This article argues that Canada’s policy of refusing extraterritorial electoral constituencies within its borders does not protect its territorial sovereignty or add any protection against foreign interference in its domestic affairs. Rather, its main effect is to alienate thousands of dual or foreign nationals residing in Canada by preventing them from being directly represented in their home state’s national assembly or legislature and, in some cases, from exercising their only voting rights.

The succeeding discussion looks at some of the concrete record of governmental practice (whether provincial or federal) in Canada, under the impact of the “Quiet Revolution” in Quebec, in important areas of foreign affairs and trans-national cultural, social, and commercial relations generally. Its thesis will be, first, that at the level of constitutional law-in-action important changes and modifications are occurring in Canada which largely render out-of-date certain traditional a priori concepts and attitudes as to inter-governmental relations within a federal system; second, that these de facto changes, which are already ripening through sustained practice and observance into conventional constitutional law, tend to present the Privy Council’s work on the Canadian constitution and its interpretation in a new and rather more favourable light (in comparison perhaps with the record of the Canadian Supreme Court); and, third, that the constitutional changes that have, in fact, occurred in this area make good sense in pragmatic, experiential terms, having regard to the inner dynamics of Canadian federalism today and to the aspirations of the main contending power groups, the new positive law of the constitution thus coming very close to being also community “living law” in Canada.

The author considers whether humanitarian intervention can be justified even without express Security Council authorization. Starting with the statement of former Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy that Canada intervened in Kosovo knowing that it did not have full legal justification, but feeling that such intervention was nevertheless morally justified, the author explores whether there is an evolving acceptance that explicit Security Council authorization is not necessary. He argues that an evolving reinterpretation of the Charter is appropriate such that, while Security Council authorization remains necessary for humanitarian intervention, there has to be flexibility in determining what constitutes authorization. In this respect, it would be important for a General Assembly declaration on legitimate humanitarian intervention to be in place in order to provide a baseline for interpreting a given Security Council resolution.

Since Mr. Carter became President of the United States, there bas been a revival in the use of human rights as a weapon in international politics. More and more western countries have stated that they are contemplating measuring the aid they give to members of the developing world in proportion to the extent to which the latter conform to basic humanitarian standards or improve their own record in relation to observance of human rights. In addition, there have been calls for the cancellation of visits by politicians, academics, and artistic performers; for non-participation in international athletic contests — a western adaptation of the African ban of the Montreal Olympic Games because of New Zealand’s participation while the latter’s athletes were not barred from competing in South Africa; for non-participation in technical and scientific conferences; and for the breaking of town-twinning arrangements. This attitude has been fed somewhat by reason of the activities of “Helsinki watchers,” who contend that this or that country, and particularly the Soviet Union, is not living up to its human rights obligations as embodied in the Helsinki Agreement.

On April 8, 1970, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau informed the members of the Canadian House of Commons that the federal government had given notice of its intention to introduce two bills dealing with the protection of Canada’s marine environment and the living resources of the sea. He then made the following statement:

I wish now to table a copy of a letter which Canada’s Ambassador to the United Nations has delivered to the Secretary General submitting a new reservation to Canada’s acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. This reservation is intended to guard against any possible litigation of certain features of these two bills.

In light of the global prevalence of secessionist movements, some have proposed “remedial secession” as a last resort solution where a “people” is either denied internal self-determination or is faced with massive human rights violations by a repressive regime. While lack of state practice largely confined this concept to academic circles through the 1990s and much of the 2000s, remedial secession received renewed international legal attention in the proceedings concerning the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) 2008 advisory opinion in the case Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo(Kosovo case). In light of support for remedial secession expressed in the submissions of eleven states, as well as its apparent endorsement in the separate opinions of two ICJ judges, advocates of remedial secession may plausibly argue that the soft law status of the concept has been strengthened and perhaps even that it is in the process of emerging as a regional customary norm for those states that supported it. However, the impact of the Kosovo case on solidifying the legal status of remedial secession should not be overstated, as opponents of the concept may point to a number of contrary indicators that also emerged from the formal discourse surrounding the case.

About four decades ago, an eminent jurist described the doctrine of denial of justice as “l'une des plus anciennes et “l'une des plus mal elucidees du droit international.” Another writer, also noting the persistent confusion over the meaning of the doctrine, suggested that the term denial of justice could as well be removed from the language of international law. Despite such suggestions, the doctrine of denial of justice, whose origin has been traced back to antiquity, has been retained, and international lawyers have constantly attempted to elucidate its meaning. In doing so, however, international lawyers, such as Alwyn Freeman in his classic book on the subject, have, for reasons explained elsewhere, eschewed the attempt to define the term justice as such. They have concentrated mainly upon the conduct that has most frequently been regarded as constituting a denial of justice. Thus, from its origin and development, the term denial of justice may be said to have been used in the following three senses:

In its broadest sense, this term [denial of justice] seems to embrace the whole field of State responsibility, and has been applied to all types of wrongful conduct on the part of the State towards aliens. In its narrowest sense, this term has been limited to refusal of a State to grant an alien access to its courts or a failure of a court to pronounce a judgment. In an intermediate sense, the expression “denial of justice” is employed in connection with the improper administration of civil and criminal justice as regards an alien, including denial of access to courts, inadequate procedures, and unjust decisions.

