1. This view is found in the older literature (Heinrich Friedjung, Heinrich Ritter von Srbik, Chester W. Clark, and others) as well as more recent studies (notably those of Richard Blaas and Nancy Nichols Barker). The historiography of the Venetian problem will be discussed below, but three disappointing articles dealing specifically with the question may be summarily mentioned. Vidal, C., “La question vénitienne et la diplomatie française en 1866,” Révue d'histoire diplomatique, LIII (1939), 328–52Google Scholar, is aggressively pro-French and is based almost exclusively upon the correspondence of Drouyn de Lhuys, Napoleon's foreign minister in 1866, which normally reveals little about the emperor's actual plans or policies. Hoffmann, Georg, “Die venezianische Frage zwischen den Feldzügen von 1859 und 1866,” Schweizer Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft, XX, No. 2 (1941), 359–442, is sketchy and offers little after 1861.Google ScholarNola, Carlo di, “La Venezia nella politica europea dalla pace di Zurigo alla pace di Vienna,” Nuova rivista storica, XLV (1961), 109–39, 230–79Google Scholar, is a rambling and rather superficial examination, although some unpublished Italian materials are used.

2. Friedjung, Heinrich, Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland, 1859–1866 (9th ed., Stuttgart and Berlin, 1912), I, 265:Google Scholar“Venetien war fur Österreich zuletzt mehr eine Last gewesen als ein Besitz. In Deutschland dagegen lagen die Wurzeln der Kraft des Reiches.” Srbik, Heinrich Ritter von, Deutsche Einheit. Idee und Wirklichkeit vom Heiligen Reich bis Königgrätz (Munich, 1935–1943), IV, 176–78, 462–63, and passim;Google Scholar also Srbik, , “Der Geheimvertrag Österreichs und Frankreichs vom 12. Juni 1866,” Historisches Jahrbuch, LVII (1937), 454–507, esp. 489;Google ScholarClark, Chester W., Franz Joseph and Bismarck. The Diplomacy of Austria before the War of 1866 (Cambridge, Mass., 1934).Google Scholar

3. Clark, , Franz Joseph and Bismarck, pp. 440–41, 307–308Google Scholar; Barker, Nancy Nichols, “Austria, France, and the Venetian Question, 1861–1866,” Journal of Modern History, XXXVI (1964), 145–54, esp. 153, 145;CrossRefGoogle ScholarBlaas, Richard, “Il problema veneto nella politica estera austriaca del periodo 1859–1866,” Archivio Veneto, LXXX (1967), 41, 81, 97;Google Scholar and Vidal, C., “La question vénitienne et la diplomatie française,” p. 334.Google Scholar Even the more cautious work of Hallberg, Charles W., Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, 1852–1864. A Study of Austro-French Relations (New York, 1955), pp. 259, 286Google Scholar, argues that Austria could probably have benefitted by accepting the cession proposals. Some exception has been taken to this view. Heinrich Benedikt is more sympathetic to Austria's retention of the province, which he feels was based fundamentally upon commercial concerns: Kaiseradler über dem Apennin. Die Österreicher in Italien 1700 bis 1866 (Vienna, 1964), pp. 220–21.Google Scholar Friedrich Engel-Janosi comes closest actually to defending Austrian policy as the best among patently bad alternatives: Graf Recltherg. Vier Kapital zu seiner und Österreichs Geschichte (Munich, 1927), pp. 133, 75, and passim.Google Scholar

4. Dr. Blaas promises to treat the cession proposals in detail in a forthcoming article. His general views, however, are presented in the article cited above.

5. Archduke Albert, the Austrian commander in Italy in 1866, vigorously opposed giving up Venetia even for Silesia. Venetia was “the key to the whole Monarchy” and “the first condition of our European power and our position in Germany.” Count Wimpffen to Count Mensdorff, Verona, July 20, 1866, in von Wertheimer, Eduard, “Zwei ungedruckte Denkschriften des österreichischen Ministers, Graf Mensdorff über das Jahr 1866,” Preussische Jahrbücher, CLXXX, No. 3 (1920), 322–23Google Scholar. (Wimpffen was Albert's attaché and wrote in the archduke's name.) On the position of the military, see also von Srbik, Heinrich Ritter, “Erzherzog Albrecht, Benedek und der altösterreichische Soldatengeist,” in his Aus Österreichs Vergangenheit: Vom Prinz Eugen zu Franz Joseph (Salzburg, 1949), pp. 107–40, esp. 111–17, 138–40;Google Scholar and Wandruszka, Adam, “Karl Moering, ein deutscher Soldat und Politiker aus dem alten Österreich,” Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, LIII (1939), 162–64, 166–68, 171–72.Google Scholar

