1. Haus–, Hof-und Staatsarchiv, Vienna (hereafter: HHSA), Rom: Weisungen, Metternich to Apponyi, June 20, 1823. All HHSA documents are from the Staatskanzlei section. I would like to express my thanks to Director Richard Blaas of the HHSA and his staff for their assistance.

The Conclave of 1823 has been frequently studied. The most reliable account is Colapietra, Raffaele, “Il Diario Brunelli del Conclave del 1823,” Archivio storico italiano, CXX (1962), 76–146.Google Scholar A good brief description is Schmidlin, Josef, Histoire des Papes de l'époque contemporaine: Léon XII, Pie VIII, et Grégoire XVI, trans. Maréchal, L. (Paris, 1940), pp. 1–9.Google Scholar Earlier studies are unreliable, marked by both bias and factual error: Rossi, Mario, “Il Conclave di Leone XII,” Bollettino della R. Deputazione di Storia patria per l'Umbria, XXXIII (1935), 135–215;Google ScholarOxilla, U., “Tre Conclavi,” Rassegna storica del Risorgimento, XX (1933), 564–84,Google Scholar and “Il Conclave di Leone XII,” ibid., VIII (1921), 611–16; de Montour, Artaud, Storia del Papa Leone XII (Milan, 1843), pp. 31–60;Google ScholarCipoletta, E., Memorie politiche sui conclavi (Milan, 1863), pp. 91–153;Google ScholarGattina, F. Petrucelli della, Histoire diplomatique des conclaves (Bruxelles, 1866), IV, 331–45, marked by strong anti-Austrian and antipapal bias, but useful for the Italian diplomatic documents it presents;Google ScholarBianchi, Nicomede, Storia documentata della diplomazia europea in Italia dal 1814 al 1861 (Turin, 1865), II, 154–63, 379–82, which shares the weaknesses and the virtues of Petrucelli della Gattina;Google ScholarFeret, P., La France et la Saint-Siège (Paris, 1911), II, 267–83, useful for French policy, unreliable on that of other Powers;Google ScholarBecker, Jeronimo, España y la Santa Sede durante el siglo XIX (Madrid, 1908), pp. 64–69, the only work to discuss the role of Spain;Google ScholarStendhal, , Promenades en Rome (Paris, 1926), pp. 173–90, unreliable on the inner workings of the conclave, but interesting as a reflection of contemporary opinion. All the above mention the important role played by Austria, but none contains a comprehensive and reliable account of it. Most share the anti-Austrian bias of the Risorgimento, with a notable reluctance to admit that Austrian policy could have been even comparatively enlightened. They tend to present Metternich as supporting the reactionary party—the exact opposite of the truth.Google Scholar Colapietra is free of this bias, but suffers from having based his account of Austrian policy not on the HHSA, but on Metternich's published Mémoires (Paris, 1881), IV, 57–62, which have been so edited as to be deceptive, as will be brought out below.Google Scholar Only Schmidlin and Terlinden, Charles, “Le Conclave de Léon XII,” Revue d'Histoire ecclésiastique, 1913, 272–303, have used the HHSA;Google Scholar but they do so primarily to illuminate the inner workings of the conclave rather than Austrian policy per se. Surprisingly, the numerous works on Metternich—headed by von Srbik, Heinrich Ritter, Metternich: Der Staatsmann und der Mensch (3 vols., Munich, 1925–1954)—fail to discuss his role in this conclave. The present study is therefore intended as the first detailed account, based on HHSA and other archival sources previously neglected, of Metternich's policy at the conclave, with a view to illuminating not only an event important in itself, but also Metternich's attitude towards the Papacy and its role in the Restoration Order in general.Google Scholar

2. Metternich's attempt to create a Union of Throne and Altar is the subject of my Ph. D. dissertation, “The Austrian Policy of Cardinal Consalvi, 1815–1823” (Loyola University, Chicago, 1964).Google Scholar

