The midwives of international law, Gentili, Grotius, Vitoria, Suarez, Pufendorf, and Wolff, found the principles of this law in the law of nature. This, in turn, was derived by some of them from the law of God and by others from the law of reason. But, as the law of nations grew and its content developed, its derivation was established, particularly with Vattel in the middle of the eighteenth century, from the will of states rather than from the law of nature. Today’s international lawyer simply inherits the principle of identification whereby international-law rules of general application are created by international custom. (This custom is produced by that kind of practice of states relating to a matter of international relations which is concordant and general and is accompanied by the conviction of states that it is obligatory under international law.) The application of this principle of identification, however, is not so simple because of the appearance of three new situations.

World peace, like war, has tended to become indivisible. Nonetheless, the formal organization of international peace and security continues to be anchored to the principle of division and imperfect co-ordination of responsibility between universal and regional instrumentalities. The problem of maintaining world peace would probably have been much less troublesome than it is now if the international system had either been hierarchically organized, or based upon a strictly federal foundation. Needless to say, the global system remains largely a semi-primitive political order characterized, as it is, by a decentralized structure of power configuration.

This comment revisits the debate on the reasons for compliance, or lack thereof, with the regulations and administrative rules that govern the current international trade regime. The research on which it is based is the first part of the five-year project on Cross-Cultural Dispute Resolution funded by the Major Collaborative Research Initiative program of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. It focuses on the cultural components of non-compliance based on analysis of the legislative internalization of World Trade Organization norms and case law in China, Canada, and Japan on the one hand and on individual perceptions of the international trade environment on the other. The main hypotheses are that the sharing of international practice rules does not necessarily indicate consensus on the normative order underlying those rules and that the behaviour of those who are involved in the interpretation and application of international rules is informed by (1) their perception of the purpose, content, and effect of nonlocal rules and their underlying norms; (2) those rules' and norms' complementarity with local rules and norms; and (3) the degree of legitimacy accorded by local communities to the processes of interpretation and application.

Les Récentes Déclarations du ministre de l’Education du Québec, M. Paul Gérin-Lajoie, à l’effet que le Québec envisage la possibilité de participer aux travaux de certaines institutions spécialisées, méritent une attention toute particulière. D’abord, puisqu’il s’agit là d’une question d’une portée politique et juridique considérable tant à l’échelle canadienne qu’au niveau international, on ne peut décidément pas la négliger ou la passer sous silence. En second lieu, cette question donne un sens nouveau aux discussions en cours au Canada depuis 1937 sur la signature et la mise en œuvre des traités internationaux et oblige ainsi les principaux participants à examiner un aspect jusqu’ici inédit de ce long et coutumier débat.

The United States notice of denunciation of the Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to International Carriage by Air, opened for signature at Warsaw on October 12, 1929, even though now withdrawn, marks the end of an era in the development of private international air law. The notice of denunciation was communicated to the Polish government, depositary of the Convention, on November 15, 1965, because, according to the United States of America, the present limit of liability — which amounts approximately to $8,300 U.S. — applicable in the case of death of, or injury to, a passenger in international carriage was considered to be no longer adequate to protect United States citizens of practically all economic levels who in ever-increasing numbers are making use of international air transport. On May 13, 1966, just two days before the denunciation was to take effect, the United States dramatically withdrew its notice after a series of eleventh-hour discussions and consultations culminating in an agreement by thirty-four airlines to accept a limit of liability of $75,000 U.S. per passenger and, with the exception of three American airlines, to accept also the absolute liability of the air carrier. The notice of denunciation of what has often been described as one of the most widely accepted conventions of its kind sent a wave of uneasiness through the world of international civil aviation. As a result of that notice, the Warsaw system came under searching examination and, in view of the agreement mentioned above, will, no doubt, be substantially modified when, in due course, a diplomatic conference is convened to amend the Convention.

The author traces the career of one of Canada’s leading international lawyers as a teacher of international law, as the founding editor and editor-in-chief of this Yearbook for thirty years, and as a scholar in the field of the international law of water resources. Bourne’s role in the development of the Helsinki Rules is recounted and hü fundamental difference with the work of the ILC over the competing principles of “equitable utilization” and “no appreciable harm” is analyzed.

One of the principal achievements of the United Nations is its work in codifying and developing international law. The International Law Commission, created in 1949, a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, is the chief agency of the United Nations for achieving these tasks. The Chairman of the Commission at its sixteenth session, Professor Roberto Ago of Italy, stated in the Commission on July 16, 1964, that if the codification work which was now taking place in that body could be completed and accepted by states, progress would have been made without precedent since the time of Grotius.

So well-established has the International Law Commission become on the international scene that it is almost surprising to recall that the existence of this body rests, not on any specific wording of the United Nations Charter calling for the creation of such a body of experts, but on the general phraseology of Article 13 of the Charter which provides that “the General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of: (a) promoting … and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification.” In the space of seventeen years the International Law Commission has achieved widespread recognition for the high quality of its work; it would be no exaggeration to say that it has come to be regarded as rivaling in importance the work of the International Court of Justice. As “the principal judicial organ of the United Nations,” as successor to the Permanent Court of Justice — a new feature of international institutions in the modern era — and as the highest international judicial tribunal, the International Court of Justice is regarded, in the general scheme of the Charter, as an exceptionally prestigious body.