6. The Austrians had hoped to develop the Adriatic ports of Venice and Trieste as commercial outlets for the South German states to markets in Italy, the Levant, and, after the completion of the Suez Canal, in India and the Far East. According to Heinrich Benedikt, this idea, which in part can be traced back to former finance minister Karl Bruck, was very important in Austrian calculations on the Venetian question (Kaiseradler über dem Apennin, pp. 220–21, and Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Österreichs in der Franz-Joseph Zeit [Vienna and Munich, 1958], p. 84).Google Scholar

7. Some authorities (such as Friedjung, , Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland, I, 322ff.)Google Scholar have insisted that ultramontanism was central in Austrian policy on the Venetian question. And it is true that clerical influences were strong in Vienna during this period (Srbik, , Deutsche Einheit, III, 135–38;Google ScholarFranz, Georg, Liberalismus. Die deutschliberale Bewegung in der Habsburgischen Monarchie [Munich, 1955], p. 420)Google Scholar. But it seems that it was the community of secular, rather than religious, interests which exercised the greatest influence (Clark, , Franz Joseph and Bismarck, p. 501;Google ScholarSrbik, , Deutsche Einheit, III, 135, IV, 467–68).Google Scholar Pius IX remarked at the beginning of 1866 that “There are only two sovereigns who defend the eternal principles on which thrones rest, Emperor Francis Joseph and I.” Jacini, Stefano, ed., Il tramonto de potere temporale nelle relazione degli ambasciatore austriaci a Roma, 1860–1870 (Bari, 1931), p. 182.Google Scholar

8. Rechberg to Metternich, Jan. 22, 1862 (confidential), as quoted in Hallberg, Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, p. 265. Although the subject cannot be discussed here, it should be noted that Rechberg was just as vociferous in denouncing the nationalism of the Germans, the Danes, and the subjects of the Sultan.

9. Memorandum by Rechberg, , Vienna, 06 5, 1862, in Il Problema Veneto e l'Europa, 1859–1866. Raccolta di documenti diplomatici, I: Austria, ed. Blaas, Richard (Venice, 1966), 468–73Google Scholar. This excellent project, under the general editorship of Roberto Cessi, was designed to commemorate the centennial of the union of Venetia to Italy. In addition to Dr. Blass's volume of Austrian documents, a second volume of English documents, edited by Noel Blakiston of the Public Record Office, has appeared. A third volume, of French documents, is projected. Cited hereafter as Problema Veneto.

10. Rechberg to Metternich, Vienna, July 6, 1860 (private); June 28 and July 28, 1861; and Aug. 15, 1862, Problema Veneto, I, 172–73, 386–87, 412–13, and 502.Google Scholar

11. Baron Werther (Prussian ambassador to Austria) reporting conversations with Rechberg to Alexander Schleinitz (Prussian foreign minister), Vienna, Feb. 25, 1860, Die auswärtige Politik Preussens, 1858–1871. Diplomatische Aktenstücke, general ed. Meyer, Arnold Oskar (Oldenburg and Berlin, 1932ff.), II, Pt. 2, 159.Google Scholar

12. For specifics of Austrian policy, see the two articles by Engel-Janosi, Friedrich, “Österreich und der Untergang des Königreiches Neapel,” Historische Zeitschrift, CXCIV (1962), 62–84;Google Scholar and “Österreich, der Kirchenstaat und die europäische Krise von 1860,” Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, LXIII (1955), 522–48.Google Scholar

13. Rechberg to Metternich, Vienna, July 20, 1862, Problema Veneto, I, 497. Cf. Rechberg to Count Alois Apponyi, Austrian ambassador at London, Mar. 27 (private) and June 12, 1860, Problema Veneto, I, 140, 157.Google Scholar