3. E.g., HHSA, Rom: Weisungen, Metternich to Apponyi, Sept. 16, 1820, June 20, 1823.

4. On Metternich's Italian policy during this period, see: Srbik, , op. cit., I, 182–229, 556–99;Google ScholarSchroeder, Paul W., Metternich's Diplomacy at its Zenith 1820–1823 (Austin, 1962);Google ScholarGrossmann, Karl, “Metternichs Plan eines italienischen Bundes,” Historische Blätter, No. 4 (1931), 37–76;Google ScholarBettanini, A. M., “Un disegno di confederazione italiana,” Studi di storia dei trattati (Padua, 1939), pp. 3–50;Google ScholarNada, Narciso, Le relazioni diplomatiche fra l' Austria e il Regno di Sardegna 1814–1830 (Rome, 1964 ff.).Google Scholar

5. E.g., HHSA, Rom: Weisungen, Metternich to Apponyi, June 20, 1823.

6. On Metternich's views on reform and his efforts to secure it, see my article, “Metternich and Reform: The Case of the Papal State, 1814–1848,” Journal of Modern History, XLII (12 1970), 524–48.Google Scholar

7. On Josephinism, see: Maass, Ferdinand, Der Josephinismus (5 vols., Vienna, 1951–1961);Google ScholarWinter, Eduard, Der Josefinismus: Die Geschichte des österreichischen Reformkatholizismus (Berlin, 1962);Google ScholarValjavec, Fritz, Der Josephinismus: Zur geistigen Entwicklung Österreichs im XVIII. und XIX. Jahrhundert (Munich, 1945);Google ScholarReiser, Herbert, Der Geist des Josephinismus und sein Fortleben (Vienna, 1962);Google ScholarPaul, P. Bernard, “The Origins of Josephinism: Two Studies,” Colorado College Studies, No. 7 (1964)Google Scholar. The nature of Josephinism is much debated: on the one hand, Maass argues that it was essentially a means to strengthen state control over the Church, while Winter regards it as rather the manifestation of a farreaching intellectual movement aimed at religious reform and modernization. Neither view has won universal acceptance. In any case, the Papacy itself saw in Josephinism no more than another attempt to bring the Church under state control, and was accordingly hostile.

8. On Metternich's attitude towards Josephinism, besides the general works cited above: Srbik, op. cit., I, 523–24; Mémoires, III, 1–7; Posch, Andreas, “Die kirchenpolitische Einstellung Metternichs,” Religion, Wissenschaft, Kultur, XIII (1962), 119–27;Google ScholarBeer, A., “Kirchliche Angelegeheiten in Österreich (1816–1842),” Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtforschung, XVIII (1897), 493–575.Google Scholar

9. On the development of Austro-Papal relations in 1815–1823, see the author's dissertation and the bibliography given there, esp. van Duerm, Charles, Correspondance du Cardinal Hercule Consalvi avec le Prince Clement de Metternich 1815–1823 (Louvain, 1899).Google Scholar

10. HHSA, Rom: Weisungen, Instructions for Prince Kaunitz, May 1817. Ercole Consalvi (1757–1824) played an important role in the election in 1800 of Pius VII, who appointed him a cardinal and secretary of state (1800–1806, 1814–1823); he was later noted for his negotiation of the Concordat of 1801 with Napoleon, his skillful handling of papal interests at the Congress of Vienna, and his attempt to reform the Papal State. No adequate biography exists. His Memorie, ed. Corneliano, Mario Nasalli Rocca di (Rome, 1950), ends in 1810.Google Scholar

11. On Consalvi's efforts at reform, see: Petrocchi, Massimo, La restaurazione, il Cardinale Consalvi, e la riforma del 1816 (Florence, 1941),Google Scholar and La restaurazione romana (Florence, 1943).Google Scholar

12. Archivio Segreto Vaticano (hereafter: AV), Rubrica 25, Bernetti to Consalvi, Nov. 4, 1815. All AV documents cited are from the Segretariato di Stato collection.

13. HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Lebzeltern to Metternich, July 29, 1815, No. 135; Dec. 14, 1815, No. 202.

14. ibid., Weisungen, Metternich to Kaunitz, Oct. 18, 1818, No. 2.

15. E.g., ibid., Metternich to Lebzeltern, July 22, 1815; Instructions for Kaunitz, May 1817; Instructions for Apponyi, September 1820.

