87c).

44. See especially Richecourt's despatches of May 31/June 11 and June 14/25, 1751, HHStA, England, Berichte, fasc. 139.

45. For the story of these negotiations, see Horn, D. B., Sir Charles Hanbury Williams and European Diplomacy, 1747–1758 (London, 1930), chapter v, pp. 68–100.Google Scholar

46. Although a treaty of 1746 allied St. Petersburg with Vienna, Russia was not required, and did not have the money, to keep a large contingent of troops ready. The Austrian ministers wanted Russian troops stationed on the East Prussian frontier to menace Frederick II. The Hanoverian ministers feared that without Russian assistance in the next European war Hanover would be swallowed up. For both ministries the solution was British funds. From the very broaching of the election plan Austria had tried to divert funds to Russia, and Richecourt had been receiving instructions since February 1751 to stress the importance of that court (“Mémoire instructif,” Feb. 16 and May 21, 1751, HHStA, England, Weisungen, fasc. 140). The Hanoverian demarche occurred in August. I have located neither Münchhausen's letter nor Newcastle's reply, but Vorster describes both in his despatch of Aug. 9/20, 1751, HHStA, R K Braunschweig-Hannover, fasc. 4b.

47. Despatches from Richecourt, July 27/Aug. 8 and Aug. 9/20, 1751, HHStA, England, Berichte, fasc. 139.

48. The Austrians were not unwarned about either man. Of George II Vorster had written: “Allein, so long der König lebet, wie ich schon oft zu melden die Ehre gehabt, ist fast nichts gutes zu hoffen” (July 6, 1751, HHStA, Wahl-und Krönungsakten, Josef II, fasc. 4b). Of Newcastle the Austrian ministry had advised: “On conçoit parfaitement bien, qu'il n'est pas aisé, de persuader ceux, qui veulent s'aveugler de gayeté de coeur” (“Mémoire instructif” [for Richecourt], Sept. 10, 1751, HHStA, England, Weisungen, fasc. 140).

49. Despatches, Nov. 1/12 and Nov. 15/26, 1751, HHStA, England, Berichte, fasc. 139.

50. Newcastle to William Bentinck, Nov. 28, 1751, O.S., Add. MSS 32832, fols. 31–32.

51. Despatch from Richecourt, Jan. 6/17, 1752, HHStA, England, Berichte, fasc. 142.

52. Ad Comitem a Richecourt, Jan. 8, 1752, and “Mémoire instructif” [for Richecourt], Feb. 18, 1752, HHStA, England, Weisungen, fasc. 140.

53. Correspondance secrète, pp. 347–48.

54. Colloredo knew that British diplomacy might bring on war, “mais il craint,” wrote Koch to Kaunitz, “que le roy, bizarre et emporté comme il est, prendroit une telle declaration en mauvaise part” (Correspondance secréte, p. 173). Kaunitz felt the modification of his plan to have been disastrous: Britain had been offended but Europe remained ignorant of Vienna's desire for peace (ibid., pp. 186–87). In fact, however, viewed in the perspective of Austria's continuing policy of retaining London's friendship, the modification may well have been wise; if it did not deter the British, at least it avoided subjecting them to public humiliation.

55. “Kurtzer Unterricht, die Churpfälzische Forderungen betreffend,” Nov. 20, 1750, HHStA, Wahl-und Krönungsakten, Josef II, fasc. 87c; despatch from Vorster, Jan. 30, 1751, HHStA, R K Braunschweig-Hannover, fasc. 4b; despatch from Richecourt, Aug. 23/Sept. 3, 1751, HHStA, England, Berichte, fasc. 139.

56. Newcastle to Keith and Hyndford, Apr. 22/May 3, 1752, Add. MSS 35472, fol. 209.

57. “Mémoire instructif” [for Richecourt], Sept. 10, 1751, HHStA, England, Weisungen, fasc.140.

58. “Projet de l'apostille à la réponse du 20me Mai 1752,” May 21, 1752, Add. MSS 35473, fol. 46; Newcastle to Andrew Stone, May 13/24, 1752, Add. MSS 32727, fols. 164–65; Keith to Newcastle, May 25, 1752, Add. MSS 35486, fol. 102.