14. Rechberg to Metternich, Vienna, Aug. 15, 1862, Problema Veneto, I, 503.Google Scholar

15. Rechberg to Metternich, Jan. 28, 1861 (private), Problema Veneto, I, 345Google Scholar. I agree, however, with Hallberg, , Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, p. 269Google Scholar, that whatever Vienna's nostalgic aspirations to return to Italy in her former position, Austrian policy toward Italy in this period was, in fact, purely defensive and was designed to preserve what was left rather than to regain what was lost. Cf. Engel-Janosi, , Graf Rechberg, p. 75.Google Scholar

16. See Rechberg to Guido Thun, the Austrian envoy in St. Petersburg [Jan. 1861], Problema Veneto, I, 350–51.Google Scholar

17. Metternich to Mensdorff (Austrian foreign minister from 1864 to 1866), Paris, Mar. 22, 1866 (secret), Problema Veneto, I, 725.Google Scholar

18. It went back at least as far as Napoleon I and had been suggested during the revolutions of 1848 and during the Crimean War.

19. Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, Sept. 5, 1859, Problema Veneto, I, 28–35.Google Scholar

20. Metternich to Rechberg, Oct. 28, 1859, Bossy, Raoul, “Napoléon III et l' Autriche de Villafranca à Sadowa (1859–1866),” Révue d'histoire diplomatique, LXXIII (1959), 222–23.Google Scholar

21. Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, Nov. 26, 1859, in Engel-Janosi, , Graf Rechberg, p. 70Google Scholar. Strangely, neither this dispatch nor the one mentioned in n. 20 are included in Problema Veneto.

22. This report is discussed and quoted at length in Bossy, “Napoléon III et l'Autriche,’ pp. 224–25, but without date (although explicitly between Oct. 28 and Dec. 1859). Barker, “Austria, France, and the Venetian Question,” p. 145, cites Metternich's dispatch from Compiègne of Nov. 9, 1859, as including the allusions to Egypt. In her book, Distaff Diplomacy, The Empress Eugénie and the Foreign Policy of the Second Empire (Austin, Texas, 1967), p. 55Google Scholar, she writes that the Egyptian proposal was also suggested in September and October of 1859 and attributes the specific idea to Eugénie. The subject is also discussed in von Hengelvar, Ladislas Hengelmüller, “Graf Alois Karolyi. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der österreichisch-ungarischen Diplomatie,” Deutsche Revue, XXXVIII, No. 2 (1913), 39—again without date, though from the context September is suggested. Metternich's reports in Problema Veneto do not include the French suggestions on Egypt.Google Scholar

23. See, for instance, Count Nigra, Italian ambassador to France, to Cavour, Paris, Feb. 13, Mar. 29, and Apr. 25, 1860, Il carteggio Cavour-Nigra dal 1858 al 1861 (Bologna, 1926–1929), III, 60–61, 230, 270.Google Scholar

24. Cavour to Nigra, Milan, Feb. 16; and to General Durando (Italian envoy at Constantinople), Turin, Mar. 5, 1860, Carteggio Cavour-Nigra, III, 74, 142–43.Google Scholar

25. Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, Apr. 23, 1860 (private), Problema Veneto, I, 151.Google Scholar

26. Apponyi to Rechberg, London, July 28, 1860, Problema Veneto, I, 190Google Scholar, reporting a conversation with Persigny, the French ambassador at London. Persigny had also mentioned the possibility of Austria receiving territory from Bavaria or Saxony (Rechberg to Metternich, Vienna, Mar. 28, 1860, Problema Veneto, I, 142),Google Scholar and Lord Clarendon even suggested the island of Crete as another possibility (Apponyi to Rechberg, London, Feb. 21, 1861, Problema Veneto, I, 357).Google Scholar

27. See Rechberg to Apponyi, Vienna, June 12, 1860 (private), Problema Veneto, I, 159–60.Google Scholar

28. Rechberg to Metternich, Vienna, Apr. 27, 1860, in Cessi, Roberto, “La crisi europea del 1860 e l'Italia,” La Sicilia e l'Unità d'Italia. Atti del congresso internazionale di studi storicisul Risorgimento italiano (Milan, 1962), I, 154–58;Google Scholar Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, July 9, 1860, Problema Veneto, I, 175–80;Google Scholar and Rechberg to Metternich, Vienna, Mar. 17, 1861, Hallberg, , Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, pp. 305–306.Google Scholar