16. ibid., Weisungen, Metternich to Kaunitz, Oct. 15, 1817. Also: Grossbrittanien: Weisungen, Metternich to Esterhazy, Apr. 19, 1817; de Bertier de Sauvigny, G., France and the European Alliance (South Bend, 1958), pp. 17–21.Google Scholar

17. HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Kaunitz to Metternich, Nov. 6, 1817, Nos. 32-A and 32-F.

18. ibid., Weisungen, Metternich to Kaunitz, Oct. 15, 1817. Bertier de Sauvigny, op. cit., pp. 16–21, and Metternich et la France après le Congrès de Vienne, I, 1815–1820 (Paris, 1968), 122–24.Google Scholar

19. HHSA, Rom: Weisungen, Metternich to Kaunitz, Oct. 15, 1817; Petrucelli della Gattina, op. cit., IV, 321–22; Becker, op. cit., pp. 64–65.

20. E.g., HHSA, Rom: Weisungen, Instructions for Apponyi, September 1820.

21. ibid., Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, Nov. 6, 1822, No. 1. On Anton Count Apponyi, ambassador in Rome 1820–1826, see: Hudal, Alois, Die Österreichische Vatikanbotschaft 1806–1918 (Munich, 1952), pp. 42–47, 61–73.Google Scholar

22. HHSA, Rom: Weisungen, Metternich to Apponyi, Nov. 28, 1822.

23. ibid., Russland: Weisungen, Metternich to Lebzeltern, June 28, 1823, No. 7; Vorträge, Kart. 234, June 13, 1823. The assertion, made, e.g., by Oxilla, op. cit., that Rudolf was not only present at the conclave, but was the focal point of Austrian policy there, is completely unfounded.

24. HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, Jan. 6, 1823. Giuseppi Cardinal Albani (1750–1834), of a noble Roman family with close ties of interest to Austria, had risen rapidly to great influence under Pius VI, and continued to be influential under Pius VII, despite his dubious reputation: able, unscrupulous, a skillful politician, an inveterate intriguer, he was described by Chateaubriand in much the same terms as by Apponyi: “Rich and excessively avaricious, he is involved in all sorts of dubious enterprises. … I am not sure he believes in God… One could easily win him by satisfying his avarice,” Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris (hereafter: AAEP), Correspondance politique, Rome, Chateaubriand to Portalis, Apr. 2, 1829. On the office of Protector, see: Blaas, Richard, “Das Kardinalprotektorat der deutschen und österreichischen Nation im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert,” Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs, X (1957), 148–85.Google Scholar

25. HHSA, Rom: Weisungen, Metternich to Apponyi, June 20, 1823. It is important to note that the version of these instructions printed in Mémoires, IV, 57–62, is unreliable, having apparently been carefully edited to remove anything which might be detrimental to the reputation of Metternich, Austria, or the Papacy. Thus, much of the original has been removed—often without any indication being given—including many crucial points. In consequence, only a limited and distorted understanding of Metternich's policy can be obtained from it. Historians of the conclave who have depended entirely upon it—e.g., Colapietra—have been misled thereby.

26. Severoli, Anton Gabriele (1757–1824) was nuncio in Vienna, 1801–1816, but his forceful criticism of the state-church system and the Imperial government eventually made him persona non grata and led to his recall: see Maass, op. cit., IV, 52–104Google Scholar. A political reactionary, he was very hostile to Consalvi's reforms: see Petrocchi, La restaurazione… 1816, pp. 121–270, for his correspondence on this subject with Consalvi. By 1823 he was the leading figure among the intransigent wing of the Zelanti. There seems no point in repeating Metternich's comments upon the other cardinals; partly because many of them were never real contenders for the tiara, but primarily because many of his judgments were erroneous, and were later revised. Metternich had relied for his information about the candidates upon a “Tableau des cardinals existent au 1 september 1821” (Rom: Varia, 1821) which Apponyi had drawn up at his request. Unfortunately, Apponyi seems to have been a poor judge of men at this early stage of his career, since most of his “portraits” are inaccurate: moderates are described as Zelanti, and vice versa. Perhaps Metternich suspected this inaccuracy; certainly, he stressed that his judgments upon individual cardinals were only tentative, and that Apponyi should carefully gather further information, especially from the knowledgeable Consalvi and Albani, before deciding whether to support or oppose a candidate.