Recent Allegations Concerning a “massacre” of Vietnamese by United States forces in the Song My area of Vietnam, together with disclosures of a similar event during British antiguerrilla operations in Malaya, have drawn renewed attention to the problem of the behaviour of troops in war, and the extent to which they may be expected to obey the laws of war. This is not the place to examine the philosophical aspect of whether there are or can be any rules of war, particularly if one of the belligerents is waging an “illegal” or “criminal” war, or is not recognized as a state so that the operations do not technically qualify as a war in the traditional sense. The Kawasaki case demonstrates that “war” may exist, even though neither the parties nor third states recognize the operations as such. It is also clear, at least since the Geneva Conventions of 1949, that laws regarding the humane treatment of wounded and sick, prisoners of war and civilians in occupied territory operate even in armed conflicts not of an international character, as well as those which only one party regards as a war, or if only one is party to the Conventions, or if territory is occupied and no resistance met.

With 2018 marking the twentieth anniversary of Canada’s Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, an opportunity presents itself to take stock of both developments and challenges for the legislative scheme. As demonstrated by a review of the parliamentary record, the desire to enact legislation to criminalize the offering of an inducement to a foreign public official to secure a business advantage was decidedly international in nature, with Canada aiming to bolster the efforts of others to create a level playing field for companies operating abroad. Yet, despite good intentions, as well as amendments to strengthen the Act in 2013 and the passage of additional transparency obligations in 2014, Canada’s legislative scheme has not kept pace with the international and multi-jurisdictional realities of the problem to be addressed. Renewed interest needs to be paid to the demand side of a foreign bribery transaction. In addition, the confiscation or forfeiture of any ill-gotten gains must become a priority, with the touting of success in securing the voluntary payment of sizeable fines failing to provide for a sufficient accounting for the wrongs done, particularly if the victims of corruption, even as a class that needs clearer definition, are to be made a true concern of the Act. The challenges posed by matters of immunity and the need to improve matters of multi-jurisdictional cooperation also need further attention.

American trade policy under the Trump administration can be summed up in one expression, “America First,” which the US president himself has repeated many times. Driven by a rejection of multilateralism, the United States has adopted numerous measures designed to maintain or stimulate domestic industry or to tighten economic policies both domestically and towards foreign trading partners. Reflecting isolationist and nationalist economic theories, these measures are the anchor for a return of economic frontiers to the United States. Yet the United States is at the heart of globalization and cannot completely isolate itself without risking an economic meltdown. This is all the more true since it has been the driving force behind the creation of the multilateral trading system since the end of the Second World War. This change of economic vision by one of the world’s greatest powers can only be a turning point in the recent history of international economic relations. As such, one may wonder whether America First and the set of measures adopted in its name also foreshadow a phase of retreat for international trade law or whether, on the contrary, they are an opportunity for reform of an area of the law that has been struggling to evolve for several decades.

A recent and prominent American appeals court case has revived a controversial international law question: can a state compel a person on its territory to obtain and produce material that the person owns or controls, but which is stored on the territory of a foreign state? The case involved, United States v Microsoft, features electronic data stored offshore that was sought in the context of a criminal prosecution. It highlights the current legal complexity surrounding the cross-border gathering of electronic evidence, which has produced friction and divergent state practice. The author here contends that the problems involved are best understood — and potentially resolved — via an examination through the lens of the public international law of jurisdiction and, specifically, the prohibition of extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction. An analysis of state practice reveals that unsanctioned cross-border evidence gathering is viewed by states as an intrusion on territorial sovereignty, engaging the prohibition, and that this view properly extends to the kind of state activity dealt with in the Microsoft Ireland case.

The 1960’s have been designated by the General Assembly as “United Nations Development Decade.” The main economic objective for the decade is the creation of conditions in which the national incomes of the developing countries will increase by 5 per cent yearly by 1970, and will continue to increase at the same rate thereafter. The means by which this objective is being pursued are many; among others are national planning, technical training and capital assistance, by both multilateral and bilateral agencies. Successful as these public sector assistance schemes have been, however, it is now recognized that an increasingly large share of responsibility must be borne by the private sector of the economies of the developed nations by means of overseas investment and international trade.

The philosophy postulating the protection of human rights is based on values that are fundamental to western civilization. These values found expression in Jerusalem and in Athens. The divine command to love one’s neighbour as one loves oneself and to obey God’s laws is the basis of the sovereign’s duty to respect these “unwritten and immutable divine laws” of which Sophocles speaks. It took many centuries before these rights, “droits naturels et imprescriptible de l’homme,” were recognized by the state to the extent that their breach was supposed to entitle the citizens to revolt.

NATO’s seventy-nine-day campaign of air strikes againstthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has sparked awide-ranging debate as to the legality of suchmilitary action. NATO has consistently justified itsintervention on humanitarian grounds, thus clearlyresorting to the controversial doctrine of“humanitarian intervention.” The author argues thatwhile a conventional analysis of the purported rightof unilateral humanitarian intervention underinternational law and of NATO’s acts on the Kosovoissue might lead some individuals to the conclusionthat such acts were illegal (or, at best, of dubiouslegality), this conclusion fails to take intoaccount the fact that state actors, particularlywhen acting in concert, tend to influence thecontent of international law itself. The authorsuggests that the true significance of NATO’sforcible intervention in the Kosovo crisis is thatit sets a clear precedent that may well crystallizean emergent norm of customary international lawpermitting forcible intervention by one or morestates against another on humanitarian grounds, evenwithout prior UN Security Council authorization.While such a norm may acquire universal status, itis also possible, in light of the regionalconcentration of the primary actors involved as wellas of important objections from some quarters as toits legality, that it will acquire (at least in thefirst instance) a local or regional character,perhaps confined to the Euro-Atlantic area.