29. See, in addition, Rechberg to Apponyi, Vienna, Mar. 27, 1860; and to Metternich, July 6, 1860, and Jan. 28, 1861, Problema Veneto, I, 139–41, 172–73, 344.Google Scholar

30. Rechberg to Metternich, Vienna, Mar. 28, 1860, Problema Veneto, I, 142;Google Scholar and Nov. 12, 1860, private letter (Hallberg, , Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, p. 254)Google Scholar and an official dispatch (Problema Veneto, I, 254–57).Google Scholar

31. Beales, Derek, England and Italy, 1859–1860 (London, 1961), pp. 108–109, 157.Google Scholar The proposal itself is found in Hudson to Russell [Sept. 1859], Il Problema Veneto, II: Inghilterra, ed. Blakiston, Noel (Venice, 1967), 88–91.Google Scholar

32. The Queen to Russell, Dec. 16, 1859, in The Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell, 1840–1878, ed. Gooch, G. P. (New York and London, 1925), II, 268–69.Google Scholar

33. For a few examples of Palmerston's calumnies against the Austrians, see Palmerston to Cowley, ambassador at Paris, Aug. 22, 1859, and to Russell, Oct. 6, Oct. 15, and Dec. 25, 1860 (all private), Problema Veneto, II, 78–79, 341–42, 347, 404–406.Google Scholar Moreover, Palmerston and Russell were not hesitant to pass on their opinions to the Italian government: D'Azeglio (Italian ambassador to England) to Cavour, London, Oct. 21, 1860, Cavour e l'Inghilterra. Carteggio con V. E. D'Azeglio (Bologna, 1926), II, Pt. 2, 268–69.Google Scholar

34. Hallberg, , Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, pp. 257–58.Google Scholar Both the Italians and the Russians were convinced that Paris and London were acting in concert on the matter and Richard Cobden, who was in Paris in November 1860, purportedly returned to London with a plan for the cession of Venetia: Nigra to Cavour, Paris, Nov. 3, 1860, Carteggio Cavour-Nigra, IV, 268;Google Scholar Thun to Rechberg, St. Petersburg, Dec. 8, 1860, Problema Veneto, I, 279–80Google Scholar. Persigny was definitely working in London for a joint Anglo-French démarche: Apponyi to Rechberg, London, Dec. 20, 1860 (confidential), Problema Veneto, I, 292–96.Google Scholar

35. Hallberg, , Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, p. 258;Google Scholar Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, Dec. 13 and 15, 1860, Problema Veneto, I, 287, 288.Google Scholar

36. Russell to Cowley, Dec. 22, 1860 (private), Problema Veneto, II, 399.Google Scholar

37. Bernstorff (Prussian ambassador to England) to the Prince Regent, London, Nov. 23, 1860; and to Schleinitz, Dec. 21, 1860, Auswärtige Politik Preussens, II, Pt. 2, 3–4, 45–46.Google Scholar

38. Palmerston to Apponyi, Dec. 27, 1860, Hallberg, , Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, p. 258.Google Scholar The letter is enclosed in Rechberg to Alois Karolyi (ambassador to Prussia), Jan. 9, 1861, Quellen zur deutschen Politik Österreichs, 1859–1866, ed. Srbik, Heinrich and Schmid, Oskar (Oldenburg and Berlin, 1934–1938), I, 486–87. Hereafter cited as Quellen.Google Scholar

39. Palmerston to Russell, Dec. 18, 1860, Problema Veneto, II, 396–97;Google Scholar and Jan. 14, 1861, Later Correspondence of Russell, II, 278–79;Google Scholar D'Azeglio to Cavour, London, December 23, 1860, Cavour e l'Inghilterra, II, Pt. 2, 178.