27. In the following account of Matternich's tactics, his instructions of June 20 are supplemented by those of Sept. 12, 1823, which go into greater detail on several points; all quotations are from the June 20 instructions, however.

28. On the exclusive, see: Pivano, Silvio, “Il ‘Veto’ od ‘Exclusiva’ nell'elezione del Pontefice,” Scritti minori di storia e storia del diritto (Turin, 1965), pp. 333–91, and the bibliography there cited.Google Scholar

29. HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, Aug. 20, 1823, Nos. 64-A and 64-B.

30. See, e.g., de Bertier de Sauvigny, G., “Sainte-Alliance et Alliance dans les conceptions de Metternich,“ Revue historique, CCXXIII (1960), 249–74.Google Scholar

31. HHSA, Rom: Weisungen, Metternich to Apponyi, Sept. 12, 1823.

32. ibid., Frankriech: Berichte, Vincent to Metternich, July 18, 1823, No. 113. On earlier French rivalry with Austria, see: Dollot, Louis, “Conclaves et diplomatie française au XVIII siècle,” Revue d'histoire diplomatique, LXXV (1961), 124–35.Google Scholar

33. Bianchi, op. cit., II, 379, Instructions for Cardinal Ruffo.

34. Staatsarchiv, Geheimes, Munich (hereafter: GSM), Päpstlicher Stuhl 736, Rechberg to Haefflin, Sept. 20, 1823. HHSA, Rom: Weisungen, Metternich to Apponyi, Sept. 12, 1823.Google Scholar

35. HHSA, Rom: Weisungen, Metternich to Apponyi, Sept. 12, 1823. On the altered Piedmontese attitude towards Austria, see: Archivio di Stato, Turin (hereafter: AST), Sezione II, Istruzioni, Instructions for Count Pralormo, Jan. 12, 1822.

36. Becker, op. cit., 67–69. In fact, the instructions of the King of Spain did not reach his ambassador in Rome until the conclave had ended.

37. HHSA, Rom: Weisungen, Metternich to Apponyi, Sept. 12, 1823.

38. ibid., Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, July 11, 1823, No. 54-B; Aug. 28, 1823, No. 67-B.

39. ibid., Weisungen, Metternich to Apponyi, June 20, 1823.

40. ibid., Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, Aug. 21, 1823.

41. ibid., Sept. 1, continuation of No. 67-B. Annibale della Genga (1760–1829) had held several diplomatic posts during the Napoleonic era. In 1814 he quarreled with Consalvi over a mission to Paris, and henceforth they were bitter enemies. See Colapietra, Raffaele, La formazione diplomatica di Leone XII (Rome, 1966).Google Scholar Francesco Cavalchini (1755–1818), of a harsh and violent character, won unpopularity for his severity as governor of Rome in 1801–1808. A satire of the conclave commented upon his candidacy, “Chi vuolche in tutto poi ci rovini, Preghi l' Altissimo per Cavalchini”: Biblioteca Nazionale, Rome (hereafter: BNR), Fondo Vittorio Emanuele, Ms. 918. Bartolomeo Pacca (1756–1844) had been Prosecretary of State in 1808–1809, and 1814–1815. Though among the more moderate Zelanti, he was personally hostile to Consalvi: their difference of outlook emerges clearly from Rinieri, Illario, Corrispondenza inedita dei cardinali Consalvi e Pacca nel tempo del Congresso di Vienna (Turin, 1903).Google ScholarArezzo, Tommaso (1756–1833) had performed important diplomatic missions to Russia and Germany during Consalvi's first ministry, and after 1816 as Legate of Ferrara he had proved a wise and moderate governor of a difficult provinceGoogle Scholar. His moderate views reflected those of Consalvi, and he was known for his sympathy towards Austria. Fabrizio Turiozzi (1755–1826) was of mediocre ability and poor health, but sympathetic to Consalvi's principles.

42. HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, Sept. 2, 1823, continuation of No. 67-B. Francesco Saverio Castiglione (1761–1830) had made his reputation as an expert in canon law. He wavered between the positions of the moderates and the Zelanti, and though on good terms with Consalvi, was distrusted by the latter for his susceptibility to Zelanti influence. By 1829 he had definitely shifted into the moderate camp, and was elected in the conclave of that year as Pius VIII: see Fusi-Pecci, Odo, La Vita del Papapio VIII(Rome, 1965).Google Scholar Carlo Opizzoni (1769–1855) won praise from liberals and conservatives alike during his long term as Archbishop of Bologna, 1804–1855. Though inclined to the Zelanti position in religious affairs, he was politically moderate and a friend of Consalvi, whom he supported at the conclave.

43. HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, Aug. 30, 1823, continuation of No. 67–B.

44. ibid., Apponyi to Metternich, Aug. 27, 1823, No. 66-E. Giulio Maria della Somaglia (1744–1830), Dean of the Sacred College, had been an important figure at Rome since the days of Pius VI. By 1823, though still a leader among the moderate Zelanti, age had robbed him of much of his former energy and ability.

45. HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, Aug. 21, 1823, No. 65; also, Aug. 27, 1823, No. 66-E; Aug., 30, 1832, No. 67-A, with annexes. Rumors of Austrian designs upon the Papal State, arising from her attempt to annex the northern provinces or Legations in 1799–1800, had been common since that time, and were seriously detrimental to Metternich's attempt to secure friendly relations with Rome. Although these rumors are still at times repeated by historians—e.g., Rossi, op. cit., p. 169—there is no hint in Metternich's correspondence that there was the least truth in them; in any case, an attempt to annex the Legations would have been contrary to his fundamental policy of upholding the status quo established by the Vienna settlement. It was indirect hegemony, not annexation, which represented Metternich's policy towards the Papal State, as towards Italy as a whole.

46. HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, Aug. 27, 1823, No. 66-E.

47. ibid., Weisungen, Metternich to Apponyi, Sept. 12, 1823.

48. ibid.

49. AAEP, Chateaubriand to Laval, July 18, 1823. On Chateaubriand's policy during the conclave, see Feret, op. cit., II, 267–84.

50. AAEP, Chateaubriand to Laval, Aug. 27, 1823.

51. Bianchi, op. cit., II, 183–84. Becker, op. cit., pp. 67–69.

52. Gattina, Petrucelli della, op. cit., IV, 336; Bianchi, op. cit., II, 183–84.Google Scholar

53. HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, Aug. 28, 1823, No. 67-B.

54. E.g., the Piedmontese ambassador in Rome calculated that only one of the six Piedmontese cardinals was reliable; the others would “follow the dictates of their consciences” and vote for the Zelanti, regardless of royal orders: ibid. The religious revival of this period has been frequently studied; a good introduction, with bibliography, is Leflon, Jean, La crise rèvolutionnaire (Paris, 1949), esp. pp. 357–71.Google Scholar

55. Bianchi, op. cit., II, 379–84. GSM, Rechberg to Haefflin, Sept. 20, 1823.

56. HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, Aug. 28, 1823, No. 67-B; Dec. 26, 1823, No. 8-B. Worth noting is the comment of the Neapolitan cardinals who, criticized by their court for having supported the Zelanti at the conclave, retorted that in electing a pope the cardinals “must be guided only by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit”—a sentiment that would have seemed absurd to the court cardinals of a generation earlier.

57. GSM, Haefflin to Rechberg, Oct. 1, Oct. 4, 1823.

58. HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Lebzeltern to Metternich, Apr. 30, 1816, No. 96.

59. Significantly, in the satires circulated during the conclave, the aspect of Consalvi most criticized was his “despotism”: BNR, MS. 918, “Satire per il conclave di 1823.”

60. HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, Oct. 6, 1823, No. 79-A.

61. ibid., Oct. 6, 1823, No. 79-A; Oct. 11, 1823, No. 80-C. When in December 1823 a new conclave seemed likely due to the illness of Leo XII, Apponyi planned to ask Consalvi not to take part, as his support would only weaken the court party: Dec. 26, 1823, No. 8-B.

62. ibid., “Extrait de la Correspondance chiffrée de S. E. le Card. Albani,” Sept. 7/12, 1823. The willingness of the Zelanti to await the arrival of the French cardinals was the result of Laval's careful cultivation of their good will: AAEP, Sept. 15, 1823, No. 9.

63. HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, Sept. 13, No. 70-C; Sept. 17, 1823, No. 70-E.

64. ibid., “Suite de la correspondance,” Sept. 17/19, 1823. For the French side of the story, AAEP; Laval to Chateaubriand, Sept. 15, 1823, No. 9. The French were willing to cooperate with Albani, but planned to avoid too close an identification with him and to cultivate the Zelanti as well, hoping in the end to impose Castiglione as a compromise upon both factions.

65. HHSA, Rom: Berichte, “Suite de la correspondance,” Sept. 18/19, 1823.

66. ibid., “Extrait de la correspondance,” Sept. 21, 1823, postscript.

67. ibid., “Extrait de la correspondance,” Sept. 21, 1823.

68. GSM, Haefflin to Rechberg, Oct. 1, 1823.

69. ibid.

70. HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, Oct. 11, 1823, No. 80-C. The leading Zelanti candidates were Della Genga, De Gregorio, and Cavalchini.

71. ibid., Weisungen, Metternich to Apponyi, Nov. 5, 1823. GSM, Haefflin to Rechberg, Oct. 4, 1823, reveals that Haefflin had been won over by the Zelanti argument that Della Genga's election was in the best interests of the Church and therefore also in those of the courts, despite the King's orders to the contrary.

72. HHSA, Rom: Berichte, “Suite de la correspondance,” Sept. 27/28, 1823.

73. ibid. See also AAEP, Fare to Laval, Sept. 27, Sept. 28, 1823. It will remembered that Chateaubriand was by no means as hostile to the Zelanti as was Metternich, and preferred a moderate of their party; since Della Genga was reasonably moderate in his religious views—his political opinions being a matter of indifference—Laval regarded him as quite acceptable (Laval to Chateaubriand, Sept. 28, 1823, No. 85), as did Chateaubriand himself: Chateaubriand to Laval, Oct. 8, 1823, No. 32.

74. HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, Sept. 28, 1823, No. 77.

75. ibid., Apponyi to Metternich, Oct. 6, 1823, No. 79-A; Oct. 11, 1823, No. 80-C; Dec. 26, 1823, No. 8-B.

76. ibid., July 31, 1823, No. 59-A.

77. ibid., Sept. 29, 1823, No. 77-B; Oct. 6, 1823, No. 79-A; Oct. 11, 1823, No. 80-C.

78. On the decline of the Powers' influence, which has not been thoroughly studied per se, see: Schmidlin, op. cit., pp. 138–45, 185–91; Engel-Janosi, Friedrich, Österreich und der Vatikan, 1846–1918 (2 vols., Graz, 1958–1960);Google Scholar cf. Chateaubriand's observation, prophetic if somewhat premature, of 1829, that “three things no longer make Popes: the intrigues of women, the efforts of ambassadors, and the power of the Courts.” AAEP, Vol. 965, Chateaubriand to Portalis, Feb. 17, 1829.

79. HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, Oct. 6, 1823, No. 79-A.

80. ibid., Sept. 28, 1823, No. 77.

81. ibid., Weisungen, Metternich to Apponyi, Nov. 12, 1823.

82. A perceptive study of Leo's pontificate is offered by Colapietra, Raffaele, La Chiesa tra Metternich e Lammenais: Il pontificato di Leone XII (Brescia, 1963); chapter III deals with his role in international affairs.Google Scholar

83. ibid., and Maass, op. cit., v, 9–24.

84. On the 1831 revolution in the Papal State, see: Piano, R. del, Roma e la rivoluzione del 1831 (Imola, 1931).Google Scholar On the Austrian reaction, see: Nada, Narciso, L'Austria e la questione romana, 1830–1831 (Turin, 1953).Google Scholar

85. The literature on Pius IX's liberal experiment is too extensive to list here; a good introduction is Cuarto, Federico, “Il 1848 italiano e europeo,” Nuove questioni di storia del Risorgimento e dell' Unità d'Italia (Milan, 1961), 1, 675–719.Google Scholar

86. On Metternich's continuing effort to reform the Papal State, see my article “Metternich and Reform…” (above, n. 6).

87. A point of which Metternich was well aware, but could not alter: e.g., HHSA, Frankreich: Weisungen, Metternich to Apponyi, Mar. 12, 1831.

88. ibid., Rom: Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, Sept. 28, 1823, No. 77.