Launchings are Fashionable in the space age. But to “launch” a Canadian Yearbook of International Law has nothing of the drama of a Canaveral countdown nor does it represent the combined technology of an era at its highest point of achievement. Yet it may be regarded as a desirable national effort to provide a forum for the data and the ideas of international law derived both from Canadian experience and from general theory and practice.

In every century, in every land, foreigners have been suspect. The alien is the universal victim of national prejudice, the object of fear and distrust. He is a stranger and society has lent emphasis to his condition by attaching to him legal disabilities — either boldly by statute, or more subtly through judicial pronouncement. Once prejudice toward an alien manifests itself in discriminatory treatment, the interests of another nation are involved. If that person is an alien friend, that is if no state of war exists between his country and the land in which he is residing, an international cause of action may exist.

The Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union is the first treaty to specify new rules governing the identity and tenure of arbitral members and provide a more extensive review function through a two-tiered investment tribunal system (ITS). CETA signals a shift towards a more public and judicialized system, akin to that of many national legal systems and the World Trade Organization. The ITS creates a permanent first instance tribunal and an appeal tribunal (featuring a pre-elected roster of tribunal members), which is competent to review the tribunal’s decisions for errors of law and fact, as well as on the grounds of Article 52 of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention) — making it a novel one-stop-appellate-shop. This treaty comment assesses the operation of, and reasons for, key provisions of CETA’s Investment Chapter and examines the extent to which it addresses points of criticism and lessons learned from the experience of arbitrating under the North American Free Trade Agreement and other open-textured treaties. The analysis draws analogies to, and distinctions from, other treaties and relevant jurisprudence that have influenced the negotiators. Among CETA’s most striking features are its purported modification of existing arbitral rules (ICSID Convention, ICSID Additional Facility Rules, and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules) and its removal of disputing party involvement in the selection of the tribunal in favour of a roster appointed ex ante by the state parties, which results in a considerable amount of the investor’s autonomy being stripped away. While these and other issues must be further analyzed and balanced in the context of present discussions regarding the creation of a multilateral investment tribunal, CETA nevertheless contains significant procedural and substantive innovations and stands as a guide for future treaty negotiations and reforms of investor–state dispute settlement.

Speaking in the general debate at the Eighteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly on September 19, 1963, Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson made the following observation:

The Canada–China Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (China FIPPA) is novel and, in key respects, non-reciprocal in favour of China. For example, it would provide a general right of market access by Chinese investors to Canada but not by Canadian investors to China; allow wider scope for investment screening by China than by Canada; omit a long-standing Canadian reservation for performance requirements that favour Aboriginal peoples; and dilute Canada’s established position on transparency in investor-state arbitration. These and other textual aspects of the China FIPPA are highlighted in comparison to other trade and investment treaties, especially those to which Canada is a party, that provide for investorstate arbitration. The China FIPPA is also examined in the current economic context of investment flows between Canada and China. The article responds partly to claims by Canadian trade officials that the China FIPPA is unremarkable because it simply continues Canada’s past foreign investment promotion and protection practice.

The settlement of the Alaska-Canada boundary is one of the more colourful episodes in Canadian-American relations. After 75 years of uncertainty, disagreement, and dispute over the actual position of the boundary line between the territory of Great Britain and of Russia, and later of the United States, a tribunal was established in 1903 to interpret the treaty between Great Britain and Russia, concluded in 1825, in which the boundaries had been defined. The tribunal in rendering its decision adopted neither the contention of the United States nor that of Britain, but drew a line that corresponded more closely with official Russian maps prepared shortly after the 1825 Treaty was concluded. However, on an issue seen at the time in Canada as critical, the tribunal found in favour of the United States, awarding it the island of Sitklan and Kannaghunut at the mouth of the Portland Channel. This gave rise to a storm of protest in Canada, anger being vented particularly at the British jurist Lord Alverstone, the president of the tribunal, who was suspected of selling out to the Americans.

Les États-Unis ont qualifié les attaques du 11 septembre 2001 ainsi que leur lutte contre le terrorisme de “guerre.” L’auteur analyse l’applicabilité et l’application du droit international humanitaire à ces événements. Il arrive à la conclusion que ce droit ne régit pas les attaques contre New York et Washington, mais la guerre en Afghanistan, indépendamment de la légitimité de celle-ci et des causes soutenues par les parties. En conséquence, tout au moins les membres des forces armées talibanes — et possiblement certains membres d’Al-Qaeda, qui sont tombés, en Afghanistan, au pouvoir des forces américaines, sont en principe et jusqu’à ce qu’une décision individuelle statuant le contraire soit rendue, des prisonniers de guerre protégés par la IIIe Convention de Genève. Les dispositions de celle-ci sont appropriées pour régir le traitement de ces personnes en partie détenues à Guantánamo Bay. Toutes les autres personnes arrêtées par les États-Unis et leurs alliés en Afghanistan sont des civils protégés par la IVe Convention de Genève. En tant que tels, elles ne peuvent pas être détenues à Guantánamo. Pour terminer, l’auteur revoit les différents arguments avancés ces derniers temps selon lesquels les Conventions de Genève ne sont pas adaptées à la “guerre contre le terrorisme.” Selon l’auteur, cette thèse n’est pas justiWée et il serait en tout état de cause impossible d’adopter de nouvelles règles mieux adaptées.