40. Clarendon to Russell, Jan. 20, 1861, in Maxwell, Herbert, The Life and Letters of George William Frederick Fourth Earl of Clarendon (London, 1913), II, 234.Google Scholar

41. Vienna, with good reason, was never very enthusiastic about these references to guarantees. London once approached Italy about the possibility of a guarantee of Dalmatia or Trieste or of leaving Verona under Austrian control. But the Italians, arguing that they could never tolerate an enemy fleet or port in the Adriatic, flatly refused to circumscribe their nationalist claims. See D'Azeglio to Ricasoli, Jan. 26 and Feb. 11, 1862; and to Durando, London, Nov. 8, 1862, I documenti diplomatici italiani, First Series, 1861–1870, II (Rome, 1955), 81–84, 130; III (Rome, 1965), 152–53Google Scholar. A guarantee of Austria's territorial integrity by all the powers of Europe, or by England alone, was even more out of the question: the English, who had first mentioned the possibility, were just as reluctant as the Italians to accept any meaningful commitment (see Palmerston to Russell, Dec. 2, 1860, and Oct. 5, 1861, Problema Veneto, II, 376, 500)Google Scholar. Lastly, Vienna was not deluded about the probable uselessness of such a guarantee even if it were possible. “By what magic virtue,” the Austrian foreign minister asked in 1866, “can this treaty be more forceful than the acts of the Vienna Congress in which all Europe participated or the Treaty of Zurich, signed by Victor Emmanuel? If such solemn international stipulations are insufficient to guarantee us the possession of Venetia, how can we believe that a treaty for the cession of Venetia could assure us the preservation of the other territories …?” (Mensdorff to Apponyi, Apr. 26, 1866, Problema Veneto, I, 749–50).Google Scholar

42. Problema Veneto, II, 377–92, 395.Google Scholar

43. The Queen to Russell, Dec. 30, 1860, Problema Veneto, II, 410.Google Scholar

44. Werther to Schleinitz, Vienna, jan. 8, 1861, Auswärtige Politik Preussens, II, Pt. 2, 101, n. 13.Google Scholar

45. Rechberg to Thun, Nov. 23; to Apponyi, Dec. 4; to Karolyi, Dec. 13, 1860; and to Metternich, Jan. 28, 1861, Problema Veneto, I, 264–65, 277–78, 286, 344–45.Google Scholar

46. Srbik, Consult, Deutsche Einheit, III, 329–65.Google Scholar

47. Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, June 30, 1861 (private), Problema Veneto, I, 391–95.Google Scholar

48. Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, Sep. I, 1862 (secret), Problema Veneto, I, 514–17.Google Scholar

49. Rechberg to Metternich, Apr. 14, 1862, Hallberg, , Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, pp. 268–69.Google Scholar

50. Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, Feb. 22, 1863 (private), Problema Veneto, I, 524–28.Google Scholar For the best treatment of the diplomatic activity of the Polish crisis, see the excellent work of Bóbr-Tylingo, Stanislaw, Napoléon III, l'Europe et la Pologna en 1863–1864 (Rome, 1963).Google Scholar

51. Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, Feb. 26, 1863, in Die Rheinpolitik Kaiser Napoleons III. von 1863 bis 1870 und der Ursprung des Krieges von 1870–71, ed. Oncken, Hermann (Berlin, 1926), I, 6–8.Google Scholar

52. Rechberg to Metternich, Vienna, Feb. 27, 1863 (confidential), Bóbr-Tylingo, Napoléon III, l'Europe et la Pologna, pp. 63–64.Google Scholar

53. Same to same, Feb. 27, 1863 (private), Problema Veneto, I, 528–30.Google Scholar

54. Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, Mar. 5, 1863 (Trés secret), Problema Veneto, I, 530–32;Google ScholarOncken, , Rheinpolitik, I, 10–13.Google Scholar

55. Rechberg to Metternich, Mar. 8, 1863, Hallberg, , Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, pp. 320–21Google Scholar; and to Karolyi, Mar. 12, 1863 (secret), Quellen, III, 113–15.Google Scholar

56. Memorandum by Rechberg, , 03, 1863, Problema Veneto, I, 536–38.Google Scholar

57. Rechberg to Drouyn de Lhuys, Mar. 21, 1863, Problema Veneto, I, 534–36.Google Scholar

58. “Instrctions secrètes et personnelles pour le Prince de Metternich,” Vienna, Mar. 21, 1863, Problema Veneto, I, 538–41.Google Scholar

59. Engel-Janosi, Rechberg, p. 97. I am strongly inclined to believe that Austria—and certainly Rechberg—was much less anxious to entertain Napoleon's overtures than is generally assumed. For the prevalent view, see Hallberg, , Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, pp. 316, 318–19Google Scholar, and Bóbr-Tylingo, , Napoléon III, l'Europe et la Pologna, pp. 63–64.Google Scholar