59. Newcastle to Hyndford and Keith, May 23/June 3, 1752, Add. MSS 32836, fol. 260; Newcastle to Pelham, May 24/June 4, 1752, Add. MSS 32727, fols. 258–59, printed in Coxe, II, 423–24. Actually, it was in April that the British had renewed discussion of a prompt convocation, but not until late May and early June, after the failure of the arbitration scheme, did immediate convocation become Newcastle's primary strategy (Newcastle to Hyndford and Keith, Apr. 22/May 3, 1752, Add. MSS 32835, fol. 214).

60. de Bourge, Gaston, “Le Comte de Vergennes: ses débuts diplomatiques en Allemagne auprès de l'Electeur de Trèves et de l'Electur de Hanovre,“ Révue des questions historiques, XLIV (1888), 123.Google Scholar

61. An English translation of Stadion's colorful account of the boisterous meeting may be found in Add. MSS 32837, fols. 174–79. Both Münchhausen and Newcastle (and apparently Stadion too) flew into angry rages during and immediately after the meeting—“a tumultuous session of Parliament,” as Stadion called it.

62. Newcastle to Hardwicke, June 18/29, 1752, Add. MSS 32728, fols. 27–35, printed in Coxe, II, 430–32.

63. Pelham to Newcastle, July I, 1752, O.S., Add. MSS 32728, fol. I40. Pelham's only condition was that all payments to the Palatine be deferred until after Joseph's election.

64. Newcastle to Hyndford, July 13/24, 1752, Add. MSS 32838, fols. 276–77.

65. Despatch from Vorster, July 25, 1752, HHStA, Wahl- und Krönungsakten, Josef II, fasc. 87c.

66. See a paper drafted by Bartenstein on Aug. I, 1752, in HHStA, Wahl- und Krönungsakten, Josef II, fasc. 87c, reprinted in part in Beer, p. xlviii. Koch described the meeting to Kaunitz (Correspondance secrète, pp. 246–47).

67. “Réponse verbale,” Aug. 5, 1752, HHStA, Wahl- und Krönungsakten, Josef II, fasc. 87c, printed in Aus der Zeit Maria Theresias, eds. Khevenhüller Metsch, Rudolph Graf and Schlitter, Hanns, III (Vienna, 1910), 314–16Google Scholar. According to Count Khevenhüller's eye-witness account, “der Mylord fielle dem Kaiser hierauf par un transport de joye zu Füssen, küste ihm die Hand und steckte sein Rappel-Schrieben in dem Sack” (p.317). Specifically, Vienna offered 500,000 German florins (£50,000), which was half of what the Palatine was asking. In return Vienna wanted a Palatine renunciation of all claims against Vienna, a promise that the capitulation would not be altered, and a defering of any payments until after the election. Moreover, to avoid the appearance of overt bribery Vienna would give the money to London, whence it would go on to Mannheim.

68. Correspondance secrète, p. 264.

69. Two separate compromises were drafted. The first, called the Stadion plan although Vorster was also a major author, specified rather clearly the commitments each party would accept. When Vienna refused to accept this plan, which would in fact have required much more of Austria than the mere payment of half of Mannheim's indemnification, Newcastle drafted his own plan, using intentionally obscure language in an effort to permit each party to claim victory. But imprecision was no more effective than precision, and Vienna again rejected the proposal. For the Stadion plan, see HHStA, Wahl- und Krönungsakten, Josef II, fasc. 87b, or Add. MSS 35474, fols. 24–27. It has been printed in Bourge, pp. 155–57. For Newcastle's plan, see Add. MSS 32841, fols. 23–27. It has been printed in Aus der Zeit, III, 332–36.

70. The first two signs of George's coolness were his refusal to read Newcastle's letters to Lord Holderness, whereby the king was providing himself with a pretext for forbidding payments for electoral purposes from the Civil List, and his growing reliance on his Hanoverian ministers, whose ardor for electoral success had long been dampened (Newcastle to Hardwicke, Aug 21/Sept. I, 1752, Add. MSS 32729, fol. 143).

