¹ U.N.G.A. A/PV. 1208, September 19, 1963, at 47.

² Background information in Pike, Frederick P., “Guatemala, the United States and Communism in the Americas,” (1955) 17 Review of Politics 233–862 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mecham, J.L., The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889–1960, at 445–453 (1961)Google Scholar; H.M.S.O., Report on Events Leading to and Arising Out of the Change of Regime in Guatemala, 1954 (London, 1954) ; Silvert, K.H., The Conflict Society: Reaction and Revolution in Latin America 113–141 (1961).Google Scholar

³ Passed under intense pressure — “we contributed our approval without enthusiasm, without joy and without feeling that we were contributing to the adoption of a constructive measure” — this Declaration was devised to provide a legal basis for initiating collective O.A.S. action against Guatemala. The Guatemalan Foreign Minister described it as “merely a pretext for intervening in our internal affairs”: Hadley, P.E., “The Caracas Conference,” (1954) 25 World Affairs Quarterly 127.Google Scholar

⁴ “The Mexican Congress passed a joint resolution censuring the action. Uruguayan schools closed down for a day of mourning and protest, and Americans stayed off the streets for a few nights.... The Chilean Chamber of Deputies sent a protest to the United States House of Representatives.” Silvert, supra note 2, at 136.

⁵ S.C.O.R. gth Year, Supp. April-June 1954, at 13 (S/3232). Article 34 of the U.N. Charter reads as follows:

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 35(1) reads as follows:

Any member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

Article 39 reads as follows :

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

⁶ S.C.O.R. 675th Meeting, June 20, 1954, at 15.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ The original draft was supported by Brazil, China, Colombia, Denmark, France, Lebanon, New Zealand, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.

⁹ S.C.O.R. 675th Meeting, June 20, 1954, at 32.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Artide 103 of the U.N. Charter reads as follows:

In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.

¹² Article 20 of the O.A.S. Charter reads as follows:

All international disputes that may arise between American States shall be submitted to the peaceful procedures set forth in this Charter, before being referred to the Security Council of the United Nations.

¹³ Article 24(1) of the U.N. Charter reads as follows:

In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

¹⁴ S.C.O.R. 676th Meeting, June 25, 1954, at 23–24.

¹⁵ Houston, John A., Latin America in the United Nations 112 (1956)Google Scholar (excellent description and appraisal).

¹⁶ L.B. Sohn concludes a magnificent analysis of these problems with the laconic remark that “The claim that in this case at least a hearing should have been granted to a small country which was in danger, overshadowed other constitutional considerations”: Sohn, L.B., “The Role of International Institutions As Conflict-Adjusting Agencies,” (1961) 28 U. Chicago L.R. 205, 240–241.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁷ S.C.O.R. Fifteenth Year, 874th Meeting, July 18, 1960; id., 875th Meeting, July 18, 1960; id., 876th Meeting, July 19, 1960.

^l8 This is one of the most interesting legal aspects of the entire Cuban episode and it is curious that so far the literature has ignored it. For brief discussion see Thomas, A.V.W. and Thomas, A.J., The Organization of American States (1963).Google Scholar

¹⁹ The argument does not appear to be valid. This was not an article 103 situation; the object of the draft resolution was not to have the Council decline to consider the problem but merely to have it adjourn it temporarily.

²⁰ 874th Meeting, supra note 17, at 2.

²¹ 876th Meeting, supra note 17, at 17.

²² 874th Meeting, supra note 17, at 28.

²³ Ibid., 34–35.

²⁴ Ibid., 35.

²⁵ 875th Meeting, supra note 17, at 7.

²⁶ 874th Meeting, supra note 17, at 38–39 (observations of the representative of Ecuador).

²⁷ But the potential impact of these and related sanctions was reduced when, on September 23, i960, the United States Department of Agriculture, with the concurrence of the State Department, reallotted part of Cuba’s sugar quota to the Dominican Republic: see (1960) 13 Hispanic American Report 612. And for a revealing description of the sugar lobby in the United States, see Cook, Fred J., “Their Men in Washington,” in The Nation, March 30, 1964, at 311, 316–320.Google Scholar This is an intriguing example of how a state, committed by a regional organization to impose sanctions, may be prevented from doing so by domestic political pressures.

²⁸ S.C.O.R. 893fd Meeting, September 8, 1960, at 4.

Article 41 of the U.N. Charter reads as follows:

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42 reads as follows:

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

²⁹ S.C.O.R. 893th Meeting, September 9, 1960, at 8.

³⁰ S.C.O.R. 895th Meeting, September 9, 1960, at 2.