60. Rechberg's words in an interview with Heinrich Friedjung in 1889,Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft, II, Appendix II, 584Google Scholar. A similar statement is found in the secret instructions. The French offers, it should be noted, were renewed in somewhat modified form in June and Oct. 1863, but were perfunctorily rejected by Vienna. See Bóbr-Tylingo, pp. 157–59, 227–28; Clark, , Franz Joseph and Bismarck, p. 45Google Scholar; and Engel-Janosi, , Rechberg, p. 114.Google Scholar

61. Blaas, , “Il problema veneto nella politica austriaca,” p. 97Google Scholar. See also pp. 102 and 108.

62. Barker, , “Austria, France, and the Venetian Question,” p. 148.Google Scholar

63. Rechberg to Metternich, July 16, 1860, Problema Veneto, I, 181–82.Google Scholar

64. See Problema Veneto, II, 725, 725–26, 734, 724, 751, 742–43.Google Scholar

65. Austria had been approached unofficially on the matter twice before by Italian agents: Rechberg to Francis Joseph, May 3, 1864, Problema Veneto, I, 618–19,Google Scholar and General Benedek (Austrian commander in Italy, 1860–66) to Count Crenneville (Francis Joseph's military attaché), Verona, Feb. 26, 1864, in Benedeks nachgelassene Papiere, ed. Friedjung, Heinrich (Leipzig, 1901), pp. 329–31.Google Scholar

66. Marmora, La (Italian foreign minister) to Malaguzzi, Florence, 10 9, 1865,Google Scholar in Luzio, Alessandro, “La missione Malaguzzi a Vienna nel 1865–1866 per la cessione del Veneto,” Risorgimento italiano, XV (1927), 194–200.Google Scholar

67. “Diario viennese del Malaguzzi,” entry of Nov. 9, 1865, Luzio, pp. 434–35; Friedjung, Heinrich, Historische Aufsätze (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1919), p. 313;Google ScholarBenedikt, Heinrich, “L'Austria e il Lombardo-Veneto,” in La Cività veneziana nell' età romantica (Florence, 1961), p. 54.Google Scholar

68. “Diario viennese del Malaguzzi,” entries of Oct. 25, Nov. 2, and Nov. 5, 1865, Luzio, pp. 417–22, 422–28, 431–32.

69. For a useful collection of French and Austrian documents and a short commentary on this episode, see Henry, Paul, L'abdication du Prince Cuza et l'avénèment de la dynastie de Hohenzollern au trône de Roumanie. Documents diplomatiques (Paris, 1930).Google Scholar

70. On Turkish opposition, see Problema Veneto, II, 782Google Scholar; on that of Russia, Henry, , L'abdication du Prince Cuza, pp. 291–92;Google ScholarProblema Veneto, I, 787;Google Scholar and Les origines diplomatiques de la guerre de 1870–1871 (Paris, 1910–1932), VII, 433–34; VIII, 49–52; IX, 88–90Google Scholar. Gorchakov said the project was “inadmisible à la guerre.” For Bismarck's stand, consult Die gesammelten Werke, ed. Friedrich, Thimme (Berlin, 1924–1935), V, 382, 405,Google Scholar and Auswärtige Politik Preussens, VI, 604, 663–65.Google Scholar

71. Russell vacated the foreign office upon becoming prime minister again after the death of Palmerston in 1865.

72. Clarendon to Cowley, Mar. 12, 1866, and Cowley to Clarendon, Paris, Mar. 9, 1866, Problema Veneto, II, 783–84, 778–79.Google Scholar

73. Apponyi to Rechberg, London, Mar. 20, 1866, Problema Veneto, I, 722–23.Google Scholar

74. Mensdorff to Metternich, Vienna, Apr. 30 (Quellen, V, Pt. 2, 549) and May 12, 1866 (Problema Veneto, I, 778).Google Scholar

75. Srbik, “Der Geheimvertrag Österreichs und Frankreichs vom 12. Juni 1866,” pp. 454–507.

76. Hallberg, , Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, pp. 259, 286Google Scholar; Clark, , Franz Joseph and Bismarck, pp. 307, 322, 404–405, 440–41, among several possible examples.Google Scholar