71. Horn, , Sir Charles Hanbury Williams, p. 140.Google Scholar

72. Some of the documents provided by two more years of pointless negotiating have been printed in Aus der Zeit, III, 461–62. See also HHStA, Wahl- und Krönungsakten, Josef II, fasc. 75.

73. Despatch from Colloredo, Karl, Sept. 6, 1754, HHStA, England, Berichte, fasc. 144. Karl Colloredo, the Vice-Chancellor's younger brother, had replaced Richecourt the previous year.Google Scholar

74. See especially Pribram, II, 58–62, and the Keith-Newcastle correspondence of February and March 1753, in Add. MSS 32842–43.

75. SirSatow, Ernest, The Silesian Loan and Frederick the Great (Oxford, 1915), pp. 134–36.Google Scholar

76. Instructions to Vorster, Dec. 18, 1750, HHStA, St K Hannover, fasc. 6.

77. Beer, p. 67.

78. The image of the “middle way” recurs frequently in Austrian documents at this time. Kaunitz advised: “Nous n'avons rien de mieux de faire, que de nous en tenir à un juste milieu. Il ne faut ni trop d'empressement, ni trop d'indifference” (Kaunitz, to Koch, Dec. II, 1750, Correspondance secrète, p. 48). And Richecourt was instructed: “Vouloir precipiter un dessein, où I'abandonner tout à fait sont deux extremités également nuisibles” (“Mémoire instructif,” Feb. 16, 1751, HHStA, England, Weisungen, fasc. 140).Google Scholar

79. For example: Hill, David Jayne, A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe, III: The Diplomacy of the Age of Absolutism (New York, 1914), 505–507;Google ScholarWaddington, Richard, Louis XV et le renversement des alliances (Paris, 1896), pp. 46–48; Arneth, IV, 366–67.Google Scholar

80. For example: SirLodge, Richard, Great Britain and Prussia in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1923), pp. 74–76;Google ScholarHorn, D. B., “The Diplomatic Revolution,” The Old Regime, 1713–63, ed. Lindsay, J. O., Vol. VII of The New Cambridge Modern History (Cambridge, 1957), pp. 440–42;Google ScholarRecueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France depuis les traités de Westphalie jusq'à la révolution française: Autriche, ed. Sorel, Albert (Paris, 1884), pp. 21–23.Google Scholar

81. For example: Zeller, Gaston, Les temps modernes, Part II: De Louis XIV à 1789, Vol. III of Histoire des relations internationales, ed. Renouvin, Pierre (Paris, 1955), pp. 222–23;Google ScholarBraubach, , Versailles und Wien, pp. 452–56;Google ScholarAnderson, M. S., Europe in the Eighteenth Century (New York, 1961), pp. 164, 208.Google Scholar

82. As suggested by Broglie, p. 12; Hassall, Arthur, The Balance of Power, 1715–1789 (New York, 1896), pp. 215–17; and Lodge, p. 80.Google Scholar

83. As suggested by Dorn, L. Walter, Competition for Empire, 1740–1763 (2nd ed., New York, 1963), p. 298;Google ScholarMuret, Pierre, La prépondérance anglaise, 1715–1763, Vol. XI of Peuples et civilisations, histoire générale, eds. Halphen, Louis and Sagnac, Philippe (3rd ed., Paris, 1949), p. 497;Google ScholarOgg, David, Europe of the Ancient Regime, 1715–1783 (New York, 1965), p. 140.Google Scholar

84. Strieder, pp. 504–509, and Kritische Forschungen zur österreichischen Politik vom Aachener Frieden bis Beginne des siebenjährigen Krieges (Leipzig, 1906), passim.Google Scholar

85. Arneth, IV, 367.

86. It is true that Austria made approaches to France before the conclusion of the Convention of Westminster. But, as stated above, these were simply an Austrian effort to avoid embroilment in colonial hostilities. They were not designed to destroy the entente, and only the conclusion of the convention made their outcome different from their several recent precedents.