³¹ The representatives of Argentina, Venezuela and Ceylon all stated that Security Council authorization was only needed when the use of armed forces was contemplated: S.C.O.R. 893rd Meeting, September 8, 1960, at 5, 6 (Argentina); at 13 (Venezuela); and S.C.O.R. 894th Meeting, September 9, 1960,at 3, 4 (Ceylon). The French representative very sensibly denied that the absolute competence of either the regional agency or the United Nations could be asserted categorically: each case had to be considered on its merits. He agreed with the U.K. representative in saying that acceptance of the Soviet resolution would be a recognition of the O.A.S. action as “enforcement action,” for which a definition was lacking: S.C.O.R. 893rd Meeting, September 8, 1960, at 15.

³² S.C.O.R. 895th Meeting, September 9, 1960, at 5. The resolution, sponsored by the U.S., Ecuador, and Argentina, was supported by Argentina, Ceylon, China, Ecuador, France, Italy, Tunisia, the U.K., and the U.S.A. Poland and the U.S.S.R. abstained.

³³ Background information in Macdonald, R.St.J., “The Organization of American States in Action,” (1964) 15 U. Toronto L.J. 359–430.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁴ S.C.O.R. 992nd Meeting 14, 1962, at 3.

³⁵ “What argument can be used against requesting such an opinion, if not the lack of faith in the legality of the Punta del Este agreements? If international decisions were taken in good faith, as they should be, this request by Cuba should be unanimously supported by all those at this table. I do not think that any state should be afraid of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice”: S.C.O.R. 992nd Meeting, March 14, 1962, at 26.

³⁶ S.C.O.R. 993rd Meeting, March 15, 1962, at 7.

³⁷ Delegates who thought that the Cuban submission had been settled by the Council’s disposition of the Dominican Case included: Dean of the U.K. (S.C.O.R., 991st Meeting, at 2); Diaz Casanueva of Chile (id., 4); Stevenson of the U.S. (S.C.O.R., 993rd Meeting, at 23–24) ; Berard of France (S.C.O.R., 995th Meeting, at 10); Boland of Ireland (S.C.O.R., 996th Meeting, at 12), and Sosa Rodriguez of Venezuela (S.C.O.R., 997th Meeting, March 22, 1962, at 6).

³⁸ S.C.O.R., 994th Meeting, at 8.

³⁹ Cf. discussion in Dept. State Bulletin, April 23, 1962, at 684–694. In reply to a Soviet charge that he had given no good reason for opposing Cuba’s request for an advisory opinion, Ambassador Stevenson said that no substantial legal issue had been presented; that the Council had already disposed of the essence of Cuba’s request, and that the Cuban complaint was politically, not legally motivated: S.C.O.R. 994th Meeting, March 16, 1962, at 7. The French and British representatives thought that the issue was only quasi-legal and could not be settled by an advisory opinion: S.C.O.R. 995th Meeting, March 20, 1962, at 3, 11. Ghana and the U.A.R. disagreed: S.C.O.R. 996th Meeting, at 7–9, 18.

⁴⁰ S/PV. 1022— unrevised. October 20, 1962.

⁴¹ 1024th Meeting, October 24, 1962. S/PV. 1024—unrevised.

⁴² Reprinted in Dept. State Bulletin, November 19, 1962, at 763. A slightly altered statement appears in Chayes, Abram, “Law and the Quarantine of Cuba,” (1963) 41 Foreign Affairs 550–558.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴³ The predominantly political nature of the problem can be seen by contrasting United States opinion on chapter 8 in relation to the Arab League in 1948, and to the O.A.S. in 1962. In 1948 the United States acknowledged that Arab intervention in Palestine was ultra vires the Arab League because of the absence of prior Security Council authorization: references and discussion in Higgins, Rosalyn, The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations 169 (1963).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Note the changed thinking of the late Mr. John Foster Dulles. In 1958 Mr. Dulles deprecated regional agreements because they tended to undermine the United Nations. But in 1953, as Secretary of State, he said that security “may have to be achieved primarily through regional arrangements which are authorized by the United Nations Charter, but which to some extent function outside the U.N.’s direct authority” : quoted in Wilcox, F.O. and Marcy, C.M., Proposals for Changes in the United Nations 148 (1955).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ For concise discussion, see Campbell, James S., “The Cuban Crisis and the U.N. Charter: An Analysis of the United States Position,” (1963) 16 Stanford L.R. 160–177.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁶ S/5509. January 10, 1964.

⁴⁷ Text of Statement by Foreign Minister Galileo Solis in the New York Times, Saturday, January 11, 1964, at 6, cols. 6, 7, 8.

⁴⁸ Background information in McCain, William D., The United States and the Republic of Panama (1937).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ 1986th Meeting, January 10, 1964. S/PV. 1086 — unrevised.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 86.

⁵¹ Compare Inis Claude, L. Jr., “The O.A.S., the U.N. and the United States,” (1964) 547 International Conciliation 1–68 Google Scholar (article 53 has been repealed) and Halderman, John W., “Regional Enforcement Measures and the United Nations,” (1963) 53 Georgetown L.J. 89–119 (article 53 is basic to the U.N. system).Google Scholar