77. See Engel-Janosi, , “Die Krise des Jahres 1864 im Österreich,” Festschrft für A. F. Pribram (Vienna, 1929), pp. 141–95Google Scholar. The spokesman for the faction was Ludwig von Biegeleben, the chief of the German section of the foreign office. Other adherents were Gustav Blome, the ambassador at Munich, Baron Meysenbug, the undersecretary of state, Richard Metternich, and Count Moritz Esterhazy, the minister without portfolio and, after Rechberg's resignation, the most important member of the cabinet. It should be noted, however, that motivations among this group varied and all members did not accept precisely the same program. Esterhazy, for instance, while emphatically favoring a more determined stand against Prussia, did not want Austria to surrender her last implement of exerting influence in Italy by abandoning Venetia and was even less enthusiastic about reaching agreement with Austria's archenemy, Napoleon III.

78. Memorandum by Biegeleben, Vienna, Oct. 19, 1864, Quellen, IV, 331–37. For This interpretation of the program, see Clark, , Franz Joseph and Bismarck, pp. 151–52.Google Scholar

79. This new spirit was clearly illustrated by Mensdorff in a private letter to Esterhazy in September 1865. He acknowledged that the alliance with France had many repugnant features, “but this should not frighten an adept diplomat out of at least making the attempt.” “This course would not be very conservative,” he continued, “and would perhaps only add to our difficulties. But to remain purely on the defensive, that is, in the position of maintaining unchanged the present territorial situation while everyone around us is striving for aggrandizement, can only redound to our disadvantage.” Mensdorff to Esterhazy, Karlsbad, Sep. 24, 1864, Quellen, V, pt. I, 61–62. Cf. same to same, Nikolsburg, Oct. 11, 1865; Vienna, Oct. 25, 1865; and Feb. 14, 1866 (all private), Quellen, V, pt. 1, 72, 82, 189. By May 1866, Gustav Blome, the most outspoken of the group, had concluded: “War, we need war, only war.” Blome to Mensdorff, Munich, May 29, 1866, Quellen, V, Pt. 2, 803 Cf. his letters to Biegeleben, Munich, Apr. 7 and May 15, 1866, Quellen, V, Pt. 2, 438–39, 678–79.

80 See Rechberg to Francis Joseph, Oct. 19, and Rechberg's criticisms of Biegeleben's memorandum, Vienna, 10 20, 1864, Quellen, IV, 330–31, 337–40Google Scholar. On Mensdorff and Esterhazy, see Clark, , Franz Joseph and Bismarck, pp. 148–49;Google ScholarEngel-Janosi, , Rechberg, pp. 149–51Google Scholar; Srbik, , Deutsche Einheit, III, 135;Google ScholarFriedjung, , Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft, I, 108–11;Google Scholar and Redlich, Joseph, Das österreichische Staas- und Reichsproblem (Leipzig, 1926), II, 362–64, 385, 773–76, 798–804.Google Scholar

81 Rechberg, p. 133.

82 Rechberg to Metternich, Apr. 27, 1860, in Cessi, , “La crisi europea del 1860,” La Sicilia e l'Unità d'Italia, I, 154–58.Google Scholar

83. Rechberg to Metternich, Apr. 14, 1862, quoted in Hallberg, Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, p. 272 (italics mine).

84. Rechberg to Metternich, July 20, 1862, Problema Veneto, I, 497.Google Scholar

85. For example, Rechberg to Apponyi, Mar. 27, 1860; and to Metternich, , 11 12, 1860, Problema Veneto, I, 140, 256.Google Scholar

86. Rechberg to Metternich, Jan. 28, 1861, and Aug. 15, 1862, Problema Veneto, I, 345, 503.Google Scholar

87. Rechberg to Metternich, Jan. 28, 1861, Problema Veneto, I, 344.Google Scholar

88. See Elrod, Richard B., “The Venetian Question in Austrian Foreign Relations, 1860–1866” (unpub. diss., University of Illinois, 1967), pp. 126n., 136, 138–42, 150–54, 163–65, 170, and the documents cited there.Google Scholar

89. As Hallberg writers, “Napoleon was Austria's misfortune to a greater degree than her policy …” Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, p. 349.

90. Russell to Hudson, Jan. 27, 1860, Problema Veneto, II, 352–55.Google Scholar

91. See, for instance, Thun to Rechberg, St. Petersburg, Dec. 22, 1859, Problema Veneto, I, 65–66.Google Scholar